Who Pulled Whom and How Much? Britain,the United States and the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty

Joyce and Gabriel Kolko , The Limits of Power. The World and United States Foreign Policy 1945-1954. ( New York: Harper & Row, 1972 ). p. 499. Another revisionist, Stephen Ambrose, sees NATO as much more of an American initiative with the (supposedly intended) effect of making Europe 'for the American businessman, soldier and foreign policy maker, another Latin America.' Stephen E. Ambrose , Rise to Globalism. American Foreign Policy 1938-1976. (London: Allen Lane, Penguin 1976), p. 177. Traditionalist view-points can be found in e.g. Herbert Feis , From Trust to Terror. The Onset of the Cold War (New York : W. W. Norton. 1970); and Louis J. Halle , The Cold War as History. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967). For a post-revisionist viewpoint see Daniel Yergin , Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 337. 362 and 364.

Geir Lundestad , America, Scandinavia and the Cold War 1945-1949. (New York : Columbia University Press, 1980 ), p. 335.

The Canadian role is analysed in Escott Reid , Time of Fear and Hope. The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949. ( Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977). Mr. Reid has been able to use the files of the Ministry of External Affairs. Ottawa. Norwegian and Danish files are now open for research on a restricted basis and are used in Nikoiaj Petersen , 'Danish and Norwegian Alliance Policies 1948-49: A Comparative Analysis', Cooperation and Conflict (XIV, 1979), pp. 159-170; and 'Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty, 1948-49', Review of International Studies (forthcoming).

Escott Reid cites his own speech on August 13, 1947 and that of his superior, Canadian Foreign Minister St. Laurent on September 18, 1947, as the first public suggestions of a Western Alliance. However, these speeches did not have any perceptible effect on later developments. Escott Reid also mentions the effect of Hamilton Fish Armstrong's article in the New York Times on September 14, 1947, which in his view strongly influenced John D. Hickerson, Director of the State Department's European Office, and Gladwyn Jebb. Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office. Hickerson and Jebb came to play key roles in the making of American and British policies respectively. See Escott Reid, op. cit., pp. 30-36.

FRUS 1947, vol. II, p. 815.

J.W.P.C. 453, March 27. 1946: Disposition of Occupation Forces in Europe... in the Event of Hostilities in Europe... RG 218: Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, N.A.: CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), sec. 5.

J.W.P.C. 432/6 (Revised), June 14, 1946: Tentative Over-All Concept and Estimate of Initial Operations, Short Title: "Pincher". RG 319: Records of the Army Staff, N.A.: A.B.C. 381 USSR (2 March 1946), sec. 1-A.

Memo for record, January 7, 1948. RG 218: Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, N.A.: CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48), sec. 1.

The American plan was codenamed HALFMOON (J.C.S. 1844/4), the British DOUB-LEQUICK. See memos from Gen. Wedemeyer to Chief of Staff, USA, May 11 & 12, 1948. RG 319: Records of the Army Staff, N.A.: P & 0 381 TS, case 121/7.

FRUS 1947, 11, p. 817.

January 9, 1948. F.O. 371/73045 (The number after the oblique stroke is the present PRO file number, not the original Foreign Office file designation).

FRUS 1948, vol. III, pp. 4-6. In a top secret telegram of the same day Bevin told Ambassador Inverchapel in Washington that he was considering how best to tackle this problem and advised the Ambassador not to broach it in the meantime: Tel. 437, January 13, 1948. F.O. 371/73045.

FRUS 1948. vol. III, pp. 6-7. According to Theodore C. Achilles, who was Hickerson's closest collaborator at the time, Hickerson mentioned the need for a military alliance in a private conversation as early as New Year's Eve. Interview with author, December 10, 1979.

Ibid., pp. 9-10.

Ibid., pp. 7-8.

Marshall to Inverchapel, January 20, 1948. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

See memo of conversation between Inverchapel and Lovett, January 27, 1948. Ibid., p. 12. Achilles states that Marshall was hesitant, but nevertheless authorized Hickerson to convey his ideas to Lord Inverchapel as representing those of the European bureau. Apparently Hickerson failed to make this reservation when talking with Lord Inverchapel on January 21. Theodore C. Achilles , 'US Role in Negotiations that Led to Atlantic Alliance', NATO Review, August 1979, p. 12.

