Revolution and Pluralism in Nicaragua

Compare the recent report of the 'Kissinger Commission', Report of the National Bipartisan Commision on Central America ( Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1984), with Stuart Holland and Donald Anderson , Kissinger's Kingdom? A Counter-report on Central America (Nottingham : Spokesman, 1984), and PACCA (Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America) , Changing Course: Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1984).

See Jaime Wheelock and Luis Carrion , Apuntes sobre el Desarrollo Económico y Social de Nicaragua ( Managua: Secretaria Nacional del FSLN, 1980).

See Nicaragua , La estrategia de la victoria (Mexico: Nuestro Tiempo, 1980).

See Amalia Chamorro , 'Algunos rasgos hegemonicos del somocismo y la revolucion sandinista', Cuadernos de Pensamiento Propio, Instituto Nicaraguense de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales (INIES) , Serie Ensayos Nr. 5, Managua, 1983.

See Salvatore Senese , 'Aspetti giuridici del nuovo assetto politico sociale', in Relazione presentate alle giornate di studio sul Nicaragua (Rome: Fundacion Lelio Basso, April 1981).

In 1979, the programme of the Government of National Reconstruction specifically mentioned that under-utilised land would be included in the agrarian reform. On 29 February 1980, a decree-law on 'decapitalisation' was announced; this was followed by the Agrarian Reform Law of 19 July 1981. See Leyes de la Republica de Nicaragua, Vols. 1-4, Ministerio de Justicia, 1983.

In May 1981, the Council of State consisted of eight political parties, seven trades union organisations, etc. Concerning the 1980 debate related to the change in composition of the Council of State, see Salvatore Senese, op. cit.

See, for instance, 'Bases jurídicas para garantizar la paz y la seguridad internacionales de los Estados de America Central' (Official proposal of Nicaragua to Contadora), Managua, 15 October 1983.

See Jim Morrel and Jesse Biddle , 'Central America: the Financial War', Report to the Washington Seminar on Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America . October 1983, as well as their previous report which appeared in International Policy Report, March 1983.

See Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction , 'Economic Policy Guidelines 1983-1988', Managua, 1983.

Ministério de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Reforma Agrana. Estrategia de desarrollo agropecuario y reforma agraria, Managua, December 1982.

In fact, regular elections were held in Nicaragua under the Somoza regime.

For a conceptual framework, see Ernesto Laclau. 'Socialisme et transformation de logiques hégémoniques', in Cristine Buci Glucksmann (ed.), La gauche, le pouvoir le socialisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983). See also Chantal Mouffe , 'Socialisme, democratic et nouveaux mouvements sociaux', in the same volume. From our point of view, future debates around the concept of hegemony should emphasise 'external political dependence' of Third World countries: that is to say. the correlation of forces is not exclusively determined within the national political arena. In the case of Nicaragua, the real threat to the Sandinista revolution comes from the Reagan Administration; its dilemma is that it sponsors a fraction of the bourgeoisie which has little real internal weight. Should such an alternative be imposed upon the Nicaraguan people by military means, a long war of popular resistance would be the only outcome because of the strength of the autonomous mass organisations. In this sense, there would be no chance of a repetition of the Grenada tragedy where events occurring within a small vanguard party determined the fate of the revolution.

A very important example is the development of the 'popular teacher' in Nicaragua. See Rosa Maria Torres , 'De alfabetizando a maestro popular la post alfabetización en Nicaragua', INIES, Cuadernos de Pensamiento Propio. Serie Ensayos Nr. 4. Managua. 1983.

