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Abstract

Community mediation and peacebuilding processes with warring gangs in urban areas create opportunities for peace and trust building. During the early 1990’s communities engaged in such mediation processes with gangs that were at war with one another. Such mediation processes have been repeated with the more recent gang wars in Manenberg, Khayelitsha and Nyanga in Cape Town. These recent gang wars have taken place in communities in which gangs consider their niche or territory. Many of the community mediation processes, more commonly known as “peace talks” in the community, failed to secure peace. However, the process of mediation between gangs has had the opposite effect of peacebuilding and trust building between rival gangs and community mediators. Methodologically, this paper is based on experiences of mediators over the last thirty years working on gang mediation processes and forms part of a larger project addressing gang mediation. Drawing on local and international gang literature, it contributes to the work of Sarah Henkeman on invisible violence. This paper provides a historical understanding of what happens during community gang mediation processes, its impact on communities (and gangs) and its contribution to peacebuilding through mediation.

Keywords

community mediation gangs peacebuilding trust-building

Introduction

Peacebuilding is contingent on the knowledge of the few and participation of many. Peacebuilders and conflict resolution specialists have for years argued that peacebuilding requires specialised skills, training and experience, (Odendaal & Spies, 1996). It posits the knowledge of such processes in the hands of a few and it has huge impact of the people for who peace is being manufactured. Trust building (Kappmeier et al., 2020) is part of the peacebuilding process and building peace must follow so predetermined steps or patterns that allows positive outcomes for all the parties. In such a scenario, one has to ask where the parties to such peacebuilding processes find themselves as it is them on whom a successful resolution of the conflict depends on. Whether such processes lasts is another thing.

In high conflict communities, mediation as part of the peacebuilding process and peacebuilding models vary and are highly contested. We argue that processes of mediation to resolve violent community and gang conflicts are huge learning curves for those in the business of peacebuilding. Internationally, there has been very little literature on the relationship between criminal gangs and mediation processes, and this paper intends to contribute to that literature.

This study is situated in Cape Town, South Africa where most of the gang conflicts have played itself out very violently. Over the years immediately preceding and immediately after liberation, there have been many attempts at mediation between warring gangs in very poor, and marginalised communities. These attempts at mediation has ostensibly been led by local mediators from the community and government has not been involved in any of the mediation processes. Significantly, in some areas, members of the police were involved in mediation processes, despite decisions and resolutions by the provincial government that it did not involve itself in “peace talks” with gangs.

The literature on peacebuilding in Africa and the rest of the world mostly relates to peacebuilding processes in states engaged in conflicts (Africa, 2020; Lambourne & Herro, 2008; Zaum, 2013). But what happens when conflicts emerges as local intra-community gang conflicts? This paper addresses such processes by principally focussing on community gang mediation processes in three communities on the Cape Flats¹ in Cape Town. It focusses efforts on mediation processes in communities such as Manenberg, Khayelitsha and Nyanga in Cape Town. These communities have been at the epicentre of gang violence over a number of years and attempts at peacebuilding have been as sporadic and intermittent as when gang violence erupts within these areas.

Henkeman (2018), provides us with a manual on peacebuilding through understanding and analysing narratives of visible and invisible violence and trauma. It neatly locates the efforts for peacebuilding through dependencies on local narratives. Drawing on the definitions by Stan Cohen (2013), Henkeman (2018) suggests that placing the self of the centre of knowing and not knowing about violence (visible and invisible), creates expertise in everyday local people who can confront sources of symbolic violence. She presents an understanding of violence and its sources that places power back in the hands of people who should respond to it, as Henkeman (2018: 32) observes:

We possess these types of knowledge because we have all either experienced, observed or heard about examples of symbolic, structural, psychological and physical violence at work in society.

This approach to peace making challenges previous international conceptions of peacebuilding processes with the consent of those involved in the violence.

International Literature on Eco-Environment and Peacebuilding

International efforts at peacebuilding present substantial opportunities for peacebuilders, peacemakers, and participants in conflict resolution. These efforts often serve as guides for how peace processes should unfold. However, gang mediation, particularly, has not garnered significant attention at either the international or African levels. Most literature on peace processes has focused on mediation efforts between conflicting states rather than intra-community conflicts involving gangs (Africa, 2020; Van Gestel, 2018).

