One True World or Many? A Gandhian Perspective

These proposals reflect a diversity of theoretical perspectives. They have been identified by Robert W. Cox as natural-rational, positivist-evolutionary and historicist-dialectical. See his ‘On Thinking About Future World Order’, World Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2, January 1967, pp. 175–96. This paper does not deal with all of them; nor does it go over the ground Cox has already covered.

This is what Heidegger argues. For a fruitful discussion of his view on modern science and technology, see Alderman Harold , ‘Heidegger's Critique of Science and Technology’, in: Murray Michael (editor), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 35–50; see also Charles Taylor, Social Theory as Practice (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985).

Morgenthau Hans , Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 3rd Edn., p. 168.

Ibid; for a classical statement of checks and balances in politics, see Hamilton Alexander Jay John Madison James , The Federalist (New York: The Modern Library, n.d.), Paper No. 57.

Nardin Terry , Law, Morality and the Relations of States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 31.

Hobbes Thomas , Leviathan (Everyman's Library), p. 154.

Quoted in Spragen Thomas H. Jr. , The Irony of Liberal Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 61.

Taylor Charles , Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 75.

Wolin Sheldon S. , Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1960), p. 43.

Wight Martin , Power Politics, eds. Bull Hedley Hollbraad Carsten (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), p. 101.

Nardin (Note 5), p. 36.

Northedge F.S. , The International Political System (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), p. 182.

Hobbes (Note 6), Ch. 13.

Butterfield Herbert , History and Human Relations (New York: Macmillan, 1952), p. 21.

See Aron Raymond , ‘The Anarchical Order of Power’, in: Hoffman Stanley (editor), Conditions of World Order (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1968), pp. 25–48. Aron argues that ‘history has more imagination than wise men do. It has thus far refused to choose between collective suicide and the abdication of states.’ He further argues that an order has emerged consequent upon the dialectic interplay among three weapons—the sub-machine gun, the tank and the atomic bomb. This, in turn, has brought about changes.

Nardin (Note 5), p. 31.

Nardin (Note 5), p. 35.

On this point, see Niemeyer Gerhard , Law Without Force: The Function of Politics in International Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 389.

Walker R.B.J. , ‘World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism, Pluralism, Hegemony’, Alternatives, Vol. VII, No. 2, June 1981, p. 200.

It should be mentioned here that there exists a lot of confusion with respect to the meaning of rationality and morality. No doubt, the shifting meanings of rationality—apprehension of the true nature of reality, on the one hand, and a prudential, calculative reckoning joining ends to means, on the other—are responsible for this. Along with epistemological and ontological difficulties in defining morality, there is also the added difficulty of determining how morality is instilled in individuals who are animated primarily by the consideration of self-interest. To take two examples: for Kant, legality is the basis of rationality and categorical imperative the basis of morality; for Spinoza, however, it is mutual needs that beget mutual aid. The perception of common dangers begets association; association fosters the feeling that men belong to the same kind; this, in turn, finally strengthens social instincts and leads to the development of the feeling of kindness. A modern version of this model has been articulated by Piaget who traces the evolution of moral sentiments through the successive stages of projection, differentiation and ejection. What must be emphasized here is that, in all these perspectives, both rationality and morality are not intrinsically given; they are externally imposed.

On this point, see also Hirsch Fred , Social Limits to Growth (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), Ch. 1.

Waltz Kenneth N. , Man, the Stale and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 170.

This is based on Fred Hirsch's argument in his Social Limits to Growth (Note 21), pp. 9–19.

Kelsen Hans , General Theory of Law and States, Trans. Wedberg Anders (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1946), pp. 13–14.

Waltz (Note 22), pp. 196–97.

Ibid, p. 193.

It is interesting to note here that even while the balance-of-power approach is felt to be morally repugnant, it is accepted by arguing that nothing better is possible in the present circumstances. See, for example, Bonanate Luigi , ‘Justice and Order in International Life’, Politica Internazionale, Vol. IV, No. 1, Spring 1985, pp. 51–57.

This is exemplified in recent times by Kenneth Boulding for whom the triggering device for the imposition of the categorical will is the fear of nuclear holocaust. See his, ‘The Prevention of World War III’, in Mendlovitz Saul H. , editor, Legal and Political Problems of World Order (New York: The Fund for Education Concerning World Peace through World Law, 1962), pp. 11–21.

On this point see Roy R. , Self and Society: A Study in Gandhian Thought (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1985), Ch. 2.

Bull Hedley , The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977).

Ibid, p. 19.

