The Japanese Constitution and Japan's Security Policy

]. Chapter II, Article IX of the Constitution of Japan, promulgated on November 3, 1946, effective on May 3, 1947 (U.S. Department of State , Publication 2836, Far Eastern Series 22, 1947), pp. 2-3.

The terms of the Kellogg-Briand Pact were as follows:

Article I: " The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."

Article II: " The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means." Documents on International Affairs: 1928 (London, Oxford University Press, 1929), pp. 1-2.

The English Historian, D.C. Somervell , wrote: "the Kellogg Pact may be regarded as entirely meaningless, and it was perhaps for this reason that no country made any difficulty about signing it." ( D.C. Somervell , Between the Wars, London, Methuen & Co. , 1948, pp. 63-64.)

Martin E. Weinstein , Japanese Postwar Defence Policy: 1947-1968 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1971), hardly mentions Article IX.

A definitive view of the origins of Art. IX should emerge once historians have sifted the official Japanese records of the Occupation. About 10 per cent. of the material (approximately 100,000 pages) was declassified in the summer of 1976. For a more handy discussion of the historical background, the reader is referred to Theodore McNelly , " The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution." Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXVII, No. 3, September 1962, pp. 350-378); also, John K. Emmerson , Arms, Yen and Power: The Japanese Dilemma (New York, Dunellen, 1971), pp. 50-53.

McNelly, pp. 374-375.

Frank C. Langdon , Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1973), p. 25. McNelly also refers to other slight differences, p. 350, note 1.

S. Shigeru Yoshida , The Yoshida Memoirs (Translated by Kenichi Yoshida, London , Heinemann, 1961), pp. 139-140; Shunpei Ueyama , "Wanted an Autonomous Approach to Defence " (Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, Vol. IV, No. 1, April 1966), p. 46. This view was reinforced in 1949 by the Chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, when he gave it as an official interpretation that Article IX also renounced a war for self-defence. Masao Maruyama , " Some Reflections on Article IX of the Constitution " in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (edited by Ivan Morris, London, Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 291.

Article 5 (c) stipulates that: " The Allied Powers for their part recognise that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements." In a previous section of the Article, Japan promises to give the United Nations assistance under the terms of the Charter, which, at least in theory, might include a call for military measures against an aggressor and a readiness to make the necessary means available to the Organisation. Documents on International Affairs: 1951 (London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), p. 614.

U.S. Department of State. Bulletin. Vol. XXV, No. 638, Publication 4362, September 17, 1951, p. 464.

U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. XLII, No. 1076, Publication 6938, February 8, 1960, pp. 184-185.

" Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major change in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan." (Exchange of Notes Incorporating Agreed Consultation Formula, Washington , January 19, 1960, ibid. p. 198).

"... The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security.... The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan." (My italics.) U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. LXI, No. 1590, December 15, 1969, p. 555.

For a detailed discussion of the LDP and constitutional revision, see Chapter 8 in Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy-Making (Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1970), pp. 198-226.

David R. Hopper , " Defense Policy and the Business Community: The Keidanren Defense Production Committee," in James H. Buck (ed.), The Modern Japanese Military System (Beverley Hills, Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 142, 147 note 88. See also, Joachim Glaubitz , Die Aussenund Sicherheitspolitik Japans: Grundlagen und Ansätze einer Neuorientierung (Eggensberg, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik , January 1973), pp. 54-55.

For a discussion of the activities of industrial interests, see Hopper , pp.117, 119-120, 122, 124-126, 134; Chitoshi Yanaga. Big Business in Japanese Politics (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 44 note 36, 132, 136, 253-262. The recent discussions about the export of arms and the modification of official policy are reported in The Japan Times Weekly, December 27, 1975, February 14, 1976, March 6, 1976.

Kõmeitõ was founded in 1963. It is based on the Nichiren Buddhist sect, Soka Gakkai, although it has recently severed official connections with it. For a general statement of the Party's position on defence, see Junya Yano , " Japan and the Role of Kömeitö," Contemporary Japan, March 1970, pp. 228-244. 18.

