Regimes,Interpretation and the 'Science' of Politics: A Reappraisal

See, for example, Max Weher's controversy with Roscher and Knies in Max Weher, Writings on the Methodology of the Social Sciences, eds. Ed Shils and Henry Finch (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1949). Also see Theodore Adorno , The Positivivt Dispute in German Ideology, eds. Glyn Adey and Dave Frisby ( London: Heineman, 1976), and Thomas McCarthy and Fred Dallmayr (eds.), Understanding and Social Inquiry (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press , 1977).

Richard Ashley , 'The Poverty of Neo-Realism', International Organization (Vol. 38, No. 4, Spring 1984), pp. 225-86.

Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggic , 'International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State', International Organization (Vol. 40, No. 4, Autumn 1986), pp. 753-76.

See Karl Popper , The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper and Row, 1968) and Carl Hempel , 'Scientific Explanation' in Carl Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965), chapter 4.

See, for example, Imre Lakatos's arguments against 'naive falsificationism ' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

For a discussion of the problem of universal laws in the social sciences see Robert Brown , The Nature of Social Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

See Popper's discussion in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, op. cit., chapter 8, and his insistence on a 'methodological rule' that 'reproducible' deviations from a probability estimate leads us to the conclusion that the probability estimate has been falsified.

Ibid.

This is Kuhn's famous distinction between 'normal science' and times of crisis in which paradigmatic shifts occur. See Thomas Kuhn , The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press , 1970),

Karl Popper , Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), especially chapters 3 and 4.

On this point, see my argument in 'Errors Have Their Advantage ', International Organization (Vol. 38, No. 2, 1984), pp. 305-30.

For a discussion of the difference between regulative and constitutive rules see John Rawls , 'Two Models of Rules', Philosophical Review (Vol. 64, No. 1, 1955), pp. 3-32. See also the discussion in the third section of this article.

Speech act theory investigates the conditions under which certain utterances are not merely referential or descriptive of an action but represent actions as such. Thus when I say I am washing I am describing an action but when I utter 'I promise' I am doing the same thing by saying. Speech act theory distinguishes therefore the locutionary dimension of an utterance (saying something) from the illocutionary dimension (doing something by saying something) and from the perlocutionary dimension (affecting someone through the utterance).

The idea that science concerned with the objective world had to forego metaphysical stances and be concerned solely with 'positive' facts was the original position of 'positivism' as espoused by Comte. Bentham - quite different from Comte - was an extreme empiricist and is said to have left numerous books of notes in which he had recorded 'facts' which are — needless to say - useless for any 'science'.

Logical Positivism neither shares with Bentham the inductivist bias nor the idea that 'facts' are theory-independent. To that extent, the term 'positivism' as used in much of the contemporary epistemological discussion is ambiguous, as it is used for empiricism and logical positivism.

On the importance of an unproblematic background knowledge, see Karl Popper , Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), chapter 10.

On the importance of a refutability criterion (rather than a verification criterion) and the 'corroborated' (rather than verified) nature of our scientific knowledge, see Karl Popper. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, op. cit

James Coleman , Introduction to Mathematical Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1964).

On this point, that modern science has largely dispensed with the notion of cause in favour of functional relationships, see Ernst Cassirer. Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity, trans. Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins (New York: Dover, 1953).

For a critique of operationalism, see Karl Popper , Conjectures and Refutations, op. cit, chapter 1.

Two operations are required in order to successfully 'measure': first, comparison imposes an order restriction on the assignment of numbers so that relations such as 'larger than' and 'equal to' satisfy the condition of the same relations among real numbers. Second, the combination operation transforms the property which orders the objects into one which makes the assignment of a quantity or metric, measure possible.

James Coleman, op. cit., p. 63.

Max Weber , Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, trans. H.P. Secher, chapter 1, section 10, and Max Weber , Basic Concepts in Sociology (Secaucus: Citadel Press , 1962), p. 49.

Ibid., p. 39.

Ibid., p. 56.

On finalistic explanation schemes, see two seminal works: Donald Davidson , 'Actions, Reasons and Causes', Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 60, No. 23, 1963), pp. 685-700, and G. Henrik von Wright , Explanation and Understanding (London: Roulledge and Kegan Paul , 1971).

A special case could naturally be that this person never attains what he intends; thus a 'causal' psychological explanation might be required if certain unconscious factors defeat the person's conscious purposes.

John R. Searle, Speech Acts : An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). p. 51.

Ibid., p. 27.

This remark refers to the nineteenth century legal philosopher and not to Austin. the language philosopher.

H.L.A. Hart , The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), chapters 1 and 2.

Hans Kelsen , General Theory of Law and the State, trans. Andreas Wedberg ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945).

John R. Searle , op. cit. p. 35.

William D. Coplin , 'International Law and Assumptions About the State System'. World Politics (Vol. 17, No. 1, Oct. 1964), pp. 615-35.

Ibid., p. 52.

Ibid., p. 46.

K.N. Waltz , Theory of Internatirmal Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), chapter 5.

Ibid., pp. 76-7 and chapter 9.

For a non-technical discussion of the importance of pragmatic factors in communication, see Michael Stubbs , Discourse Analysis ( Chicago. IL: University of Chicago Press. 1983). especially p. 97.

Ibid., pp. 97-8.

For a short discussion of the various conceptions of 'truth', see Waldemar Schreckenberger , Uber den Zugang der modernen Logik zur Rechtsdogmatik', in Ottmar Ballweg and Thomas-Michael Seibert (eds.), Rhetorische Rechtstheorie ( Freiburg: Alber, 1982), pp. 151-80.

Karl Otto Apel , 'The A-Priori of Communication and the Foundation of the Humanities', in Thomas McCarthy and Fred Dallmayr (eds.). Underslanding and Social Inquiry, op. cit, pp. 292-315; Thomas Kuhn , 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 1-24.

See Thomas Kuhn's argument in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. op. cit.

R.M. Hare , The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1974), p. 18.

See, for example, Niklas Luhmann. Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), chapters 2-4, 10 and 12. Another possibility in dealing with this problem of validity is to treat normative statements similar to assertions as ethical descriptivism does. On this problem, see Ulrich Klug , Juristische Logik , Third Edition (Berlin: Springer. 1966) and R. Schreiber , Die Geltung von Rechtsnormen (Berlin: Springer . 1966).

See Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie. op. cit

Thomas Franck , The Structure of Impartiality ( New York: Macmillan, 1968). chapter 1.

For a systematic treatment of the logic of topical orderings and the function of topoi, see Aristotle, Topica trans. E.S. Forster (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press , 1906). For a modern treatise on the same subject and an analysis of argumentative structures see Chaim Perelman , La Nouvelle Rhetorique: Traité de l'Argumentation (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958) and Chaim Perlman. logique Juridique (Paris: Dallor , 1976).