Anomalies Generated by Contemporary Physics

We can express the criterion of logical generality as follows: Given: A concerted body of observations, and at least two theories, C and D, which purport to account for (at least some of) these observations. Then we can show D as more general than C if the following circumstances hold: a) That we display a restricted and restrictive assumption Z; b) That we show that Z forms an intrinsic part of the premises of C and no part of the premises of D; c) That by introducing or eliminating Z, we can inter-convert between C and D. Specificially, i) by systematically introducing Z into the premises of D, we can collapse it into a structure logically equivalent to C; and ii) By systematically eliminating Z from the premises of C, we can expand it into a structure logically equivalent to D

Kaufmann Walter .“Die magnetische und electrische Ablenbarkeit der Bequerelstrahlen und die scheinbare Masse der Elektronen” (“Magnetic and electric deflectability of the Becquerel rays and the apparent mass of the electron”).Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen. 1901;2:143-155

To quote mathematician/comedian Tom Lehrer, “Once the rockets are up, Who cares where they come down? That's not my department!” Says Wernher von Braun. Lehrer, Tom, “Wernher von Braun,” from That Was The Year That Was, Reprise Records RS6179, 1965. Reprinted in Too Many Songs by Tom Lehrer, Pantheon, New York, 1981, pp. 124–125

Polanyi Michael Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1958.:216-217.

Korzybski Alfred Papers from the Second American Congress on General Semantics. Kendig M. , ed. Chicago, IL: Institute of General Semantics; 1943:93-108.

Einstein Albert The Meaning of Relativity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 1955.:1.

At the current stage of development of our notation, we use a total of five ordering terms: Besides spatio-temporal Ot and hierarchical Oh, we utilize synchronous Os (“occurring along with, as viewed from a specified position”), co-ordered Oc (“occupying one and only one position in an ordering on abstracting”), and polar Op (“mutually necessary, opposing”). Although we do not explicitly take up the latter three orderings here, each might serve as the basis for a criterion against which to look at physical theories, and might yield findings as unexpected as those presented in the present paper. Although the constructs of spatio-temporal and synchronous ordering do apply to the “self” component of our setting (e.g., to the functioning of the organism side of the contact or transacting), we think of them as applying predominantly to the “other” component of our setting. Conversely, although the constructs of hierarchical and co-ordered ordering Do apply to the “other” component of the setting, we think of them as applying predominantly to the “self” component

Galileo posited that in order to transform one's viewpoint from one coordinate system (e.g. C) to another moving with uniform velocity v with respect to C along the common axis x (e.g. C'), one adds or subtracts a correction factor vt, where t represents the time which has elapsed since C and C' coincided. x' = x - vt y' = y z' = z t' = t The Lorentz-Einstein transformations assume these specified conditions, along with the proviso that light propagates at a uniform velocity c which remains constant for all observers regardless of their positions and velocities with respect to each other and with respect to the light source. Their equations include a correction factor in which the square of the velocity of light appears in the denominator of a fraction. x' = β(x - vt) y' = y z' = z t' = β(t - vx/c2) where v = relative velocity of the two systems; c = the constant velocity of light; and Part of the significance of tacitly assuming that light has an infinite velocity became apparent after someone noticed, in the early 1900's, that the Lorentz-Einstein transformations reduce to the Galileo transformations provided that we assume that light propagates at an infinite velocity. In the endeavor to make explicit the logical relations between relativistic and Newtonian mechanics, that discovery has come to hold central place. Roemer first measured the velocity of light in the 1670's, some 30 years after Galileo's death and Newton's birth. Obviously, then, neither Galileo nor Newton explicitly attributes any theoretical significance to the velocity of light. But in order to account for this discovered relationship between the Galileo and the Lorentz-Einstein transformations, we attribute to the workers who preceded Einstein a view on this topic, in the guise of an unsuspected or hidden assumption; and we hold that such assumptions can qualify as restricted and restrictive, or even as untenable (“so restrictive as to hold under no circumstances whatsoever”). These considerations suffice to show that relativistic mechanics qualifies as more general than Newtonian mechanics, according to the criterion stated in Note 1

We take phrases such as just knows what really happens, or absolute simultaneity, as concealing a restricted and restrictive assumption of great importance. This assumption makes, on behalf of the view – the knowing – in question, an indefensible claim, namely, the claim to absolute certainty. In our alternative notation, we express this claim by means of the construct of map-territory identity – in plain English, the delusional idea that one's map or picture of some territory qualifies as identical with the territory itself (qualifies as a point-for-point perfect and exhaustively complete replica of the territory). If map-territory identity obtains, then the map has no “room” left in it for any kind of representation of the map-maker. Or in the language of modern physics, such a map eliminates the observer from consideration. In contrast, the central tenet of our alternative frame of reference (namely, Korzybski's postulate of Non-identity), rejects (disallows) the possibility of map-territory identity. We treat the forbidden possibility of map-territory identity as a disqualifying assumption – any viewpoint which posits such identity thereby renders itself ultimately unacceptable. For example, the Newtonian construct of absolute simultaneity posits that the construct of time, as encoded in the grammatical structure of languages such as English or analysis, models the relevant aspects of the Universe with perfect fidelity; the unreconstructed construct of just knows what really happened tacitly posits for the entire structure of Newtonian mechanics a similar absolute certainty. And both constructs get criticized, and replaced, in the theory of relativity

