What if Contingency Is the Norm? A Buddhist Intervention in Doing IR and Practising Global Ethics

Abstract

There has been a burgeoning interest in the concepts of relationality and temporality within the field of International Relations (IR) in recent years. This shift is driven by the recognition among many mainstream IR scholars that the global landscape has increasingly been characterised by profound uncertainty and unpredictability. A significant amount of recent works focusing upon the IR frameworks emphasise the relationality of actors. This is because the more pressing questions arise not from a desire to solve the problem of ‘uncertainty and unpredictability’ but from a need to critically examine how these concepts are problematised. One ideological current premised on this uncertain and unpredictable world is the discussion presented in this article, which originates at the intersection of three academic disciplines: Mahāyāna Buddhism, quantum theory, and IR. In this article, I critically examine the image of ontology historically assumed by contemporary IR and make every effort to further develop a new methodology grounded on Mahāyāna Buddhism supported by quantum mechanics for this purpose and I will present the potential implications of this integrated worldview for contemporary world politics, suggesting how these insights can contribute to a deeper and more nuanced understanding of global ethics.

Introduction

There has been a burgeoning interest in the concepts of relationality and temporality within the field of International Relations (IR) in recent years. This shift is driven by the recognition among many mainstream IR scholars that the global landscape has increasingly been characterised in the past more than two decades by profound uncertainty and unpredictability (Katzenstein, 2022; Katzenstein & Seybert, 2018; Shih, 2024). Events such as the 9/11 attacks, the global financial crisis, and escalating geopolitical tensions have rendered many of the discipline’s longstanding assumption irrelevant. In response, mainstream IR has often sought to restore order by appealing to models of predictability and certainty. Yet, this paper begins from a different premise: what if uncertainty is not an anomaly to be resolved but a fundamental condition of political life? Rather than perceiving unpredictability as a problem, this paper asks how our desire to neutralise it has shaped IR theory – and what it would mean to take uncertainty seriously, both ontologically and ethically.

To pursue this question, I bring into conversation two seemingly disparate bodies of thought – Mahayana Buddhism and quantum mechanics – and consider how they might offer a radically different ontological and methodological framework for rethinking IR. Both traditions challenge the notion of an autonomous self-contained subject, instead emphasising interdependence, relationality, impermanence, and the irreducible role of the observer in shaping the world they perceive. If the world is inherently fluid and impermanent, the question of how we ought to act emerges as a profound ethical concern. This is to say, the challenge before us is this: when ontological foundations are destabilised and lost, what forms of ethical commitment remain available to IR?

To this end, I will proceed as follows. First, I will begin by briefly revisiting the current understanding of the ontological argument, particularly ontological insecurity, within the field of IR, highlighting its roots and implications. Next, I will focus on recent methodological developments known as relationality and temporality approaches. While they have not been well developed as independent paradigms, they certainly challenge traditional IR paradigms and offer new ways of understanding global dynamics. Third, I will then introduce one of the most radical relational theories, Mahāyāna Buddhism, and explore a worldview based on chance and contingency by incorporating the relational quantum theory. This section will delve into how these perspectives intersect and provide a cohesive methodology to inquire into the contemporary discourses of uncertainty and unpredictability. Finally, I will present the potential implications of this integrated worldview for contemporary world politics, suggesting that virtue ethics can the most suitable ethical perspective when the world is inherently fluid and impermanent.

Ontological Insecurity and IR

In IR, the concepts of uncertainty and unpredictability have long been seen as impediments to order and control. Yet, such frameworks rarely question what uncertainty means, or why it is treated as problematic in the first place. Instead, uncertainty becomes the underlying condition that justifies security-driven institutional and military responses. In this section, I strive to reinterpret uncertainty not simply as a strategic or structural impediment but as an ontological concern – a product of the modern constitution of the subject. Drawing from social theory, particularly the works of Anthony Giddens, I argue that modern individuals are shaped and reshaped by a pervasive sense of existential anxiety or ontological insecurity.

