Muslim Diasporas: An Examination of the Issues of the Second and Third Generation Muslims in Europe

Abstract

This article studies the issues of the emerging second and third generations of post-war Muslim migrants in Europe. There has always been some presence of Muslims in Europe, but immigrants who came in the post-Second World War (WWII) period represent the majority of today's Muslim diasporas in Europe. They are referred to as the ‘first generation’. This division is made to distinguish between those who had moved permanently to a country other than their country of birth, from the second/third-generation immigrants referring to those who were born in Europe. This article explores issues of second and third-generation Muslims in Europe, contrasting and comparing them with their parents’ experiences. Family socialisation has significant effects supporting the effective transmission of religious identification, belief and practices to the next generation. The younger generations may receive a ‘transmitted package of heritage’ from the first generation, but they are not born in a vacuum, rather are exposed to a different mainstream cultural identity coming from the media, non-Muslim (The term non-Muslim refers to anyone who does not define himself as belonging to or practising the Islamic faith.) friends and educational institutions in the new environments. They are not expected to be just passive recipients. They try to relate to both heritages and negotiate in such a way as to maintain relations with family and achieve full European citizenship. For the younger generations in Europe, greater contact and exchange between the races and cultures is the key towards the future even if it is contested within their own community.

Introduction

The entry of Muslim labour immigrants to Europe was not just a geographical move. It involves changes for both them and the host countries. They might have come as ‘guest labourers’, or refuges but now they are no longer being perceived as ‘guests’ but rather as equal civic and political actors. Their permeant presence has resulted in the institutionalization of Islam in Europe which gave them equal rights as the mainstream communities.

Immigrants and their descendants are becoming part of a ‘New Transitional Europe’, but the encounter between their cultures and those of the new lands is likely to prove challenging. In addition, they represent a diversity of ethnic identities and religious beliefs and practices. They may have similar experiences, but carry their ethnic (country of origin) differences.

In the beginning, those from the first generation experienced what we may call the ‘myth of return’ – living physically in Europe but mentally in their lands of origin. Neither they nor the host countries were sure of what would happen next. Muslims did not have a ready-on-hand strategy to help them live among non-Muslim majorities. The host countries still struggle to reach a final formula for settlement. The outcome is an unsettled situation. Their experience of migration to another country may strengthen the awareness and importance of cultural, or religious identities, rather than weakening them.

The first generation is appearing to be constructing a religious and cultural identity to protect themselves from influences that might come from mainstream cultures. This enables them, and their descendants to remain loyal to their origins. The goal is to emphasise identities that distinguish them and to protect them from any influences from other cultures. The younger generations receive values from their parents, which we call a ‘transmitted package’, but they are not passive recipients. They are embedded in both Islamic and European cultures. They are expected to negotiate traditional and modern values and construct a coherent self-narrative about their bicultural existence as ‘European-Muslim’.

Studies referring to the second generation have been conducted, but the issues of the third generation remain an open empirical question. In both contexts, one may argue that, younger generations do not retain a strong ‘ethnic identity’ and consequently, they are more willing to negotiate between what they receive from their parents, and that from the mainstream culture. Consequently, they could consider more progressive stages of adjustment to life in Europe. This reasoning suggests that the third generation may be expected to surpass their parents and grow closer to the culture of the majority.

I aim to examine the elements that the first generations attempt to transmit to their descendants and also compare and contrast the reaction of younger generations vis-à-vis the package they receive from their parents. I will discuss three factors referring to cultural and religious distinctiveness, public behaviours, and family matters. Relevant empirical findings from my empirical research will be used as evidence. ¹

Cultural and Religious Issues

Muslims cannot be considered homogenous. However, they share a common experience in understanding the existing boundaries set by Islam that is, incorporating values, beliefs, customs and behaviours. Their differences are related to ethnic, cultural, religious trends (Sunni, Shia or other), and linguistic elements. As minorities, Muslims are keen to maintain and transmit their distinctive identities to the younger generations. They struggle to balance their loyalties to religion and the laws of the European countries. They aim to remain loyal to their origins, at the same, not to be separated from their new lands. Values related to European civic life likely attract them, but religious and family values are less affected by their new settings. Issues of Islamic uniform, women's head covers, dietary practices, family values and public behaviours are the main practices to preserve their heritage and to protect younger generations against any influence from the majority. To achieve this, they transmit ‘a package they construct’ to their descendants.

