Abstract
Despite the recent profusion of historical scholarship in International Relations (IR), there has been little questioning of the positivist assumptions upon which much of that work is premised. This is important because if the assumptions upon which historical knowledge within IR scholarship is constructed were found to be flawed, then explanations that appear to successfully account for historical cases might not be as accurate as we would like to believe. In response to this problem, this article explores John Dewey's pragmatist approach towards history, arguing that Dewey's pragmatism views historical knowledge as socially constructed, but not necessarily to the exclusion of alternative perspectives. The article concludes that Deweyan pragmatism not only provides a more useful way to go about historical research, but also recovers for IR the ability to engage in work that is explicitly for something, and in particular, for the improvement of the public good.
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