FRUS 1948. vol. III, pp. 14-16.

Ibid., pp. 12-14.

Lovett to Inverchapel, February 2 1948. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

Memo of conversation between Lovett, Hickerson and Inverchapel, February 7, 1948. Ibid., pp. 21-23.

Bevin's record of conversation. FO 371/73069. Ambassador Douglas also got the impression that Bevin's ideas were rather vague: 'I could not determine whether Bevin made this suggestion as a slanting effect to entangle us at the moment in Europe quasi-military alliances, but I rather doubt that this was his motive ...'. Tel. 755, February 26, 1948. FRUS 1948, vol. III, p. 33.

Lange's records of conversation. File no. 25.2/63, Department of Foreign Affairs, Oslo.

FRUS 1948, vol. III, p. 47.

March 4, 1948. D.S. 840.00/3-448.

FRUS 1948, vol. III, pp. 40-42. By this time other State Department officials had also initiated concrete discussions of the future U.S. role in Western European defense. See e.g. memo by Blaisdell (of the Office of UN Affairs) on the 'Terms of US Adherence to a Western European Pact', March 6, 1948. D.S. 840.20/3-648.

Jean Edward Smith , ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. Germany 1945-1949. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 568.

J.C.S. 1844, March 9, 1948: Short Range Emergency Plan. RG 218: Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, N.A. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), sec. 13: Glover to Maj. Gen. Gruenther, March 13, 1948. Ibid.

Walter Millis , ed., The Forrestal Diaries. ( New York: The Viking Press, 1951 ), p. 395.

Tel. 983, March 1, 1948, from Inverchapel. F.O. 371/73050.

D.S. FW 840.20/3-1148.

Memo from Marshall to Lovett, March 12, 1948. D.S. 711.00/3-1248.

Marshall to Inverchapel, March 12, 1948. On the same day Marshall informed Bidautt that the United States, after studying the Brussels Pact, would be ready to discuss further steps with the Brussels countries. These discussions were not initiated until July, see below. FRUS 1948, vol. Ill, pp. 48 and 50.

Cf. Marshall to Embassy in Oslo March 12, 1948. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

Address to Congress March 17, 1948. Ibid., pp. 54-55.

RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, N.A.: Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953, Minutes of Meetings (Box 32).

Memo by George H. Butler (PPS) March 19, 1948. FRUS 1948, vol. III, pp. 58-59.

Ibid., pp. 61-64.

Memo on 'Pentagon Talks', April 5, 1948. F.O. 371/73069.

FRUS 1948, vol. III, pp. 72-75. In the first meeting with the British and Canadian representatives Hickerson had noted that 'an ultimate worldwide Art. 51 agreement might be the best goal'; in the next meeting this concept was abandoned, however, as too unpractical. Ibid., pp. 61, 64. In the end, the following countries were seen as potential members of a North Atlantic treaty: the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Eire, Italy and Portugal.

Ibid., pp. 85-88. The document did not come up for discussion and approval in a formal NSC meeting.

Cf. paraphrase of tel, from Bevin, April 9, 1948. Ibid., pp. 79-80. Joint message from Bevin and Bidault, April 17, 1948. Ibid., p. 91.

Ibid., pp. 96-97. Interview with John D. Hickerson, January 15, 1980.

FRUS 1948, vol. III, records three such contacts; on April 11, April 18 and April 27 (in which also Secretary Marshall and John D. Foster Dulles took part). Ibid., pp. 82-84, 92-96, and 104-08. But contacts between the two were much more frequent and intimate. See Daryl J. Hudson , 'Vandenberg Reconsidered: Senate Resolution 239 and American Foreign Policy', Diplomatic History, (vol. 1, 1977), pp. 46-63.

FRUS 1948, vol. III, p. 82.

Ibid., p. 136.

Ibid., p. 109.

We may only guess what made Hickerson subscribe to a programme which represented a substantial weakening of his own policy line. Perhaps he felt increasingly isolated on the sidelines during the broadening domestic debate in April and accepted the paper as a tolerable compromise averting a further weakening of the American commitment. At any rate he told a member of the British embassy staff in late April 'that he was still not fully in the picture'. Tel. 2068 from Inverchapd April 30, 1948. F.O. 371/73069.