Ontological insecurity is a concept that has its roots in existentialist philosophy and has been elaborated upon by various thinkers to describe the fundamental state of human anxiety about existence. Among them, Anthony Giddens’s Modernity and Self-identity would be the most influential work of ontological security (Giddens, 1991). In this book, Giddens conceptualises ontological insecurity as a defining feature of late modernity. According to Giddens, identity must be continuously maintained through self-narration in the face of social flux. Ontological security is defined as ‘a sense of continuity and order in events, including those not directly within the perceptual environment of the individual’ (Giddens, 1991, p. 243). It is based on the sense of stable and trusting order in their lives and, in there, ‘abstract systems become centrally involved not only in the institutional order of modernity but also in the formation and continuity of the self’ (Giddens, 1991, p. 33). However, when these surroundings are fragile, one will face existential anxiety or ontological insecurity.

Anxiety about ontological survival is not confined to social psychology. It was consciously/unconsciously adopted by the mainstream IR theories (Mitzen, 2006; Shani, 2017; Steele, 2008; Steele & Homolar, 2019; Zarakol, 2010, 2011). Under anarchy, many mainstream IR scholars have assumed that the world is lawless and disordered. In IR, ontological insecurity can be understood as the chronic state of uncertainty and anxiety. Mearsheimer clarifies in his interpretation of Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism, that states are not inherently aggressive, but the structure of the anarchic system forces them to act defensively (Mearsheimer, 2014). Here, the concept of anarchy helps to explain and justify the states’ engagement in behaviours aimed at securing their identity and stability, often through power dynamics and the accumulation of resources. Evidently, they anthropomorphised the states as an insecure subject here. However, what is missing is a serious interrogation of underlying anxiety. Insecurity of subject is simply projected onto the international system and institutionalised through realist assumptions of anarchy.

Such an anarchic world is commonly described as lacking a central order, a condition that is often invoked to legitimate the survival-oriented strategies of its actors. Within this framework, it is further assumed that a hegemonic order emerges when a single actor attains overwhelming power (Gilpin, 1988; Keohane, 2005). In this sense, traditional IR does not envision sheer disorder but rather a form of dominant order sustained through the exercise of power. This line of reasoning presupposes that order is inherently preferable to disorder, typically represented by uncertainty and unpredictability, and that condition of disorder must ultimately give way to a condition of order.

Here, I would like to pose a fundamental question rather than searching for the way to eliminate disorder, uncertainty, and unpredictability; why is uncertainty seen as a problem in the first place? What lies behind this framing? What if the contingency is the default position? After all, ontological insecurity is not an externality of IR theorisation. It is rather the central concern of it. This relocation of ontological insecurity within IR pushes us forward to reorient ourselves to approach uncertainty not as a threat but as an ethical opening.

Relationality and Ontology of IR

Our desire to be ontologically secured is transplanted into IR theories, notably, through the individualised autonomous profit-maximising agent. This assumption has underpinned the development of the field, yet its reliability and feasibility have not been sufficiently subjected to serious scrutiny. Whether in realism, liberalism, or constructivism, the autonomous subject consistently occupies a central role – presumed to possess a fixed essence and to exhibit patterned, predictable behaviour.

Unlike the traditional IR’s assumption of relationality, contemporary relational theory does not dismiss the changes in actors resulting from interactions. They include social network approaches, Processual relationalism, Practice theory, and Pragmatism (Jackson & Nexon, 2019). ¹ Probably the first explicit attempt was made by Jackson and Nexon (1999), in which they argue that relationality precedes the existence of nation-states. This implies that it is not nation-states that create relationships, but rather relationships that constitute nation-states. While their argument did not attract significant attention initially, researchers gradually became more attuned to relational thinking and their argument of relations before the state came into the limelight (Fisher, 2013; Holm & Sending, 2018; Jackson & Nexon, 1999). Attention to relational perspectives began to surge in the 2010s. Contemporary relational theories of this sort have emerged with the growing interest in non-Western frameworks such as Chinese Confucianism, Andean cosmologies, Hindu dharma, and African Ubuntu (Querejazu, 2023; Shani & Behera, 2023; Smith, 2012; Trownsell et al., 2021, 2023). The concept of relationality is now attracting global attention calling into question the Western-centric assumption of autonomous and independent agency.

