DavisRobertZannisMark, The Genocide Machine in Canada: The Pacification of the North (Montreal, Canada: Black Rose Books, 1973), p. 179.
2.
Ibid.
3.
Quoted in RaushningHerman, The Voice of Destruction (New York: Putnam & Sons, 1940, p. 138.
4.
Ibid.
5.
Concerning the Wannsee Conference, see ShirerWilliams L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), p. 965. On Nazi policy concerning the Jewish question in the period prior to the conference, see Heinz Hohne, The Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS, trans. Richard Barry (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1969), pp. 196–258.
6.
DekerNikolai K.LebedAndrei, Genocide in the USSR: Studies in Group Destruction (New York: The Scarecrow Press, 1958).
7.
An excellent example of the Marxist deployment of the term “genocide” is to be found on pp. 440–1 of The Large Soviet Encyclopedia (Bolshaya sovetskaya enstisklopedia) (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1952), therein, genocide is defined as “an offshoot of decaying imperialism.”.
8.
ChomskyNoamHermanEdward S., After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology (The Political Economy of Human Rights, Vol. II) (Boston: South End Press, 1979), p. 164.
9.
A comprehensive analysis of the US impact upon Kampuchea (Cambodia), including detailed maps of the “overlapping box” method of US saturation bombing before 1975, is found in William Shawcross, Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger and the Bombing of Cambodia (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979). Of particular interest is Shawcross's citation, on p. 375, of an April 1975 US Aid report which noted that, “Slave labor and starvation rations for half [of Kampuchea's] people … will be a cruel necessity for this year, and general deprivation and suffering will stretch over the next two or three years [as a result of the American bombing]. Such information became increasingly and conveniently “lost” in the Western examination of Pol Pot's “autogenocide.”.
10.
DadrianVahakn N., “Factors of Anger and Aggression in Genocide,”The Journal of Human Relations, vol 19, no 3, 1971, p. 384.
11.
LemkinRaphaelDr., Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Concord, NH: Rumford Press/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), p. 79. It is noteworthy that Lemkin's book was acquired by the McGill Law Library in 1945, but despite its obvious importance as a groundbreaking text in an important aspect of international law, it was checked out only twice in the subsequent 28 years.
12.
Ibid.
13.
Ibid.
14.
TaylorTelford, Nuremburg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 96.
15.
Ibid, p. 14.
16.
Ibid, p. 28.
17.
Among the more important provisions of the secretariat's draft convention scrapped largely at the insistence of the United States were the inclusion of two categories of genocidal activity: (1) Planned disintegration of the political, social or economic structure of a group or nation, and (2) Systematic moral debasement of a group, people, or nation. Additionally, the draft convention contained an important nuance deleted from the final version, again largely at the insistence of the United States. This concerns defining genocidal acts in a two-fold way: (1) The destruction of a group (in whole or in part) and, (2) Preventing the preservation and development of the group. Ultimately, only the first of these two was retained.
18.
An interesting point in reference to the International Military Tribunal which tried many of the Nuremburg defendants is made by Ladislas Farago in his Aftermath: Martin Bormann and the Fourth Reich (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974). This is that there was nothing in the Charter, subscribed to by the participating nations, which set a concluding date for the tribunal's activities. Hence, its mandate might be correctly viewed as still being in effect and the tribunal might be properly and legally reconvened at any time. It could serve not only to continue to try Nazi criminals (as Farago suggests), but, at least in principle, could serve as the instrument of justice for those guilty of comparable crimes in subsequent years; the covenants employed at Nuremburg, after all, covered categories of criminality rather than membership in given nationalities or political parties per se. A legitimate means to solve at least a portion of the jurisdictional problems/questions associated with the 1948 Genocide Convention therefore exists in a technical sense. But there has never been an effort to use this means in any way.
19.
Davis and Zannis (Note 1), p. 21. Since their analysis the United States Senate has finally ratified the convention; it was signed into law by Ronald Reagan in February 1986.
20.
