The Myth of the Liberal Coup: The United States and the 15 October 1979 Coup in El Salvador

See, for example, Alan Riding's story in The New York Times. 17 October 1979.

Thomas P. Anderson , Politics in Central America: Guatemala. El Salvador. Honduras and Nicaragua (New York: Hoover Institution/ Praeger, 1982), p. 76. Professor Anderson is the author of two outstanding books on El Salvador Matanza: El Salvador'.s Communist Revolt of 1932 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press , 1971), and The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 1969 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1981).

Thomas P. Anderson , 'El Salvador', in Robert Wesson (ed.). Communism in Central America and the Caribbean ( Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1981). p. 64.

Thomas P. Anderson , Politics in Central America, op. cit, p. 76, and ' El Salvador ', op. cit, p. 64. See also Keesing's Contemporary Archives , (Vol. 26, 25 January 1980), p. 30045B. and Facts on File (Vol. 39, 1979), p. 790.

Testimony of Professor Tom J. Farer before the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 29 September 1983. Prof. Farer is a member of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, serving as its President from 1980 to 1982.

Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America ( Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 28-29.

Another example of this typical image is presented by the former Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders:

El Salvador is not Nicaragua. The golpe (coup) by moderate military officers against the Romero dictatorship in October 1979 launched a process of political development and reform which continues to the present [and which is] remarkable in its persistance despite armed opposition by ideologues of the Right and the Left.

Thomas O. Enders , 'Revolution, Reconciliation, and Reform' SAIS Review (Vol. 3, No. 2. Summer/Fall 1983), p. 5.

A paper prepared by an agrarian reform specialist in the US Embassy in San Salvador also postulates 'a break with the past':

The coup d'etat of October 15, 1979 and the agrarian reform which followed less than six months after the coup, culminated almost ten years of growing agitation for social, political and economic reform.

US Department of State , 'Assessment of the Agrarian Reform', filed from American Embassy, San Salvador . 11 March 1983 (message ref. no. A-48); the assessment conflates the events of 15 October 1979 and March 1980.

Finally, the 'radical break' hypothesis is supported, though more cautiously, by Princeton political scientist Paul Sigmund:

In neighbouring El Salvador ... the shock waves of the Somoza overthrow had sparked a reformist coup in October 1979, led by army colonels in league with civilian politicians who established a junta to carry out long-overdue social and economic reforms....

Paul E. Sigmund , 'Latin America: Change or Continuity?'. Foreign Affairs (Vol. 60, No. 5. 1981), p. 632.

Lars Schoultz , Human Rights and United States Policy Towards Latin America (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 112-113,

Stephen Ambrose , Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938-1980, 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), p. 390.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (Vol. 23. 5 August 1977), p. 28491B: Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 94-95. The combined opposition was known as the Union Nacion Opositora (UNO), see Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk , El Salvador : The Face of Revolution (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1982), pp. 85-89, and Dermot Keogh , Romero: El Salvador's Martyr ( Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1981), pp, 26-29.

James R. Brockman , Oscar Romero - Bishop and Martyr (New York: Orbis Books, 1982). Romero proved to be quite a surprise; he had been known as very conservative. The murder of Rutilio Grande was a turning point in his development. Within weeks of becoming Archbishop, he was not just in confrontation with the state but was acting in opposition to the directive of the Papal Nuncio, Emmanuele Gerarda, and without the support of his fellow bishops.

The complex relationship between the major guerrilla groups and the popular organisations is laid out clearly in Robert S. Leiken , 'The Salvadoran Left', in Robert S. Leiken (ed.). Central America: Anatomy of Conflict (New York: Pergamon Press. 1984). pp. 111-130. See also B.K. Gills' article in this issue, pp. 129-52, for a discussion of the Salvadoran centre and left.

, Walter LaFeber , Inevitable Revolutions : The United States in Central America (New York: Norton, 1983), p. 247.

Stephen Ambrose , op. cit. p. 247.

Interview with former US envoy. New York , July 1983.

Another envoy present at the meeting had no recollection of this proposal being made. His main recollection is that the report on Nicaragua presented to the meeting was completely wide of the mark. Interview, Cork, April 1984.

It could be argued that at the meeting stereotypes took the place of accurate, objective analysis because of poor political reporting; as will be seen later, the young officer group was ideologically heterodox and the majority was deeply suspicious of some elements of the leadership of the popular organisations. But it was virtually impossible to have such a point of view accepted by US military advisers in the region. At a subsequent Central American diplomatic meeting in 1980, US Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White was asked to give his views on the Salvadoran military. He spoke of the need for radical change and purging of the high command to remove men who were implicated in death squad activities. A senior US officer present gave White 'a rough time'. He regarded it as dangerous to tamper with the high command. The army was too important an institution to be demoralised. Gutierrez and Garcia could be controlled. White argued that the military in El Salvador was a political institution. If there was to be political change in the country, then the military would have to be reformed. The point was greeted with uncomprehending hostility by the officer. This was six months after the October coup. Interview with former US envoy. New York, July 1983.