However, even though these approaches assume that relations are the central concern in this new paradigm, some of their images of the subject are still characterised by enduring agency. In other words, actors are regarded as stable and enter into relations, rather than as entities constituted by the relations (Trownsell et al., 2023). This is particularly so in the case of Confucian relationality (Kang, 2007; Qin, 2018; Qin & Nordin, 2019; Shih, 2021). The assumption of the enduring agents leads us to the world image that order is more preferable than disorder, predictability than unpredictability. The concept of the enduring subject presupposes a continuous worldview. This follows from the fact that the enduring subject depends upon the sustained existence of other entities. For the continuity of the subject itself to be secured, the continuity of these external entities must, in turn, be regarded as certain and predictable. Put differently, the very notion of enduring subject is predicated upon the assumption of certainty and predictability.

The hope for ontological security becomes even clearer when we turn our focus onto the issue of time. Previous discussions on temporality have pointed out that Western civilisation is constructed on the premise of linear temporality (Hom & Steele, 2010; Solomon, 2016), which has produced a Westphalian-centric worldview characterised by a conflict between an advanced ‘self’ and a stagnant ‘other’ (Fabian, 2014; Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004). In this context, the autonomy and independence of actors in mainstream IR are intertwined with linearity to form a Westphalian worldview.

As an alternative to such a worldview, non-Western international relations have proposed a relational image of actors and the concept of circular temporality. This argument posits that the combination of relationality and circularity contributed to the stable East Asian regional order that existed prior to the arrival of Western modernity. Some Scholars argue for the need to establish a new international order centred on China, which embodies these principles of relationality and circular temporality (Kang, 2010; Qin, 2018).

However, what interests us in this confrontation in our theoretical endeavour for contingency and unpredictability is that these discussions posit a unity of the subject that persists across past, present, and future. The continuity of the subject – whether understood in terms of autonomous or relational subjectivities, or in linear or circular frameworks – is not questioned. Both of them recognise the importance of relationality and temporality, yet they agree that agents possess a high degree of persistence. Consequently, regardless relationality and temporality are emphasised, the assumption of continuous relations results in a rigid and static depiction of the world.

Mahāyāna Buddhism, Quantum Mechanics, and International Relations

After all, the existing literature on IR, whether they are realists, neorealists, liberals, constructivists, critical theorists, or global IR scholars, there is a penetrating assumption that achieving and maintaining a world order, whatever it means, is the norm. World contingency is something that should be avoided. If there is a possibility of world disorder, then we should alleviate or eliminate it. This is precisely the reason why we focus on past events.

Typically represented by E.H. Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis, through Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics and John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Powers to David Kang’s East Asia Before the West and Yan Xueton’s Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers, IR scholars have analysed numerous historical events (Carr, 1946; Kang, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2014; Waltz, 1979; Yan, 2019). This focus is driven by their attempts to understand the causes of wars. The principal objective has been to prevent conflicts before their emergence and to preserve order through understanding of the underlying causes of war. In this respect, the central preoccupation of IR has been the pursuit of greater certainty and predictability. In this sense, a significant portion of IR scholarship has been devoted to the study of conflict causation, predominantly grounded in the logic of causality.

E.H. Carr addressed the intricacies of causality in his seminal work What is History? by illustrating with an example involving Mr. Robinson, who was involved in a car accident while buying cigarettes. Carr poses the question: Was Mr. Robinson involved in the accident because Mr. Jones, who was driving, was intoxicated, because the car’s brakes were failing, because the accident occurred at a blind corner, or simply because Mr. Robinson was a smoker? Carr distinguishes between rational and accidental causes in this context, ultimately suggesting that the delineation between these causes is contingent upon contemporary values (E. H. Carr, 1990).