Cultural identity is determined by the family, and community, and above all shaped by religion. Religious and cultural identities are highly overlapped in Islam. They are not like private beliefs or attitudes that, can be sustained without public expression and recognition. Rather, they offer them with a useful framework for behaviour and contact with the global community of Islam. This sums up the rationale beyond their desire to transmit religious and cultural identities to the younger generations. Furthermore, Muslims are advised not to lose their Islamic identity or their sense of belonging to the global nation of Islam. Al-Qaradawi, ² for example, encouraged Muslims to live in the West but he warned them not to lose their religious identity. He argued that it is not important what type of society or social context a Muslim minority lives in, but rather how far it is self-aware of its distinct identity and belonging. He gave a warning to Muslim minorities in the West of the consequences of losing their religious identity and added that it may become even more difficult in particular cases when Muslims are persistently self-conscious about their religious and cultural identity and are not ready to sacrifice it in favour of any other allegiances and affiliation. ³ The most famous text referring to the ummah is Surah 3:110 ‘You are the best of peoples [ummah], evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah’. Their belonging to the ummah is through the medium of sacred texts and religious duties. In his warning to Muslims in Europe, Al Qaradawi noted that the early generations of Muslim minorities in Australia who were mostly Afghanis lost their identity as Muslims due to their indifferent attitude towards their religion and thus he warned Muslim minorities in Europe not to commit the same error. On the other hand, Muslims are also expected to demonstrate that they belong to the culture to which they have migrated. Muslim scholars became aware of the conflicts and aimed to find suitable juristic rulings to help them in their day-to-day life in Europe. ⁴ Those from the first generation struggle to construct this sense of belonging to two cultures. In the case of faith-based minorities, religious affiliation and language are the two pillars of identity that they are keen to maintain. ⁵

Younger generations often seek a balance between the transmitted package they receive and the new practical demands of life in Europe. Fleischmann and Phalet studied the migration history of Turks and Moroccans as well as their religious and ethnic belonging. They reported that the European-born generations from Turkish or Moroccan backgrounds still carry aspects of their religious and ethnic belonging ⁶ (emphasis is mine). Thus, according to this research, the European-born generations carry religious and ethnic heritages of origins. However, they are obliged to negotiate and switch between identities in such a way as to maintain relations with family and demands of European citizenship. According to research conducted in the UK, the younger generation is usually able to adapt and belong more easily than the elders. Having British citizenship and being fluent in the English language are found to have a positive impact. ⁷ Thus, the study reported that the younger generations can adapt. Another research pointed out:

A considerable proportion of second and third generations of Muslim migrants have largely been challenging, if not rebellious, towards not only the culturally nurtured lifestyle of their parents but also their way of thinking on matters largely about the life pattern these younger generations aspired to live in Britain. ⁸

The process of transmission and substituting is challenging. The second and third generations may not retain a strong ethnic identity as their parents did, but are more challenged than their parents. They are willing to negotiate between traditional and modern identities, but in so doing, they suffer from the dual loyalties they experience. In addition, handling religiously prohibited food and drinks, medicines, make-up substances, and ingredients produced from non-halal animals was understandably seen to be problematic by most. Many of my second-generation informants were obliged to work or study in these conditions that their faith forbids. ⁹ Muslim scholars developed a suitable jurisprudence for Muslims who live as minorities in non-Islamic societies.