Walter LaFeber , op. cit. p. 244.

Plácido Erdozaín , Archbishop Romero : Martyr of Salvador ( New York: Orbis Books, 1981), p. 66. The source given for the statement is Presidential spokesman Hodding Carter, 14 September 1979.

Ibid. The author claims that this is a quotation from a plan, 'Central America at the Crossroads', presented by Vaky to the State Department. Vaky later reflected on the situation in El Salvador

Any concept of a 'center' in the current Salvadoran situation is a relative one. Taking it in that sense, the government is a 'center' and could be the nucleus of a process that over time could depolarize the country. The policy of the Carter Administration has been. to support that process and the governing coalition, including the provision of military assistance to help it defend itself against the extremist insurgency.

Viron Vaky , 'Hemispheric Relations: "Everything is Part of Everything Else"', Foreign Affairs (Vol. 59, No. 3, 1981), pp. 620-621.

Frank J. Devine , 'The Domino Myth in Central America', article commissioned by USIA, circa 1980. Devine served as US Ambassador to El Salvador from October 1977 until February 1980.

Walter LaFeber , op. cit, pp. 247-248.

Zbigniew Brzezinski , Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p. 355. See Walter LaFeber. 'From Confusion to Cold War: The Memoirs of the Carter Administration', Diplomatic History (Vol. 8, No. I, Winter 1984), p. 9.

Interviews with two former US envoys to Central America, New York and Washington DC, July 1983. Neither was prepared to be very specific about this. Both, however, voiced thei r suspicions about extra-di plomatic forces being at work.

Ex-Colonel Rene Guerra remains convinced that Gutierrez was 'playing both sides of the street'. I have not been able to find any written proof of this ; but it is a view held by a number of prominent Salvadorans (all of whom would admittedly be quite hostile to Gutierrez).

For a recent account, see David Blundy , The Sunday Times . 22 February 1981, on the Sumpul massacre.

Robert Varney Elam , Appeal to Arms: The Army and Politics in El Salvador 1931-1964 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1968), is one of the few studies available on the Salvadoran military ; see also Richard Millett , 'Praetorians or Patriots? The Central American Military', in Robert S. Leiken (ed.), op. cit, pp. 69-94, and Charles W. Anderson , 'El Salvador. The Army as Reformer', in Martin C. Needier (ed.), Political Systems of Latin America ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 53-72.

Howard S. Beutstein , Area Handbook for El Salvador ( Washington, DC: 1971). pp. 191-192.

John J. Johnson , The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 107.

See the excellent articles by Carlos Andino Martinez , 'El Estamento Military en El Salvador', ECA (Nos. 369-370, July/August 1979 ), Universidad Centro Americana. San Salvador, pp. 615-630, and Nicolás Mariscal , 'Militares y reformismo en El Salvador', ECA (Nos. 351-352, January/February 1978), pp. 9-27.

John J. Johnson , op. cit, p. 102.

Guerra continues:

Verbal, and even physical, abuse from senior to junior cadets was the rule while, at the same time, honor, pride and virtues were preached by officers who openly condoned - and even participated in - abuse of cadets. Usually officers repeated the slogan, 'The military career is hard and overwhelming, but eventually returns great rewards'. Unaware cadets would naively think about moral and spiritual rewards, but no doubt was left as to the kind of rewards meant when the same officers later preached that: 'Seniority in the military was created to avoid mobs when milking the State'.

Rene Guerra , 'On the nature of the Salvadoran military establishment', unpublished article in the author's possession.

Guerra continues:

Thus, I saw colonels involved in a variety of white collar crimes: smuggling heavily, if the province under his responsibility had a proper sea coast; the Motor Vehicle Department Head selling license plates, driver's licenses, taxi cab operating permits, etc.; the president of the Salvadoran Industrial Development Institute embezzling millions of dollars; the presidents of the Phone Company. the Water Works Company, and the Electrical Power Generating Authority receiving millionaire kickbacks from costly contracts they doctored.

Rene Guerra. Ibid.

This school has since been destroyed by the military.

Guerra claims that he threatened to resign in 1977 but was convinced by Romero that he should remain at his post pending promised reforms.

Barrera was sitting in the military dining room of the Presidential Palace when word was brought to General Romero that a priest, Fr. Ernesto Barrera Motto, a first cousin and close friend of Captain Barrera, had been killed in an alleged shoot-out between the military and a guerrilla group. Guerra persuaded Barrera to join the Movement later that afternoon. 36. A more junior figure is this loosely knit group was a member of ANSESAL, one Major Roberto d'Aubuisson, who was to rise to political prominence following the 1982 elections.

Guerra incurred the wrath of some of the President's close aides while serving in the Palace and had been transferred to the repair shop as a reprimand. In fact. the location proved ideal for further recruiting. as officers from all parts of the country brought equipment there for repair.

Interview with Hugo Guerra, San Francisco, California, April-June 1983.