Africa (2020, p. 16) argues that peacebuilding involves:

Given the ambiguity of violence in Africa, peacebuilding processes tends to be complex, multifaceted and messy, with several processes overlapping or running concurrently. These can include political transition, where political actors must sort out their differences, level the playing field and work together in a common geographical territory.

Significantly, he suggests that political actors should play a role, especially in a political transition and this clearly provides a clue as to some of the actors in inter-state conflicts. But the success of such processes hinges on clearly identified actors. We want to suggest that in community and gang conflicts in particular, it is difficult to clearly identify primary and secondary actors. The reasons are not difficult because such actors do not principally want to take responsibility for deaths as a result of the conflicts (in most cases), are concerned about their own reputations and generally dismiss claims that they are involved in gang conflicts because it is bad for business and attracts the interest of the state law enforcement agencies.

Much of the literature to these approaches is built on conflict theoretical models first explained by theorists such as Hall et al. (1978), Young (1988), and Young and Brotherton (2014). Of course there are other, more recent theorists who argue that crime on the periphery and in local working-class communities do not matter: capitalism remains in control (Tierney, 1996). In this scenario we have to propose the idea where there are high levels of conflict and crime in poor, densely populated and marginalised communities, with low levels of policing, that government appears to have abandoned when it comes to safety provision. Is it therefore reasonable to expect that such communities will appeal to the perpetrators of gang violence to attempt mediate, or in their own words: “peace-talks”.

We argue that communities engage in peace-talks when there is no prospect of the police quelling violence in the affected communities and the numbers of casualties have increased leading to severe community trauma and fear.

The success of peace talks, and mediation processes in gang and community conflicts often hinges on the involvement of non-armed actors residing within the same territories as the gangs. Excluding these actors can delegitimize the mediation process. Van Santen (2020) argues that gang violence in communities is not significantly reduced by gang truces alone. For instance, in Greater August Town, Jamaica, a gang truce between different factions of the Jungle 12 gang did not lead to a reduction in violence. Instead, a general decrease in national crime statistics influenced the reduction of gang violence (Katz et al., 2022).

The question remains whether gang mediation processes can be considered part of broader peacebuilding efforts in countries where gang conflicts permeate the social and political landscape. Often, state actors become involved in peacebuilding processes, especially in scenarios where organised gangs form tenuous links with guerrilla resistance movements, such as FARC in Colombia. This conflict quickly emerged as a conflict between the FARC and the state. However, these scenarios typically involve political leaders who mediate the conflicts. There have been several attempts to mediate this particular conflict with many stops and starts that resulted in greater violence in the interregnum during the peace talks. We need to make the point that without prior peacebuilding and trust building processes in place prior to mediation processes, such mediation efforts are bound to fail or secure a temporary ceasefire without long-term peace. At a local level however, gang mediation efforts involving local communities are rarely integrated into national peacebuilding strategies. But it does have the potential, if left unchecked to develop into a national conflict that eventually draws several political parties.

Some researchers argue that gangs lack an ideological commitment to overthrowing governments and do not aim to challenge political power (Rodgers & Jensen, 2009). Others, like Manwaring (2005) and Sullivan and Bunker (2012), characterize gangs as forms of urban or criminal insurgency, necessitating different state responses, such as military intervention. However, such approaches can hinder peace processes by giving gangs time to regroup and enhance their strategies, which is why peacebuilding processes should precede state intervention.

Unlike many American contexts, South Africa has experienced official peacebuilding and peace-making processes through mediation, negotiations, and truth and reconciliation processes. Rodgers and Jensen (2009) highlight how gangs supported the apartheid government by attacking black political activists at the behest of the state, and later participated in Truth and Reconciliation Committee hearings (TRC:1998, p. 461). Despite the extensive literature on South African gangs and the associated violence, there is a dearth of research on gang mediation processes. The few documented instances of gang mediation are usually informal community efforts unsupported by government resources.

The international literature underscores the importance of involving local actors in peacebuilding and highlights the complexities of gang mediation. While global peacebuilding strategies offer valuable frameworks, the unique dynamics of gang conflicts require tailored approaches that consider the local socio-political context.