Unger Roberto M. , Knowledge and Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 115.

Walker (Note 19), p. 203.

See Nardin (Note 5), p. 46.

Ibid, p. 41.

See Niemeyer (Note 18), Introduction.

Unger (Note 32), p. 16.

Cox (Note 1), p. 188.

This is what Cox identifies as a positivist-evolutionary approach to the question of world order. He identifies two variants of this approach—structural-functional and system dynamics. See Ibid, pp. 178–81 and 188–92.

Cf. Kant: ‘The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally—and for this purpose also externally—perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely.’ Kant's Political Writings, ed. Reiss Hans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 50.

Cox (Note 1), p. 180.

Ibid, p. 179.

A variant of this approach, viz. system dynamics, abandons the equilibrium bias of functionalism by introducing the notion of a ‘feed-back loop’. The interactions within the system are seen merely as producing certain outputs or consequences which ‘feed back’ by modifying the inputs for the next round of outputs. See, for example, Forrester Jay W. , World Dynamics (Cambridge, Mass: Wright Allan Press, 1971).

The representative statement of this position is to be found in Haas Ernest B. , Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

Cox (Note 1), pp. 188–89.

Gadamer Hans-Georg , ‘Notes on Planning for the Future’, in: Stanley Hoffman (Note 15), p. 329.

On this point see Charles Taylor (Note 8), p. 115.

Hoffman Stanley , ‘Obstacle or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the case of Western Europe’, in: Hoffman (Note 15), p. 113.

Ibid, p. 113.

See, for example, Jaguaribe Helio , ‘World Order, Rationality and Socioeconomic Development’, in: Hoffman (Note 15), pp. 208–227.

Falk Richard A. , Legal Order in a Violent World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 39.

Jaguaribe (Note 50), p. 209.

Falk (Note 51), p. 43.

Ibid, p. 54.

This is what Johan Galtung calls ‘structural violence’. See his, The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective (New York: The Free Press, 1980), Chs. 2–4.

This is the genesis of the World Order Models Project initiated in 1966 with the collaboration of five research groups from West Germany, Latin America, Japan, India and North America. The substantive approach adopted by the WOMP is variegated, as is reflected in, for example, Mendlovitz Saul H. (editor), On the Creation of a Just World Order (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1975). For an evaluation of WOMP, see Juergen Dedring, Recent Advances in Peace and Conflict Research: A Critical Survey (Beverly Hills, Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 1986), pp. 53–67.

Hutchins Robert M. , ‘Constitutional Foundations of World Order’, in: Saul H. Mendlovitz (Note 28), pp. 66–67.

For a critical evaluation of this perspective, see my ‘Information-Overload and Information Underuse: Coding and the Socio-Cultural Context of Information’, A paper written for the UNU Project of the same name, 1985.

Hutchins (Note 57), p. 67.

Jaguaribe (Note 50), p. 211.

Mendlovitz Saul H. , The Struggle for a Just World Order: An Agenda of Inquiry and Praxis for the 1980's, Working Paper No. 20, WOMP (New York: Institute for World Order, Inc., 1981), p. 12.

Ibid, p. 14 (italics in original). To be fair to Mendlovitz, it should be admitted that he is careful to distance himself from those who espouse a cultural imperialist position. He says, ‘To be more specific we must make certain that our enquiry does not overlook the possibility that concepts and experiences of the dominant culture have swamped traditions and culture not holding center stage in the communication and information flow of the globe.’ Ibid, pp. 12–13.

Jaguaribe (Note 50), p. 212.

It is a sad commentary that a very exciting contribution to the discussion of world order by Carl-Friedrich von Weizsacker entitled ‘A Sceptical Contribution’, in: Saul H. Mendlovitz (Note 56), pp. 111–150, has been dismissed as ‘a withdrawal into the sphere of ontology’ and an ‘escape’. See Dedring (Note 56), p. 61.

Taylor Charles , ‘Growth, Legitimacy, and the Modern Identity’, Praxis International, Vol. 1, No. 2, July 1981.

Ibid, pp. 112–13.

Loc. cit..

See Wood Ellen M. , Mind and Politics: An Approach to the Meaning of Liberal and Socialist Individualism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 11.

On this point, see Colletti Lucio , From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society, trans. Merrington John White Judith (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 150.

Taylor (Note 65), pp. 116–17.

Nisbet Robert A. , The Quest for Community (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 250 (emphasis in original). Also, see Jacques Maritain, Challenges and Renewals: Selected Readings (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 300.