Frank J. Devine , El Salvador Embassy Under Attack (New York: Vantage, 1981 ), pp. 139-140.

Interview with former US diplomat. New York , July 1983.

Frank J. Devine , up. cit, p. 134.

Interviews with Rene and Hugo Guerra, San Jose and San Francisco, California, March-June 1983. It is also likely that the former President of Venezuela, Carlos Andes Perez, was made aware of the coup plans. He later became friendly with ex-Colonel Rene Guerra during the latter's exile in Caracas.

Ibid. I have not been able to confirm this in Washington.

Frank J. Devine , op. cit, p. 135.

Guerra says that the Archbishop had been contacted by Gutierrez through Roberto Badia and Alejandro Saca Melendez, who were the Archbishop's doctors.

Guerra contacted Archbishop Romero through the sociologist Fr. Jesus Delgado, who also served as the Archbishop's Secretary. Guerra and Delgado were cousins. The latter is not to be confused with his brother, the Auxiliary Bishop of San Salvador Freddy Delgado, who was a strong critic of the late Archbishop.

Carolyn Forche , quoting an unnamed young officer, in 'The Road to Reaction in El Salvador', The Nation. 14 June 1980. cited in James Dunkerley , The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in El Salvador (London: Junction Books, 1982), p. 136.

Tommie Sue Montgomery, op. cit., p. 196

Quoted in James R. Brockman , op. cit, pp. 136-140.

Mayorga was informed of his proposed seat in the junta on the same day as Majano, 11 October 1979. He agreed in a meeting with the Military Co-ordinating Group to take the seat after consulting his friend the Archbishop and satisfying himself that the coup was intended to bring about radical reforms.

Interview with Monsignor Ricardo Urioste. Cork, Ju ly 1983,

James R. Brockman , op. cit, pp. 180-185.

Frank J. Devine , op. cit, pp. 135-137; James R. Brockman , op. cit, p. 181; interview with Monsignor Ricardo Urioste, Cork, July 1983.

Guerra was suspicious of both Gutierrez and Salazar Brenes and states he was convinced that Salazar Brenes had been sent to the meeting-place with instructions to kill him. The late arrival of Gutierrez - he felt - was calculated to give Salazar Brenes time to complete his task, Guerra did not let his machine-gun out of his hand during the hours of waiting.

Guerra had been made manager of the telephone company ANTEL in September by President Romero, possibly as a way of buying the young colonel off any idea of launching a coup against him. On his first day in the job, he attended the funeral of the President's brother, Sr. Jose Javier Romero Menea, who had been shot dead in an ambush outside the capital on 6 September. There Guerra was approached by the Deputy Minister for Justice who had just returned from a meeting in Switzerland. He offered Guerra a bribe to secure a major contract for a Spanish telecommunications company. Guerra refused and was approached a few days later by the same man with a larger offer, $30,000. Guerra made a formal report to the President about the bribe attempt. He was promptly sacked from his post. While in the phone company, Guerra (who is an electrical engineer) had a secret line put into the First Brigade barracks in anticipation of the coup.

Guerra was convinced that the mix-up was no accident and that the First Brigade had been deliberately misled by Gutierrez.

Frank J. Devine , op. cit, p. 141.

Tommie Sue Montgomery , op. cit p. 13: interviews with Hugo Guerra. San Francisco, California , March-June 1983.

Frank J. Devine , op. cit.

Proclama del 15 de Octubre 1979(copy of the original in the author's possession).

For a list of the members of the Government, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives (Vol. 26, 25 January 1980 ), p. 30046A.

It was Vides Casanova who argued at this Cabinet meeting, with the obvious approval of Garcia and Gutierrez, that if it was necessary to kill 200,000 people to defeat the opposition in El Salvador-then the military was prepared to do it. Rene Guerra states that 'Vides Casanova was so proud of his intervention that he later played a recording for privileged friends on special occasions'. Interviews with Rene Guerra, San Jose, California. April 1983, and Alberto Arene, former Cabinet member, Dublin. February 1981.

According to Guerra, when the Christian Democrats agreed at the meeting of 29 December 1979 to resign and boycott any government, they had already made a pact with the military to form a new government.

One source states that the young officers blocked Duarte's membership of the first junta.

Interview with Rene Guerra, San José, California. June 1983.

The New York Times. 16 October 1979.

Ibid., 17 October 1979.

Ibid., 24 October 1979.

Viron Vaky , 'Reagan's Central American Policy: An Isthmus Restored', in Robert S. Leiken (ed.), op. cit. p. 247; this quotation does not apply directly to El Salvador,

Walter LaFeber , op. cit. p. 270. See also Walter LaFeber , 'The Burdens of the Past', in Robert S. Leiken (ed.), op. cit., and Viron Vaky, 'Hemispheric Relations: "Everything is Part of Everything Else"', op. cit, p. 647.

Interview with Fr. Jose Alas, Cork, May 1984.