Local Literature

The history of gang scholarship in South Africa is extensive, with significant contributions from researchers focusing on youth participation in gangs and delinquent activities in Cape Town. Notable scholars such as Pinnock (1984), Kinnes (2000), Pillay (2002), Standing (2003), Dixon and Johns (2001), and Samara (2011) have explored gang structures, the drug trade, criminal social networks, power dynamics, and gang culture. The emergence and evolution of gangs in the Cape Flats have been comprehensively documented. Pinnock (2016) attributes the rise of gangs to structural factors, such as the forced removals of coloured and black people from inner-city Cape Town, leading to gang formation in newly established communities. His earlier works (1984, 1997) provide detailed accounts of these developments. There are four main gang typologies in the Western Cape Province: Crew, Clique, Street Gang, and Prison Gang, each characterized by distinct geographical and social contexts (Roloff, 2014).

Street gangs are typically associated with lower educational levels, creating their own social order by gaining respect and status through tough behaviour and criminal activities (Mitchell et al., 2017). In contrast, prison gangs, composed of convicts, operate under a set of informal prison rules that demand loyalty within prison boundaries. These gangs are highly organised and maintain extensive criminal networks both inside and outside prison (Mitchell et al., 2017). Recently, Cape Town has faced the emergence of violent youth groups in its townships, adding to the traditional gang problems. These groups, visible in small cliques and crews, operate in both schoolyards and neighbourhoods. Unlike traditional street gangs, these groups include young people who are still attending high school (Mguzulwa & Gxubane, 2019; Sefali, 2014).

During South Africa’s political transition, gangs developed criminal empires by exploiting lowered social controls, as discussed by Kinnes (2000). His later work (2009) examines the impact of gangs on police governance. Various scholars have explored the state’s response to gang violence, highlighting the shortcomings of these approaches (Goga, 2014; Lambrecht, 2014; Schärf, 1990). Despite the extensive literature on gang violence, there is limited documentation on community mediation processes with gangs. Most mediation attempts have been informal and unsupported by government programs or resources. The Western Cape government’s policy against engaging with organized crime groups has left communities to mediate gang conflicts independently, often without formal support (Pinnock, 2016; Wollberg, 2020).

Focusing on localised prevention strategies is crucial for addressing gang violence in South African townships. Matzopoulos and Myers (2014) emphasise the importance of detailed sub-national data for effectively implementing and evaluating neighbourhood-specific interventions.

Situating the Cape Flats

A significant portion of gang violence occurs in the Cape Flats. Despite the efforts and strategies implemented by local, provincial, and national authorities to dismantle gangs in the Cape Town, gang-related crime and violence remain a daily threat to the safety and security of many residents in the Cape Flats. South Africa is an exception to many of the countries in Africa where gang violence routinely disrupt the lives of communities and contribute to the death rates as documented in the official crime statistics. In 2019, South Africa ranked 127th out of 163 countries in the Global Peace Index (GPI), placing it among many countries experiencing conflict (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019). The cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape and Durban are all affected by disruptive gang violence. Furthermore, Van Der Linde (2019) reported that statistics from the South African Police Service (SAPS) indicate a significant increase in gang-related murders, the Western Cape province being the highest whose capital is Cape Town (SA Cities Network, 2019), being a murder capital in the world. In 2019, Department of Community Safety reported that over a year, gang-related events in the Western Cape were an average of 28 times per day. From November 2018 to May 2019, there were 2,302 recorded murders with the majority being gang-related. Gangs contribute to 70% of all crimes in Cape Town (Van der Linde, 2019).

This research contribution is part of a larger project aimed at mapping gang mediation processes through various case studies. Three areas in the Cape Flats—Manenberg, Nyanga, and Khayelitsha—have been selected for this research due to the high incidence of gang violence and the communities’ efforts to initiate “peace talks” between the gangs.

Nyanga remains the murder capital of South Africa if the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) crime statistics were to be believed. Khayelitsha has a significant place in the murder rate statistics and Manenberg has been one of the epicentres of gang violence over the last thirty years.

Mediating Gang Violence in Cape Town

South Africa has experienced devastating effects of gang violence in recent times. Despite the various strategies and efforts by law enforcement agencies and other appropriate bodies, the impact remains significant. Responses to gang violence in South African communities have predominantly been suppressive rather than preventative (Pinnock, 2016). Measures such as the South African Police Service’s Anti-Gang Unit (Dziewanski, 2021) and the deployment of military forces in gang-ridden communities in the Western Cape (Cano et al., 2023) have been implemented. However, these approaches often fall short due to significant legislative and practical gaps in prevention measures and gang mediation processes. We consider attempts at mediation in three communities in Cape Town: Manenberg, Nyanga and Khayelitsha.