Public Behaviour Issues

Religious identity implies self-understanding in a variety of contexts. In general, religious groups use particular public behaviour to form and negotiate their ethnic or religious identity. It is a way in which groups conduct themselves when interacting with another individual, group, or event. Groups may also have different choices for residence centres or measures of trust. Issues of Islamic uniforms, women's head covers, dietary practices, and public interaction behaviours are essential parts in which they are reasonably expected to be observed. Al-Qaradawi advised Muslims to look different from non-Muslims:

The beard is required not merely because the Prophet (peace be on him) had one but because he explicitly commanded it to distinguish from non-believers … To make the Muslims different from non-believers was the aim of the lawgiver … Gold ring, gold watch, gold teeth and pure silk are haram [forbidden] for men. Silver rings are permitted transparent … Tightly fitting clothes perfume and hair style to attract men or undergoing surgery for beautification … Artificial hair or hair wigs are haram for women. ¹⁰

The bottom line in the view of al-Qaradawi is the obligation for Muslims to look different. Consequently, public identification to maintain religious identity was of great concern to Muslims in Europe. It was pointed out:

Koran lessons and parental religious attendance contributed to all dimensions of current religiosity by increasing the orientation of the second generation towards heritage culture maintenance and increased the strength of religious identity through a decreased orientation towards culture adoption. ¹¹

The insistence on wearing hijabs, and the establishment of Qur’anic schools for children are some actions adopted by Muslims to signal their difference from the majority community.

Many European countries banned the covering of women's faces and this became a subject of public debate which continues. Looking at the issue in the wider European context, security was the main concern, while Muslims see it as one of the fundamental principles of rights and discrimination. Furthermore, the regulations of specific uniforms depending on the job may have implications for some religious groups. The visible expressions of identity, especially in public, could be problematic when they are different from those of the majority. Thus, the freedom of Muslims to behave in public in their own personal way is limited. Therefore, expressions and experiences of religious and social identities are not only subjective but depend on their practical expression and acknowledgement by others.

Adding to this complexity, some collective social behaviour practised by the majority is disliked by Muslims. My research informants reported disliking drinking in public, women's dress codes and opposite-sex relations. When I asked why they disliked the cultural behaviour of the majority, 65% reported they are different from the Islamic culture, in addition, they are presented not as private matters but are public and on media, as such, may influence the Muslim younger generations. Most importantly, the second generation, those who were born in Europe, reported a higher ratio of cultural conflicts concerning this public behaviour of the majority than their parents (69% to 61%). When I asked one of the leaders about this finding, he answered: ‘The second generation has more interaction with their environment through media education and relations with non-Muslim mates’ (A first generation Moroccan imam).

The issue of respect for Islamic culture and women's dress code was the top priority for the second generation. Most interestingly, they realized that Muslims who reside among non-Muslim majorities may succeed in separating from non-Muslims concerning worship and moral conduct, but they will find it difficult to do so in other opinion-forming sectors. The issue of public behaviour in everyday interaction is multi-dimensional. In line with the literature, my empirical findings pointed to three different positions to deal with this struggle. The position of those who relate to European laws was adopted by 14.80% of informants. Those who were for ignoring the context in which Muslims live presented 20.40%, while 64.80% accepted that both the text and the context should be balanced. The tendency to become more religious may become prevalent among those who may experience any sort of social exclusion.

Radicalization Factor

Radicalism may happen when the minority is challenged. It refers to a set of behaviour and actions adopted to signal variance from the majority community. Radicalization does not develop in a vacuum: it is fuelled by fear and hatred, humiliation, or suffering in Islamic countries especially those caused by the West. They are ranging from non-violent acts such as the establishment of Qur’anic schools, the increase of the development of a strong religious and ethnic attitude, and the emphasis to transmit Islamic teachings to younger generations and violent reactions. Radicalization may reduce trust between the immigrants and the hosting society, and increase criminal activities. Empirical studies suggest that it is cultural transmission rather than experiences of group discrimination that drives lower levels of trust among second-generation members of Muslim minority groups in Europe. The issue of feeling humiliated ignites violence: ‘We have avenged the Prophet Muhammad’, shouted the killers of the Charlie-Hebdo cartoonists. The younger generations executed a series of events like the Madrid, London and Brussels attacks, or the killing of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam. Their actions were not mostly motivated by personal experiences such as discrimination or socio-economic disadvantage, but by some collective events from within the Muslim diasporas or from abroad. ¹² Other factors, such as the Western policies about the Muslim world, along with humiliating feelings play a part in the development of radicalization. If identity is threatened, the minority is likely to have negative attitudes towards the majority. It is significant what Pew pollsters reported in 2007. They stated that Muslims older than 30 were much less likely (28%) than those aged 18–29 (42%) to agree that there is a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in modern society. ¹³ The awareness of existing conflict is higher in the case of the younger generations.

