For Germany's war aims in 1914-18, see F. Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (Chatto and Windus, 1967), and in the second world war, W.A. Carr, Arms, Autarky and Aggression (Arnold, 1972), and N. Rich, Hitler's War Aims (André Deutsch, 2 vols., 1973-74).
2.
V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (Macmillan, 1973), provides a detailed discussion of the role of the naval programme in the domestic and foreign policies of Germany.
3.
It is a matter of some dispute among western authorities as to whether or not the Russian proposals for a neutralised Germany were genuine. I have assumed that they were, although the issue is marginal to present purposes. The more traditional western view on the Russian proposals is well expressed in J.L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance (Harvard U.P., 1966); the mildly revisionist line followed here, in P. Windsor, German Re-unification (Elek, 1969).
4.
D. Pickles, The Government and Politics of France (Methuen, 1973), Vol. II, p. 235.
5.
See H. Von Brentano , Germany and Europe: Reflections an German Foreign Policy (Andre Deutsch, 1964), p. 58, for the former Foreign Minister's disparaging dismissal in 1952 of the analogy drawn by Erich Ollenhauer.
6.
U. Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion (Thames and Hudson,. 1973), p. 98.
7.
Metternich's celebrated advice to his Emperor on assuming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the unpropitious circumstances of 1809, following Austria's defeat at the Battle of Wagram, is quoted by E.L. Woodward, Three Essays in European Conservatism (Cass, 1963 edition) p. 17 note 1.
8.
Kitzinger, op. cit p. 71.
9.
For instance in the opening chapter of Brandt's programmatic A Peace Policy for Europe (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).
10.
This aphorism, culled from Mein Kampf, is quoted in M. Wight, Power Politics (R.I.I.A., 1946), p. 27.
