Abstract
Poland’s strategy for fighting Nazi Germany has always been controversial. Was it necessary to confront the invaders close to the frontier, or should Poland’s forces have stayed much further back to allow a more viable defence? The head of the British Military Mission to Poland in 1939, Major-General Adrian Carton de Wiart, argued strongly but in vain for a defence in the interior. The Polish army proved inadequate against German forces using new lightning operations. The promised major offensive by France did not materialize. Carton de Wiart failed in his efforts to expedite material assistance from Britain, whose political and military leadership wrote off the Poles. Carton de Wiart and his officers continued to report to the War Office until Soviet intervention on 17 September brought an end to the Military Mission. After leaving Poland, the Mission produced invaluable accounts of the new German warfare but these had little influence on army practice. So there was a failure to learn from the fall of Poland.
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