This is the second of a three-part article which provides a comprehensive typology useful in any analysis of how public policies are used to control the operations of market exchanges and marketing systems. The first part (JMM, Spring 1983) provided a typology of market failures. The second part, presented here, provides a typology of regulatory responses to market failures. The third part, to appear in a subsequent issue, provides a typology of regulatory failures and discusses the implications of the three typologies for public policy and marketing decisions.
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