The recent COVID-19 pandemic has significantly disrupted governance. A strong intergovernmental response is critical for stemming the worst damage during the outset of a disaster. Collaborative planning with networks of constituent governments, medical experts, and emergency managers are needed to provide a holistic response to the highly technical and complex issues brought on by the novel coronavirus. This commentary highlights the differences in response by the United States and Australia, provides a comparison of intergovernmental relationships, and sheds light on how these federations vertical and horizontal collaborative efforts were stymied by politics or facilitated by existing intergovernmental forums.
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