The following extracts have been chosen to represent the stated views of some of the major partioipants in disarmament negotiations and of a cross-section of other states. They are taken from Chapter I of the 1974 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference (GOAR: 29th Session, Supplement No. 28; UN Doc. A/9628), where each statement is attributed by document reference to a specific meeting of the First Committee or other UN source. Here, for convenience, the year from which each statement dates is given in place of the UN document reference.
2.
Algeria: "It is the aim of the non-aligned countries, in order to ensure the conditions for true worldwide security, to achieve GCD through a worldwide conference." 1973
3.
China: " If a WDC is to be convened, it must help promote the struggle of the people of various countries against the imperialist policies of aggression and war, it must be truly conducive to world peace, and it must not allow the one or two super-Powers to carry out arms expansion and war preparations under the name of disarmament...." Recalling its preconditions,* China stated that " If the two super-Powers have no intention even to do these elementary things, while some of them still keep on talking about convening a WDC and making preparations for it, their talk is not worth a penny, and that only shows that they harbour ulterior motives.... The Chinese delegation categorically cannot agree to, nor will it ever participate in, such a WDC and its preparatory work." 1972
4.
China " has always held that in the present world situation, the key to the question of disarmament lies in the nuclear disarmament of the two super-Powers. If a WDC is to be held, clear objectives must be set and the necessary conditions must be created, so as to break the nuclear threat of the super-Powers and to ensure that the conference will be conducive to the realisation of nuclear disarmament. Failing this ... it is better not to hold such a conference at all." 1973
5.
India: Convinced that the WDC " would promote the cause of GCD provided that adequate preparations were made with the participation of all States." 1974 The two preconditions for the participation of one nuclear-Power State were " most valid and vital considerations " and " should not be treated as preconditions but should be included as one of the first and most important items before the proposed WDC." 1972
6.
Mexico: "... in such a delicate and complex matter, we must be guided by the wise advice provided by proverbs in various languages, such as 'no por mucho madrugar amanece más temprano' in Spanish, 'let us make haste slowly' in English and 'rien ne sert de courir, il faut partir à point' in French. Naturally patience does not have to be endless, but it should not be incompatible with perseverance and with a balanced approach permitting correct judgments." 1974
7.
Sweden: "... after 12 years of frustrating failures since the hopes were raised by the Zorin-McCloy agreement, we need to create some more effective mechanism for grappling in depth and detail with disarmament.... This is the overriding reason why my Government has given strong support to the proposal of calling a WDC." 1973
8.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics : "The convening of such a conference and consideration by it of a wide range of problems relating to disarmament is designed to increase the importance of the problem of disarmament in contemporary international life and to draw the attention of Governments and public opinion in all States in the world to this important problem...." 1971 " We harbour no illusions that the World Disarmament Conference will do away with all problems at one stroke. It may last for several months or even several years. Can there be any objections to that if the Conference contributes to the practical solution of urgent disarmament problems?" 1973
9.
"... at this session of the General Assembly, as last year, the view has been expressed that it is necessary to put forward as a prior condition which should be met before the conference is convened the requirement that some States take unilateral steps in the field of limiting armaments ... putting forward such requirements or conditions before any international negotiations or before the opening of a disarmament conference is, in principle, inappropriate if we mean to have serious negotiations or a serious exchange of views among sovereign States on a footing of equality. At the same time, history has not a few examples showing that prior conditions of all kinds are often put forward for the purpose of preventing or wrecking negotiations. This is particularly easy to see when such conditions include the deliberate selection of questions whose solution gives rise to serious difficulties. Take, for example, the question of the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories, of other States: if the convening of a WDC were to be made contingent on the solution of that problem, one could safely say that such a conference would be long postponed." 1972
10.
United Kingdom: The United Kingdom "recognises the necessity periodically to renew the sense of urgency with which the nations address the problem of disarmament and arms control. It recognises also that it is of the highest importance that all the five permanent members of the Security Council should be included in the international disarmament negotiations. The United Nations General Assembly is itself a forum for such reassessment and renewal. But the United Kingdom Government does not close its mind to any other forum for which there is general support. It would favour the calling of a WDC provided such a conference had the general support of the United Nations membership and in particular of all the nuclear Powers, whose active participation would be essential to the consideration of measures in the nuclear field as foreseen in the preamble to resolution 2833 (XXVI); and provided thorough preparatory work showed that a satisfactory basis for such a conference exists." 1972, 1973
11.
United States of America: The United States does not believe "that a WDC could in fact contribute at this time to the achievement of concrete arms control agreements. The history of arms control efforts today shows that there is no substitute for careful, patient negotiations. A large, unwieldy conference would not provide the sort of atmosphere conducive to real progress; it could indeed be harmful to institutions that have already achieved a record of proved accomplishments and that are currently conducting ongoing negotiations. So far as the establishing of broad objectives is concerned, we believe that this Committee, the First Committee of the General Assembly where all nuclear Powers are represented, is performing this task and that it need not be duplicated in another forum." 1972
12.
" For such a conference not to disappoint the hopes of all those wishing to see rapid progress in disarmament, the conference would have to be able to offer real prospeots of agreement on significant arms control measures. However, it is not the lack of a suitable forum, but the lack of political agreement which prevents us from taking more far-reaching steps towards a more peaceful order with reduced levels of armaments. A WDC would be less likely to overcome this lack of agreement than to fall victim to it. The end result could well be a slow-down in our work combined with the dashing of expectations everywhere. Therefore we oppose convening a WDC or setting a date or starting preparations for one at this time." 1973
13.