Residential Centres Factor

When the public behaviour of a minority is challenged, they may choose to reside together in communities where they are in majority. Studies indicate that Muslim immigrants tend to live together in large industrial towns. They reside in particular areas in capital cities, besides a tendency among each ethnic group to live together in particular locations. In studying the state of Muslims in 11 European cities, it was reported: ‘most Muslims in Europe prefer to live in capital cities and large industrial towns … no difference among ethnic groups concerning the tendency to live in industrial cities … each ethnic group live together in particular locations’. ¹⁴ The second generation might have no choice but to live with their families, while the third generation is expected to have more freedom to choose other alternative residential centres. It is expected that the third generation will be more likely to live outside ethnic areas, participate in civic life, and speak European languages well. We have a little empirical basis for this assumption. Perhaps the processes in the third generation are not quite finished. Overall, the generational status will have a major impact on the probability of identifying oneself ethnically, and the process continues into the next generations.

In my research, informants from both the first and second generations reported reasons for their choice for living together. A female first generation argued: ‘it is for practical reasons such as finding housing and halal food’. Another, a male first generation said, ‘we feel more secure when living together’. Second-generation informants were not exceptional. A male second-generation respondent simply justified the tendency to live together by saying, ‘it is normal to live in a community with family and friends’. The choice of living in industrial areas was ‘because it is easier to find jobs’ as stated by a female from the second generation. Finding housing, halal food and drinks, for the sense of being secure when living in communities with fellow Muslims were reported as the main reasons by informants from both the first and the second generations. In my observation, while talking to informants, they were comfortable in their Muslim neighbourhoods as they realised that they represented the majority in those neighbourhoods. Though the home is not only a physical place, studies highlight the complexities between mobility, emplacement, belonging and engagement in transnational social spaces. ¹⁵ Exclusion or self-separation is negative as people will be inclined to establish their institutions and social contacts in places where their groups are concentrated.

Family Issues

Family laws are the most applied branch of Islamic law (Shariʿah) in Muslim countries. Among its most central topics are family structure, rights and responsibilities, child-rearing, marriage, divorce, inheritance, domestic violence, and the role of women in family and society. It is an issue upon which traditions, religions and cultural values have impinged the most regardless of where Muslims live.

Family Structure Factor

The family structure in Islam differs from that of the European notion. The European notion of family is marked by an individualistic nuclear understanding of a family as spouse and dependents, while the concept of family in Islam extends to include other blood ties. ‘There can be little doubt that traditional Muslim family structure has been closer to the extended than to the nuclear type. Family members are entitled to their rights and are assigned reciprocal obligations’. ¹⁶ Muslim family consists of groups or circles, the first is the husband, the wife and their children. The next is close relatives and so on. The structure is important to decide the rights and obligations of each family member. According to the Qur’an, Surah 4.1 reminds the believers that it is a divine command to be dutiful to ‘relatives of the womb’ and as such Muslims are lawfully required to be more mindful towards their blood relatives.

Some of the informants expressed in detail some of the social, moral and legal implications. They reported stories of conflicts, particularly concerning inheritance, the care for the aged family members, especially parents, and the necessity for balancing the collective rights of the family with the rights of individuals. The rulings of inheritance are different from the European laws. The Islamic rulings may be clear and precise but the assumption that the issue of inheritance is settled based on Islamic legal instructions is not true. Those who live in Europe can choose between Islamic and European Laws. One of my female informants, for example, reported:

I do not accept a Shariʿah ruling giving unconditional rights on inheritance to my extended family members. In my case, the extended members who might have rights on our inheritance had more wealth than us. The European laws regulating eligibility for inheritance helped me to challenge those who claimed religious rights on my father's wealth when he died

A second-generation female explained how the Shariʿah rulings of inheritance were problematic for her. She had established with her husband a business in Morocco:

When my husband died in an accident, we had only a daughter and no male children. I could manage to claim the wealth we had in Belgium for me and our daughter. But as for our business in Morocco, I could not. It was divided according to the legal Islamic ruling applied in the country.

