de CuellarJavier Perez, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 1984 (New York: United Nations, 1984), p. 6. The other two elements were disarmament and arms control, and a just and effective system of international economic relations.
2.
Ibid., p. 8.
3.
For background to the establishment of these operations, see NelsonRichard W., “Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model,”International Affairs, Vol. 61, Winter 1984/85, pp. 67–89; Nathan A. Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon (Boulder: Westview, 1984), pp. 5–16, or Ramesh Thakur, “Peacekeeping in the Middle East: From United Nations to Multinational Forces,” Australian Outlook Vol. 38, August 1984, pp. 81–89.
4.
For an evaluation of UNIFIL's work prior to the Israeli invasion, see ThakurRamesh, “International Peacekeeping: The UN Interim Force in Lebanon,”Australian OutlookVol. 35, August 1981, pp. 181–90; for an assessment since the invasion, see Marianne Heiberg, “Observations on UN Peace Keeping in Lebanon: A Preliminary Report” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Notat No. 305, September 1984.
5.
HoffmannStanley, “An Evaluation of the United Nations,” in WoodR.S. (editor), The Process of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 77.
6.
See BullHedleyWatsonAdam (editors), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).
7.
NorthedgeF.S., The International Political System (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), pp. 24–7.
8.
This is the meaning of international society which informs Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977).
9.
Cf. BeitzCharles R., Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) and James Mayall (editor), The Community of States (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982).
10.
NardinTerry, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 309.
11.
EastonDavid, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 139.
12.
Van WagenenRichard W., “The Concept of Community and the Future of the United Nations,”International OrganizationVol. 19, Summer 1965, p. 813.
13.
YoungOran R., “United Nations and the International System.”International Organization, Vol. 22, Autumn 1968, pp. 902–904. Young discusses the UN role in norm-creation and collective legitimization as one. I think there is sufficient analytic distinction between them for the two to be treated separately.
14.
CiobanuDan, “The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peacekeeping Operations,” in CasseseA. (editor), United Nations Peacekeeping: Legal Essays (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), pp. 23–4.
15.
VerrierAnthony, International Peacekeeping: United Nations Forces in a Troubled World (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), p. xxiii.
16.
CassinelliC.W., “Political Authority: Its Exercise and Possession,” in de CrespignyAnthonyWertheimerAlan (editors), Contemporary Political Theory (New York: Atherton, 1970), pp. 74–88.
17.
For a detailed analysis of both these operations at various stages of the UN involvement, see Abi-SaabGeorges, The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960–1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
18.
GagnonMona Harrington, “Peace Forces and the Veto: The Relevance of Consent,”International OrganizationVol. 21, August 1967, p. 822.
19.
The phrase is used by Gagnon, Ibid., p. 819.
20.
JamesAlan, “United Nations Action for Peace, The World TodayVol. 28, November and December1962, pp. 478–86, 503–13.
21.
For brief but useful discussions of these conceptual complexities of power, see ArtRobert J., “To What Ends Military Power?”International SecurityVol. 4, Spring 1980, pp. 3–35; Robert A. Dahl, “Power,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 12, pp. 405–15; James Eayrs, “From Middle to Foremost Power,” International Perspectives, May/June 1975, pp. 15–24; Klaus Knorr, “On the International Uses of Military Force in the Contemporary World,” Orbis Vol. 21, Spring 1977, pp. 5–27.
22.
See WeinbergerCaspar W., “Why the Marines Have to Stay,”The Guardian Weekly October 2 1983.
23.
Bull (note 8), p. 202.
24.
See BullHedley, “The Great Irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order,”International JournalVol 25, Summer 1980, pp. 437–47.
25.
The Economist, October 29 1983, pp. 28–9.
26.
In a letter to President Reagan on July 7 1982; Keesing's Contemporary ArchivesVol 29, 1983, p. 31917.
27.
For the Soviet response to the Lebanese crisis of June 1982, see the Current Digest of the Soviet PressVol. 34, 1982: August 4, pp. 1–4; August 18, p. 6; September 1, pp. 8–10; October 6, pp. 1–5; October 20, pp. 1–4; and November 24, pp. 6–7.
28.
The Times, September 1 1983.
29.
Keesing's, 29 (1983), p. 31916. Indeed Beirut is half the distance from the Soviet border that Grenada is from Miami.
30.
ClaudeInis L., “United Nations Use of Military Force,”Journal of Conflict ResolutionVol. 7, 1963, pp. 117–29.
31.
ClaudeInis L., “The Symbolic Significance of The United Nations,” in SondermannF.A. (editors), The Theory and Practice of International Relations, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 231.
32.
ClaudeInis L., “The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations,”International OrganizationVol. 15, Spring 1961, pp. 219–35.
33.
Claude (note 31), p. 233.
34.
PetersR.S., “Authority,” in Crespigny and Wertheimer, Contemporary Political Theory, pp. 69–73.
35.
PeabodyRobert L., “Authority,” in SkillsDavid L. (editor), International Encylopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 473–477; emphasis in original.
36.
For example Australia and New Zealand; see Thakur (note 3), pp. 87–8. Finland and Sweden similarly declined to participate in the MNF because it was a non-UN force; even France had misgivings: “The U.N. cover is politically necessary for some countries to certify international legitimacy and ‘acceptability’ “; Pelcovits (note 3), p. 85.
37.
For an application of this to third world contexts, see ThakurRamesh, “Liberalism, Democracy and Development: Philosophical Dilemmas in Third World Politics,”Political StudiesVol. 30, September 1982, pp. 333–49.
38.