It can be argued that this is true of a society that is conceived of as an entity embracing two mutually exclusive ideas: that of the ‘dependent’ existence of individual units, and that of the collective existence of all of them in a group and, further, it would pose no problem in an organic society based on the sharing of ends. But, then, in such a society law as a regulatory mechanism will be of only secondary importance, since there already exists a normative structure that predefines ends as well as the means to realize these ends. Further, if we treat shared values as neither individual nor subjective, we violate the basic tenets underlying modern world-view in the hope that the replacement of one premise by another will alter the course of history. If, on the other hand, shared values are nothing more than a coincidence of individual values, the problem of ensuring compatibility between individual interest and collective good remains unresolved.

For detailed discussions on this point, see Unger (Note 32), pp. 83–88.

O'Connell D.P. , ‘The Role of International Law’ in Hoffman (Note 15), p. 56.

Ibid..

Ibid, p. 57.

On this point, see Niemeyer (Note 18).

Acton Lord , Essays on Freedom and Power (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 158–59.

Ibid, p. 160.

For a penetrating analysis of this, see Gellner Ernest , Spectacles and Predicaments: Essays in Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 273–74.

Rosen Stanley , ‘Man's Hope’, Social Research, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 1981, pp. 614–637.

Gellner (Note 80), p. 274.

Charles Taylor (Note 8), p. 115.

Ibid, p. 115.

Nakamura Hajime , in: Wiener Philip P. (editor), Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1974), p. 24.

On this point, see Walker (Note 19). Cf. Adda Bozeman's observation that ‘… it is clear that only this European view of the human being allows for meaningful, universalization’ in her essay, ‘The International Order in a Multi-cultural World’, in: Bull Hedley Watson Adam (editor), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 390.

Mus Paul , ‘Buddhism and World Order’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, Summer 1966, p. 815.

Chaitanya Krishna , Gandhi's Quest of Being in Becoming (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1977), p. 9.

The idea of sacrifice as supportive of the cosmic order goes back to Taittiriya Brahman, esp. 2.8.8. where food is equated with matter and energy combined, constituting all the power of life. He who hoards this substance to himself and deprives others from having it cuts himself off from divine metabolism of the living world. See Zimmer Heinrich , in: Campbell Joseph , editor, Philosophies of India (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 347–48. This was later developed into the idea of Yajna (Sacrifice, that is, making sacred) as the supporter of the life-world.

The concept of Lokasamgraha, i.e. the maintenance of the life-world, is, again, referred to as the guide to individual action in its social ramifications.

See Ramanan K. Venkata , Nagarjuna's Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1978), p. 102.

This is referred to as the Adhyatmam-Adhidaivam principle which signifies the oneness of the worlds of both spirit and matter.

See Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1959), LXIV, p. 141. (Referred to hereinafter as CWMG.).

See, Narayan Shriman (editor), Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1969), VI, p. 109. (Referred to hereinafter as SWMG.).

See Gandhi's statement, SWMG, VI, p. 107.

SWMG, VI, pp. 107–8.

CWMG, XII, p. 295.

Ibid, XL, p. 192.

SWMG, VI, p. 109.

It is in this context that we can appreciate how mistaken is the view that suggests the complete subordination of the individual to the collectivity in oriental cultures. As just one example of this, see, Bozeman, ‘The International Order in a Multi-Cultural World’, in: Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Note 86), pp. 388–89.

Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979), p. 23. Also, see Martin Buber, ‘Distance and Relation’, in: Maurice Friedman (editor), The Knowledge of Man (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), pp. 59–71.

Gandhi M.K. , Hind Swaraj, SWMG, IV, p. 135.

Wei-Ming Tu , Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979), p. 23.

CWMG, XIII, p. 219.

Pandey G. C. , Bhartiya Parampara ke Mool Swara (Fundamental Source of Indian Tradition) (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1981), p. 6.

Ibid, p. 8.

Radhakrishnan S. , The Heart of Hinduism, pp. 17–18, quoted in Robert Lingat, The Classical Law of India, tr. Duncan J. Derett M. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 258.

CWMG, LXIV, pp. 191–92.

Ibid, LV, p. 62. See, Walter Harding (editor), Selected Works of Thoreau (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Co., 1974), p. 788.

Democracy: Real and Deceptive, Comp. Prabhu R.K. (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1961), pp. 4–5.

Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1958), Vol. 2, p. 581.

For a detailed discussion, see Gangal S.C. , The Gandhian Way to World Peace (Bombay: Vora and Co., 1960), pp. 89–113.