GorbachevM., “Replies to Questions put by the Washington Post and Newsweek,” in USSR-USA: Summit Documents and Materials (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1988), p. 7.
2.
ReaganR., USSR-USA Summit: Documents and Materials, ibid, p. 79.
3.
In retrospect it is now clear that the expansion of US defense spending was a cynical attempt to court domestic political support. Its legitimation was based on faulty information and it undoubtedly diminished US security by fueling a blow out in the US deficit and generating extraordinary military wastage, graft and corruption in the Pentagon. A 1983 Central Intelligence Agency report, for example, indicated that the US aggressive posture and defense spending spree was based on faulty information about the real growth rate of Soviet military spending. Instead of a relentless Soviet expansion (as the Administration had claimed) the Soviet Union had cut their real defense growth rate in half from 4–5% for 1970–76 to 2% a year from 1976–83. And the CIA also discovered the important point that Soviet military procurement was stagnant and had not grown in real terms for the entire seven-year period. See Joshua Epstein, The 1988 Defense Budget (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 1.
4.
For a discussion of the background to the work of the Palme Commission and concern about unilateral measures see VayrynenR., “Common Security: A Metaphor and an Incipient Doctrine”, World Futures, Vol. 24, 1987, pp. 177–178.
5.
E.g. GaltungJ., There are Alternatives: Four Roads to Peace and Security (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1984). Particularly Chapter 4 on disarmament where Galtung says of the Palme Commission recommendations “What is good is not new and what is new is not particularly good,” p. 139.
6.
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (London: Pan Books, 1982), p. 138.
7.
I will not develop the common security idea any further here since the central ideas are now very familiar. The original 1982 book coining the term has now been elaborated by VayrynenR. (ed), Policies for Common Security (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985) and in numerous other articles, e.g. Vayrynen, op cit, note 4; and R. Mutz, Common Security, Elements of an Alternative to Deterrence Peace (Hamburg: University Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, 1985).
8.
For some recent discussions of this suggestion see ClementsKevin P., Back from the Brink: The Creation of a Nuclear Free New Zealand (Wellington and London: Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1988), and some more recent discussions in Andrew Mack, “Arms Control in the North Pacific,” Background Paper Nr 1 to 53rd Pugwash Symposium on Peace and Security in the Asian-Pacific Region, Beijing, People's Republic of China, October 17–20, 1988; also T. Findlay, “Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific: The Relevance of the European Experience,” paper delivered to 53rd Pugwash Symposium on Peace and Security in the Asian-Pacific Region, Beijung, P.R.C. October 17–20 1988.
9.
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, op cit, note 6, p. 142.
10.
VayrynenR., op cit, note 4, p. 190.
11.
It is fascinating to see how assymetrical the Summit papers are in terms of short- or long-term objectives. The Soviet Union is willing to imagine a world beyond minimal deterrence while the United States is aiming for permanent nuclear deterrence with more stability. While stability and risk reduction is useful it is not particularly conducive to the achievement of more truly cooperative defense and security policies and is certainly not conducive to the enhancement of common security in the Asia-Pacific region.
12.
See “Rivalry in the Pacific” Time Magazine, November 24, 1986, pp. 4–11.
13.
It is interesting to note in this regard that the Australian Minister of Trade, Michael Duffy, is warning that if the current GATT round does not produce a desirable outcome on agriculture Australia will take the lead in initiating a Pacific-run trading community. This view was also echoed strongly by New Zealand's Minister of Overseas Trade, Michael Moore. See The Christchurch Press, Vol. 9, No. 8, 1988.
14.
MendlWolf, Department of War Studies, London University, who has been following this issue closely, feels that the one or two Soviet initiatives which would have conceded two of the islands could have been responded to more positively by the Japanese Government but were equivocally rejected. (Personal conversation, Tokyo August 20, 1988).
15.
See HoriguchiR., “Soviet Snooper Finds a Sting in the Air,”Pacific Defence Reporter, March 1988.
16.
See KimHong N., “Sino-Japanese Relations,”Current History, Vol. 87, No. 528, April 1988, pp. 153–180. The question of not allowing Japan to develop “historical amnesia” was a strong sub-theme at the United Nations University Seminar on Common Security and the Role of the State, held in Yokohama, December 12–16, 1987 attended by the author.
17.
See Time, November 24, 1986, op cit, note 12, p. 8.
18.
See Gordon-BatesKim, “A Sea of Troubles,” in South, June 1988, pp. 35–37.
19.
See Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 140, No. 22, June 2, 1988; also The Christchurch Press, June 7, 1988.
20.