FRUS 1949, vol. III. pp. 116-118.

These were expressed in the Senate hearings in May over the proposed Vandenberg Resolution. The Vandenberg Resolution. Hearings held in Executive Session ... Washington: G.P.O., 1973.

FRUS 1948, vol. III, pp. 140-141.

It was not until April 2 that the J.C.S. took the initiative to set up an ad hoc group to study the military implications of U.S. alliances in Europe. J.S,P.C. memo April 2, 1948. RG 218: Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, N.A.: CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48), sec. 1.

J.C.S. 1868/1, April 17, 1948: The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Europe and other Related Free Countries. Ibid. Cf. J.C.S. 1868/6, May 17, 1948: (same title).

Ibid. 54. See e.g. tel. to Embassy in France, May 14, 1948: '1 told him (French Ambassador Bonnet) we had never considered any form of guarantee and he and his Govt would do well to avoid any such thought...'. FRUS 1948, vol. Ill, p. 121.

See memo of conversation Achilles-Maclean, May 19, 1948. Ibid., pp. 127-128.

See e.g. memo of conversation Balfour-Bohlen, May 1, 1948. FO 371/73070. And tel. 2383 from Inverchapel, May 20, 1948. Ibid. The concern of the Foreign Office came through when in a telegram to Washington it was said that in view of the doubts expressed by 'certain important members of the State Department' it was desirable that Kennan and Bohlen participate in the coming talks. 'Many of our difficulties since last may seem to be attributable to their exclusion from the Pentagon discussions'. Tel. 6866, JUne 25, 1948. F.O. 371/73071.

Kirkpatrick minute, April 14, 1948, F.O. 371/73069.

FRUS, 1948, vol. III, pp. 122-123.

Lovett to British Charge (Balfour) May 28, 1948. Ibid., pp. 132-134.

Bevin specifically referred to the danger that France would 'run out on our plan for Germany' and that Scandinavia might go neutral. See tel. 5909 to Washington. F.O. 371/73070.

FRUS 1948, vol. III, pp. 138-139.

Kennan's expression in a memo of May 24, 1948. Ibid., p. 128.

Ibid., p. 139.

Gladwyn Jebb minute dated June 25. 1948. F.O, 371/73071.

Minute dated June 16. Ibid.

FRUS 1948, vol. III, p. 238.

Ibid., pp. 237-48.

In a Foreign Office memo commenting on the first WET meetings Lovett's position was evaluated in the following way: 'The general impression ... is (a) that he was rather at sea, (b) that he was consciously playing for time, or (c) that it was a bit of both. Personally I am in favour of (c) F.O. 371/73074.

This expression was used in an (unsigned) letter to U.S. Ambassador Caffery, Paris, August 24, 1948. D.S. 840.20/8-2448. In an appreciation of the WET talks after the first week of negotiations the British Embassy in Washington noted that the Americans 'still feel that they are in the position of a kind of fairy godmother handing out favours to the less fortunate Western European countries-provided always that the latter can justify their claims for such favours'. Memo dated July 13, 1948. F.O. 371/73074.

See e.g. FRUS 1948, vol. III, p. 156.

In this he had the strong support of important domestic groups. In April Senator Vandenberg had 'pointed out the importance of trying to bring Scandinavia in in some way as that had great vote appeal in the Senate...' FRUS 1948, vol. III, p. 105. Iceland and Greenland were the only strategic areas specifically discussed in the Senate hearing in May 1948 (by Senator Lodge). The Vandenberg Resolution. Hearings held in Executive Session ... Washington 1973, p. 12. Ever since World War II American military planners had seen the retention of military bases in Greenland and Iceland as absolutely essential for the defense of the United States and for communications with Western Europe. E.g. of the 30 base locations listed in a SWNCC paper of June 1946 (SWNCC 38/35) only six were listed as 'essential'. 'Of these six Iceland, Greenland and the Azores are of outstanding importance'. State Department Lot Files, N.A. RG 353: SWNCC Papers 1944-49, box. 12.

