Abstract
The Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) has been interpreted as exceptional among its European counterparts because of its internal divisions, radicalization and the impossibility of reaching cross-cutting agreements. This article demonstrates how, during the 1930s, the PSOE's evolution went hand in hand with other socialist parties in Europe, especially with the Section Française de l’International Ouvrière (SFIO). In particular, this article focuses on the views of the Spanish socialist factions – prietismo and caballerismo – on the formation and development of the Popular Front in Spain and France. The press of these factions – El Socialista, Claridad and Leviatán – had a similar role in the evolution of both parties. Furthermore, this study points out how the different factions of Spanish socialism used the French experience to legitimize their positions during the first part of 1936.
European socialist parties have always found different mechanisms for communicating, relating to and influencing each other politically and intellectually; especially after the foundation of the Second International in 1889, in which they agreed on joint programmes and unitary positions. In the interwar period, the Labour and Socialist International, founded in 1923, maintained this relationship, although less actively, and the socialist parties were well aware of their counterparts’ behaviour.
In the Spanish case, during the first three decades of the twentieth century, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) had attended the Second International meetings. Furthermore, socialist theorists and practices, especially from France, Germany and Great Britain, had influenced the PSOE. 1 However, the PSOE's connections, similarities and divergences with other European socialist parties are still a persistent controversy. Some of the historiography affirms that ‘the Spanish socialists were different’. 2 From this perspective, Spanish socialism was more prone to confrontation than to agreement; hence, it spearheaded a radicalization process that led to internal division and the risk of breaking with the republican democratic framework. Unlike its European counterparts, which were even capable of negotiating with conservative forces, the PSOE did not feel at ease with that agenda. 3
Nevertheless, this interpretation does not consider the fact that the salient international influences upon the PSOE during the 1930s had been established for decades, although to a lesser extent than the internal processes. 4 In the interwar period, each socialist party in Europe had, in the first place, to overcome the challenges derived from obtaining increasing electoral support, while largely maintaining the traditional non-participatory stance in the governments of capitalist regimes. Furthermore, having overcome such problems through government collaboration, these European socialisms had to manage the successes and failures that these coalitions could represent. Moreover, they had to deal with new political actors such as communism and fascism, which threatened, in one case, the traditional socialist hegemony within the labour movement, and in the other, the survival of the basic freedoms under which the socialist parties had developed themselves since the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
Therefore, in the post-war years, many aspects of the Second International debate from the turn of the century resurfaced. Socialist parties were forced to adapt or disappear, and similar situations arose throughout the continent: internal divisions, implementation of different and imaginative solutions to face new challenges, and even street mobilization and violence. 5
hus, this article adopts an analytical perspective that integrates this context to adequately explain the PSOE's behaviour during the Second Republic. Here, the focus is on the positions of the PSOE and the SFIO (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière) regarding the construction and objectives of antifascism and the Popular Front. This issue is tackled through the Spanish socialists’ constant observation and interpretation of the same processes and behaviours in France. The comparative perspective is paramount at this point, since antifascism and the Popular Front were essentially transnational phenomena. 6
In this regard, Spanish socialism constitutes an important case study for the 1930s, due to its leading role in the design and government of the Second Spanish Republic – which made it, together with the Nordic socialisms (especially in Sweden), one of the parties with the most significant ruling experience. Likewise, the PSOE was a crucial element in the development of antifascism and its fulfilment in the pact and the following Popular Front government. Furthermore, similarly to the experience of other European socialisms, and as a result of the October 1934 revolution, Spanish socialism experienced a deep internal division between two factions (prietistas and caballeristas), which were organized around two of the main leaders of the party in this period: Indalecio Prieto and Francisco Largo Caballero. While the first defended more moderate positions and tended to join forces with the left-wing republican parties, the second aligned with current schemes of the European socialist left. 7 These facts enable a comparative analysis of Spain and France, the only European cases in which this situation arose, in order to highlight these socialisms' responses to processes in interwar Europe.
In this sense, although much of the historiography has traditionally established the existence of three factions within the PSOE during the 1930s, these three never coexisted as such as opposing groups – groups that can be recognized by the positioning of national, regional and local leaders or militants, and for their debates and votes within the socialist decision-making bodies. Rather, there were successive confrontations between two different positions: besteiristas and non-besteiristas at the beginning of the Second Republic; caballeristas and non-caballeristas in the years 1935–1937; and negrinistas and non-negrinistas in the last moments of the Spanish Civil War (1938–1939). Thus, the article focuses on prietistas and caballeristas because of the disappearance of besteirismo as a faction by that time. After the ordinary congress in October 1932, the besteristas' position was diluted, since the group was reduced to Besteiro himself and a few leaders, who lacked militant bases or control over socialist organizations. 8
This study is based on reports in the foremost Spanish socialist newspapers: El Socialista, Claridad and Leviatán. It focuses mainly on the vision of prietistas and caballeristas in 1936, and their views on the big question of the moment in Spain and France: the nature and implications of Popular Front antifascism. Likewise, through the major newspapers dedicated to the leftist tendencies in the SFIO – La Bataille Socialiste and La Gauche Révolutionnaire, and the party's mouthpiece, Le Populaire – the stance of French socialism is studied and contrasted. Accordingly, the two socialisms will be compared, especially from the Spanish perspective, starting from an analysis of previous years, to understand both parties' prior trajectories.
