Abstract
Should there be any limitations on who is defined as a ‘victim’ for the purposes of the discipline of victimology? Does the discipline extend beyond the traditional study of victims of crime, to include, for example, the study of victims of natural disasters, poverty, HIV/AIDS, and all forms of repression and discrimination? While this issue was frequently discussed in the earlier years of modern victimology, since the agreement of the UN General Assembly to the 1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (the ‘Declaration’), debate on this issue seemed to have subsided. The title of the Declaration suggests that a consensus emerged that victimology should only include victims of crime and victims of abuse of power, each of these terms having specific definitions as found in the Declaration.
However, it appears that many victimologists do not necessarily accept the definitions and limitations of the Declaration. They argue that victimology ought to be concerned with all forms of human suffering, regardless of their origin. This article aims critically to assess the arguments and counter-arguments to this perspective. It concludes that there is no strong justifiable reason to limit the scope of the discipline, although for practical reasons it will often be necessary for particular research projects, victim advocacy and courses to establish clear parameters around which types of victims they will be concerned.
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