The principle of causality in historical research has primarily been developed to account for rational causes (Kurki, 2008; Kurki & Suganami, 2012; Suganami, 2011). This emphasis on rational causes arises from the necessity for causes to be generalisable, thereby holding significance for the present. Lessons for the present peace cannot be drawn from causes considered contingent (E. H. Carr, 1990). In other words, the distinction of rational and accidental causes is intended to enhance certainty and predictability. It is within this framework that many IR scholars, both mainstream and critical scholars, seeking certainty and predictability of international order operate without questioning its underlying assumptions.

The idea that causes must be rational leads as to another fundamental assumption of Carr’s argument which closely relates to the notion of rational causes in historical research is that researchers themselves have no influence on past events and remain independent of them. This presupposes a clear separation between the observer and the observed, suggesting that the presence or absence of the observer does not affect the mode of existence or behaviour of the observed (Brigg et al., 2022). Of course, Carr was well aware of this problem and this was the reason why he stated that history is ceaseless dialogue of past and present (Carr, 1990). But in general, his warning about the importance of the present has long been ignored in IR.

Can we truly assert that the observer is an independent entity, separate from the observed? This question marks the intersection of Buddhism, quantum theory, and IR. Quantum theory, which currently influences political thought in various forms, demonstrates that the very act of observation is deeply connected to the appearance of the observer (Rovelli, 2020). According to Carlos Rovelli, We are not independent entities but links in a web of relationships woven by various phenomena, including past events. More precisely, we are part of an ongoing phenomenon, and the act of revealing the past is also one of these phenomena. This is demonstrated by the so-called double-slit experiment in which photons are directed towards a wall with two slits. Without observation, the screen located behind the wall shows a striped pattern of wave interference. However, when observers attempt to measure which slit each photon passes through, the striped pattern disappears and two bands appear on the screen instead. This demonstrates that the relationality of observers to the phenomenon of photons is a part of the game (Rovelli, 2020). This implies that there is no independent reality apart from the act of measurement. While this phenomenon is only observed in a microscopic level in physics, a Japanese physicist, Sato Katsuhiko argues that the same logic of measurement is at work in the macroscopic world. We do not see them simply because too many other factors are involved in the latter’s case (Sato, 2014, 2016). In other words, the measurement problems merely become harder to see in the macroscopic world; they do not disappear.

If the measurement problem is at work even in the macroscopic world, how might our world be understood? Quantum mechanics and Buddhism tell us that nothing has an intrinsic and inherent essence. Rovelli writes:

The world fractures into a play of points of view that do not admit of a univocal, global vision. It is a world of perspectives, of manifestations, not of entities with definite properties or unique facts. Properties do not reside in objects, they are bridges between objects. Objects are such only with respect to other objects, they are nodes where bridges meet. The world is a perspectival game, a play of mirrors that exist only as reflections of and in each other (Rovelli, 2020, p. 88).

Similarly, another quantum physicist, Anthony Aguirre, states, ‘we break things down into smaller and smaller pieces, but then pieces, when examined, are not there’ (Aguirre, 2019, p. 318). In other words, there is no essence in objects, but it appears in relation to other objects. Then, he arrives at a confusing point where

if things are forms of forms of forms of forms, and if forms are order, and order is defined by us (who define macrostates) and by history (which actualizes them) and by the Universe (which undergirds the order), then those forms, it would seem, do not exist in and of themselves. They exist, it would appear, only as created by, and in relation to, us and the Universe. They are, the Buddha might say, emptiness (Aguirre, 2019, p. 318).

When reading quantum theory, in fact, one is struck by its proximity to Buddhism, particularly Mahāyāna Buddhism. Nagarjuna (Ryuju) asserts that everything we perceive as reality is constructed by relations, called dependent origination (or engi in Japanese and pratityasamutapada in Sanskrit), and lacks inherent essence. According to him, all phenomena are part of a dense web of interactions, and the self, or ‘I’, is merely a knot in this web. He describes this ultimate state of interdependence as ‘empty’ (ku and sunyata) (Katsura, 1997; Nāgārjuna, 1995).

