The United States experiences thousands of local boundary changes each year, which is important because boundaries determine service delivery, shape economic development, and set the parameters for intergovernmental relationships. Using census data from 1987 to 2002, this study creates a model to account for special district dissolution and disappearance. In addition, it examines whether the immediate characteristics of individual districts are related to their disappearance. The study finds that special district disappearances are driven by (a) changes in service demands, (b) state restrictions on local governments, and (c) the actions of public entrepreneurs. In addition, a special district that is overseen by elected officials is less likely to disappear than a district governed by political appointees.
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