Zambia: "We remain strongly convinced that a WDC would be a most significant endeavour and perhaps a real beginning in the search for genuine disarmament.... We remain convinced that all nations must participate fully as equals, in all discussions that touch on their peace and security. Any bilateral decisions among big powers which affect other nations, big or small, without full consideration for their legitimate interests are unacceptable to us. Furthermore, we consider world peace and security based on balance of power, which seems to be the framework of accords bilaterally negotiated between the super powers, as nothing but an illusion." 1973
14.
A bbreviations:
15.
GCD general and complete disarmament; WDC world disarmament conference
16.
UN Doc. A/8491.
17.
Quoted by Ambassador Komives of Hungary in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, September 28, 1971: CCD/PV. 542, para. 111.
18.
G.A.Res. 2833 (XXVI).
19.
UN London Weekly Summary, WS/72/13, p. 3. This was the year of the " Vienna formula " dispute over East German participation in the UN Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm, a dispute which led to the refusal of the USSR and its allies to attend.
20.
UN Doc. A/8817.
21.
G.A.Res. 2930 (XXVII).
22.
Ibid.
23.
United Nations No. I (1975) Report: Cmnd. 5907 . London: HMSO, February 1975.
24.
UN Doc. A/8990.
25.
Nicholas A. Sims, " Etat actuel des négociations multilatérales pour une reduction des armaments," Politique Etrangère, Vol. 37, No. 5 (December 1972), p. 704, citing an Italian memorandum of August 28, 1972 (CCD/389, p. 3), on the future of the CCD.
26.
Every state party to the Warsaw Pact, except the German Democratic Republic, was a member of the new Special Committee by virtue of its prior membership of the CCD.
27.
UN Doc. A/9033.
28.
UN Doc. A/8990/Add. 1.
29.
UN Doc. A/9041.
30.
G.A.Res. 3093A (XXVIII).
31.
Operative paragraph 4.
32.
UN Doc. A/9800: Note from the Secretary-General, October 16, 1974.
33.
UN Doc. A/AC. 161/L.1.
34.
UN Doc. A/9228, para. 6.
35.
UN Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1998, p. 37.
36.
UN Doc. A/9228.
37.
G.A.Res. 3183 (XXVIII).
38.
UN Press Release GA/4935, December 18, 1973.
39.
UN Doc. A/9628, pp. 1-2.
40.
UN Doc. A/9628, p. 9 et seq.
41.
UN Doc. A/8817.
42.
G.A.Res. 3093B (XXVIII) on reduction of military budgets.
43.
UN Doc. A/9628, p. 2.
44.
Burundi, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Spain.
45.
Argentina, Yugoslavia.
46.
Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Zambia.
47.
UN Doc. A/AC. 167/L. 5.
48.
UN Doc. A/AC. 167/L. 6.
49.
UN London Weekly Summary, WS/74/37, p. 4.
50.
UN Doc. A/9628 (GAOR: 29th Session, Supplement No. 28).
51.
UN Doc. A/AC. 167/L. 4.
52.
G.A.Res. 2833 (XXVI).
53.
This Bureau consists of the Chairman, (three) Vice-Chairmen and Rapporteur of the Committee: respectively the representatives of Iran, Poland, Burundi, Peru and Spain. Note the regional balance carefully observed in the Bureau's composition.
54.
(i) Administrative questions (date and contemplated duration, site favoured, etc.); (ii) structure, functions and procedures; (iii) relationship to the UN and other disarmament bodies.
55.
UN Doc. A/9628, p. 2.
56.
UN Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1998, p. 42.
57.
UN London Weekly Summary, WS/74/37, p. 4.
58.
Statement by Ambassador Anand Panyarachun, Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations, in the First Committee, October 31, 1974: UN Doc. A/C.1/PV. 2005, pp. 44-45.
59.
G.A.Res. 3260 (XXIX).
60.
UN Doc. A/9906.
61.
Alva Myrdal was Principal Director of the Department of Social Affairs in the UN Secretariat from 1949 to 1950; Director of the Social Sciences Division of UNESCO from 1951 to 1955; a member of the UN Group of Experts on South Africa in 1964; and Chairman of the UN Group of Experts on Disarmament and Development in 1972.
62.
William Epstein also holds a Special Fellowship of the UN Institute for Training and Research, and is the author of Disarmament: Twenty-Five Years of Effort (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1971).
63.
William Epstein , "The Inexorable Rise of Military Expenditures ," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 1975 ), pp. 17-19. Alva Myrdal, " The International Control of Disarmament," Scientific American, Vol. 231, No. 4 (October 1974), pp. 21-33. These are the most recent of several articles by these two authorities which might be consulted.
64.
He was Minister for External Affairs of the Republic of Ireland, 1948-51; Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, 1963-70; more recently he has been Chairman of Amnesty International and President of the International Peace Bureau. He first came to prominence in international organisation as Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 51. UN Doc. A/9628, Appendix Two (pp. 151-152). There was no conference in 1967.
65.
Ibid.
66.
UN Doc. A/9628, p. 24 (A/PV. 1985, p. 6).
67.
" General views and suggestions on the convening of a world disarmament conference and related problems: conditions for the realisation of the conference" ; pp. 10-63 of A/9628.
68.
Sic. The correct allusion would have been to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which made the recommendation in a resolution (DC/224) adopted by 89 votes to none, with 16 abstentions, on June 11, 1965. For the texts of and discussion on DC/224 and G.A.Res. 2030 (XX), see The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1965 (New York: United Nations, 1967, pp-103-106.
