M. Hoffman, 'Critica! Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', Millennium. Journal of International Studies (Vol. 16,No.2, Summer 1987), p. 244.
2.
M. Hoffman, 'Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1988), p. 91; N.J. Rengger, 'Going Critical? Response to Hoffman ', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1988 ), p. 81.
3.
This is the main theme of Y. Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-positivist Era', International Studies Quarterly (forthcoming. September 1989); see F. Halliday, 'A Crisis of International Relations?' International Relations (Vol. 8, No. 4, Nov. 1985); and S. Smith, 'The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1987).
4.
First, the Hoffman-Rengger exchange mentioned above in reference 2; and second the R. Roy -R.B.J. Walker-R.K. Ashiey, 'Dialogue: Towards a Critical Social Theory of International Politics', published as a special feature in Alternatives (Vol. 13, 1988), pp. 77-102. With minor exceptions this essay refers only to the Millennium exchange.
5.
M. Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', op. cit., p. 244.
6.
The key step here will be an attempt to shift the terrain of the discussion away from its preoccupation with the broader debates over 'radical interpretivism' and the nature of modernity - which are Rengger's mains concerns but which, I argue, are only indirectly related to the 'next stage' projection - to questions concerning the direction of international relations disciplinary development which are the primary interest of this essay,
7.
A. Linklater , 'Realism, Marxism and Critical International Theory' Review of International Studies (Vol. 12, No., 1986), p. 309. Emphasis added.
8.
Ibid, p. 303.
9.
Ibid, p. 301.
10.
M., Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', op. cit., p. 244.
11.
Ibid. Mark Hoffman's disclaimer notwithstanding, the 'next-stage-systemic-reconstruction' response must, in my view, presume at least a mild version of some new foundationalist methodological monism. It seems likely that Hoffman unwittingly reflects here Giddens's own vacillation between monistic and pluralistic epistemic positions. G. McLennan indeed charges that Giddens's work suffers from a lack of 'epistemological security' because it displays 'equal attraction for contrary epistemic metaphors'. See G. McLennan, 'Structuration Theory and Post-empiricist Philosophy: A Rejoinder', Theory, Culture and Society (Vol. 5, 1988), p. 104
12.
Rengger, op. cit., p. 85.
13.
S. Lelas differentiates among four different attempts to make intelligible the essence and mechanisms of scientific change. These views accent respectively 'social and external', 'social and internal', 'intellectual and internal' and 'intellectual and external' determinants of such dynamics. (pp. 67-9). For clarity's sake, it is possible to reduce these controversies to a polarised internal/external debate. The internal position accepts Camap's view that the proper subject matter of such studies is scientific statements abstracted 'from the persons asserting the statements and from the psychological and sociological conditions of such assertions'. By contrast, the subject matter of the external position includes the scientists and their historical and sociological milieu. The external position seeks to demonstrate, in fact, connections between the contenl of any scientific field and its organisational structure and functioning. See S. Lelas, 'Topology of Internal and External Factors in the Development of Knowledge' Ratio (Vol. 27, No. 1, 1985), pp.67-82.
14.
Rengger, op. cit., p. 86.
15.
See, O. Amsterdamska , Schools of Thought (Boston, MA: D. Reidel, 1987).
16.
See articles by J. Farganis, M. Hoover, H. Greisman, and T. DeNora in R.C. Monk (ed.), Structures of Knowing (New York; University Press of America, 1986), pp. 219-322. Edward Tiryakian's 'school approach' - which employs the insights of sociology of knowledge to situate scientific perspectives in their socio-political context- provides the conceptual framework for this analysis. The key insight is that the development of social theory is better understood as a sociological succession of dominant schools, paradigms or research programmes than through the exploration of formal scientific logic and would-be intellectual virtues.
17.
H. Greisman, 'The Paradigm that Failed' in ibid, p. 286.
18.
G.A. Almond, 'Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science' in PS. Political Science and Politics (Vol. 21, No. 4, 1988), pp. 828-40,
19.
J.N. Rosenau , 'Learning and Living World Politics: Involvement through Detachment', International Studies Notes (Vol. 12, No. 2, 1986), p.26.
