I. Read 'Nowhere', ie.. Utopia, spelt more or less backwards.
2.
For some of the more obvious examples, see my 'Toward Rediscovcring Political Realism' II Politico. (anno Vol. 47, No. 31982). pp. 499-537.
3.
On this point, see R.N. Berki.On Political Realism ( London: J.M. Dent & Sons. 1981 ), especially Chapter 2. My difficulties with Berki's understanding of political realism are, first, that the author's ferocious Hegelian vocabulary is somewhat difficult to follow and. second, that it is unclear, as it is in Hegel, how Berki could find a place for a conception of morality which is not public morality. Nonetheless. Chapter 2 brilliantly brings out the tension between classical and modern political realism.
4.
Machiavelli, The Prince . John Plamenatz (ed,) ( Glasgow: Collins. 1965). p. 100.
5.
Isaiah Berlin, 'The Originality of Machiavelli'. in Isaiah Berlin. Against the Current (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1981), p. 45.
6.
For this observation, I am indebted to David Wiggins.Truth. Invention and the Meaning of Life. The Proceedings of the British Academy (Vol. 62. 1976). pp. 331-378.
7.
See Stephen G. Salkever, ' "Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values: Is. Ought. and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science', American Political Science Review (Vol. 74. No. 1, 1980), pp. 70-77.
8.
David Hume.A Treatise of Human NatureL.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1946), Bk. 111. Section I. Part i. Hume's spelling has been modernised.
9.
Max Weber.The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Edward A. Shits and Henry A. Finch (eds.) (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press . 1949). pp. 11-12.
10.
op. cit.. p. 472.
11.
I I. Sec D.C. Yalden. Thomson. 'Hume's View of ''Is-Ought" '. Philosophy (Vol. 53, 1978 ), pp. 89-93.
12.
David Hume, op. cit., Book III, Section II, p. 3.3.
13.
See Alasdair MacIntyre. 'Hume on "Is" and "Ought" '. in W.D. Hudson (ed.). The Is-Ought Question (London: Macmillan, 1909). pp. 35-50. See also Alan Gewirth. 'On Deriving a Morally Significant "Ought" '. Philosophy (Vol. 54, 1979), pp. 231-232 and P.T. Geach, 'Moral Autonomy Still Refuted'. Philosophy (Vol. 57. 1982), pp. 127-129.
14.
See Alasdair MacIntyre. op. cit.
15.
For a persuasive negative answer see Arthur Prior.Papers in Logic and Ethics (London: Duckworth. 1976). p. 95.
16.
On the marvellous expression 'the absolute conception of the world' see Bernard Williams .Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1978), pp. 65-67.
17.
Cf., David Miller , Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press . 1981), pp. 107 -108.
18.
See David Fate Norton.David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist. Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), Chapter 3.
19.
Max Weber .Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glencoe: Free Press. 1964) p. 115.
20.
See Philip Mercer, Sympathy and Ethics (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1972). Also Poll S. Ardal.Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University Press, 1966).
21.
David Wiggins, op. cit, p. 339.
22.
Ibid., p. 338.
23.
Ibid. p. 357.
24.
Hans Morgenthau.Politics Among Nations5th, cd. ( New York: Alfred Knopf1973), P, 11: italics added.
25.
For recent examples of descried ontologies' see Ralph Pettman, Biopolitics and International Values (New York: Pergamon Press. 1981), esp. Chapter I and also John A. Vasquez.The Power of Power Politics: . A Critique ( London: Frances Pinter. 1983). Chapter 3.
26.
Reinhold Niebuhr.Children of Light and Children of Darkness (London : Wisbet. 1945). p, 21.
27.
Hans Morgenthau. 'The Moral Dilemma of Political Action', in Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1950). pp. 246-247.
28.
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980).
29.
Ibid p. 8.
30.
Roger Hilsman.To Move a Nation (Garden City: Doubleday. 1967). p. 228.
31.
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Part One of The Metaphysics of Morals translated by John Ladd (Indianopolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1965). p. 24.
32.
Michael Walzer, op. cit p- 269.
33.
Ibid. p. 272.
34.
See, in particular. Albert Wohlstetter. 'The Delicate Balance of Terror'. Foreign Affairs (Vol. 37. No.2. January 1959), pp. 211-234,
35.
See Bernard Williams. 'Practical Necessity', in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp, 124-131.
36.
Nieomuchean Ethics, 1137 b 17.
37.
Bernard Williams . 'Conflict of Values', in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. op. cit.. p. 72.
38.
Sir Isaiah Berlin .Four Essays on Liberty ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, (969). p.11.
39.
Bernard Williams . 'Conflict of Values', op. cit., p. 72.
40.
Adrienne Koch and William Peden. (eds.) The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Modern Library. 1944). p. xx.xvi, cf. pp. 334-338 and 571-572.
41.
For this genre of objection, see Charles Beitz, 'Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics'. International Organization (Vol. 33, No. 3. 1979). p. 420.
42.
Charles R. Beitz , Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979), P. 58.
43.
For a good example of just how far Positivist-Empiricists can go in the direction of abstraction, see Harold K. Jacobson. 'The Global System and the Realization of Human Dignity'. International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 26, No. 3, September 1982). pp.315-332. A particularly revealing sentence is this one: No matter what their practices, governments. throughout the world have accepted the norms embodied in the many international declarations and conventions that have heen adopted by international institutions as a legitimate definition or the conditions of human dignity and justice', p. 322. my emphasis. Evidently, the 'practice' of states and governments can never constitute a refutation of their own moral claims. So if. say. the Soviet Union claims to adhere to norms of democracy in its constitution, their practices could in no way be used to refute such claims! This thought comes very close to a 'right you are if you say you are' understanding of ethical judgement and is, as such, quite obviously incoherent.
44.
Support for a 'reconstructed* historical materialism is to he found in (i.A. Cohen.Karl Marx's Theory of History (Oxford : Press. 1978), especially Chapters 6 and 7. An excellent recent critique is to be found in Ted Honderich, 'Against Teleological Historical Materialism', Inquiry (No. 25. 1982). pp. 451-469.
45.
Bernard Williams, op. cit, p. 75.
46.
Winston S. Churchill , The Second World War. 6 Vols., Vol. IV, 'The Hinge of Fate' (London: Cassel & CO.. 1950)
47.
Ibid. p. 448
48.
Such a conception of mind is deeply embedded in empirieisl approaches to international politics and goes a long way towards accounting for the empirieist's attachment to a familiar kind of methodological solipsism. In this, see Hilary Putnam, 'The Meaning of "Meaning" '. in Mind Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers . Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 215-171.
49.
Phillippa Foot , 'Moral Realism and Moral Dilemmas'. The Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 80, No. 7, July 1983), pp. 395-396.
50.
Such a vocabulary is brilliantly described by Phillippa Fool in her 'Virtues and Vices', in Virities and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Phiosophy op. cit, pp. 1-18. See also John McDowell "Virtue and Reason', The Monist (Vol. 62. No. 3, July 1979). pp. 331-350.
51.
Raymond Aron, le developement de la societe industrielle et la stratification sociale (Paris: Plon, 1956), p. 10.
52.
Hans Morgenthau, op. cit. p. 5.
53.
Sir Herbert Butterfield. writing in The New York Times. 3 January 1973. remarked that each of the US and USSR 'may overlook the fact that it can make its own security complete only by destroying the security ofthe other altogether', p. 34.