Perhaps the most notorious example of this sort of thing was the release of Alfred Krupp von Bohlen und Hallbach on February 3, 1951. Krupp had served barely three years of a prison sentence passed on him for crimes including the massive use of slave labor in keeping his sprawling armaments empire humming on behalf of the Third Reich. Krupp's release was effected by John J. McCloy, acting on behalf of the US government, which felt Krupp's managerial genius would be a significant tool in bolstering a revived German industry in following an anti-Communist Cold War course. This is well detailed in William Manchester's, The Arms of Krupp, 1857–1968 (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 754–770.
21.
Farago (Note 18), p. 19. Throughout his book, Farago illustrates his point with a number of case studies including, for example, that of Alfred Franz Six (recounted on pp. 326–327). Six (NSDAP No. 245,670/1930; SS No. 107,840/1935) was a Brigadeführer (major general) in the SS by the end of the war. Apparently a former university professor, he had attained his high rank via the expedient of excellent performance with the Einsatzgruppen (murder squads) butchering Jews in the USSR. He was sentenced on April 10, 1949, by an American military tribunal, to serve 20 years imprisonment for his crimes. By early 1951, US General Thomas Handy had reduced his sentence by half. Shortly thereafter, he was amnestied and released on orders from US High Commissioner in Germany, John J. McCloy. He immediately entered an executive position with Porsche-Diesel, within which he rose to become publicity and advertising manager by 1965. All the while he served as a “consultant” with the Gehlen Organization—a reconstitution of the Nazi Abwehr intelligence apparatus—assisting US intelligence in conducting propaganda operations against the Soviet Bloc.
22.
ArendtHannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (revised and enlarged edition) (New York: Penguin Books, 1965). Arendt has the good grace to note, on p. 294, that Israeli troops were being subjected to similar sorts of pressures, as was Eichmann, in Israel's prosecution of its war against the Palestinian population (but she chooses not to develop the implications of this). She also observes on p. 40 that Eichmann believed, with apparent sincerity, that he himself was an ardent Zionist (again, she fails to speculate upon the implications of this).
23.
Hitler's candid views on such matters are brought out in the memoirs of his confidant, HoffmannHeinrich, Hitler Was My Friend (London: Burke Publishers, 1955) and elsewhere. They are noted by John Toland in his definitive two volume biography of the Nazi dictator, Adolf Hitler (New York: Doubleday, 1976).
24.
ArendtHannah, The Origins of Tolalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1976).
25.
HorowitzIrving Louis, Genocide; State Power and Mass Murder (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976), pp. 1–6.
26.
Ibid., p. 18.
27.
Ibid.
28.
Ibid.
29.
HorowitzIrving Louis, Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982).
30.
Ibid., pp. 193–212.
31.
Horowitz (Note 25), p. 31.
32.
Horowitz (Note 29), p. 23.
33.
An interesting argument is offered by Hugo Adam Bedau, in an essay entitled “Genocide in Vietnam?” (HeldVirginia, editors), Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 5–46, that yet another category of murder might be used to parallel genocide. Commonly termed “felony murder,” this category is one in which death is not inflicted directly by the perpetrator in any way at all, but in which death nonetheless ensues to the victom as a by-product of the perpetrator's commission of other criminal (felonious) acts. It is probable that any comprehensive typology of genocide will ultimately include a clear analogy to this category.
34.
Francisco Suarez (1548–1617), as quoted in Taylor (Note 14), p. 63.
35.
Bedau (Note 33), provides an excellent illustration of the sorts of convoluted reasoning which occur under the rigid application of the intent criteria as the only possible definition under which conceptions of genocide may be lodged.
36.
Horowitz (Note 25).
37.
Davis and Zannis (Note 1), p. 18.
38.
DuffettJohn (editor), Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell War Crimes Tribunal (New York/London: O'Hare Books/Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1968).
39.
Taylor (Note 14). Taylor actually went further than suggesting another focus, stating in his conclusion on p. 207 that, “Somehow we failed ourselves to learn the lessons we undertook to teach at Nuremburg and that failure is today's American tragedy.” (One assumes it was also something of a tragedy for the Vietnamese, Kampucheans and the Laotians victimized by America's failure to learn its own lessons.) By my conservative count, Taylor's is one of not less than 40 widely read volumes referenced closely to the Russell Tribunal proceedings which emerged in the US during the period. Government participants such as Robert McNamara and Clark Clifford have acknowledged that the growing degree and quality of accusations of US criminality made them increasingly uncomfortable in pursuing Johnson's policies in Southeast Asia.