20.
Hoffman, 'Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory', op. cit., p. 94.
21.
J.D. Moon, 'Political Ethics and Critical Theory' in D.R. Sabia, Jr. and J. Wallulis (eds.), Changing Social Science (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1983), p. 176.
22.
J.N. Rosenau , 'CFP and IPE: The Anomaly of Mutual Boredom ', International Interactions (Vol. 14, No. 1, 1988), pp. 17-26.
23.
A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 238.
24.
Ibid, p. 240. See, however, note 11 in this essay.
25.
See Lapid, op. cit
26.
Being, furthermore, still in the process of completing its recent escape from the positivistic straitjacket, international relations has no reason to push so early for a new one even if it boasts a promising 'critical' label.
27.
Needless to say, to raise such questions is different from implying that the long standing - and in all probability permanent - dialectical tension which exists in science between the programmes of theoretical pluralism and theoretical monism needs now to be abolished in favour of the former. Some form of theoretical pluralism may result in mental paralysis and there are undoubtedly very good reasons to be less than happy with the current pattern of fragmentation in political science and international relations. My point is simply that neither pluralism nor monism can be said to enjoy a privileged and unassailable site in contemporary discourse on social science. 'For well nigh three centuries', notes Zygmunt Bauman, 'relativism was the malin genie of European philosophy and anybody suspect of not fortifying his doctrine against it tightly enough was ... forced to defend himself against the charges the horrifying nature of which no one put in doubt. Now the tables have been turned - and the seekers of universal standards are asked to prove the criminal nature of relativism; it is they who are pressed to ... clear themselves of charges of dogmatism, ethnocentrism, intellectual imperialism or whatever else their work may seem to imply when gazed upon from the relativist positions'. Z. Bauman, 'Is there a Postmodern Sociology?', Theory, Culture and Society, (Vol. 5, 1988), p.228. Theoretical pluralism can be still convincingly portrayed, of course, as an obstacle to scientific growth. But now, so can 'paradigmatic singularism' (i.e., 'the refusal to accept pluralism as part of our ontological and epistemological condition'). See S. Lindholm. 'The Problem of Singularism', Annals of Theoretical Psychology (Vol. 3, 1985), p. 327. If nothing else, the debate over 'post-modernism' has raised the need for a balanced rethinking of the implications of theoretical diversity in social science.
28.
J. Farr, 'The States of the Discipline' Polity (Vol. No., 1988), p. 729.
29.
T. Ball (ed.), Idioms of Inquiry (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 4. If valid - as I believe it is - this observation should apply not only to Critical Theory but also to 'scientific realism' - or any other version of epistemological monism which might try to take advantage of deeply rooted international relations' foundationalist reflexes. See, A.E. Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization (Vol. 41, No. 3, 1987), pp. 335-70.
30.
Moon, op. cit., p. 198.
31.
Ball, op.cit., p. 4.
32.
Ibid.
33.
Moon, op. cit.
34.
See, for instance, Kal Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, ( Winchester, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1985); M. Banks , 'Where We Are Now' Review of International Studies (Vol. II, No. 3, 1985), pp. 215-33.
35.
This order of priorities is, of course, highly consonant with the implications of 'radical interpretivism' as portrayed by Rengger. Bauman indeed points out that social scientists turned interpreters are fascinated, above all, by both the problems and the pay-offs of rendering messages mutually communicable. See Bauman, op. cit., pp. 229-30.
36.
R.J. Antonio , 'The Origin, Development, and Contemporary Status of Critical Theory', The Sociological Quarterly (Vol 24, No. 3, Summer 1983 ), p. 326.
37.
See, for instance, K. Nielsen, 'Searching for an Emancipatory Perspective: Wide Reflective Equilibrium and the Hermeneutical Circle' in E. Simpson (ed.), Anti-Foundationalism and Practical Reasoning (Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1987), pp. 155-60. See also B. Fay, Critical Social Science (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987).
38.
Hoffman, Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate, op. cit. , p. 240.
39.
See, in particular, Walker's contribution to this exchange.