See memo August 31, 1948. D.S. 840,00/8-3148.

This was also the impression of British Minister Hoyer Millar in a letter to Gladwyn Jebb, August 23, 1948: 'Latterly, he (i.e. Kennan), and Bohlen for that matter, have seemed to come down much more on the treaty side of the fence'. F.O. 371/73075.

See memo August 31, 1948. FRUS 1948, vol. III, p. 225.

Tel. 6988 to Washington, June 28, 1948. F.O. 371/73071.

Tel. 4324 from Washington, September 10, 1948. F.O. 371/73076.

Bohlen told Gladwyn Jebb on July 28, that 'if we firmly told the Americans that Brussels could not be extended at the present time, or from a military point of view it was in our opinion undesirable to do so, he thought the Americans would take this in the last resort'. Jebb minute, F.O. 371/73074.

Lovett to Embassy in France, November 9, 1948. FRUS 1948, vol. III, p. 271.

PPS 43, dated November 24, 1948. According to a note on the memo Marshall orally indicated his agreement with its views. Ibid., pp. 283-289. Hickerson wrote a rejoinder on November 27, 1948. D.S. 840.20/12-148.

Minutes of meeting December 9, 1948. FRUS 1948, vol. III, pp. 315-321.

On November 2, 1948 the Cabinet approved a paper according to which questions of membership should not be allowed to delay the negotiations or the conclusion of the treaty: 'any country whose attitude proves likely to cause delay should be at once discarded'. F.O. 371/73080.

At a meeting on December 9, 1948, between Minister Hoyer Millar and Hickerson it was agreed to concentrate on getting Denmark and Norway in as full members and leaving Sweden to care for herself. See memo by Hickerson December 9, 1948 (D.S. 840.20/12-948), and letter from Hoyer Millar to Kirkpatrick, December 13, 1948. F.O. 371/71455. On this particular aspect of British-U.S. relations, see Nikolaj Petersen , 'Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty, 1948-49', Review of International Studies (Forthcoming).

See Report of the International Working Group to the Ambassadors' Committee , December 24, 1948. The Committee approved the report on the same day for submission to their respective governments. FRUS 1948, vol. III, pp. 333-343.

Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 4, 5.

We may refine the analysis by nuancing the concepts of power or influence. In the literature on international power there is a growing, though still not very explicit recognition of the need to differentiate the concept and to see it as a two- rather than a one-dimensional phenomenon, with one dimension being represented by concepts such as 'offensive power', 'active power' or just 'power', the other by notions like 'defensive power', 'passive power' or 'sensitivity/vulnerability'. The most sensitive conceptualisation may have been presented by Peter Hansen, who distinguishes between 'influence capability' denoting a country's ability to control and manipulate its external environment aad to structure it according to its own values, and 'stress sensitivity' which represents the degree to which societal structures and the distribution of societal values are affected by changes in and demands from the external environment. On these concepts see Kjell Goldmann , 'The International Power Structure: Traditional Theory and New Reality', in Kjell Goldmann & Gunnar Sjostedt, eds., Power, Capabilities, Interdependence: New Perspectives on International Power, (Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 7-36. Klaus Knorr , The Power of Nations. The Political Economy of International Relations. ( New York: Basic Books, 1975). R.O. Keohane & J.S. Nye , Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition ( Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977). Peter Hansen , "Adaptive Behavior of Small States: The Case of Denmark and the European Community', The Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, (vol. II, 1974), pp. 143-175. The two concepts have been further developed in Nikolaj Petersen , 'Adaptation as a Framework for the Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior', Cooperation and Conflict, XII, 1977, pp. 221-250, and Nikolaj Petersen , 'International Power and Foreign Policy Behavior', in K. Goldmann & G. Sjostedt, eds., op. cit, pp. 235-269.

In fact, the United States in 1948 had very tittle military hardware to distribute, but this only increased its bargaining power.

Tel. 3625 from Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas, London to State Department, August 12, 1948. D.S. 711.41/8-1148.

FOr instance, it appears that Britain accepted the stationing of U.S. B-29 bombers in the summer of 1948 without trying to elicit any quid pro quo from the United States.