The logic of emptiness provides a conceptual framework within which practitioners of Mahāyāna Buddhism hold a decisive role. Particularly, the role of doctors in Buddhist medicine exemplifies the principle that no individual exists as an autonomous agent distinct from others. Rather, doctors and patients are mutually embedded within a relational process of healing. This process entails engaging with fundamental ontological and epistemological inquiries, such as the nature of life, the mechanisms governing the world, and the origins of human suffering. In this sense, the doctor is not located outside of the patient’s lifeworld, but the doctor and patients count as integral parts of the entire web (Shimizu & Noro, 2024). This is precisely the point at which quantum mechanics and Mahāyāna Buddhism resonate with each other. Both regard the world as an intricate web of relationalities, and no one is supposed to be located independently or in isolation. As a result, the notion of a neutral objectifying observer located independently is fundamentally contested. Instead, we reach the conclusion, as a matter of course, that an observer always constitutes a portion of the entire web.

This relational understanding of the world extends beyond physical objects to perspectives themselves: any point of view exists only in relation to another, with no intrinsic existence. This is true even of Nagarjuna’s own perspective – nothing, not even the ideas of emptiness or nothingness, has inherent essence; everything is a conventional form, incapable of sustaining metaphysical scrutiny (Kajiyama & Ueyama, 2014). From this standpoint, we must accept the inherent uncertainty of our own existence and this is a condition to engage with ethics. Thus, ethics begins not after understanding but within the very conditions of uncertainty. Theorisation under this paradigm is not to explain the world as it is, but to take responsibility for how one is in the world.

This is precisely where the issue of uncertainty and unpredictability that international relations studies have been facing in recent years comes into play. Mainstream IR theories have been built on the assumption that the world is capable of being rendered certain and predictable through appropriate frameworks and methodologies. Certainly, the post-war reconstruction of Europe and Japan, the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, the fiscal and monetary policies of the G7, and the strategies of major powers such as Russia and China to maintain the global political and economic order may have achieved a certain degree of success. But to whom was this success beneficial? Was not the theory of international relations ultimately part of a strategy to foster and sustain the prosperity of the club of industrialised countries?

Conversely, while the developed world enjoyed unprecedented prosperity, was not ‘uncertainty and unpredictability’ the prevailing condition for the rest of the world? The shadows of major powers flicker behind various conflicts, such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraq War, and the Syrian civil war (Bilgin & Smith, 2024). While people in these war zones suffer, the major powers observe the images of injured civilians from the comfort of their air-conditioned rooms, via CNN and BBC news. In the next moment, they shift their focus to stock market developments, reacting with joy or sorrow to financial fluctuations or start typing an article to be published in high impact journals.

What is important here is the way in which we locate ourselves in the world, typically appears in the form of the measurement issue, that is, the relationship between the observer and the observed. When we base our inquiry into world politics on the world view of Mahāyāna Buddhism and quantum mechanics, the observer has the responsibility to become self-reflexive that they have already been stripped of their privileged position. It is necessary to recognise that the observer is not in the God-like overlooking perspective, but is, in fact, the constructor of the ‘world’. The state of the observer can only be understood in terms of possibilities and probabilities, and the act of comprehension and interpretation themselves construct the subjectivity of the observer. The act of Westphalian narration constructs a Westphalian subject, who can only see the world in Westphalian terms.

The relational ‘I’ must bear in mind that the world it narrates is of its own making and must not believe that there is an objective world. This awareness imposes an ethical responsibility to engage with world politics not as detached observers but as participants whose interpretations and actions shape the realities they study. This means acknowledging the fluid and interconnected nature of global interactions and understanding that our perspectives are inherently subjective and constructed.

The approach grounded on the intersection of Mahāyāna Buddhism and quantum mechanics perceived the world as intrinsically relational. It takes observers positioned within the web of relations. The relational ‘I’ is not just about reality but about our ethical responsibility. We have an ethical responsibility to become aware of the relationality that we are located in. Karin Fierke explicitly refers to this responsibility, saying,

The point is…that ‘I’ am part of a larger whole and a global equation that is badly out of balance; ‘I’ thus have an ethical responsibility from whatever position I occupy, and with whatever resources are available, to look at it from a different angle, to see through the illusions attached to ‘normal’ life, to begin the rotation from ego to relational ‘I’ (Fierke, 2022, p. 367).