The DSP was formed in January 1960 by a break-away group from the JSP, partly because of differences over foreign and security policies. It has since developed into a moderate conservative group. For its overall position on defence, see Eki Sonc , " On Okinawa and U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," Contemporary Japan, March 1970, pp. 245-255.

Masatsugu Ishibashi , " Japan's Decision in 1970 and Unarmed Neutrality ," Contemporary Japan, March 1970, pp. 226-227. For a full treatment of JSP policy, see J.A.A. Stockwin , The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and its Foreign Policy (London , Melbourne University Press, 1968 ).

Statement by Seiichi Katsumata , Chairman of the Party's Policy Review Committee, The Japan Times Weekly, September 27, 1975. See also the proposals for an integrated step-by-step approach to the security problem, which included replacement of the SDF by "National Guards " and "National Construction Units," made bv three socialist members of the Diet. Ibid. January 3, 1976.

Ibid. February 7, 1976.

Ibid. February 10, 1973, September 15, 1973, January 17, 1976, February 7, 1976.

For a general discussion of popular attitudes see Douglas Mendel , " Public Views of the Japanese Defense System," in Buck , The Modern Japanese Military System, pp. 149-177.

The legality of the SDF was tested in 1952 and 1959. On both occasions the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution does not forbid the right of self-defence, or the right to sign a security treaty which provides for the stationing of foreign troops on Japanese soil. However, using various pretexts, it has avoided ruling on the question of the constitutionality of the SDF. A recent challenge arose from the Naganuma case, in which a group of farmers in Hokkaido challenged the constitutionality of the SDF when contesting a decision of the Ministry of Agriculture to remove the designation of forest-preserve from the area, so that a Nike missile base could be built there. On September 7, 1973, the Judge of the Sapporo District Court ruled the SDF unconstitutional on the basis of Article IX, which had to be carried out in the " spirit of eternal peace contained in the Constitution as a whole." The Government appealed and the Sapporo High Court reversed the decision on the same grounds put forward by the Supreme Court in the past. Even more recently, a District Court for the first time ruled in favour of the constitutionality of the SDF.

For a full examination of the origins of Japanese security policy, see Weinstein, especially Chaps. 2 and 3.

The dates of the Plans are as follows: First Plan: 1958-60, Second Plan: 1962-66, Third Plan: 1967-71, Fourth Plan: 1972-76. For more detailed information about them, see " The Evolution of Japan's Defense Plan ," The Japan Interpreter, Vol. VIII, No. 2, Spring 1973, pp. 214-218. The most up-to-date information about Japan's military strength is in The Military Balance 1977-78 (London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), pp. 59-60.

White Paper on the Defense of Japan (Defense Agency, Tokyo, 1976), pp. 128-132; The Military Balance 1977-78, p. 83.

Weinstein, pp. 78-80.

The Military Balance 1977-78, pp. 82-83.

The debate has been revived more sharply with the decision to purchase 100 F-15 Fighters, see The Japan Times Weekly, January 7 and February 4, 1978.

"The possession of long or medium-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs or IRBMs), attack carriers or long-range bombers, for example, or the despatch of armed forces, with the intent of exercising military power to foreign territory, must certainly be regarded as exceeding the limits of self-defense recognized by the Constitution," Defense of Japan, p. 32.

There have been several examples of such statements. One of the earliest was by Prime Minister Kishi in 1957, see John E. Endicott , Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical, and Strategic Factors (New York, Praeger, 1975), p. 42. A more recent example has been a statement by Prime Minister Tanaka in 1973. Ibid. pp. 42-43; Yomiuri, March 15, 1973.

Defense of Japan, p. 33.

Among the contingencies listed are " limited aggression"; neighbouring conflicts " spreading to this nation "; " any invasion of our land, air or sea space"; surveying and data-gathering activities; resisting indirect aggression, i.e. large-scale disturbances or uprisings caused by " agitation or intervention of one or more foreign powers"; small-scale surprise attacks. Ibid pp. 33, 39-40, 51.

Ibid pp. 58-59, also pp. 7, 44, 48, 60.