40.
SartreJean-Paul, On Genocide (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 57–85.
41.
All this was, of course, before Daniel Ellsberg “leaked” the so called “Pentagon Papers” in which “confidential” US goals, objectives and assessments of methodologies were spelled out. This thoroughly eliminated the contrived murk surrounding the question of American intentions in Southeast Asia, but nonetheless resulted in no charges being brought. See The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of the United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam (Gravel Edition) 4 volumes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).
42.
See, for example, The Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1972); ChomskyNoam, For Reasons of State (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); and all the testimony collected in the Winter Soldier Archive in Berkeley, CA (very little of which has been published).
43.
WeisbergBarry, Ecocide in Indochina: The Ecology of War (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1970).
44.
While the United States was a signatory to both of these Resolutions, it by no means has refrained from the production (including the development of new forms, such as pyophoric incendiaries based on depleted uraniun), stockpiling or proliferation. See BarnabyFrank (editor), Incendiary Weapons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1975), pp. 101–109. In terms of use of incendiaries, this has only been indirect: a notable example was the Israeli army's massive use of American-supplied white phosphorous ordnance, with full US diplomatic support, against Beirut in 1982. See Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (Boston: South End Press, 1983).
45.
Even without the latter pair of insertions, the elimination of words such as “knowingly” and “with intent” from the Convention, coupled to the latitude of interpretation arguably possible under Article III (d), should provide flexibility of analysis and response heretofore impossible under the Convention, a situation which might well cover the ground implied by the insertions themselves.
46.
For purposes of this paper, Bedau's analogy to Felony Murder should be considered as encompassed under Genocide in the Second Degree.
47.
In the event that this last category seems unfair, it should be noted that under common law, “good intentions” do not necessarily mitigate results. US courts have, for example, undertaken the successful manslaughter prosecution of “holy roller” parents who, with the best intentions (the salvation of their children's immortal souls, in their view), have denied medical treatment to their offspring. When the children die, the parents are held accountable; why should governments be less so, in principle?.
48.
The Reagan administration response was sparked by the Sandinista government of Nicaragua bringing a dispute before the World Court in The Hague, Netherlands during 1984. The Sandinistas argued that the US action of mining its harbors was a violation of international law. The Court agreed and called for removal of the mines. Interestingly, the mines were removed even while the US was preparing a response challenging the Court's authority to reach a finding in the matter.
49.
Richard Falk, “International Law and the United States' Role in the Vietnam War,” in BairdJay W., (editor), From Nuremburg to My Lai (Toronto: D.C. Heath & Co., 1972), p. 189, All Professor Falk had to do in order to discern the practical fallacy of this argument was to review the history of relations extant between the US government and American Indian; of 371 formal treaty agreements entered into by the US with various Indian sovereignties since 1789, all were systematically violated, and remain so to this day. It seems likely that the process of treaty violation was designed as an integral aspect of American expansion in precisely the same fashion as became evident in Hitlerian realpolitik..
50.
FalkRichard, “Ecocide, Genocide, and the Nuremburg Tradition of Individual Responsibility,” in Held (Note 33), p. 126.
51.
See, for example, FalkRichard, The End of World Order: Essays on Normative International Relations (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), especially “Part Five: Normative Horizons,” pp. 277–336.
52.
Horowitz (Note 25), pp. 56–57.
53.
A sample of literature addressing the examples provided include CarrancoLynwoodBearEstele, Genocide and Vendetta: The Round Valley Wars of California (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983), Maurice Collins, Cortez and Montezuma (New York: Avon Books, 1944); Jennings C. Wise, The Red Man in the New World Drama (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1971); Gloria Jahoda, The Trail of Tears: The Story of the American Indian Removals, 1813–1855 (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1975).
54.