In this sense, we have to seriously take into account the engagement in unlearning reality as well as the autonomous and independent ‘I’ (Bilgin & Ling, 2014; Bilgin & Smith, 2024; Cueva et al., 2023; Rösch, 2017; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988; Sutherland, 2023). By doing so, we can foster a more ethical and reflective approach to international relations, one that is attuned to the complexities and interdependencies of the modern world.

As quantum theory and Buddhist thought teach us, the world is composed of relationships, where different factors produce different consequences. Students of international relations must carefully consider this relational nature when contemplating the future of world politics. Accordingly, we should not confine our academic interest solely to events deemed rational, and should unlearn the methodology it suggests.

For instance, in February 2019, Moon Hee-Sang, Speaker of the South Korean National Assembly, attempted to integrate the non-rational aspect of empathy into the rational framework of international relations. He suggested that the issue of wartime sexual violence could be resolved if the Emperor of Japan met directly with the victims and empathised with their grief. This effort to introduce irrational causality into the rational causal structure of international relations was met with rejection. Fierce criticism from Japanese conservatives compelled Moon to apologise, thereby demonstrating the persistent power of Carr’s curse on rationality (Shimizu, 2021). However, Moon’s actions merit greater recognition. Precisely because we are constrained by rational causality, and because this rational causality can be so perilous, the intervention of irrational causality must be welcomed. In other words, we are compelled under such circumstances to unlearn the rational causality and open ourselves to unexpected encounters. We must accept a worldview that embraces both rational and irrational causality; E. H. Carr’s curse is not invincible.

However, we must pause to consider: Is it possible to fully understand a historical event if a variety of factors are at play? Is there truly such a thing as a complete, fallacy-free understanding? Unfortunately, the answer is negative. Nevertheless, or precisely because of this, we must challenge this impossibility. As quantum theory and Buddhism tell us, we must strive for a more comprehensive understanding, even while assuming that everything is in flux and nothing is immutable.

It is our ethical responsibility to proceed from the self-reflective premise that it is impossible to attain full awareness (Fierke, 2022; Sueki, 2018, 2020). This means that what we understand is temporary, a snapshot that becomes inapplicable in the next moment. When we face this fact squarely, our work in international relations presents itself as a never-ending process with no definitive goal.

Mahāyāna Buddhism, Quantum Mechanics, and Global Ethics

Global ethics in IR, typically represented by utilitarianism and deontology, often rests on universalist principles such as human rights, justice, and democracy which are projected from a Western model of the self (Frost, 2009; Hutchings, 2018; Widdows, 2011). However, if we take seriously the Mahāyāna Buddhist and quantum mechanics’ claim of the world as ever-changing and impermanent, thus bringing unlearning as methodology into play, leads us to a crossroad of ontology and ethics. From this perspective, ethical subject is not stable or autonomous, but emergent, porous, and changing, in other words relational. What, then, does ethics mean in the context of this radical ontology? Traditional Western ethical systems such as Kant’s deontology and Bentham’s utilitarianism are fundamentally posited on the assumption of a more or less stable and unchanging society. However, if the world is ontologically unstable and relational, the concept of ethics itself will be compelled to undergo significant transformation. If the world is relational and contingent, how can we speak of ethics?

In general, East Asian thought tends to regard virtue as the core principle of ethics. This orientation arises from a premise of relationality rather than autonomous actors. Such an ontological presumption implies that there are no overarching principles which are universally applicable. Mahāyāna Buddhism is no exception. However, IR has been slow to engage seriously with virtue ethics until recently (Ainley, 2017). When virtue ethics is discussed within the field of Global Ethics, it is most often framed through the lens of Aristotle (Ainley, 2017; Hutchings, 2018). While some contemporary approaches to virtue ethics emphasises the enumeration of specific virtuous acts (Nussbaum, 2011), others comprehend virtue in broader terms, highlighting the importance of reflexivity as an ethical practice (Amoureux, 2016). Virtue ethics theorists contend that ‘ethics is about the cultivation of character, or of the good life’ (Hutchings, 2018, p. 52), assuming ‘right actions follow from good character, from a conception of what a person is like; their character, inner traits, dispositions and motives are important’ (Widdows, 2011, p. 59). In practice, virtue ethics means:

the dialectic, dialogic, and affective navigation of thought and action coupled with a critical ontology of the self, wherein we investigate our subjectivity and the potential for its transformation as a response to difference, relationship, and epistemological uncertainty (Amoureux, 2016, p. 9).

