For examples of this renaissance see especially M. D. Donelan (ed.), The Reason of States; A Study of International Political Theory (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978); W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978); F. Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Redations: A Study in the History of Thought ( Beverly Hills, Sage Library of Social Research, 1977).
2.
Pufendorfs key works are The Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, first published in 1660 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1931); The Law of Nature and Nations, first published in 1672 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934); The Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen According to the Natural Law, first published in 1673 (New York, Clarendon Press, 1927).
3.
Two other examples of what may be termed the "classical" theory of the states-system are E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (New York, Oceana Publications, 1964) and C. Wolff, Jus Gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934).
4.
G. P. Maximoff (ed.), The Political Philosophy of Bakunin (London1964), p. 137.
5.
C. Phillipson, "Samuel von Pufendorf" in J. McDonnel and E. Manson, Great Jurists of the World (New York, N. J.Rothman Reprints, 1968), p. 316. For a general account of Pufendorf's thought, see L. Krieger, The Politics of Discretion: Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press , 1965).
6.
Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, p. 8, p. 212, p. 342; see also Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, p. 240.
7.
Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, p. 1330.
8.
Pufendorf, Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen, p. 48.
9.
Grotius, The Law of War and Peace (Oxford, Clarendon Press , 1925), p. 15.
10.
Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, p. 103.
11.
Pufendorf, Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen, p. 49.
12.
Ibid., p. 157.
13.
Ibid., p. 48.
14.
Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, p. 274; see also Pufendorf , The Law of Nature and Nations, p. 169.
15.
Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, p. 949.
16.
Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, p. 242.
17.
Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, p. 958.
18.
Pufendorf, Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen, p. 106.
19.
Ibid., p. 968.
20.
Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jursiprudence, p. 237.
21.
Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, p. 163.
22.
Kant, Perpetual Peace, in M. G. Forsyth, H. M. A. Keens-Soper and P. Savigear (eds.), The Theory of International Relations: Selected Texts from Gentili to Treitschke (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 211.
23.
See S. Hoffman , "Rousseau on War and Peace," in The State of War (London, Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 65-67.
24.
Kant, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmo-political Point of View, in Forsyth et al., p. 183.
25.
Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, p. 236; see also Pufendorf , The Law of Nature and Nations, p. 213.
26.
Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, p. 163.
27.
Pufendorf, Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen, p. 48.
28.
Treitschke, quoted in R. Aron, Peace and War Among Nations ( London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966), pp. 486-587.
29.
Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, p. 103; see also Pufendorf , Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen, p. 42.
30.
Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, p. 380.
31.
Ibid., pp. 974-975.
32.
Ibid., p. 1009.
33.
Ibid.
34.
Ibid., p. 147.
35.
Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, p. 165.
36.
For Pufendorf's discussion of states-systems, see The Law of Nature and Nations, pp. 1043-1051.
37.
Pufendorf, Two Books on the Duty of Man and Citizen, p. 121.
38.
Ibid., p. 144.
39.
Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, p. 163.
40.
Ibid., p. 1068.
41.
H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics ( London, Macmillan, 1977), pp. 152-153.
42.
This is true, for example, of Wolffs Jus Gentium and Vattel's The Law of Nations, but it also applies to Locke's Two Treatises of Government.
43.
Sir Robert Filmer, "The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy" in P. Laslett (ed.), Patriarcha and Other Political Works (Oxford, Blackwell, 1949), p. 285.
44.
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 378-379.
45.
B. Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 133.
46.
Ibid., pp. 128-129.
47.
Rawls, Theory of Justice , p. 378.
48.
Barry, Liberal Theory of Justice, p. 133.
49.
R.G. Grice, The Grounds of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 152.
50.
Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 33.
51.
Kant's application of the idea of consent to the relations between states appears, for example, in his discussion of the principle of publicity, Perpetual Peace, in Forsyth et al., Theories of International Relations, p. 213 and pp. 238-239.
52.
A good contemporary discussion is S. Lukes, Essays in Social Theory, ( London, Macmillan, 1977), Part 2.
53.
This critique of Kant originates with Hegel , The Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 90.
54.
For a discussion of this development in connection with Meinecke's thought see R. Sterling, Ethics in a World of Power: The Political Ideas of Meinicke ( Princeton,Princeton University Press, 1958).
55.
One possibility draws upon the resources of philosophical history. The assault upon the idea of a suprahistorical ethic undermined the traditional method of grounding obligations to humanity. But the advocates of the historical approach did not defend an ethical relativism which supported the primacy of vertical divisions within international society. This is especially evident in the writings of Marx. For Marx, as for Kant and Hegel, human history was to be regarded as a process of development whereby man elevated himself above the merely natural world. History was the medium in which free beings created a "second nature," the world of culture. That world was defective for Marx to the extent that it stood over its maker and escaped his control. Human history would begin properly when the species, in controlling its social world, exhibited the triumph of mind over nature. The application of this perspective to theorising about international relations has yet to be attempted. Suffice it to say that by these criteria the states-system may be judged an obstacle to the establishment of a humanly-controlled social environment; and from the same basis arises the obligation to transform it.
