The Military in Argentine Politics: 1880-1982

During the period 1880 to 1930 only one general was to be President, though not because of any disagreement with the Constitutional system of government. General Julio A. Roca was elected President in 1880 following his victory over the Indians in the 'conquest of the desert'. His second term in 1892 merely acknowledged his continued stature as a result of political influence of a distinctly civilian nature.

See A. Ferrer , The Argentine Economy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967). The author points out that 35,000,000 hectacres became available - either for cultivation or cattle breeding - as a consequence of the military campaign.

R. Cortés Conde and E. Gallo , La formación de la Argentina moderna (Buenos Aires : Paidos, 1973), pp. 34-35. For further patterns of the expansion of the pampas see C.F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970 ).

First came hides, then wools, followed by wheat, maize, linseed and finally beef, which was exportable by the turn of the century as a result of refrigerated transport. One important consequence of this is that Argentine exports were never subject to the constraints of monoculture, a problem which was to afflict most other Latin American countries.

A proportion of the population which was by no means strikingly out of step with standards of political participation prevalent in Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Both Chambers are elected gradually. Half the Chamber of Deputies stands for election every four years. The Senate is more complex, Senators being elected by the Provincial Legislatures for a nine year term. But one third of the Senators only serve three years, a second third serves six years and a final third serves nine years. Therefore, obtaining a Radical majority in Congress would take some time.

J.V. Orona , La Revolución del 6 de Septiembre (Buenos Aires : 1966). Orona revealed and substantiated the existence and influence of the 'Logia 25 de Mayo' in the 1930 military intervention, as well as providing an account of the genesis of the secret society due to the events between 1890 and 1922.

There are other explanations for military intervention, the most credible of which is the one which holds that the propertied groups in Argentina had been incapable of organising a political party which could win elections. See T. Di Tella , 'Populism and Reform in Latin America' in C. Véliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). This explanation is better than the one which argues that the military enter politics as a consequence of abrupt social changes imposed on a traditional society. The latter explanation stems from the concept of praetorianism: the military intervene in the politics of a given society when there is a weak middle class and institutionalisation is low. Neither of these, however, applies to Argentina prior to 1930. More importantly, the second explanation sees the military as a passive agent of social forces. If anything, the Argentine experience shows that the military can become the cause of the low level of institutionalisation, rather than being the result of the enfeeblement of political institutions, as is mistakenly argued by S.P. Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1968). Huntington's other explanations of the presence of the military in politics, especially where he argues that they intervene in order to politically demobilise a polity, appear as more convincing, at least in light of the Argentine case. However, it seems equally plausible that every time the military freeze politics, institutional channels are less able to contain social and political changes and conflicts. I also suspect that each coup regards itself as perfecting the previous one, correcting its mistakes. To that extent, the 1976 coup and the present military regime regard themselves as having internalised the reasons for the failure of the previous four coups. This corporate character may help to explain the conduct political discourse and policy options of the military regime.

See W. Little , Political Integration in Peronist Argentina (Cambridge University: un-published PhD Thesis, 1971). Hard bargaining was always the case, especially prior to 1952.

Peron was aware of his 'shortcoming'. One of his ministers, Dr. Oscar Albrieu, recalls that shortly before his downfall in 1955, Per6n told him, '... my problem is my uniform ...'. Interview with the author, Buenos Aires: November 1980.

See R. Potash , The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945-1962: Perón to Frondizi (London: Athlone Press, 1980), pp. 188-189.

It is interesting that the military held this belief in 1930 and would hold the same belief in 1962, 1966 and 1976.

Hence the struggle between the Army 'reds' and 'blues' and the Navy, though there is no political connotation attachable to either colour. They were the colours used by the army on manoeuvers.

See G. O'Donnell , Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley,CA: Studies in South America, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 197 3). See also G. O'Donnell , 'States and Alliances in Argentina: 1956-1976', Journal of Development Studies (Vol. 15, No. 1 October 1978 ) and 'Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State', Latin American Research Review (Vol. 12, No. 1 1978). O'Donnell employs the concept of bureaucratic-authoritarian state from S.P. Huntington, op. cit., such as mass praetorianism and the resulting political mobilisation, as well as a series of further elements, such as the name itself, from Juan Linz' typology of authoritarian regimes. O'Donnell's contribution lies in his conceptualisation of the economic and political circumstances leading to the establishment of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. For O'Donnell, the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime is brought about by the requirements of late or dependent capitalism. The reasons would be a fear of the popular sector, a desire to co-opt the popular sector, a feeling of threat by the propertied sectors and inflation. O'Donnell has also used the concept of alliances to analyse the support the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime receives and finds that such support is to be found, not surprisingly, among the internationalised bourgeoisie, the transnational corporations, the Pampean bourgeoisie and, finally, the military

It should be noted that Lanusse became President because of his position as Chairman of the Junta of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, an institutional arrangement which was to crystallise and become prevalent with the 1976 coup.

