The Central American Crisis: Is There a Role for Western Europe?

Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America ( Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1984), p. 124.

For earlier treatments of this question see Wolf Grabendorff , 'Western European Perceptions of the Turmoil in Central America', in Richard E. Feinberg (ed.), Central America: The International Dimensions of the Crisis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), pp. 201-212; Wolf Grabendorff , 'The Role of Western Europe in the Caribbean Basin', in Alan Adelman and Reid Reading (eds.), Confrontation in the Caribbean Basin (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Center for Latin American Studies, 1984), pp. 275-293; and Heinrich Krumwiede , 'Centroamerica vista desde Europa Occidental', in Donald Castillo Rivas (ed.), Centroamerica: Mas Alia de la Crisis (Mexico: Ediciones SIAP, 1983). pp. 407-423.

Robert Tucker, for example , argues : 'It is not the safety of shipping lanes, or the prospects of a flood of refugees to this country, or the danger held out to the stability of Mexico that is ultimately at stake in Central America; it is the credibility of United States power'. See Robert W. Tucker, 'Their wars, our choices', The New Republic. 24 October 1983, p. 26.

See Rolf Linkohr , 'Perspektiven parteipolitischer Beziehungen zwischen EG und Lateinamerika ', draft discussion paper presented at the Conference on EEC-Latin American Relations of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn, 22 September 1983.

Addressing the XI German-American Conference in Princeton on 21 March 1981. the Deputy Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, Horst Ehmke, drew attention to this fact: 'We have for such a long time helped to defend outmoded structures that we should not be surprised that the revolutionary movements seek help wherever they are able to get it - and that the Soviet Union and Cuba are taking advantage of that situation' (author's translation).

Department of State Special Report, No. 80, 23 February 198 1, 'Communist Interference in El Salvadof, p. 1, mentions 'another case of indirect armed aggression against a small Third World country by communist powers acting through Cuba' and 'the gravity of actions of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other communist states who are carrying out what is clearly shown to be a well coordinated, covert effort to bring about the overthrow of El Salvador's established government and impose in its place a communist regime with no popular support'.

President Reagan himself has been very outspoken about this: 'The Sandinista rule is a communist reign of terror' and 'What the Sandinistas have done to Nicaragua is a tragedy. But we Americans must understand and come to grips with the fact that the Sandinistas are not content to brutalize their own land. They seek to export their terror to every other country in the region'. Department of State, Current Policy. No. 576, 9 May 1984,'US Interests in Central America'. Section 2.

This policy has been in effect since 16 November 1981 when US actions in Central America were approved by President Reagan following a National Security Council discussion. For details see 'Ultimate Goal of US Policy in Central America Still Unresolved'. Wavhingion Post, 29 April 1984, p. A15.

This became especially apparent in the German case. when the Christian Democratic leader Kohl took over from the Social Democrat, Schmidt. See ' West Germany: Hardening the line', Latin America Weekly Report, 31 March 1983, p. 7. and 'Opposition: Wende in Bonns Mittelamerikapolitik'. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28-29 January 1984.

See the excellent critique by William M. LeoGrande. 'Through the Looking Glass: The Kissinger Report on Central America', World Policy Journal (Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1984), pp, 251-284 andthe article by Aniba ! Romero in this issue.

As Heinrich Krumwiede observes, 'In assessing the development of revolutionary Nicaragua one must not forget that the Sandinista regime has faced an external threat to its very existence'. See Heinrich W. Krumwiede , 'Revolution in Central America: A Western European Approach', draft of a policy proposal prepared for the Conference Europa ante la Crisis Centroamericana, Santander, Spain, July 1984, p. 11

'Every effort has been made to downgrade the proposals of the Contadora Group and strip them of their content - by obstructing their sponsors, by holding up the measures advocated and by cutting the project off from any form of international solidarity or commitment', criticises the Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Spanish Chamber of Deputies, Miguel Angel Martinez. See his discussion of the US position in his paper for the Bilderberg meetings, 'The Soviet Union, the West and the Third World - A case study: Central America', Saltjobaden, Sweden, 11-13 May 1984.

'The attitude of Western industrialized states toward Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala is an important indicator of the extent to which these industrialized states are willing and capable, either individually or collectively, to seek constructive political solutions for those Third World countries in which, as the result of oligarchic and repressive as well as anti-reformist and anti-democratic regimes, the political center has been weakened and the social-revolutionary movements have gained mass support'. See the Introduction to Wolf Grabendorff. Heinrich W. Krumwiede and Jorg Todt (eds.), Political Change in Central America: Internal and External Dimensions (Boulder, CO: Westview 1984), p. 5.

'Needing to collaborate with the Reagan Administration on other, more pressing foreign policy concerns and being ultimately dependent on the American security umbrella, many European parties and governments wish to avoid overly sharp criticisms of the United States'. See Eusebio Mujal-Leon , 'Europe and the Crisis in Central America', in Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, op. cit., p. 704.