Often mediators are drawn from community-based organisations and civil society organisations that are located directly within the communities affected by internecine gang violence. They are often invited by members of the community police forums (and sometimes churches) to intervene in the violence affecting the community.

More often than not, the mediation process starts with a conflict analysis with a small team of volunteers after the invitation to mediate. This is followed by bilateral meetings with gang leaders to check on their willingness to enter a mediation process. Only once all parties (both primary and secondary parties) are prepared to enter the dialogue, does the process really start.

Areas affected by gang violence has included Nyanga, Khayelitsha and Manenberg and we have selected these three areas because of the preponderance of gang violence and criminality.

Nyanga, Manenberg, Khayelitsha

All three communities, Manenberg, Nyanga, and Khayelitsha are located on the Cape Flats² in Cape Town. According to the City of Cape Town 2011 census data, Manenberg has a population of 61 615³ on a 3.5km² piece of land. Nyanga and adjacent and has a population of 57 996⁴ on a 3.09 km² piece of land. Khayelitsha holds a population of 391 471⁵ on a piece of land. Despite official population communities have almost doubled with the amount of informal and backyard dwellers.

All three communities are known for gang violence and contribute to official crime statistics, especially the official murder and attempted murder rates. As indicated earlier in this paper, Nyanga has been on the South African Police Service (SAPS) top thirty station list for over town years. The crime profile for Nyanga in particular shows that it remains the top murder hotspot for the country.⁶

According to the official crime statistics,⁷ the murder rate in Nyanga increased from 164 in 2021/22 to 235 in 2022/23 by 71 or 43%. For the same period, the murder rate in Khayelitsha decreased by 15.2% from 197 in 2021/22 to 167 in 2022/23. The murder rate in Manenberg decreased from 87 in 2021/22 to 80 in 2022/23. For the same period under review, drug related crime has increased in Manenberg by 36%, Nyanga by 45.7% and in Khayelitsha by 90.7%. Similarly, the number of firearms and ammunition confiscated in these communities show increases for Manenberg (16.8%), Nyanga (1%) and a decrease for Khayelitsha (−9%).

Similarly drug related crime has shown an increase of 36.7% in Manenberg, a 45.7% in Nyanga and 90.7% increase in Khayelitsha. Despite the drop in the confiscations of firearms and ammunition in Khayelitsha, the community is known for a host of other violent crime. Drug related crime. Policing in Khayelitsha has been contested and the community launched a complaint against the police for not investigating and preventing crime. This resulted in the Premier of the province instituting the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry in 2014. The report noted the findings of Jean Redpath that Khayelitsha had the third worst murders in the country after Nyanga and Inanda in KwaZulu-Natal. (O’Regan-Pikoli Commission of Inquiry, 2014, p. 44)

Manenberg

Community groups opposed to crime and violence have been at the forefront of protests, mass marches, and demonstrations against gang violence. They have engaged in various efforts to mediate or create ceasefire arrangements between gangs, although not all mediation efforts have been successful. In Manenberg, for instance, several gang wars over the last thirty years have resulted in numerous deaths. In 1993, the African National Congress (ANC) sent its national executive committee to Manenberg to negotiate with gang leaders in an attempt to stop the violence (Friedman, 1994a). Despite these efforts, mediation attempts faced significant challenges, leading to the involvement of the army to secure peace (Friedman, 1994b).

Mediation processes in Manenberg have had varied in success. Some initiatives, such as using the Cape Town Holocaust Centre as a venue for mediation, achieved temporary ceasefires, while others failed, merely serving as opportunities for gangs to regroup and replenish their resources. Mediation processes with the gangs of Manenberg took place in 1993, 1994–1996–2002, and more recently in 2020 and 2021. The reason for the protracted mediation processes are because of the protracted gang wars, some lasting years and others starting anew and spilling over into neighbouring communities such as Hanover Park and Mitchell’s Plain. The requirements for mediation processes have continually changed in high violence communities precisely because the intensity of the violence, preparedness of the parties to engage in ceasefires to allow mediation talks to continue and the time it takes with trust building.