A clear case in which the FSLN was not successful in preventing this manipulation of specific identities in favour of the Reagan Administration's project is the case of the Miskito Indian communities. Although many 'mistakes' have been recognised by the FSLN, the truth of the matter is that the question of integrating minorities while at the same time preserving their autonomy has not been satisfactorily resolved anywhere. In Latin America, the Left has oscillated between the extreme positions of identifying these minorities with the proletariat (thereby seeing their complete proletarianisation as the 'solution' to the problem), and proclaiming support for an 'indigenophile' position where complete self-determination is the goal and where all non-Indians are seen as 'white' (a highly apolitical view). Under a social revolution, new possibilities present themselves for seeking fresh approaches to this difficult question. But in the case of Nicaragua, the fact that the contras had infiltrated the Atlantic Coast zone and that some religious leaders had denounced the revolution as 'evil' produced a situation whose handling by the FSLN cannot simply be seen as a mistake, but reflects real contradiction between the need to defend the revolution against external aggression and the need to allow for self-determination and the articulation of the Miskito community within the national liberation process. A further historical element is the lack of participation of isolated Miskitos in the revolutionary struggle against Somoza. This further illustrates that the direction of the revolution is not unilaterally determined by the 'project' but by the dialectics of struggle.

See Xabier , Gorostiaga , 'Dilemmas of the Nicaraguan Revolution', in Richard R. Fagen and Olga Pellicer, The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the US and Mexico (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984).

See G.W., Irvin , 'Nicaragua: Establishing the State as Centre of Accumulation', Cambridge Journal of Economics (Vol. 7. No. 2, 1983). For a discussion of some of the theoretical and ideological difficulties of planning in the first phase of transition, see also Jose Luis Coraggio , 'On the Significance and Possibilities of Territorial Planning for Transition in Latin America', Regional Development Dialogue (Vol. 3, No. 2, Autumn 1982), Nagoya. Japan.

Hegemony develops unevenly due to its contradictory character, and liberation does also mean transformation. When we speak of transformation, we imply both ideological and behavioural change. Such is the case, for instance, of the Miskito community, which had been only marginally active in the revolutionary struggle and felt that the revolution was the affair of the 'Spaniards'. The problem of the Miskito community is that of relating not only to the Sandinista revolution but to the Nicaraguan nation as a whole. A more dialectical approach to this question will become easier once contra activities cease.

For a critical assessment of the struggle for women's liberation in Nicaragua, see Maxine Molyneux. 'Women and Socialism: The Revolution Betrayed ? The Case of Nicaragua', paper presented at a CEDLA workshop, Amsterdam, October 1983.

See Orlando Nunez Soto , 'La ideologia como fuerza material y la juventud como fuerza ideologica', in Estado y clases sociales en Nicaragua (Managua: Asociación Nicaraguense de Cientificos Sociales, 1982).

See Charles Downs and Fernando Kusnetzoff , 'The Changing Role of Local Government in the Nicaraguan Revolution', April 1982, (mimeo).

An analysis of the succession of events before and after the revolutionary triumph in Nicaragua would show that: (I) of those who now oppose the Sandinista revolution and claim that the revolution has betrayed its principles, many entered into the massive front against Somoza quite late and, until the final days of Somoza, sought to negotiate with the United States envoys for a 'Somocismo without Somoza' based on purging the National Guard; (2) this internal opposition is unable to present any meaningful national project to the people of Nicaragua and for this reason depends on the US Administration to create a real alternative to popular power in Nicaragua.

The main provisions of the Electoral Law of 22 February 1984 are: (I) that the President and Vice-President of the Republic would be elected by direct ballot and that a Legislative Body of 90 members would be elected under a system of proportional representation; (2) that the National Assembly would during its first two years draft a new Constitution; (3) that the state would finance all political parties wishing to campaign but that other sources could also be used; (4) that only those war criminals serving sentences or whose trials are pending, and those who have appealed for external intervention against the Government, would be excluded from the electoral process. Some reactions to these measures show their effectiveness. Certain members of the opposition have said - despite claiming that elections are their main objective - that they might not participate 'because they know the elections would not be fair'. Meanwhile, spokesmen for the Reagan Administration have said that they do not trust Sandinista intentions because 'they are acting out of fear', a somewhat ironic situation given that the Reagan Administration has justified its 'covert' action campaign against Nicaragua as a means of forcing the Sandinistas to hold elections. See Envío (Ano 3, Nr. 33, March 1984), Instituto Histórico Centroamcricano, Managua.