See FawthropTom, “Vietnam's Opening Door,”South, October 1987; and M. Barang, “Overstepping the Marx,” South, February 1982, pp. 23–24.
21.
See WainBarry, “Vietnam Squeezed by Crop Shortage and Currency Crisis,”The Asian Wall Street Journal, Vol. 10, No. 20, May 16, 1988, pp. 1 and 20.
22.
See AwanoharaSusumu, “Many East Asian Countries Want the US to Remain,”Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 140, No. 16, April 21, 1988, pp. 27–28.
23.
MackAndrew, “Arms Control in the North Pacific: Problems and Prospects,” Background Paper Nr 1 presented to the 53rd Pugwash Symposium on “Peace and Security in the Asian-Pacific Region” Beijing, PRC October 17–20, 1988, p. 2. Most of my information on weapon systems in the Asia Pacific region is gleaned from this paper.
24.
See DibbPaul, “The Soviet Union as a Pacific Military Power” Working Paper No. 81, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, August 1984, pp. 7–9 cited in Mack, ibid p. 2.
25.
See HayesP.ZarskyL.BelloW., American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific (Melbourne: Penguin Books, 1986), particularly pp. 129–131.
26.
For two recent explorations of this and related issues see ClementsKevin P., Back from the Brink: The Creation of a Nuclear Free New Zealand (London and Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1988); and Stuart MacMillan, Neither Confirm nor Deny (Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1987).
27.
Ibid, p. 3; and A. Mack, “Global and Regional Superpower Policies,” paper presented to IPPNW Conference, February 9–10, 1987, Auckland, New Zealand.
28.
See, for example, HayesP.ZarskyL.BelloW., op cit, note 25, p. 274.
29.
See “Going over the Top,”South, February 1986, pp. 17–18.
30.
See RidderKnight, “US Pressure Proving Effective on Japan,”The Christchurch Star, Vol. 21, No. 6, 1988.
31.
Ibid.
32.
Ibid.
33.
Ibid.
34.
See “The Allies: Time to Share the Burden,”The Economist, Vol. 307, No. 7549, May 7–13, 1988, pp. 23–24.
35.
At a UNU/Soviet Academy of Sciences meeting on Peace and Security Issues in Asia and the Pacific (held at Tashkent May 1985) Academician Primakov spent a considerable amount of time elaborating how Japanese changes to force structure, the reactivation of an armaments industry and close harmonization of United States and Japanese maritime strategies posed direct threats to Soviet defense.
36.
See SegalGerald, “Pacific Arms Control,” Background Paper Nr. 2 for 53rd Pugwash Symposium on Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region, Beijing, October 17–20, 1988, 11–13.
37.
See CornerF.ClementsK.PoanangaB.HuntD. (Defence Committee of Enquiry), Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want (Wellington: Wellington Government Printer, 1986); The Defence of Australia, (Canberra: Australia Government Publishing Service, 1987); and Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987 (Wellington: Wellington Government Printer) for details. While Australians feel greater insecurity than New Zealanders, neither government believes that either country faces any external territorial threat in the short or long term.
38.
For further discussion of the Treaty see K. P. Clements, op cit, note 26, Chapter 7; and M. Hamel-Green, “The Raratonga Nuclear Free Zone Treaty: A Critical Analysis of its Scope, Domain and Contribution to Regional Security and Disarmament,” paper presented to UNU Conference, Auckland, April 3–6, 1986.
39.
For an interesting analysis of this question see BroadhurstArlene Idol, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones: A Comparative Analysis of Theory and Practice (Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1987), pp. 9–10.
40.
See South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Preamble, in New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act, 1987, p. 12.
41.
Ibid, p. 13.
42.
For an excellent recent analysis on this installation see BallDes, Pine Gap (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988).
43.
For details see ClementsK.P., op cit, note 26; “New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Stand,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 43, No. 2, March 1987, pp. 32–35; and “New Zealand's” role in promoting a Nuclear Free Pacific,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1988 (forthcoming).
44.
See ClementsK. P., “The New Zealand Defence Review: A Unique Opportunity for Public Participation,” in BostonJ.HollandM. (eds), The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 214–242.
45.
See WanandiJusuf, “Political Aspects of ASEAN-US Relations,” paper presented to Fourth ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies Conference, organized by the Singapore Institute for International Affairs, Singapore, June 27–30, 1988, p. 1.
46.
Dato Abu Hassan bin Haji Omar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. Keynote address given to Second Asia-Pacific Roundtable on Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific, 2–4 July, 1988, KL, Malaysia.
47.
BlechmanBarry M., “Confidence Building in the North Pacific: A Pragmatic Approach to Naval Arms Control,” in MackA.KealP. (eds), Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, forthcoming).