See for example, J. Zysman, "The State as Trader," International Affairs (Vol. 54, No. 2, April 1978), pp. 264-281; P. Katzenstein, "Domestic and International Forces and strategies of foreign economic policy," International Organisation (Vol. 31, No. 4, Autumn 1977), pp. 587-607; "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," International Organisation (Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 1976), pp. 147, and S. Warnecke (ed.), International Trade and Industrial Policies (London: MacMillan, 1978 ).
2.
See Zysman op. cit., p. 265.
3.
For a study of attempts to impose collective solutions to trade problems see S. Strange, "The Management of Surplus Capacity: or how does theory stand up to protectionism 1970's style?" International Organisation (Vol. 33, No. 3, Summer 1979), pp. 303-335.
4.
E. Haas, "Turbulent fields and the theory of regional integration," International Organisation (Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring 1976), pp. 173-213.
5.
Ibid. p. 197.
6.
For a detailed study of EEC textile policy which stresses the effect of recession and trade turbulence on the Community's attitude towards the renewal of the MFA from 1974-78 see C. Farrands, "Textile Diplomacy: The Making and Implementation of European Textile Policy 1974-78" Journal of Common Market Studies (Vol. XVIII, No. 1, September 1979), pp. 22-39.
7.
For details of Eastern European textile agreements with the Community see, The European Communities and the Countries of Eastern Europe, External Relations Information Document, Commission of the European Communities, May 1978, p. 2. Also Farrands op. cit. for the general impact of the MFA on low cost suppliers.
8.
See for example, the view of Third World countries participating in the GATT trade negotiations, reported in The Guardian, December 30, 1978. This view of the Community's involvement in trade relations was also taken by Soviet and Eastern European commentators, for example, A. Manzhulov, "On Soviet Foreign Trade Relations in the Light of the Helsinki Accords," Foreign Trade (No. 10, 1978), pp. 16-24 and the comments of a Polish trade official reported in The Banker, May 1978, p. 23.
9.
The report was summarised in Bulletin of the European Communities718, 1978, pp. 26-27. For union reaction see The Guardian December 30, 1978 .
10.
For the Anti-Crisis Plan see Bulletin of the European Communities (No. 12, 1977), pp. 6-8.
11.
The European Community and the Countries of Eastern Europe, op. cit., p. 3.
12.
For a detailed study of recent developments in the Western European chemical industry see European Chemical News, Chemscope, European Review, July 21, 1978.
13.
The Commission has been pressured over the issue of compensation trade and socialist states "dumping" chemical products on Western markets by individual companies such as Hoechst (West Germany), I.C.I. (United Kingdom), Creusot-Loire (France), Solvay (Belgium), Monsanto (Italy) and Shell (U.K. and Holland). Representations have also been made by their European trade association, CEFIC (the European Council of Chemical Industry Federations) calling for stronger anti-dumping action on 15 socialist chemical imports, a common European reference price for chemical products and greater supervision over compensation deals. British and German chemical trade unions have also urged action on the East European chemical trade. For details see P. Marsh "Multinational Corporations and the Development of East-West Detente: A Case Study of Corporate Involvement in Western Foreign Economic Policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univeristy of Manchester, 1979.
14.
European Chemical News, June 16, 1978.
15.
For the Commission's original decision to oppose the cartel see The Guardian, July 27, 1978. For the subsequent unofficial operation and tensions within the Commission which led to its abolition, see European Chemical News, December 24-31, 1979.
16.
For details of Commission anti-dumping action against Eastern European chemical imports see European Chemical News, June 23, 1978, and March 5, 1979.
17.
The prospect of Community action against American synthetic fibre imports also indicated the pressure on the Commission from sections of the Western European chemicals industry for protective measures, as did similar action taken by the Commission against Eastern European tyre imports, see The Guardian, March 19, 1980, and March 31, 1980.
18.
The Banker, May 1978, p. 3, and European Chemical News, European Review, op. cit.
19.
European Chemical News, July 22, 1977.
20.
For a summary of Soviet and Eastern European moves towards negotiating with the Commission see P. Marsh, "The Development of Relations between the E.E.C. and the C.M.E.A." in A. Shlaim and G. Yannopoulos (eds.), The E.E.C. and Eastern Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 25-71.
21.
For the respective attitudes of the Soviet Union and Eastern European states to CMEA integration see P. Marsh "The Integration Process in Eastern Europe 1968 to 1975" Journal of Common Market Studies, June 1976, pp. 311-335.
22.
Whilst most of the socialist states now devote a sizeable share of their total trade to trade with the West, Poland and Hungary appear to have the largest deficits with the Community and Poland also has a sizeable debt outstanding to Western banks. For details see "The European Communities and the Countries of Eastern Europe" op. cit. p. 9.
23.
The relative powers of the Community and the CMEA in foreign economic policy are well summed up in J. Pinder, "Integration Groups and Trade Negotiations ," Government and Opposition (Vol. 14, No. 2, 1979), pp. 149-172.
24.
As pointed out by P. Wiles and A. Smith, "The Convergence of the C.M.E.A. on the E.E.C." in Shlaim and Yannopoulos op. cit, pp. 71-107.
25.
Romania agreed to open negotiations with the Community on a trade agreement in early 1979 and concluded such an agreement in June 1980, see The Guardian, July 1, 1980. In April 1980, Commissioner Haferkamp cancelled talks with the CMEA Secretary, Feddeyev, on the grounds that protracted negotiations between the two sides had failed to produce progress towards a framework agreement. The Commission's view was still that the CMEA had little to offer in the way of power over foreign trade matters to warrant serious negotiations. It preferred to pursue bilateral relations with the socialist states and the limit relations with the CMEA to exchange of information on technical and statistical matters. In June, the Community announced that it would resume talks with the CMEA on a framework agreement after receiving a letter from the CMEA Secretary, urging the need for such an agreement as a basis for bilateral negotiations between individual socialist states and the Community. For details see The Guardian, July 1, 1980.