Virtue ethics is, therefore, inherently relational. Mahāyāna Buddhist virtue ethics likewise takes relationality seriously and resonates with the Aristotelian emphasis on reflexivity and practice. Mahāyāna Buddhism guides adherents to engage with concrete contexts and adopt a reflexive stance. However, Mahāyāna Buddhist virtue ethics goes further by grounding ethical engagement in the concept of non-self. From this perspective, the subjectivity is understood as a temporal phenomenon, continually dying and being reborn every moment. In other words, it never overlooks the aspect of temporality.

In this context, introducing the classical ethical thought experiment known as the trolley problem would be beneficial. The trolley problem posits a hypothetical situation in which an out-of-control train is barrelling towards a maintenance site where five workers are present. A switching mechanism is available that can divert the train onto a sidetrack, where only one worker is located. In this context, the question arises: what constitutes the morally correct course of action? From a utilitarian standpoint, which is supposedly the predominant principle of ethics in the age of neoliberalism, the appropriate response would be to activate the switch, thereby sacrificing one life to save five. This conclusion aligns with the utilitarian principle of maximising overall happiness, often articulated as the ‘greatest happiness for the greatest number’. Mahāyāna Buddhism offers a nuanced perspective on ethical dilemmas, as evidenced by a compelling dialogue between a utilitarian philosopher and a Mahāyāna Buddhist monk. This discourse features Peter Singer, a prominent figure in utilitarian ethics, and Shih Chao-Hwe, a distinguished feminist monk from Taiwan. Their engagement seeks to elucidate the contrasting approaches of utilitarianism and Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics (Singer & Shih, 2023). Initially, both scholars acknowledge a superficial similarity between the two frameworks, particularly in their responses to the trolley problem, where both would advocate for redirecting harm towards one individual rather than allowing greater harm to multiple individuals. This initial resemblance may lead one to erroneously conclude that Buddhism aligns with utilitarian principles. Indeed, Singer appears to be inclined towards this interpretation. However, Shih encourages a more profound examination of the ethical implications, suggesting that a deeper understanding reveals significant distinctions between the two ethical systems.

Their argument, in fact, takes a decisive turn when they begin referring to the meanings of karma. For Singer, karma is merely a religious doctrine rooted in the concepts of reincarnation and causal effect. He interprets it from a predominantly secular perspective. From this viewpoint, the core issue in the case of the trolley problem is simply whether one should switch the lever or not. Even when karma is considered, it appears, in Singer’s understanding, to pertain only to the prospect of good or bad fortune resulting from some mysterious force that cannot be scientifically validated.

From a Mahāyāna Buddhist perspective, however, the issue takes on a different form. The focus is not on the action itself but rather on how one perceives and relates to the action afterwards. In other words, it involves temporality in its understanding of virtue. There is no definitive ‘right’ answer to the trolley problem in the world of impermanence in Mahāyāna Buddhist ethical discourse. It claims that, whether one decides to switch the lever or not, any action – or inaction – is inherently problematic. It is the commitment to wrongdoing that sets the stage for the undesirable consequences that follow through the workings of karma.

While individuals may fully comprehend the potential repercussions arising from a web of relationality, they are still compelled to choose between two acts of wrongdoing. Here, what matters is one’s conscious determination to commit an act, knowing its moral implications. They hold the self-reflexive attitude and understand that they cannot escape the consequences of karma but willingly accept the punishment it entails. This acceptance, in turn, becomes the path to virtue. In fact, one of the austerities of Mahāyāna Buddhism is called ninniku (forbearance) stated in one of the most important teachings of ancient Buddhism, Rokuharamitu (Six paramitas). It encourages adherents to undergo hardships and insults that appear to them as a result of one’s actions. This is a part of the process of accumulating virtue, and through this hardship, one becomes able to achieve a higher level of virtue and noble mind (Sueki, 2021).