Khayelitsha and Nyanga

In contrast, the issues of gang mediation peace processes in areas like Nyanga and Khayelitsha are less well documented. However, a growing body of research investigates community interventions (Mguzulwa, 2022; Super, 2015; O'Regan-Pikoli Commission of Inquiry, 2014; Boqwana, 2009). A common conclusion is that communities struggle to oppose gang activities due to fear for their own lives and the safety of their loved ones. This fear further promotes gang associations, as there is inadequate monitoring and support. Nyanga CPF was trained in conflict mediation by members of the Centre for Conflict resolution in 1998 and supported by the Western Cape Anti-Crime Forum. Both communities of Nyanga and Khayelitsha attended a training programme facilitated at the time by the Centre for Conflict Resolution on creative and constructive approaches to conflict. This was followed up by a training programme with the WCACF on neighbourhood watch training.

Most residents in these communities are marginalised, vulnerable, and powerless, living in deep poverty (Ward et al., 2012). These harsh realities are compounded by a high crime rate and a lack of safety in their homes and streets. More than 80% of Khayelitsha residents, for instance, do not feel safe in their community (O'Regan-Pikoli Commission of Inquiry, 2014). The area has limited policing resources, with only three police stations serving its entire population, which partly explains the difficulty in maintaining accurate crime statistics (Kinnes, 2017).

Youth violence in Khayelitsha has become a significant social issue, shaping the nature of public spaces, including recreational parks and schools. Some taxi drivers have attempted to stop gang violence but were unable to sustain their efforts due to threats against their lives and those of their loved ones (Sefali, 2014). Instances of temporary police protection for residents have been reported when communities sought intervention against gang violence (Mguzulwa, 2022), leading to protests against youth gang violence. Effective interventions in areas like Khayelitsha and Nyanga must address the vulnerability of young people and the root causes of their involvement in gang violence. Raising awareness and providing support to vulnerable youth are crucial steps in reducing their participation in gangs.

The literature on peacebuilding in communities is extensive, covering conflict resolution, mediation, and negotiation. Van der Merwe’s framework for mediators is particularly relevant. He emphasises that successful mediation requires an invitation from one or more of the parties involved. Most mediation processes in these communities have been initiated by third parties, such as community police forums or peace committees, rather than the gangs themselves.

Van der Merwe outlines several fundamental principles for mediators: impartiality, sensitivity to the conditions and needs of the parties, assisting parties in avoiding loss of face, ensuring the quality and credibility of mediation services, reconciling opposites, and maintaining open communication channels (Van der Merwe, 2000). While his principles were developed in the context of political transformation, they are applicable, with some adaptation, to mediation with violent gangs.

However, the lack of resources in many African and coloured communities often means that professional mediators are unaffordable. Consequently, untrained volunteers often mediate, leading to temporary ceasefires that collapse when opposing gang members encounter each other. This instability undermines confidence in the peace process and makes gang leaders reluctant to participate in public mediation efforts.

Much of the attempts at mediation has been led by the community police forums in both Nyanga and Khayelitsha. It has not yielded sustainable peace and where such attempts have been succeeded, it has not been peace. What has been significant is that the communities of both Nyanga and Khayelitsha have turn towards taxi vigilantes to resolve their conflicts, violently (Abrahams, 2010).

Peacebuilding in Violent Communities

The literature on peacebuilding in communities is thick and there are significant texts devoted to conflict resolution, mediation, peacebuilding, and negotiations. For the purposes of this paper, we draw on Van der Merwe’s (2000) framework for mediators.

One of the founders of the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), van der Merwe (2000) played a significant role in recognising that conflicts not only takes place at state level, and at regional levels, he also implicitly recognised that such conflicts takes place at community level.

In South Africa, the organisations that supported mediation processes was the National Institute for Crime Prevention and Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) as it used to be known in the mid to late 1980’s. Another organisation that played a significant role in mediation was the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) who provided much needed resources to community police forum members to allow them to engage in such mediation processes. CCR provided training and capacity building processes at community level with basic and advanced mediation courses, creative and constructive approaches to conflict and making resources available for facilitators.

When implementing gang mediation processes, there are a number of considerations that should be prioritised by mediators engaging in the process. Firstly, consideration of any mediator should be whether there is an invitation from one or more of the parties to facilitate mediation. This is a crucial aspect because if there is no invitation, there can be no successful mediation. In most cases, most of the mediation processes was initiated by the community police forum or the peace committee, a third party to the conflict purporting to represent a secondary party.

HW van der Merwe establishes fundamental principles for conflict mediators. He distinguished between “principles of negotiation” where the parties faced each other without a third party and “principles of mediation” where a third party was present (van der Merwe, 2000, p. 203). A third, principles of legitimacy was added after his engagement with political parties during the period where the old apartheid state was challenged as an illegitimate government.

