European Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative

The studies on ballistic missile defence and Europe relied upon in this paper include: Lawrence Freedman , 'Europe and the ABM Revival ', in Ian Bellany and Coit Blacker (eds.), Antiballistic Missile Defence in the 1980s (London: Frank Cass, 1983), pp. 73-85; relevant chapters in Ashton Carter and David Schwartz (eds.), 'Ballistic Missile Defense' (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984); David Yost , 'European Anxieties About Ballistic Missile Defense', The Washington Quarterly (Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 1984), pp. 112-29; Arnold Kanter , 'Thinking About the Strategic Defense Initiative: An Alliance Perspective', International Affairs (Vol. 61, No.3, Summer 1985), pp. 449-64; relevant papers in New Technology and Western Security (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 199, 1985); Pierre Lellouche , 'SDI and the Atlantic Alliance', SAIS Review (Vol. 5, No. 2 Summer-Fall 1985), pp. 67-80; and Nanette Brown , The Strategic Defense Initiative and Western Security, a RAND Corporation conference report R-3366-FF ( Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1986). For anti-SDI positions in Europe, the END Journal (London: European Nuclear Disarmament, bimonthly) is a useful source outside the political establishment; also, two conferences in London on the SDI hosted by the Council for a Livable World/Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (October 1985), and by the Greater London Council/European Proliferation Information Centre (February 1986).

See Union of Concerned Scientists , The Fallacy of Star Wars (New York: Vintage Books, 1984); also E. P. Thompson (ed.), Star Wars (London : Penguin, 1985).

For a powerful statement along these lines see George Ball , 'The War For Star Wars', New York Review of Books, 11 April 1985; also Julie Dahlitz , `The Option of Star Wars: Meaning and Consequences', Bulletin of Peace Proposals (Vol. 16, No. 2, February 1985), pP. 99-104.

See, for instance, the article by the US Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council: David Abshire , 'SDI: The Path to a More Mature Deterrent ', NATO Review (Vol. 32, No. 2, April 1985), pp- 8-16.

See Fred Iklé , 'Nuclear Strategy: Can There be a Happy Ending? ', Foreign Affairs (Vol. 63, No. 4, Spring 1985). pp. 810-26; also David Yost , op. cit, p. 28. OnAdministration views of Soviet policy see US Department of State/Department of Defense Report, Soviet Strategic Defense Programs ( United States Information Service, October 1985); and ' Strategic Defense and Space Operations', Chapter 3 in Soviet Military Power 1986 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986).

See US State Department, Factsheet on the Strategic Defense Iniliative (US Information Service, June 1985 ).

On the defence transition see Paul Nitze , special adviser to the US President on Arms Control, Strategic Defense and Arms Control, address to the US National Academy of Sciences, April 1985 (United States Information Service, 29 April 1985). For the underlying theory see the discussion by Colin Gray and Keith Payne , 'Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition', ForeignAffair.s (Vol. 62, No. 4, Spring 1984 ), pp. 820-42.

These criteria are associated with Paul Nitze in particular. See his Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture, The Objectives of Arms Control ( London: International Institute for Strategic Studies , 28 March 1985), original text.

On the vulnerability of the American nuclear infrastructure see Bruce Blair , Strategic Command and Control- Redefining the Nuclear Threat ( Washington, DC: Brookings Institution , 1985).

On the character of the nuclear military infrastructures, see William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse , Nuclear Baltlefield: Global Links in the Arms Race (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985).

See McGeorge Bundy et at., 'The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control', Foreign Affairs (Vol. 63, No. 2, Winter 1984-85), pp. 1099-1112.

See Paul Nitze , 'Strategic Defenses and Arms Control' op. cit

Nitze states:... Non-nuclear defenses pursued by the SDI would provide a critical hedge against cheating or clandestine deployments of nuclear weapons systems. Frankly, I do not believe that either side would have the necessary confidence to give up its nuclear arms without such a hedge....' Ibid., p. 4. Thus, the SDI is being justified as a disarmament confidence-building measure. On the idea of a 'self-policing arms control agreement' through ballistic missile defence see Robert Kuppermann and Harvey Smith , 'The Pros and Cons ofABM', The Washington Quarterly (Vol. 4, No.4, Autumn 1981), p. 76.

For instance, in their critique of US nuclear policy, two analysts note that one of the merits of opting for land-based missiles in the future, despite the costly exertions necessary to maintain their credibility is that the United States avoids the political cost that might be incurred by appearing to have let the Soviets 'force the US out of the ICBM business...'. From Albert Camesale and Charles Glaser , 'ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures are Worse Than the Disease', International Security (Vol, 7, No. 1. Summer 1982), p. 84. It is legitimate to ask what happens if the USSR adopts the same logic about its own land-based ICBMs.

On the impact of technology on strategic forces and arms control verification, see William Kincade , 'Over the Technological Horizon', Daedalus (Vol. 110, No. 1, Winter 1981), pp. 105-28. See also Bruce Berkowitz , 'Technological Progress, Strategic Weapons and American Nuclear Policy'. Orbis (Vol. 29, No. 2, Summer 1985), pp. 241-58. On the problems of sea-launched cruise missiles and verification see, SIPRI Yearbook 1984 (London : Taylorand Francis, 1984), esp. pp. 34-5 and pp, 46-7.

The American policy think-tank, the Council on Economic Priorities, notes that the main defence corporations in contention for strategic defence research contracts are also the main nuclear weapons system manufacturers of the present, implying that the corporate constituency for nuclear weapons and forSDI is, basically, the same: see Council on Economic Priorities , The Strategic Defense Initiative: Costs, Contractors and Consequences (Washington, DC: Council on Economic Priorities, 1985), p. 24.

For an analysis of how the pace of US and Soviet BMD research programmes could interact, and the diplomatic repercussions, see US Office of Technology Assessment , Strategic Defenses: Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), esp. pp. 9-37.

See Arnold Kanter , op. cit, p. 457.

For a discussion of this see Nanette Brown. op. cit, pp. 14-21. Most specialist discussions seem to be premised on the plausibility of NATO nuclear doctrine of escalation control, and assess the implications of the SDI on that basis. But, see Paul Bracken , The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983), which seriously challenges this premise.

See John Roper , The British Nuclear Deterrent and New Developments in Ballistic Missile Defence ', The World Today (Vol. 41, No. 5, May 1985), pp. 92-5.

A reassessment of the goals and methods of arms control has long been underway, but it tends to focus on bilateral issues - e.g., joint risk-reduction measures - as the primary concern. See Graham Allison , Albert Camesale and Joseph Nye , Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda,for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York : Norton. 1985). For concise overview of the issues see Phil Williams , 'What Future for Arms Control? ', ADIU Report (Vol. 7, No. 1. January 1985), pp. 1-5.