THE CRISIS OF MODERNITY AND THE LIFE-WORLD

Abstract

One of the most influential diagnoses and therapies of the crisis of modernity was formulated by Husserl. He spoke about the crisis of modern European culture as a situation of dramatic choice between the heroism of reason or barbarism. The crisis results from scepticism and irrationalism as products of scientific rationality itself. Husserl was convinced that the only remedy against it is a universal science, based on an absolutely firm foundation and proceeding according to the rigorous method - i.e. transcendental phenomenology. In The Crisis he turned to historical reflection in order to realise the goals of philosophising and of humanity. He also discovered the life-world - the therapy for rationalism must consist in returning to the Lebenswelt. The paper shows tensions between two motives in Husserl's late philosophy and two different practical philosophies which emerge from it. Contrary to Husserl's programmatic declarations, the phenomenological analysis of the life-world does not portray the human being as an autonomous being, but as being rooted in tradition and history, bodily present in the world, and always among opaque facts and limited in sovereignty. In addition, the alternative of the heroism of reason and barbarism has proved false. We have no scientific ethic, our morals and mores are provisional and non-absolute. For Husserl such a situation would mean the demise of humanity. Be he did not draw this conclusion from his own discoveries. The lesson we have to learn from our experience of the twentieth century and from Husserl's inconsistent attempt differs from the one he wanted to teach us. The paradoxical implication of his philosophy is that the only thing of which we can be absolutely certain in our ethical and political life is the fact that we can never be absolutely certain. But the fact that we are conscious of this does not turn us into barbarians, but, on the contrary, protects us from that.