He also establishes important principles for the mediator. These includes impartiality of the mediator; sensitivity to the conditions and needs of parties involved; to assist parties who have made themselves guilty of misbehaviour, or who have painted themselves into a corner, to get out of it without losing face (Van der Merwe, 2000, p. 205); quality of mediation services; credibility of the mediator; reconciling opposites; respecting the popular base of elected leaders and acknowledging the tension between privately held views and public stands; impartiality of the mediator; no high expectations but patience in abundance; open communication channels with all parties; and, respect for all parties (Van Der Merwe, 2000: 2011).

While it is understandable that Van Der Merwe was writing about his mediation during a process of political transformation and negotiations, these principles can be applied with reserve to mediation with violent gangs.

In Africa, different initiatives such as churches are facilitators of peacebuilding as Zambara (2014) found in Zimbabwe:

Church congregations transcend ethnic barriers, geographical locations and political polarities. They can effectively build peaceful communities by promoting non-violent ways of resolving conflicts among youth militias as a way to bring them back to normal community life. The churches can use their social teaching programmes for youths to promote a more non-violent orientation using the Alternatives to Violence Project (AVP) model, with necessary modifications to suit the Zimbabwean context.

The significant part of professional mediators is that often, community groups cannot afford to employ such mediators as often many African and coloured communities does not have the resources or time, to find such mediators, especially when they are in the middle of a violent conflict scenario.

It often leads to untrained people being asked to, or volunteering to mediate in circumstances they are ill prepared for. This often leads to temporary talks, ceasefire arrangements that often break down the minute opposing gang members see one another. It does not inspire confidence in any peace process and neither do gang leaders prefer such public processes.

Findings: What Have We and What Can We Learn

Gibson and Maringira (2020) suggest that the rise and complexity of corruption in South Africa have also contributed to the persistence and growth of gang-like structures. This questions the legitimacy and effectiveness of the judicial and policing systems, with some officials becoming involved in illegal activities such as fraud and bribery (Gibson and Maringira, 2020). Gangs have enhanced their ability to survive and prosper by forging links with law enforcement agencies (Kinnes, 2017). In addition, inadequate policing and a loss of public trust in the justice system have further fuelled the wave of gang violence in the Western Cape (Lamb, 2018a; Kinnes, 2017). The White Paper for Safety and Security 2016 suggests that prevention measures must be aligned with policies on safety and security, with their effectiveness being monitored on the ground (Civilian Secretariat for Police, 2016; Lamb et al., 2021). According to the constitution, providing safety and security to citizens is not just the government’s responsibility but also a basic human right. Furthermore, local government has a significant role to play in promoting a safe environment. This involves working with the Community Police Forum and requires direct engagement with the public. Gangs in every marginalized society are a reality that must be addressed collaboratively by the community, civil society, government, and other key stakeholders. Effective preventative measures should be employed to benefit the entire community, rather than provoking gangs to retaliate further.

In all the mediation talks conducted soon after political transition, were facilitated by an independent third parties until at least 2002. Thereafter the mediation processes were conducted by community members themselves, often led by the community police forum. This is despite the internecine violence that took place as a result of the PAGAD and taxi vigilante wars on the Cape Flats. During the early 1990’s many of the mediation processes with violent gangs were subject to external third-party mediators (mostly from CCR and NICRO at the time) working closely with the parties, with many bilateral meetings, trust building exercises and finally bringing the parties into one room to settle their differences.

Such processes are time consuming and require teams of mediators to undertake initial conflict analysis, identifying the primary and secondary parties before any attempt at mediation. A critical step always is the invitation to the mediators to become involved in the process by a community-based organisation such as the CPF. Lastly, the conflicting parties must show a willingness to enter such a process and participate in it. That too is time-consuming and requiring their support for the process requires a certain set of communication skills.

Only after these processes were set in motion, did many of the multiple mediation processes take place between the warring gangs during the 1990’s. Some of the mediation processes yielded ceasefire agreements, others yielded complete cessation of hostilities and gangs ending the war, and yet others did not yield results.

From current reports, gang violence has erupted intermittently between a new set of gangs and their opposition around turf, drugs and other personal disputes since 2004. What we have seen is that community members have spontaneously, and often without preparation, analysis, neutrality initiated ‘peace talks’.