See WightMartin, Systems of States; edited with an introduction by BullHedley (Leicester University Press, 1977), Ch. 6, and in particular pp. 171–2.
39.
Gagnon (note 18); p. 818.
40.
FabianLarry, Soldiers Without Enemies (Washington: Brookings, 1971), p. 21.
41.
Ibid., p. 63.
42.
Cf. Javier Perez de Cuellar in his first annual report: “… when, as happened recently (i.e. June 1982), a peace-keeping operation is overrun or brushed aside, the credibility both of the United Nations and of peace-keeping operations as such is severely shaken.”UN ChronicleVol. 19, October 1982, p. 14.
43.
LuardEvan, “Collective Intervention,” in BullHedley (editor), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), p. 157. Where the intervention is by a group of states independently of generally representative organizations (e.g., UNO, OAS, OAU), Luard prefers the term “multilateral” or “multinational” to “collective” intervention; p. 162.
44.
Text of address in USA, DOS, Bulletin 82:2066 (September 1982), pp. 23–5.
45.
Ibid., 82:2067 (October 1982), p. 3. Among other objectives, the Israeli invasion of 1982 could well have been motivated by the negative desire to reject the option of a Palestinian state. See Strategic Survey 1982–1983 (London: IISS, 1983), pp. 69–72.
46.
See SealePatrick, “How Syria persuaded Reagan to about-turn,”The Observer, October 2 1983; Herbert H. Denton, “US Middle East Policy Shift Reported,” The Guardian Weekly, October 9 1983.
47.
See AshtonClive C., “The United Nations Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: Realistic or Rhetoric?” in WilkinsonPaul (editor), British Perspectives on Terrorism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 139–60.
48.
See RosenauJames K., “Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World,”International SecurityVol. 1, Fall 1976, pp. 32–49.
49.
Hence the characterization “Olive Branch Brigades.”.
50.
The exchange is described in Verrier (note 15), p. 109.
51.
The story behind the capture of the Finnish soldiers seems to be somewhat complicated and involves their role in the defection of 11 members of the “South Lebanon Army” (SLA) to the rival Amal militia at Al-Quantara in the Finnish sector of UNIFIL. The United Nations report of inquiry into the affair was released by the Secretary-General in June 1985; Press Release SG/SM/3723—UNIFIL/30. A summary report can be found in Moshe Brilliant, “Finns aided the SLA deserters,” The Times, June 27 1985. For Israeli scepticism on the UN version see GoodmanHirsh, “Fog remains over UN role in Shi'ite capture,”The Jerusalem Post, International Edition, June 29 1985.
52.
Verrier (note 15), p. 117.
53.
See, for example, The Economist, October 29 1983, pp. 28–31; Patrick Seale, “The seeds of the Beirut carnage,” The Observer, October 30 1983.
54.
New Zealand Times, September 25 1983; Otago Daily Times, October 29 1983.
55.
The Times, September 19 1983.
56.
On October 12 1983, Congress determined that US forces in Beirut had been engaged in armed hostilities as of August 29, thereby bringing the War Powers Resolution into operation.
57.
The Economist, January 7 1984, pp. 25–6.
58.
The decision was justified on the grounds that the military success of the Lebanese Army was essential to the safety of the marines. Nelson points to the irony that US troops had been sent to Beirut on the condition that the MNF would be protected by the Lebanese Army. Nelson (note 3), p. 81.
59.
Quoted in ibid., p. 78.
60.
For instance, after the February 7 1984 authorization to use force, French officers argued that American firepower would more likely endanger than enhance the safety of the French contingent.
61.
Caspar W. Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power”; text of address supplied to author by US Embassy in Wellington.
62.
For a discussion of a parallel dilemma which confronted ONUC in 1960, see HoffmannStanley, “In Search of a Thread: The UN in the Congo Labyrinth,”International OrganizationVol. 16, Spring 1962, pp. 331–61.
63.
Weinberger (note 61).
64.
PearsonLester B., “Force for U.N.,”Foreign AffairsVol. 35, April 1957, p. 401. Pearson was subsequently Prime Minister of Canada, 1963–1968.
65.
Hoffmann (note 62), p. 353.
66.
LandeGabriella Rosner, “The Effect of Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly,”World Politics, vol. 19, October 1966, pp. 83–105.
67.
UN Chronicle. Vol. 19, October 1982, p. 14. Perez de Cuellar was referring to the MFO as well as the MNF.
68.
RikhyeIndar JitHarbottleMichaelEggeBjørn, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 315.
69.
Somewhat paradoxically, the experience of the largely successful MFO may also be said to vindicate UN peacekeeping: “The MFO so closely resembles the UN model as to constitute an advertisement for UN peacekeeping.” Nelson (note 3) p. 89; “the UN can take pride in the fact that the Sinai force has been entirely organized on the basis of the UN experience in peacekeeping, that its commander is an old UN hand, and that the force was prepared, assembled and deployed with the advice of a former senior UN administrator”; RikhyeIndar Jit, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (London: C. Hurst, 1984), p. 73. For a good assessment of the relative merits and disadvantages of UN and multinational forces, see Pelcovits (note 3), Ch. 7.
70.
This argument has been adapted from Hinsley's outstanding discussion of the failure of the League of Nations; HinsleyF.H., Power and the Pursuit of Peace (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), Ch. 14.
71.
CasseseAntonio, “Recent Trends in the Attitude of the Superpowers Towards Peace-keeping,” in Cassese (editor), United Nations Peacekeeping: Legal Essay (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), p. 237.
72.
For a survey of US-Soviet attitudes towards UN peacekeeping, see Rikhye (note 69), Ch. 8.