Grounding the argument-based framework for validating score interpretations and uses 1

Abstract

Kane’s argument-based framework is summarized and examined. He implicitly appeals to the backgrounded concepts of fairness and justice. From there it is a short distance to grounding the whole system in the mundane notion of truth. In fact, valid argument systems must depend on representations that are ‘true’ by virtue of agreement with purported facts. As a friendly amendment, therefore, I argue that (provided the ceteris paribus, all else being equal, requirement is met) agreement with known facts in testing, experimental research, and scientific measurement counts for a great deal more than disagreement. It follows by Peircean ‘exact logic’ that higher test scores (if the tests have any validity at all) are invariably more informative (interpretable in general) and thus more useful than lower scores. Why? Because higher scores show more agreement between the test-makers and the higher scoring test-takers about whatever facts (or performances) may be at issue. Exceptions are cases where the ceteris paribus requirement is not met. Necessary (but testable) inferences follow for interpretations and uses of ‘cutscores.’