LewisNorman, “Genocide,” in: A Documentary Report on the Conditions of the Indian People of Brazil (Berkeley, CA: American Friends of Brazil/Indigena, 1974), pp. 9–10.
55.
The Yanomami Indian Park: A Call For Action (Boston, MA: Anthropology Resource Center, 1981).
56.
MunzelMark, “Manhunt,” in: Genocide in Paraguay, ArensRichard (editor), (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1976), pp. 37–38.
57.
WeiselElie, “Now We Know,” in Arens (Note 56), p. 167.
58.
ChomskyNoam, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), pp. 168–190.
59.
ChomskyNoamHermanEdward S., The Washington Connection and the Third World Fascism (The Political Economy of Human Rights, Vol. I) (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1979), pp. 129–204.
60.
Arens (Note 56), p. 137.
61.
DavisZannis (Note 1), p. 18.
62.
U.N. Doc. E/A.C. 25/S.R. 1–28..
63.
DavisZannis (Note 1), p. 18.
64.
Ibid., p. 20.
65.
A sampling of available literature taking up this theme includes, of course Davis and Zannis (Note 1). Also see FuchsEstelleHavighurstRobert J., To Live on This Earth: American Indian Education (New York: Anchor Books, 1973); Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984); Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983).
66.
Concerning James Bay, see Davis and Zannis (Note 1). On the planned forced relocation of Navajos from the Big Mountain area of Arizona, see KammerJerry, The Second Long Walk: The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1978) or Ward Churchill, “Navajos: No Home on the Range,” The Other Side, vol 21, no 1, January-February 1985, pp. 22–27. Concerning termination, see Sarah M. Sneed, “Termination: The Indian Trust Responsibility During the Eisenhower Administration,” unpublished honors paper submitted to Professor George Pilcher, University of Colorado/Boulder, April 5, 1982.
67.
For an overview of the uranium contamination problem in the United States, see ChurchillWardLaDuleWinona, “Radioactive Colonization and the American Indian,”Socialist Review, vol 15, no 3, Berkeley, CA, May-June 1985. This particular problem also applies to Namibia and Australia.
68.
On this possibly odd-sounding point, see FredericksonGeorge, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
69.
Although it is an imperfect document, the most comprehensive recounting of the conditions referred to here are to be found in CoboJose R. Martinez, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, United Nations Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/Add. 8., September 30, 1983.
70.
As Kenneth L. Adelman describes in his African Realities (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1980), p. 5, “Meeting in Berlin in 1884, the European Powers carved up Africa without taking into account geographic and demographic conditions in that distant continent. Their legacy—borders making little if any political, ethnic, economic or strategic sense—set the stage for decades of squabbles, if not all out wars, by the fiercely nationalistic new states … Since ethnic groups straddle borders, conditions are ripe for irredentism … Even Africa's sacrosanct principle of ‘territorial integrity’ does not help much with states that never, in fact, accepted the old boundaries (such as Somalia) or with those plagued with secessionist movements (such as Eritrea and Biafra). After all. Biafra was recognized as ‘independent’ by Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon and the Ivory Coast.”.
71.
SklarRichard, “Political Science and National Integration—A Radical Approach,”The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol 9, no 2, 1971, pp. 137–138.
72.
NkrumahKwame, I Speak For Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology (New York: Praeger Paperbacks, 1961), e.g., p. 167, “… [we] are opposed to imperialism, colonialism, racial, tribal and religious chauvinism.” Again, on the following page, he states: ‘… until we purge from our minds this tribal chauvinism and prejudice of one against the other, we shall not be able to cultivate the wider spirit of brotherhood which our objective Pan Africanism calls for. We are all Africans and peoples of African descent …” In other words, the distinct identities and continuing existence of tribal peoples as such is something to be eliminated from the progressive scenario.
73.
Adleman (Note 70), pp. 126–127.
74.
Ibid., pp. 130–131.
75.
LeysColin, “Politics in Kenya: The Development of Peasant Society,”The British Journal of Political Science, no 1, 1970, p. 326.
76.
SaulJohn S., The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979). It should be noted that Saul does not offer his recounting of group emulsification as a criticism of the states in question.