The Malvinas Conflict: Some Elements for an Analysis of the Argentine Military Regime's Decision-Making Process,1976-82

An examination of some of these internal and external policy-making factors form part of a work by the author published in " Estudios Internationales (No. 60. October-December 1982), University of Chile. The effects on the possible political evolution of Argentina in the middle term and the impact of the conflict on the armed forces of Latin America are the subjects of an article by the author in Foro International (No. 1, 1983). Colegio de Mexico.

The conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina covers not just the Malvinas Islands but also the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, For reasons of brevity, the term 'Malvinas' will be used in the text on most occasions.

The details of the process and the Malvinas conflict (fundamentally, the aspects of the war itself and the international negotiations) can be found in Latin American Newsletters, Malvinas. La Historia Oficial de la Guerra (London: Latin American Newsletters 1983). See also the special issue on the conflict by Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 12, No. 1 Spring 1983).

The legal regime for the contracting of petroleum explorations with private backing was given in law 21,278 of'Contratos de Riesgos'. In 1978 exploration of marine areas and certain land areas was begun by the private sector. At the beginning of 1981, there had already been 11 and and 7 marine areas licensed, among them 'Magallanes Este', 'Tierra del Fuego Este I' and 'Tierra del Fuego Este II'. See 'La Expansion productiva dc Petrolco y Gas entre 1976 y 1981', Informacion Economica Argentina , (No. 114, February 1981).

Ministerio de Economia , Informe Economico de la Argentina (Buenos Ai res, 1982 ).

Ibid.

Quoted in Clarin (Buenos Aires), 2 June 1982, p. 15.

On this theme, see Luis Maira , 'La Politica Latinoamericana de la Administracion Reagan: Del Discurso Armonioso alas Primeras Dificultades' and Carlos J. Moneta , 'El Papel de los Estados Unidos en le Decada del 80 en las Relaciones entre America Latina y Africa Negra: Factores Politico-Estrategicos', in Helio Jaguaribe (ed.). La Politica Internationalde los Anos 80: Una Perspectiva Latinoamericana. ( Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1982).

See Carlos J. Moneta , 'Aspectos Conflictivos de la Relaciones Afro-Latinoamericanas: Las Vinculaciones Politicas, Economicas y Militares de la Republica Sudafricana'con los Paises del Atlantico Sur Latinoamericano' in Carlos J. Moneta (ed.), Geopolitica y Politica del Poder en el Atlantico Sur (Buenos Aires: Editorial Plcamar. 1983), pp. 130-37.

'El Atlantico Sur', in Futurables, Revista de la Fundacion Argentina Ano 2000 (No. 13, 1982), Buenos Aires, p. 59.

See Charles D. Corbett , The Latin American Military as a Socio- Political Force: Case Study of Bolivia and Argentina (Miami, FL: University of Miami. Center for Advanced International Studies, 1972), p. 13. Another reason, according to a North American military leader and political scientists, is that in the absence of real and serious external dangers, a Latin American military actor usually tends to universalise the communist threat to the 'Western and Christian world' and seeks a role for his country in opposing this threat.

Roberto Russell and Teresa Carballal , 'Democricia y Autoritarismo en Argentina: Los Problemas Pstructurales del Sistema Politico y Su Incidcncia en la Redomocratizacion, (preliminary version). Seminario sobre Sistema Politico y Redemocratizacion. Vina del Mar. Chilc April 1983 .

Ibid.

Ibid.

General Ramon G. Diaz Ressone , 'Sentido y Justification dc las Fuerzas Armades en al Gobierno', Futurables (No. 13. 1982), Beunos Aires. pp. 8-9.

Ibid.

Carlos J. Moneta , 'El Factor Energetico en la Politica Internacionat de America Latina', Gaceta Internacional (Vol. 1. No 2 October-December 1983), Caracas.

General Ramon G. Diaz Bessone , 'La Scguridad y la Libertad del Continente ', Futurables (No. 13, 1982), Beunos Aires, p. 13.

Sec the declarations of the Chief of Staff of Counsellor Costa Mendes, Ambassador Gustavo Figueroa, Cable IPS, 24 May 1982, 'Estados Unidos Quiere Base Anglo-Norteamericana en ias Malvinas, Dice Diplomatico'.

This date is based on conversations held with high officials of the armed forces. Different sources and researchers, including English and North American ones, agree with the estimate of August-October as the original planned date of invasion.

See Nestor J. Montenegro and Eduardo Aliverti , Los Nombres de la Derrota (Buenos Aires: Ediciones . 1982), p. 23.

'Galtieri. Argentina Seguira Combatiendo', El National (Caracas). 16 June 1982 , p. 8.

Ibid.

By way of example, in December 1981 a seminar was held in Buenos Aires by the 'Fundacion Argentina Ano 2000' directed by General R. Diaz Bessone, that counted among its participants some Republican Congressman and Senators: Skeen. Congressman for New Mexico: Nelligan. Congressman for Pennsylvania: Mrs. Carlist. Director of the Senate Republican Commitee: J. Lisker. Director of the Senate Subcommittee for Security and Terrorism: Professors Lewis Tamb and Thomas Ward. both experts on security: and General Lewis Walt of the Marine Corps. The seminar was entitled 'La Seguridad y la Libertad del Continente' (The Security and Liberty of the Continent), and the principle themes were: 'The Weakness of the West', 'The Situation in Central America and the Caribbean', and 'The Strategic Importance of the South Atlantic'. General Diaz Bessone, ex-Minister of Planning in the Videla Government and personal friend of General Galtieri, was the organiserofthe symposium.

Los Nombres de la Derrota, op.cit., pp. 24-25.

Security Council Resolution 502 (1982) called for a cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the Malvinas, and a diplomatic solution. Accordingly the Minister of the Interior, General Saint Jean, in a meeting with leading politicans, was to dismiss the veto of the People's Republic of China in the Security Council. Councillor Costa Medez denied that the veto of China and the Soviet Union had been solicited before 2 April, but indirectly confirmed that the Soviet veto had been solicited. See La Nacion (Buenos Aires), 7 April 1983 , p. 16.

There are numerous examples of this theme. See 'Este-Oeste; Norte-Sur', La Prensa (Buenos Aires), 5 June 1982, second section, editorial page. La Nacion (Buenos Aires), also maintained this position during the greater part of the conflict.

Ricardo Kirschbaum. 'Los Riesgos de la Diplomacia Doble', Clarin (Buenos Aires), 11 November 1982, pp. 14-15.

Conversations held with leading Argentine politicians involved with Multipartidaria.

Statement by General Galtien in Los Nombres de la Derrota. op. cit., pp. 21-22.