Specific problems arose from the US decision to mine the Nicaraguan harbours. See 'After Initial Anger, W. Europe Eases up on US in Mining Case', The Washington Post, 15 April 1984.

'It is perhaps unfortunate that such a shift in American policy has occurred at a time when violence and political polarisation in Central America have eroded the forces of the political centre to the point where governments of the extreme left may appear to provide the only alternative to governments of the extreme right'. House of Commons, Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Caribbean and Central America (London: HMSO. October 1982), p. 15. 'It is clear that the American discovery of the importance of human rights, land reform and democratic elections in Central America follows directly from the success of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua', Stuart Holland and Donald Anderson , Kissingers Kingedom? (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984) p. 14.

'In failing to concede political and economic space for nonalignment, the United States, far from guaranteeing its security, jeopardises it'. See Institute of Social Studies , An Alternative Policy for Central America and the Caribbean The Hague Declaration, The Hague, June 1983, p. 7.

Pierre Schori , the former international secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, writes: 'We find it curious and unfortunate that instead of querying and counteracting the involvement of European social democracy,the US does not make positive use of it. Our purposes are not extremist or even extreme. We believe, like Mexico for example, that it is unrealistic to try to exclude from a solution armed resistance against the regime'. See Pierre Schori , 'Central America Dilemma', Socialist Affairs (No. 1, 1981), p. 37. But however, Eusebio Mujal-Leon notes that, 'European Christian Democratic parties have been generally more supportive of American policy in Central America'. See Eusehio Mujal-Leon , op. cit , p. 702.

Ronfeldt writes, 'Although West European involvement can contribute to the region's economic and political development, this general push-pull process is fostering the internationalization of local conflicts and eroding US leverage'. See David Ronfeldt , Geopolitics, Security and U.S Strategy in the Caribbean Basin ( Santa Barbara, CA: RAND, November 1983), p. 30.

'We should seek their political and diplomatic support where this is possible. and their restraint where it is not .... And we should encourage their economic involvement in the region ....' Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America op. cit. p.124.

Krumwiede argues. 'Central America presents an ideal opportunity to realize the strategy of reconciliation between Western industrialized nations and the socialrevolutionary regimes and mass movements of the Third World', See Heinrich W. Krumwiede, op. cit., p. 8.

For a detailed treatment see the excellent study by Eusebio Mujal-León, 'European Socialism and the Crisis in Central America', in Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), Rift and Revolution: The Central American Imbroglio (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute 1984), pp. 253-302.

See Constantin Menges , 'Central America and Its Enemies', Commentary (Vol. 72, No. 2, August 1981), pp. 32-38.

For such a critique of the SI from the right, see Carlos Alberto Montaner , ' The Mediation of the Socialist International: Inconsistancy, Prejudice and Ignorance', Caribbean Review (Vol. 11, No. 2, Spring 1982), pp. 42-45, 57.

See David Ronfeldt, op. cit.

See Jean Pierre Cot, 'Winning East-West in North-South', Foreign Policy (No. 46, Spring 1982), pp. 3-18.

'Moreover, if negotiations between various groups are begun, some European governments (perhaps the Spanish) might be used either as mediators or as participants in a possible multinational peacekeeping force'. See Eusebio Mujal-León , 'Europe and the Crisis in Central America', op. cit., p. 705. The possibility of such a role is even noted in the US: 'Would there be any value in our sharing leadership with any West European states - e.g.. Spain - in creating and managing a political and economic framework for Central America? Would either side be willing to do so?' See Robert E. Hunter , 'Long-Range and Political Options: Factors External to Central America ', in Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, op. cit., p. 294.

See El Pais, 26 May 1984.

See 'Full of good intentions', Latin America Weekly Report. 22 October 1982.

Hertogs notes: 'These surprisingly enterprising policies of the European Community can be partially accounted for by Germany's preference for multilateral rather than bilateral initiatives. But one should also take into account the fact that the European Commission and the European Parliament must distance themselves from American policy if they are to generate recognizable policies of their own'. See Erik Jan Hertogs , 'Western European Responses to Revolutionary Developments in the Caribbean Basin Region', in George Irvin and Xabier Gorostiaga (eds.), Towards an Alternative for Central America and the Caribbean (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1984), p. 84.

See 'EEC Assures US of Delay in El Salvador Relief Aid', The International Herald Tribune, 19 February 1981.

See 'Bonn will go to San Jose: Kohl wants to fill in the gaps in US diplomacy', Latin America Weekly Report, 20 July 1984, p. 4.

See the commentary by Theo Sommer , 'Macht und Moral: Reagan und Mittelamerika ', Die Zeit, 4 May 1984.

'To date, other Western powers have left much of the responsibility for the region's security to the United States'. See Western Interests and US Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin ( Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States , October 1983). p. 19.

See my similar assessment about a Western European option for the Caribbean Basin in Wolf Grabendorff , 'The Role of Western Europe in the Caribbean Basin'. op. cit., p. 288.