Interview by the author with Dr. Angel Federico Robledo, Minister of Defence (1973-74), later Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then Minister of the Interior (September 1975 - January 1976). Mrs. Peron made Robledo the Vice President of the Juticialista (Peronist) Party. Against the opposition of the Perorust right wing, Robledo sought to organise the party along the lines of a political party proper. His analysis was that charisma and proscription had deformed the party. The reasons for his failure are too complicated to allow for discussion here.

Taken from La Prensa, La Opinión, all issues December 1974 to April 1976. The dead reported by the press are 810. The breakdown of the dead due to acts of violence is as follows:

A view shared by Alain Rouquié, who finds that the most persistent phenomenon of 43 years of military domination (he ends his analysis in 1973) is that it would appear that the said type of domination is the revenge of the defeated by universal suffrage. See Alain Rouquié , "Póuvoir Militaire et Societé Politique en Republique Argentine", Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1978, cf. p. 681.

There was only one exception to this scarcity of coalitions which was the understanding between Perón and the Radicals between 1973-74. However, Mrs. Per6n had alienated the Radicals and other members of the FREJULI alliance by early 1975 and the coalition fell apart. See G.A. Makin, ibid.

See B. Loveman and T.M. Davies, Jr. (eds.) The Politics of Anti-Politics (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1978). For a brief extract of General Ongania's views concerning the role of the armed forces in the 1966 coup see pp. 174-176. During the almost ritual visit to West Point by a general soon to become president as a consequence of a US tolerated coup, General Ongania spelt out the politics of anti-politics. This doctrine, part of the doctrine of 'national security' is present in subtle and unsubtle ways in the teaching and textbooks at all the military academies in Argentina. In order to obtain political stability, any democratic regime will have to reform such educational practices.

See D. Cant6n , Eleciones y Partidos Politicos en la Argentina: Historia, Interpretación y Balance, 1910-1966 (Buenos Aires : Siglo XXI, 1973).

Given these facts it seems extraordinary that some journalists and economists should argue that military regimes are good for business.

One such attempt was made to Dr. Vicente Leónidas Saadi, a Peronist and former Governor and Senator for Catamarca province. It took place in September 1980 between members of the Air Force General Staff and Dr. Saadi. The officers were anxious to know what would be the attitude of a constitutional government to the excesses of the military regime. Saadi pointed out that Peronism would, at some point, become a political party proper and that no political party could either make such a promise or deliver on it once the constitution began to function. Since then there have been attempts to obtain the same ends by passing a law whereby any political party wishing to investigate the excesses of the military would be outlawed. Political parties have insisted that they will only participate in elections if there are no pre-conditions or exclusions.

These manifestations of the plans of the regime are analyzed in another essay which will appear in the July 1982 issue of International Affairs. Precise references are given to what was said in the Argentine media. Such unheard of pronouncements are related to the supposedly warlike statements of President J.D. Per6n and it is shown that it is only in 1982 that Argentine discourse shifted towards warlike pronouncements. It also shows that the British ability to understand such distinctions was undermined by a poor understanding of Argentine politics and because of a still present paranoia towards a territorial claim. Therefore, a peaceful assertion of a claim came to be regarded as warlike and, when an Argentine regime became truly warlike, there was little ability - or willingness - to perceive the distinction between one regime and another and their demonstrably different discourses. The Franks Reports has not evinced any greater ability to understand Argentine politics.

See "Falkland Islands Review, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors ", Chairman: The Rt. Hon. The Lord Franks, London, HMSO, January, 1983, cf. p. 41.

For the coverage the development received in the Argentine press, see La Nación, 'Clarin', 'La Prensa' of 11, 12 and 13th February, 1982. The barbecue for 13,000 guests, the speeches and other announcements were regarded with considerable disquiet.

Several extensive telephone interviews with Dr. A. Illia, Dr. R. Alfonsin, Dr. A. Trócoli, Dr. A. Cafiero, Dr. A.F. Robledo, Mr. A. Framini, Dr. O. Albrieu and Gen. A.N. Laplane, April-June, 1982.

See Malcolm Deas , "Falkland Islands Title Deeds", London Review of Books, 19 August - 2 September 1982 , pp. 15-17 for a debunking of British myths concerning the past of the islands.

Reported to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, by Mr J.C. Walford, representing Barclays Bank Int. on 22-xi-82. The full text of the testimony and other components of the report are forthcoming. The Report is "to consider the future of British foreign policy in relation to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Antartica and adjacent South American states, making use of: a) the Franks report ... and b) evidence from Government Departments and other sources at home and overseas ..." as released to the press on 12-vii-82.

Telephone interview with Dr O. Albricu, 18 November 1982.