We examine the extent to which public corruption influences the tax structure of American states. After controlling for other tax structure influences, we find that states with greater measured public corruption have more complex tax systems, have higher tax burdens, rely more heavily on regressive indirect taxes, and have smaller shares of their tax burdens with initial impact on business. These are significant structural impacts on the tax systems.
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