This research attempts to account for the number of adoptions of four economic development policies in large American cities. Four explanations focusing upon fiscal stress, growth coalitions, government institutions, and competition among cities are examined in the light of a typology that classifies the polices on the basis of their visibility and distributional impact. We hypothesize the applicability of the four explanations to be contingent upon the particular policy being explained and its visibility and distributional consequences. Poisson regression analyses of data drawn from large U.S. cities reveal inconsistent support for these expectations. We discuss the importance of policy characteristics in the prediction of policy adoption.
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