The consequences of such ad-hoc approaches by individuals post 2004, who were almost always mothers of gang members (and sometimes leaders of gangs), led to ill-prepared processes for disputing parties to address the conflictual issues in a deliberate and long-term manner that ensures lasting peace. Often such ad-hoc peace talks lead to a breakdown of trust when one or more party reneges on the agreements struck with parties that are members of the gangs, but do not have the mandate to act on their leader’s behalf. Hanover Park is such a community where several ad-hoc peace agreements were made only to be broken at the next available opportunity.⁸ This does not augur well for the long-term stability and safety of the community.

Mediation processes are difficult of and in itself and facilitators of such mediation processes, particularly in gang conflict areas should make sure that they possess and pass on such skills to community facilitators if we are to develop sustainable mediation and its outcome, sustainable peace in communities.

A significant factor that should be considered when engaging in mediation processes with gang members. That is the lessons for the gangs themselves when they engage in such processes. One of the first lessons gang leaders learn is that they require ‘mandates’ from their ‘organisation’ and they usually verbalise it. This is often used to delay mediation processes in order for them to make more gains on the battlefield before they come to the table. Gang leaders have also understood the language of mediation, the need for bilateral meetings prior to meeting with their opposition, and the decision and agreement phases. A good mediator picks up on this language very early and recognises signs of astute gang leaders during negotiations, bilateral meetings and the mediation process itself.

Conclusions

Trust and peacebuilding in communities with high levels of gang conflict is difficult and requires mediators who possess the necessary skills in communication, mediation, conflict resolution in order to facilitate agreements. This process is tedious and requires much planning and thought before embarking on the process. Included in such a scenario are the necessary preparations such as where will the mediation take place, who are primary and secondary parties, the stage where the conflict is at and who has power in the relationship during the conflict. Preparation requires that a thorough conflict analysis is prepared for the mediation team in order to draw of strengths of the participants.

Where such processes are undertaken, it is easier to steer the participants to a win-win situation. Where adhoc processes are undertaken without the necessary instruments and processes in place, the conflict resolution processes and mediation in itself are bound to fail.

Gang leaders learn very fast if the mediators themselves are unprepared, do not have the support from the community to embark on the process and do not have the resources to follow through with the mediation, or follow up on the issues that were raised during the mediation, that it will go nowhere. Often, this becomes a reason for mediation processes conducted in an ad-hoc manner, not being sustainable and gang leaders pulling out of ‘peace talks’.

In the longer term, ad-hoc talks create more damage and danger to communities who already face the brunt of gang attacks.

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Sisanda Mguzulwa

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biographies

Sisanda Mguzulwa is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre of Criminology, University of Cape Town. She completed her Master's and PhD studies in the Department of Social Development at the University of Cape Town. Her doctoral work critically examined the rise of a violent youth culture popularly known as ‘Gurans’ in the township of Khayelitsha in Cape Town. Sisanda has presented this work at numerous national and international workshops and conferences, including the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting 2024. Fellowship, Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIHSS) Fellowship, and the National Research Foundation (NRF) Innovative and Scarce Skills Fellowship. She aims to expand her research interests to multidisciplinary endeavours, facilitating and collaborating on transformative practical research projects in community engagement. Focusing on addressing contemporary challenges such as youth exploitation by gangs, youth homicide, and gang extortion, while advancing knowledge in the field of criminal justice.

Irvin Kinnes M.Sc. in Criminology (London School of Economics), PhD in Criminology (UCT), former Policing Programme Manager and Board member of the Centre for Conflict Resolution. He has been the General Secretary to the Western Cape Anti- Crime Forum and the NICRO National Office regional coordinator. He has extensive experience in training senior police, correctional officers, and community members in South and Southern Africa. He has a strong interest in gang prevention, policing and crime prevention strategies and community conflicts related to policing and has published and lectured on the topics. Irvin is a former Chief Director for Policy and Research at the Civilian Secretariat of Police and is currently the Content Adviser to the Portfolio Committee on Police.

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Community Gang Mediation and Peacebuilding in South African Communities: A Case Study of Cape Town

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

International Literature on Eco-Environment and Peacebuilding

Local Literature

Situating the Cape Flats

Mediating Gang Violence in Cape Town

Nyanga, Manenberg, Khayelitsha

Manenberg

Khayelitsha and Nyanga

Peacebuilding in Violent Communities

Findings: What Have We and What Can We Learn

Conclusions

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Funding

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Notes

Author Biographies

References