The article aims to deepen knowledge of Spanish socialism and its antifascism. Against a priori hypotheses based on ideas of special paths and exceptionalisms, the study underlines the non-exotic behaviour of Spanish socialism. Comparing its position and evolution with French socialism at the beginning of the Popular Front, it exhibited similar responses to similar challenges. Although studies on the Popular Front in Spain and France are well-established and abundant, it is rare to find an explicit comparison between both experiences which considers the evolution and positioning of the actors involved. 9
PSOE and SFIO: Different Paths Towards Collaboration
Although both parties followed different paths until the 1930s, the SFIO and the PSOE are valid subjects for comparison. The SFIO, after its late unification and without a direct link to trade unionism, combined Marxist doctrinal orthodoxy and non-participation in the government with its integration and growing importance in the French Third Republic, mainly led by Jean Jaurès. The Great War and the collaboration in the Union Sacrée governments broke the socialist unity – on the one hand, because some majoritaires de guerre were gone and forgotten; and, on the other, because of the split and the following creation of a powerful communist party at the 1920 Tours Congress. 10 In addition, the electoral and political affirmation of the SFIO fuelled the recurring debate on participation, which eventually broke the party again. 11
The PSOE, led by Pablo Iglesias, was less successful, and had a trade union that supported expansion and the abandonment of political marginality. Although Spain remained neutral in 1914, this did not prevent the conflict from generating great political and socioeconomic upheaval, so that socialism could not abstract itself from the debates and processes of the moment. 12 The PSOE internally debated the space it should occupy and the behaviour that would keep it close to the bosom of bourgeois liberal parliamentarism, with access to power and social transformation. Therefore, French and Spanish socialisms followed more similar paths than is usually thought. 13 Furthermore, since the establishment of the Republic in Spain, the existence of similar political regimes during the 1930s reinforces this comparative analysis.
Subsequently, the PSOE overcame its traditional lack of members and political weight compared to the northern socialists – thanks, among other reasons, to the prominence it gained in the new government, formed in April 1931. 14 While the SFIO declared a membership of around 137,000 in 1932, the PSOE had just fewer than 75,000 members in the congress held in October that same year. 15 However, the significant difference (83 per cent in favour of the SFIO) is greatly reduced (to practically 10 per cent) if the population difference between Spain and France is taken into account. 16 Furthermore, French socialism had 109 representatives in the National Assembly, 17 while the PSOE obtained 116 in the 1931 elections. At first glance, the parliamentary force was similar, but the balance tips in favour of the Spanish case, since the Spanish Courts had 473 seats while the French Chamber had just over 600. Yet at the end of the period, in 1936, this situation had been reversed: within the respective Popular Fronts, the PSOE had 87 deputies, while the SFIO had 146. 18
Therefore, the two socialist parties' positions were not discordant. In some respects, Spanish socialism gained more strength and influence, mainly due to the governmental experience between 1931 and 1933, which spread from Spain as an example for France. 19 In Spanish socialism, the government's collaboration was aimed at developing more ambitious objectives based on compliance with social reformism. This was the ‘reformist gradualism’ of the PSOE, which found its counterpart in French socialism's revolutionary reformism of the political culture. 20 Thus, during the 1931–1933 biennium, Spanish socialists systematically turned to the French to underpin their idea of government collaboration. In fact, El Socialista did not avoid criticizing the SFIO, which stubbornly maintained the non-participation strategy. From the PSOE's point of view, the SFIO's approach was leading French politics to follow a reactionary course at the expense of the working class. 21 The right wing of the SFIO thought the same; whereas the Bataille Socialiste had emerged as the main trend on the left of the party, as opposed to taking part in the government along with republicanism. 22 Aligning itself with the Bataille Socialiste, the SFIO leadership closed all collaborationist attempts and chose external pressure to improve the proletarian condition. 23
Léon Blum attempted to maintain party unity, and the balance between the socialist doctrine and practice, through the distinction between the ‘conquest of power’ and the ‘exercise of power’ – but without openly rejecting an agreement with the radical socialists, provided that specific social and political measures were proposed. Blum himself pointed out: ‘If the socialists enter the government, they must enter to do something.’ 24 This was expressed in the Cahiers Huyghens in 1932, 25 when the electoral results made possible a left-wing republican government with socialist participation or support. As a requirement for the SFIO's collaboration, this document included, among other demands, the reduction of armaments and the nationalization of all war industries, the organization of a single national network of railways, an insurance monopoly, a 40-hour working week, and a general amnesty for political crimes.
However, the radical socialists responded to the SFIO by offering a meagre programme, so the pact was not concluded. 26 Nevertheless, the dynamics accelerated: at the end of 1933, a group of deputies in favour of government collaboration was expelled from the party as they supported a centre-right executive budget. 27 Meanwhile, the SFIO wanted to carry out political and social changes, proclaiming their desire and suitability to exercise power ‘with those who are determined to save the Republic’ from political degeneration and corruption. 28
Also, in autumn 1933, the PSOE had begun a turn towards the working organizations with a definite intention: to save the Republic from a conservative and reactionary political drift. In September 1933, the leaders of the PSOE announced the break with the republican forces, as well as ‘their resolute decision to defend the Republic against any reactionary aggression and their conviction of the need to conquer political power as an indispensable means to deploy socialism’. 29 Two months later, after the November elections, they went one step further and agreed to prepare a defensive ‘joint action’. As Francisco Largo Caballero pointed out, it was convenient that the provocation should start from the right-wing government, ‘to justify the reasons for our defensive action before the country’. 30
The similarities and comparisons were noted explicitly by the French side. Paul Faure indicated that, in the evolution of the European socialist parties, revolutionary guidance was needed, as evidenced by the frustration of the Spanish socialists regarding participation in government during the first biennium. 31 Months later, Jean Longuet viewed the rapprochement towards the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) as aligned with the evolution of international socialism. 32 At the same time, Blum celebrated the workers’ unity achieved in Spain, France and Italy. 33
In this context, there was a turning point in French politics due to the February 1934 events that followed the workers’ rapprochement and the formation of the Popular Front. 34 On the evening of 6 February 1934, while the National Assembly was voting on the ministerial nomination of Édouard Daladier, right-wing leagues, associations and groups encouraged mobilizations through the streets of Paris, which ended in violent riots. The initial confusion between the socialist and communist working-class forces ended up giving way to a joint response, and a later action unity pact, since they understood they were facing a right-wing and fascist coup to end the Third Republic.
Initially, the unitary dynamics escaped the control of the SFIO leadership, which was overwhelmed by the local and socialist-left push. 35 In this sense, Blum and the bulk of the SFIO did not condemn communism from an ideological point of view; they frequently recognized it as their ‘wayward’ brother. 36 However, this did not avoid tensions throughout the convergence process after years of open confrontation. 37
In contrast, the differences with the Parti Républicain, Radical et Radical-Socialiste (PRRS) were easier to point out. Thus, during 1934 and looking towards the October elections, Blum made an effort to hold the radicals responsible for the lack of agreement after the 1932 elections, and for the current reactionary political turn. The rejection of the Cahiers Huyghens and the following adherence to the National Union policy revealed the doctrinal incoherence and practical limitations of radical republicanism. According to Blum, the SFIO would have maintained the same criteria during the 1932 non-participation and the 1934 opposition. 38
The leaders of French socialism insisted that the antifascist response implied class action, the assumption of power, and the implementation of a policy of reforms against the socioeconomic crisis, which should include nationalizations, social insurance, and banking and financial control. The socialist left proclaimed the pact with the bourgeoisie impossible. Some of its spokesmen, such as Jean Zyromski and Marceau Pivert, talked about capitalism's economic and political disarmament. 39 In contrast, others such as Georges Lefranc understood that the Cahiers Huyghens had been superseded, since ‘what was enough in 1932, it is no longer enough in 1934’. 40
At last, the SFIO accepted the communist proposal to extend the antifascist agreement to non-working forces, which wanted to confront fascism and the policies of the National Union governments. This was equivalent to seeking the incorporation of the PRRS – achieved in July 1935, when the Popular Front became a political reality. However, the latent hostility within the SFIO remained. While part of the SFIO understood that the pact could drag the Party into governmental participation with the bourgeois left, another part thought it could intensify the workers’ unification and the new antifascist militant practices, and advance towards the final goal. In any case, none of the factions necessarily excluded government participation led by the SFIO to implement ambitious reformism. 41
Meanwhile, the PSOE began to pursue the path of agreement with communism to avoid future disasters, since ‘the adversaries, if they were to win, would not distinguish between communists and socialists, [or between] Trotskyists and trade unionists’. It was necessary to learn from the example of other countries and not fall into discussions with only negative consequences: ‘It has been crucial, tragically crucial, to do afterwards what other countries did not know how to do before the defeat. Fortunately for us, we still have time to save ourselves from the pain of a defeat.’ 42
Indeed, by 1934, the socialist dilemma in Spain and France was the same: ‘The socialist workers have to choose between allying themselves with the more or less republican and pseudo-democratic petty bourgeoisie’, or ‘with their class and Marxist creed brothers’. Here there was a background of especially disappointed and frustrated tactics regarding collaboration with the bourgeois reformist forces: ‘Could this happen after the painful experience in which the Socialist Parties embarked with that collaboration between antagonistic classes?’ 43 Of course, during the thirties, this collaboration did not happen in France, but in Spain. The French drift responded to a context where the reformist forces had never accepted the SFIO's starting conditions to collaborate. For this reason, the experience of other countries was not comparable. Nevertheless, the PSOE's motivation was to strengthen the internal movements that aimed to revise previous agreements and implement new ones – in this case, with the working forces. 44
Thus, firstly, in the Spanish case, collaboration with the republicans in government tasks had already contributed to the acrimonious end of the relationship during the second half of 1933. Secondly, the frustration due to difficulties in implementing reformism increased as a consequence of the November electoral result, the stronger pressure from the Catholic conservative CEDA, the revisionist measures from historical republicanism in the government, and the 1933–1934 events in Germany, France, Austria and Portugal. For socialism, the presence of fascism was increasing, and the reaction was gathering momentum in Spain and Europe.
Added to this background were the consequences of the failure of the October 1934 revolution, which caused both the massification of antifascism and the beginning of negotiations for the formation of the Popular Front pact, in alignment with transnational tendencies. 45 While in France the previous workers’ agreement led to the popular pact, the negotiations to reach this kind of bargain in Spain were driven by republicans and socialists. Those talks started in mid-1935 with the first contacts between Indalecio Prieto and Manuel Azaña, but only made progress after the government's fall at the end of 1935. 46 The leading role in the process was taken by plural republicanism – which was never receptive to the formulas of a pact with communism 47 – and by divided socialism. The talks translated into an electoral agreement and a government programme, which would be developed after the elections of 16 February 1936. 48
Once the pact was concluded, the PSOE offered it to the rest of the working formations. This was the condition of the socialist left, which, in return, had to accept the republican proposal to remove the representation of these working forces from the part corresponding to the PSOE in the original pact. Throughout this process, the different conceptions of this strategy that existed within Spanish socialism were highlighted. On the one hand, the followers of Indalecio Prieto opted to prioritize collaboration with the republicans, even accepting possible government participation, 49 without necessarily excluding the incorporation of communism into the pact. 50 On the other hand, the supporters of Largo Caballero tried to avoid repeating the experience of 1931, which could end up limiting their capacity for action within the framework of a republican–socialist collaborative government. 51 They always maintained that the worker's agreement, of which they would be the spearhead, had to prevail.
In this sense, classical analyses propose that it was this division in the PSOE, and specifically the caballeristas’ attitude and their supposed empty revolutionary rhetoric, that limited or destroyed the Popular Front alliance, whereas left-wing republicanism and prietismo emerged as the architects of a pact that was, ultimately, considered different from the French case. 52 This interpretation has enjoyed a widespread acceptance and historiographical continuity. 53
However, as demonstrated in this research, the behaviour of the socialist left on both sides of the Pyrenees was similar, so the differences between the French and Spanish popular fronts should not be overestimated. 54 Indeed, throughout this process and the following implementation, the French case gave the Spanish socialists not only an example of a political pact and a means of reformist action, but also a way of facing internal conflicts.
Prietismo and the Popular Front: French Formulas for Putting Differences Aside?
Since the meeting of the National Committee, the followers of Prieto controlled the direction of the PSOE and El Socialista. 55 They used the French Popular Front to establish their own conceptions through the newspaper and spread them as the same as in France, which allowed them to gain respectability. On the one hand, the central role of socialism within the Popular Front was highlighted, as the main pillar of the coalition and, therefore, of the republican regime. On the other hand, the French case was useful in the struggle between socialist factions, by delegitimizing the rivals who followed Largo Caballero. 56
In the first case, El Socialista reported Daladier's description of the Popular Front as a pact that aimed to reinforce the republican regime's appeal among the popular and working groups: ‘If in 1936, after a great popular victory, the working masses had to suffer the same disappointment as they suffered in 1924 and again in 1932, these same masses would put the republican regime in danger.’ 57
According to the prietistas, success depended on bringing republican and communist elements together, with the socialists as the centre and axis. In their opinion, the best option to save the Republic in Spain and advance towards socialism was the inclusion of as many progressive elements as possible. By returning to the coalition between republicans and workers (1931–1933), the reformist path would lead to the approval of a broad set of reforms and changes in the political, social, labour, cultural and educational milieus. At all times, the PSOE's governmental and parliamentary collaboration was paramount. The will of Prieto and his followers was to return to that moment of collaboration, and they viewed the legal achievements as more important than the socially transforming outcomes – in contrast to the caballeristas’ position.
The prietismo also added that the SFIO was a harmonious party in which, despite differences, everyone supported the primary goal of carrying out the reformist task. Hence their insistence that, in the Spanish case, there were ‘rioters from the Popular Front’ who disagreed, and ‘aspire[d] to build based on socialist indiscipline and discord’ instead of support. In fact, they openly pointed out that ‘in the neighbouring Republic the Popular Front has the powerful feeling of responsibility of the Socialists’, who were united around Blum's efforts. They remarked how Blum had praised the SFIO's compliance in the government formation process, quoting him as follows: The Party has accepted the mandate and entrusts delegates with the care of implementing it, but it must continue its proper function. The Party will take advantage of government action. For this, the solidarity between the Party and the Government must be total. I am determined to confront everything except the lack of agreement with the Party.
Of course, this was not the Spanish experience, so the article's conclusion was as follows: ‘It is precisely that lack of intelligence that is beginning to be felt in Spain … without even participating in Power.’ 58 Therefore, France prompted the prietista leadership to try to influence the internal conflict of the PSOE, where they had to learn that discipline was necessary for fruitful government work. However, this approach concealed important differences within the SFIO regarding the conception of the Popular Front. In fact, the more leftist sector was committed to giving a markedly socialist aspect to government and legislation – although it maintained support for Blum's positions at this point. 59 Indeed, Blum's speech took place at the XXXIII Congress of the SFIO, at the end of May, when the Party unified around his leadership in the government. Nevertheless, this did not obscure a diversity of opinions, and even suspicions, about Blum's attitude to the exercise of government. Then, Blum responded to Marceau Pivert and the more left-wing members who wanted to go beyond the programmatic framework of the Popular Front, when the wave of workers’ mobilizations occurred; for the president, the time had not come for the conquest of power. 60
In this new context, El Socialista insisted on French socialism's duty to ‘accept all kinds of responsibilities’, provided that a government programme was fulfilled, regardless of the actual composition of the government. 61 For this reason, Blum welcomed the pact between workers and republicans, and stated that the SFIO wanted to ‘bring the programme to reality’. For this, it would be necessary to take the reins of power – as part of a coalition government if required. However, progress was also being made to turn the joint programme into the central electoral issue. If the socialist candidates were to give up in the second round, that resignation would be done without hesitation because the primary purpose was to develop that programme through the government, ‘[to guide] our electoral actions [… which] we are willing to apply […] in the government with the other parties united in the Popular Front’. 62
The concern about the programme fitted into the official discourse of the prietista side of the PSOE, which considered it a priority, regardless of who exercised power. 63 It was opposed to the caballerista scheme – and that of the left of the SFIO – which insisted not only on the measures but also on who should develop them: a fully socialist government – the largest parliamentary minority – by drawing on the support of republicans and, above all, communists.
This strategy caused an internal struggle to maximize the number of deputies in the face of prietismo, which praised the prudence of Blum. As a ‘statesman’ and a ‘socialist militant’, he demanded from the working masses the confidence necessary not to jeopardize the government. 64 This was attributed to the caballeristas, who were preventing socialists from entering the Executive, or even claiming the formation of a government made up entirely of PSOE members. 65
El Socialista thus published several interventions by Blum, calling for the fulfilment of a Popular Front programme in a government of this nature. No one should think this was a purely socialist programme and government. In turn, Le Populaire also mentioned that the task was ‘to extract from the regime what can be used for the good of social justice and welfare of those working’. Then, could be ‘arranged the coming of our society’, 66 which showed Blum's determination to pursue a socialist goal continuously.
In this sense, Blum hoped to be able to carry out the reformist project of the Popular Front. If not, the error should be admitted and another socialist path followed: The question is whether […] it is possible to extract a quantity of order, welfare, security and justice for the working masses from today's society. If we failed in the task, if an invincible resistance forced us to recognize the impossibility of improving them, then I would be the first to tell you: It was a chimaera, a vain dream. I would also be the first to tell you the consequences to be drawn.
67
Even when the programme [of the Popular Front] is implemented […] not all difficulties will have been overcome, nor will all problems have been solved. […] The Popular Front programme will be carried out. It will be done shortly. Later it will be necessary to do more and better.’
70
This was a sign of the French political evolution, and a clear message for Spain at the beginning of 1936: the Popular Front used reformism as a means, but the goal was more ambitious. It even served the prietistas' second objective of counteracting the caballerista message, and reflected the PSOE's situation, as well as the internal message that Prieto's supporters wanted to transmit, based on international experiences: fidelity to reformism as a basis for further achievements. Overall, the crucial factors to examine are who was issuing the message, which was the best ally, and what was the context.
The prietismo used Blum and the SFIO internally, although the French theories were closer to the caballeristas’ paradigms. The first was the exercise of the government's presidency based on having the largest parliamentary minority. Second, ambitious economic, social and labour reforms were implemented, which could even call private property into question – as demonstrated in the public intervention in the Bank of France or the arms industries (as already seen, this approach was questioned by Prieto in the Spanish case). Moreover, caballeristas were willing to make a close agreement with the Partido Comunista de España (PCE), even more intensely than with the parties of the Republican left. This contrasted with prietista socialism, which never prioritized (or rejected) the PCE's inclusion in the pact between Spanish republicans and socialists.
Furthermore, the SFIO's greater radicalism than the prietismo cannot be ignored in the negotiation of the Popular Front programme, which had to yield to communist and radical moderation, thus causing disappointment among the more leftist tendencies. 71 On the contrary, in Spain, the prietismo did not share the most daring economic and social proposals defended by both left-wing socialists and communists, and repeatedly preferred to temporize before the moderation of the left-wing republican forces. It was the same with the rapprochement with the PCE: this was a traditional demand by the left of French socialism; it was hardly comparable to the attitude of the prietistas, who shared the misgivings expressed by the leftist republicans and only agreed to incorporate the PCE into the Spanish Popular Front due to pressure from the caballeristas. 72
Therefore, the prietismo relied on alien schemes, similar to those of the internal rivals, to discredit caballeristas. At that time, the only similarity between the directions of the PSOE and the SFIO was that, from both sides, loyalty and discipline were requested in the face of the task ahead. However, the intentions were different, as the caballeristas themselves resolved to stand out.
Caballerismo and the Popular Front: Favouring for the French Approach
The followers of Largo Caballero repeatedly refuted the prietistas’ assumptions regarding socialist collaboration within the framework of France and the Popular Front. Speaking to the French press, Prieto remarked that the government that succeeded Azaña would not have a Marxist orientation but rather a Popular Front approach. He also professed to maintain the same positions as Blum within his party. Against that, Claridad stressed that Blum could govern because he had the SFIO's support, which Prieto lacked. Nevertheless, unlike his French counterpart, the latter had contributed to concealing the true power of the Spanish left, on account of the agreed over-representation of republicanism. By contrast, in France, there would be a faithful reflection of the strength of each party in Parliament, with a majority for socialism. Finally, despite the final moderation, the two Popular Front ‘programmes cannot be compared’: the French one ‘is nothing like the Spanish in the measures to defend the working class and the petty bourgeoisie’.
The caballeristas were frightened that the French experience could be used ‘as an example in favour of a republican–socialist ministerial collaboration’, although the workforce component was more important. Furthermore, unlike in France, this collaboration experience had already happened in Spain, and the result had been disappointing. The caballerismo had learned from the political experience of the first republican biennium, which placed them in a better position than the French socialists. They had already drawn the pertinent conclusions regarding their participation in power, in coalition with bourgeois forces. They were at the stage that Blum would highlight in the following June. 73 For this reason, the Spanish socialist left did not want to look backwards, but preferred to focus on the Popular Front, emphasizing the transforming and revolutionary approach that they perceived in France.
Consequently, in response to the demands to unify around the Popular Front's socialist leadership as an antifascist formula in Spain, France and Europe, 74 the left of the PSOE condemned any will for government collaboration that was not decidedly oriented towards the establishment of socialism. Against the idea, attributed to the Party's leadership, that the Popular Front supported the existing bourgeois republican democracy – and as a route to hypothetical participation in a government not approved by a socialist Congress – the caballerismo maintained that ‘socialism cannot be established by bourgeois-democratic means’. They also claimed that the reformism had led Italian, German and Austrian socialisms to ‘catastrophes’, and caused sterility in British, Belgian and Spanish ones. Thus, the solution was to remain outside a Republican government, and form a homogeneous socialist one. The mixed formulas would either be rejected by republicanism or lead to fascism. 75
This attitude was similar to that of the SFIO's left. In fact, as soon as the PRRS had adhered to the socialist and communist antifascist pact, Zyromski of the Bataille Socialiste contended that the Popular Front emanated directly from the class struggle and was linked to workers’ action. He thereby legitimized the strategy, and at the same time warned that the workers’ parties had to be the decisive force of the antifascist alliance – but without partaking in ‘Sterile and disappointing parliamentary and governmental operations’, or ‘being a traditional coalition government’. 76 At the end of summer 1935, when the PRRS was being incorporated into the antifascist pact, and with the negotiation processes of the electoral programme underway, the left of the SFIO set the limits. 77 Likewise, before the 1936 elections that were likely to leave socialism subordinate to the Republicans, the left of the SFIO insisted that the Popular Front did not serve as a substitute for the Bloc des Gauches; rather, the government had to be formed with the workers’ parties, as pivots and executors of actions against the capitalist oligarchies: ‘The guarantees of the programme are not enough; they must be sought in the very membership of the government.’ From Zyromski's point of view, if the victory of the Popular Front did not allow workers' leadership in the government, their participation should be avoided and limited to parliamentary support. 78
The Gauche Révolutionnaire, a faction that split from the Bataille Socialiste, was moving in the same direction. 79 Since the end of 1935, its leader Pivert had been asking for the Party to be made leader of the Popular Front; but this was far from any attempt at governmental collaboration that did not lead to an attack on the bases of capitalism. 80
Moreover, they were not the only ones supporting these positions within the SFIO. Before the 1936 elections, the General Secretary of the Party, Paul Faure, did not take socialist participation in a Popular Front government for granted. This situation would only happen if their hypothetical partners were determined to attack capitalism directly, through a decided policy of nationalizations to obtain resources and ‘invest in a great public works programme’. 81
After the April–May elections, and the socialists’ success, Bataille Socialiste repeated the need to form a plural government of communists, socialists and other forces – always commanded by the SFIO – to carry out the Front's programme, while insisting on an approach of anti-capitalist and antifascist combat. 82 Even the Gauche Révolutionnaire preferred an exclusively socialist government if the PCF refused to join the Popular Front executive. 83
Thus, from the point of view of both socialist leftist parties, only a clear proletarian and revolutionary orientation of the Popular Front was acceptable. In the caballeristas' opinion, this had already been shown when intellectuals such as André Malraux, Jean Cassou and Henri-René Lenormand had visited Spain. Then Claridad pointed out the existence of two different tendencies in the Popular Fronts: ‘One tendency does not overcome the traditional democracy, while the other does, transforming it into a proletarian democracy. This and no other is the desire of revolutionary socialism.’ Beyond the ‘common language’ of the fight against fascism, it was necessary to move towards socialism, since ‘the language of 14 April […] sounded like an anachronism’. The revolution would run its course in France and Spain, in spite of the attitude of the Popular Front, thanks to the growing union of intellectuals and manual workers favouring progress and against fascism. 84
All this took place before the Blum government had entered the scene. After that, and the resolution of the May–June strikes, the PSOE's leftist perspective changed. Subsequently, the French Popular Front and socialism were taken as a model, and the caballeristas were aware of the opportunities offered by the government's presence. At the beginning of June, Claridad had already announced the plan to introduce socioeconomic reforms by Blum and the Popular Front.
85
Largo Caballero's supporters highlighted the behaviour of the Popular Front led by the SFIO as exemplary, especially because of the solution proposed for the workers’ mobilizations. It should be remembered that Indalecio Prieto had called for social calm on 1 May 1936, in his famous speech in Cuenca.
86
Instead, in response to Prieto, the caballerismo clamoured for government action connected with social mobilizations, as they interpreted what was happening in France.
87
The French government acted in accordance with the people, on the side of the working class, to maintain the socialist ideal.
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This caused requests for a similar reaction from the Spanish government in its own struggle – sometimes led by the Socialist trade union Unión General de Trabajadores, which was controlled by the caballeristas. The goals of the trade union were to recover more quickly many of the reforms cancelled by the right-wing government, and to provoke new and bolder reforms on the road to social transformation.
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Explicitly, Claridad remarked that there was a Popular Front government in both Spain and in France, with the difference that the Blum Cabinet has immediately understood its mission regarding labour issues, and has managed, thanks to decisive and vigorous action, to impose on the employer class a solution in line with the requests formulated precisely by workers.
In Spain, the employers’ intransigence would benefit from the ‘bourgeois liberalism [of the] nineteenth century’ that was defended by the republican authorities, resulting in long-lasting conflicts. 90 For the socialist left as well, Blum thus became a model, and the French Popular Front set an example. When ‘adversaries and not a few [of] the allies’ quoted the French example, the left of the PSOE gladly accepted it, 91 since that example was what they advocated. ‘[T]he Popular Front’ was not surrendered ‘to the line of the petty bourgeoisie’; rather, it was pressed so that the reforms advocated would achieve a ‘revolutionary perspective’, ‘seeking to have the maximum emancipatory content’. 92
Indeed, as a socialist, Blum became a model, and his government was the true exponent of a Popular Front for the caballerismo. Claridad took as examples the measures relating to the dissolution of the far-right leagues, the intervention in the Bank of France, and the nationalization of the arms industries – as well as the Matignon agreements to resolve the strike movement in May and June. 93 The caballerismo urged the government to legislate by decree to ‘end the strikes, and end up with the fascist intransigence of the employer class that promotes them, as the French Government did’; 94 it should also give the Spanish working class ‘the same effective support that they [the French workers] have found in the Government of the Popular Front in France’. 95 The solution was clear: ‘Follow the example of France, where the Popular Front is an integration of parties, organizations and Government for all times and all parliamentary and extra-parliamentary problems.’ 96
As reported by all the PSOE press, communism stood out among these formations. Communism was the most controversial component of the coalition also in France, where the congress of SFIO in 1936 signed the pact – and, in addition, expressed the desire that they ‘not only sign the common document but also share responsibilities for power’. 97 Thus, there was a strong desire for collaboration, and all the members of the Popular Front would assume the ultimate implications of the concluded pact.
This point was especially highlighted by the caballerismo, whose press frequently reported Blum's invitations to participate in power, to achieve the Popular Front's success at the polls. 98 In any case, the communists’ commitment to remain outside the government, in charge of the ministry of the masses, seemed not to be frowned upon at first by Claridad. Indeed, it described the decision as an ‘example of good political sense’, 99 since that willingness to support and externally pressurize the PCF's government also aligned well with the caballeristas’ proposals 100 – despite calling for a rapprochement between communists and revolutionary socialists. From the caballerismo's point of view, the crucial elements were the ambitious programme of social and economic reforms towards socialism, the governmental action in support of the workers, and the socialist leadership. This was the case throughout the decade, especially after the end of 1933. 101
Thus, the caballeristas’ socialism used the French example to defend the idea of the PSOE's non-participation in the government formed in February – against what was claimed by the prietista Executive – because the attitude of the SFIO and the conditions of the French Popular Front were not present in Spain. Blum counted on his party's support to exercise power within a coalition faithfully represented in Parliament, where the socialists were the majority group. Furthermore, despite the limited nature of the agreement, the French Popular Front pact far surpassed the Spanish one. It provided an adequate basis for achieving reformism effectively, which was favourable to the working class. For this reason, it was initially pointed out that the SFIO did not have the PSOE's experience in government collaboration. Nonetheless, after observing the French political practice, the caballeristas’ line of argument pointed to France as a model. The SFIO, Blum and their government achieved a positive collaboration based on social and economic measures against big capital and fascism, and on support for workers’ mobilization. These concerns had not existed in the direction previously followed by the Spanish government.
Similarly to the case of the prietismo, to strengthen its position inside the PSOE, the caballerismo perspective portrayed a non-existent homogeneity within the Popular Front government and the French Socialist Party. The caballeristas largely followed most of the arguments of the SFIO left. However, they failed to consider that the Blum government, despite its initial unity, was not exempt from criticism and pressure (not always from his own party), in favour of the aims of the most leftist factions.
Conclusions
The notion of exceptionality has been prominent in studies of the PSOE and the European labour movement. 102 According to these narratives, the Spanish case has been strongly characterized by internal division and the radical nature of its proposals and political strategy. Meanwhile, at different times and in a contradictory manner, French socialism has been considered exceptionally reformist, parliamentary and weak – on the basis that it was scarcely connected with the union world, 103 barely Marxist, 104 lacking a social democratic spirit, and fundamentally revolutionary and doctrinaire. 105
In this regard, by contesting the idea of exceptionality, this paper's approach shows the similar problems faced and the solutions adopted in both cases. By 1936, both socialisms considered the Popular Front formation as a necessary temporary step towards the socialist goal, based on an equally common element: the implementation of a reformist programme as a basis for advancing on different paths towards this final socialist objective, regardless of how long it might take. Furthermore, the factions of the PSOE used the French example to justify their own policies, to satisfy both public opinion and members.
The prietista leadership seemed to contradict or partially understand the SFIO's actions. On the one hand, in the programmatic negotiation regarding the Popular Front, French socialism, led by Blum, brought forward several proposals that were much closer to the caballerismo; thus, republicans and communists were reluctant to accept them. On the other hand, the Spanish alliance, with the prioritized pact with republicanism and the refusal of communism, did not correspond to the SFIO's attitude. Despite Blum's and many socialist leaders’ distrust of a close union and fusion, French socialism, unlike the prietistas, agreed with communism with regard to performing a joint action. It always demanded the participation of this group in the government, and its leftist faction pushed firmly for it. Eventually, when internal struggles arose, the prietistas could take advantage of a fictitious union within the SFIO, trying to import it to Spain. They constantly demanded that their colleagues and adversaries showed the unity and discipline enjoyed by French socialism, as a basis for a successful Popular Front and government. The intention was to impose an internal discipline that would successfully strike the pact, and convince the caballeristas that inclusion in the government was the best solution.
Instead, the caballeristas initially pointed out the differences between the two cases, proclaiming that they were different Popular Fronts and government programmes, to differentiate the behaviours of the PSOE and the SFIO. However, the formation of the Blum government, the labour mobilizations, and the social achievements included in the Matignon agreements signed in early June 1936, resulted in a new perspective among the caballerismo. The left of the PSOE strongly upheld the French example, in order to view governmental action differently; it demanded a closely linked action between the republican government and the Popular Front forces, aligned with the Spanish labour movement. To some extent, the caballerismo behaved similarly to the French socialist left: they opted for directly exercising power, counting on the support of the workers’ forces, and developing a programme and a government action to achieve a socialist transformation. This led to the caballeristas’ move to delegitimize the actions of the PSOE prietista leadership, such as reluctance towards communism, lukewarm reformism, leaving the republicans in the government a great deal of room for manoeuvre, and little commitment to workers’ strike movements. The caballeristsas highlighted the comparison with the French case to underline the prietistas’ deviations from fully socialist goals.
Although the socialist dilemma of whether or not to return to the actions performed in the first biennium has been well known to historiography for decades, generally it has overlooked Spanish socialism's connection with the logics and debates throughout the continent. The PSOE's two factions used frameworks from beyond Spain to reinforce their positions, since their experiences and debates were not exceptional among their European counterparts, as the French case shows – despite the fact that the leadership and the actions of the government in France helped to pacify a socialism as much under pressure as the Spanish one. In this way, Spanish and French socialists underwent the same processes, although they faced specifically different issues. They shared debates and received many similar reactions and responses within the complex framework of continental socialism, especially during the interwar period.
Footnotes
Funding
This work was supported by the Generalitat Valenciana GVPrometeo [2020/050], the University of Valencia [GIUV2013], the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación of Spain “Estado y dinámicas nacionales en España (1931-1978)” [PID2019-105464GB-100 AEI/10.13039/50110001103], and the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación of Spain “El antifascismo socialista en el período de entreguerras. Municipalismo, reformismo y nación en el sur de Europa” [PID2020-114379GA-I00 MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033].
