The Politics of Arms Control after Vladivostok

New York Times, November 25, 1974.

New York Times, November 25 and December 3, 1974.

See e.g. Walter C. Clemens Jr , The Superpowers and Arms Control, Lexington books, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Mass., 1973.

For a detailed critique of these Moscow Summit agreements, see my " Weighing chances for progress in the field of arms control," International Perspectives, Ottawa, September/October 1974, pp. 27-31.

The dominance of this technical approach to arms control from the earliest days of nuclear weapons was unintentionally revealed in Arms Control: Readings from Scientific American, Introduced by Herbert F. York , W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973.

See Colin S. Grey , " The Arms Race Phenomenon," World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1, October 1971, pp. 39-79 and "The Urge to Compete," World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2, January 1974, pp. 207-233 and Morton Halperin , " The Decision to Deploy the ABM," World Politics, No. 1, October 1972, pp. 62-95.

These views, shared by Robert S. McNamara , U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1967, were summarised in George W. Rathjens , The Future of the Strategic Arms Race, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York , 1969.

Contrary evidence was now emerging that the U.S. would have developed MIRVs independently of Russian ABM deployment or non-deployment. See R.L. Tammen , MIRV and the Arms Race, Praeger, 1973.

Herbert Scoville Jr , Towards a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York , 1970.

For this view, see John Newhouse , Cold Dawn, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, New York, 1973.

For the flavour of the current debate on MAD, see e.g. "Focus on the Military Balance, U.S. Strategic Forces and the New Targeting Doctrine ," Orbis, Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 1974.

Robert S. McNamara , Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget, Washington, Department of Defense, 1968, p. 50.

See Scoville op. cit and Scoville, Lall and Hunter , The Arms Race: Steps Towards Restraint, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, March 1972.

These and subsequent figures are taken from The Military Balance 1974-75, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London , September 1974, except for the figure of 756 Soviet SLBMs, based on their calculations. The figures in Table I differ slightly as these are projected force deployments.

Joseph Kruzel , "SALT II: The Search for a Follow-on Agreement," Orbis , Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1973, p. 340.

John Newhouse , op. cit, p. 181.

Ibid pp. 174-175.

See H.R. Myers , "Extending the Nuclear Test Ban," and H. York , "The Great Test Ban Debate," in Readings from the Scientific American, op. cit, pp. 283-302.

New York Times, op.cit

See Table I. These and subsequent figures are taken from The Military Balance 1974-75, op. cit., modified to take account of Soviet ICBM silo construction to mid-1975. The figure of 720 Soviet SLBMs includes 8 H-class FBMS with a total of 24 SLBMs not counted under the SALT I ceilings for " modern " FBMS.

Paul Nitze , " The Strategic Balance Between Hope and Scepticism," Foreign Policy, No. 17, Winter 1974 -75, p. 154.

David Aaron , " A New Concept," Foreign Policy , No. 17, Winter 1974-75, p. 161.

Nitze , op cit

Aaron, op cit., p. 160; The Military Balance, op.cit., gives throw-weight as six to seven million pounds rising to ten to twelve million pounds for the U.S.S.R. as against one to two million pounds for the U.S.

Nitze , op cit

R. Forsberg and K. Tsipis , Tactical and Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Almquist and Wiksell, Stockholm 1975.

" Special Issue on Counterforce and SALT" Public Interest Report, Washington: Federation of American Scientists, February 1974.

H. York , Deterrence by Means of Mass Destruction, Pacem in Tenis Conference III, Washington, October 1973.

See L.E. Davis and W.R. Schilling , " All You ever Wanted to Know about MIRV and ICBM Calculations but were not Cleared to Ask," Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 1973, pp. 207-242.

D.R. Westervelt , "The Essence of Armed Futility," Orbis, Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 1974, p. 699.

New York Times, November 25, 1974.

See my "Arms Control Within a Changing Political Context" International Journal, Vol. 26, No. 4, Autumn 1971, pp. 735-752, and my "Arms Control Proposals and Concepts within a Changing Political Context, 1958-1972," Ph.D. thesis, LSE, 1973.

See my " MBFR: political or technical arms control? " The World Today, Vol. 30, No. 10, October 1974, pp. 411-418.