Einstein, 1955, p. 1

The attitude that “others may have seen something useful to me that I didn't see” forms an absolute prerequisite for discovering the kind of anomaly (namely, what we now call a relativistic discrepancy) which logically leads to the theory of relativity. We find that these anomalies have the following common structure: a) Observer B makes some observations; b) B takes in some observations made (under slightly different conditions) by Observer A; or else B considers observations that B made at a different date, and under slightly different conditions; c) B finds that the two sets of observations DONT MATCH in some crucial fashion; and d) B takes seriously (eventually, takes on the job of accounting for) this mismatch, this anomaly. The discovery of a relativistic discrepancy requires, and signals the presence of, a new level of trust between modern scientists – a trusting of themselves and of each other. If, like the traditional Newtonians, Observer B should seek to invalidate and discredit the findings of Observer A which don't match with her/his own observations, then s/he could not ever discover a relativistic discrepancy. The trusting must precede the discovering. The increase in predictability shown by the theory of relativity (and quantum theory), then, follows from this increase in intra-personal and interpersonal trusting

Hilgartner C. A. .“The Method in the Madness of Western Man,”.Communication. 1978);;3:143-242

Dewey John , Bentley Arthur F. Knowing and the Known. Boston: Beacon Press; 1949.:

Sommerhoff G. Analytical Biology. London: Oxford University Press; 1950:164 196-171.

KaufmannWalter, 1901 (see Note 2); Hilgartner, Harrington and Bartter, 1985b (see Note 12)

SommerhoffG., 1950 (see Note 14); Singer, E. A., “Mechanism, Vitalism, Naturalism,” Philosophy of Science 13, 81–99 (1946); Ashby, W.Ross, “The Set Theory of Mechanism and Homeostatis,” Technical Report No. 7, Electrical Engineering Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 1962; Hilgartner, C. A. and John F. Randolph, “Psycho-logics: An Axiomatic System Describing Human Behaviour. 1. A Logical Calculus of Behavior,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 23, 285–338 (1969a). Sommerhoff proposes the construct of directively correlated as a way of accounting for the apparently 'purposive' activities of living systems. Whenever we look in detail at what living systems DO – at their behavior, ecology, morphology, anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, etc. – we find that whatever particular details we examine seem “goal-directed.” They fit into biological activities on the next higher level as if “on purpose,” so as to make the higher level functions work. Furthermore, underlying whatever details we may examine, we find subsidiary details, occurring on the next lower level of activities (down to atomic and quantum-mechanical levels), which fit in as if “on purpose,” so as to make the details under examination also work. Accounting for these apparently ‘purposive' activities has long posed severe problems. Where previous efforts to model these activities (usually in one-to-one terms, as “mechanisms”) had failed, Sommerhoff's model, which he expresses in many-to-one terms, succeeds both logically and empirically. To express this model, we define four constructs, which occur in an ordered sequence that spans the interval t0 to t2. To express the first of these, we utilize two terms (“initial conditions” and “goal”), and posit a strict logical relation between the two. a) Initial conditions and goal: The construct of initial conditions signifies a grouping of existing or possible “disturbances.” When such a disturbance occurs, it initiates the ‘purposive' sequence by affecting both organism and environment. The logically related construct of goal, a subsidiary portion (or “subset”) of the construct of “outcome,” gives the criterion for an outcome which appears ‘favorable' from the point of view of the organism. Each of these constructs stands as polar to the other: neither could “exist” or “occur” without the real or imagined presence of the other. (If, for example, the “initial conditions” consisted of a “need,” e.g. a relative lack of nutrients – which a human might express by saying, “I feel hungry!” – then the “goal” consists of the conditions that spell out what it would take to satisfy this “need,” e.g. to leave this human feeling well-fed and replete.) b) Effects of the “initial conditions” on the organism: This construct expresses “what the organism does” when the “disturbances” impinge on it. c) Effects of the “initial conditions” on the environment: This construct expresses “what the environment does” when the “disturbances” impinge on it. d) Outcome: The interplay between (b) and (c) leads eventually to an “outcome” of the sequence. This may (or in the negative case, may not) satisfy the “goal,” the criterion for “‘favorable' from the point of view of the organism.” A directively correlated sequence, then, over the interval t0 to t2, involves the following doings or happenings: At t0: the “initial conditions” function; At t1: “what the organism does” and “what the environment does” in responding to the “initial conditions” takes place; At t2: the outcome, produced by the interplay between “what the organism does” and “what the environment does,” occurs; and it satisfies the “goal,” the criterion for what constitutes a ‘favorable' outcome from the point of view of the organism

HilgartnerHarringtonBartterand, 1985b (see Note 12)

Polanyi, 1964, pp. 217–218 (see Note 4)

Schell Jonathan The Fate of the Earth. New York: Alfred A. Knopf (Borzoi); 1982: