Abstract
This article examines the blurred boundaries between public and private repressive practices in Wilhelmine Germany with a special focus on the legal and administrative framework drawn up to redistribute security tasks and delegate the use of violence to non-state actors. While the rapid escalation of political violence in Central and Eastern Europe after 1917 has been widely discussed in the recent historiography, the structure of violence in the pre-war period remains less explored, especially with regard to the public-private interplay in the policing of popular protests. After the first massive strike by Ruhr miners in 1889, the Prussian authorities began to support the formation of semi-private armed protection groups in an effort to tackle ‘strike terrorism’. The idea of privatizing repressive practices arose as a result of widespread fears of social and political disintegration. Yet, although it may seem paradoxical, the precondition for delegating the use of violence to non-state actors was Prussian administrators’ confidence in the state’s solidity and efficiency. The ambivalence in contemporary discourses concerning the vulnerability of the existing social and political order is crucial to explaining why the Prussian authorities implemented strategies for legally distributing arms to those groups that were considered part of the ‘loyal classes’. The mobilization against ‘strike terrorism’ involved not only officially organized armed groups, such as the Zechenwehren, but also more informal or extra-legal strategies such as private use of the municipal police, the distribution of arms to strike-breakers and the militarization of white-collar workers and supervisors.
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