This virtuous action is profoundly entangled with the concept of temporality. As the dialogue between Singer and Shih illuminates, the principle of Mahāyāna Buddhist understanding of the world takes the concept of time seriously. From a perspective that is based on autonomous and independent individuals, time and space concerned in ethics is confined to when and where the action takes place, such as utilitarianism. Therefore, their argument illustrates a one-off game. From a perspective that is based on relational individuals like Mahāyāna Buddhism, time and space extend themselves to eternity and infinity through the relational web like karma. Any action one takes is a part of the web, and never becomes conclusive by itself. The action, within the trolley question, for instance, necessitates the actor’s explicit awareness that they are engaging in wrongdoing, coupled with a determination to accept the consequences of their behaviour. In other words, the actor must consciously prepare for and acknowledge the karmic repercussions that their actions will inevitably engender. In this way, the action appears to be a part of the process of accumulating virtue which promotes one’s wisdom.

Ultimately, Mahāyāna Buddhist virtue ethics can be regarded as more radical form of ethics than Aristotle’s virtue theory, insofar as it begins with the negation of one’s own existence. In Aristotle’s account, prudence occupies a central place, and its cultivation is considered a mark of growth. By contrast, the self-negation emphasised in Mahāyāna Buddhism signifies that the self is but an ephemeral node within a web of interdependent relationships. Accordingly, the cultivation of virtue entails both theoretical and practical engagement with the ontological claim that the self does not exist. In other words, growth within this framework means moving closer to nothingness. And in this process of approaching nothingness, we remain perpetually imperfect and prone to wrongdoing. It is precisely this stance of continual self-reflection that IR demands today.

Conclusion

When we think of global ethics in IR, we tend to confine our knowledge in a limited time and space. This seems to be based on the tradition of Newtonian physics which promotes the understanding of the world on the basis of autonomous and independent individuals. This seems to end up with the empiricist methodology in which observers are detached from the target of inquiry. Under significant influence of this peculiar perspective, IR has been developed as an academic subject that focuses exclusively on the ontological security. IR has at least appeared to be successful insofar as it disregarded what has been taking place at the margins of the world. In this sense, IR as an academic field has colonial dispositions. On the other hand, for those who have lived on the margins, the world has never been a field of security and protection. It has rather been a place of uncertainty and unpredictability. In other words, security, including the ontological one at the centre, has been one side of the same coin as the uncertain and unpredictable world.

To perceive the world comprehensively, we need to first unlearn the long-established ontology and turn our eyes to unconventional approaches such as the relationality of Mahāyāna Buddhism and quantum mechanics. When we focus on Mahāyāna Buddhism and quantum mechanics, the world appears to be inherently uncertain and unpredictable. Unlike the contemporary IR literature, Mahāyāna Buddhism and quantum mechanics presupposes the world of ephemeral and transient characters. In this understanding, what is important in comprehending the world is not how we recognise and analyse it from an objective standpoint, but how we live in it. The question is of ontology, and the new ontology on the basis of Mahāyāna Buddhism and quantum mechanics guides us to a novel ethics. This is precisely the reason why we have to turn our eyes to virtue ethics, which instructs us how to engage with the new ontology.

There is a rich literature of ethics in the world of ephemeral and transient characters globally. Mahāyāna Buddhism is just one of those. By expanding our imagination of the world to eternity and infinity, the way we live as academics would be substantially changed. What we need to be open to is not limited to ‘others’ in IR, but to another form of ourselves. This line of inquiry fundamentally challenges the conventional understanding of what it means to engage in the academic field of IR. While IR has traditionally been established as a social science, when reinterpreted through the ethical orientation developed in this paper, IR emerges as a practice-oriented field through which scholars are invited to grapple with the existential question of how to live well.