Her story demonstrates that in Muslim countries the Shariʿah law on inheritance is applied to all citizens regardless of their place of residence. In addition, Islamic law does not allow any non-Muslim family members to have the same rights regarding wealth as Muslim members. Thus, dividing inheritance between Muslims and non-Muslims from the same family is problematic. Accordingly, one can speculate the effect of this ruling on inter-faith marriages in Europe. One position was: ‘A Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim woman of “the People of the Book,” a Jewess or Christian. However, if the non-Muslim wife happens to survive her Muslim husband; she is not entitled to inherit from him’ (Abd al-Ati, 1977: 35). Another position could permit non-Muslim wives to have autonomy over their wealth if they have personal accounts, but not over the wealth of the Muslim husbands. Muslims, if they wish, can write a will to give claims on their wealth as they wish. ¹⁷ In my studies there was diversity among informants on the matter of inheritance: 55% reported they would be inclined towards a religious solution on the matter of inheritance, 38% said they will write a will if they expect conflicts to happen, while 7% reported they would turn to European laws to issues of inheritance. The results were almost identical between the first and second generations.

Gender Equality and Autonomy Factor

Gender equality, and autonomy, are not only challenging because of the internal complexity, but also because they stand out within the European culture and are often in conflict with local laws. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights gives males and females equal rights. It allows individuals to conduct their life the way they wish. Accordingly, gender equality, individualism and collectivism need to be carefully balanced for more harmony between European Laws and the Islamic rulings as well as for the betterment of Muslim communities. Females and males are morally equal in Islam and as such are expected to fulfil the same religious duties and receive the same reward. However, Qur’an 4:34 stated:

Men are in charge of women by [right of] what Allah has given one over the other and what they spend [for maintenance] from their wealth. So righteous women are devoutly obedient, guarding in [the husband's] absence what Allah would have them guard. But those [wives] from whom you fear arrogance – [first] advise them; [then if they persist], forsake them in bed; and [finally], strike them. But if they obey you [once more], seek no means against them. Indeed, Allah is ever Exalted and Grand.

The text explains the rationale why men are to have a degree of charge over women: firstly, by the right, Allah has given men over women; secondly because of what men are particularly expected to spend from their wealth for the maintenance of their families. Indeed, females were the subject of instruction as indicated in the text and men were instructed on how to discipline their wives. A male first-generation respondent explains: ‘women are required by this divine order, to know how to conduct themselves in the context of the family as well as in the society at large’. While a second-generation female made me aware that: ‘The two terms in text ascribing advantage to men are not clear and direct. They need clarifications as they are often misused by males’.

Gender equality is a hot subject of discussion. ‘The single greatest number of questions received by the ECFR is related to the status of women, appropriately reflecting the politicization of gender issues in European Islam’. ¹⁸ The questions referring to women demanding guidance relating to some basic day-to-day matters reflected what was problematic for females, especially for wives. They mostly referred to women's demands for personal autonomy. Some of their struggles concern basic questions, such as can a woman cut her hair without the permission of her husband? There is a problematic implication for the family structure concerned with the struggle between the autonomy given to individuals by European laws and what the family considered to be its right to decide for the children. Freedom of choice is one of the fundamental social rights given to the individual, Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe. From an Islamic viewpoint, the concepts of individualism and collectivism were not seen as two opposite concepts but as two intertwined precepts complementing and enhancing each other. ¹⁹ Thus, the rights of individuals and families are not seen as standing in contrast to each other as both are equally governed by Islamic laws. However, the autonomy given to individuals, Muslims, and non-Muslims, in Europe, implies legal capacities and rights to self-determination. Accordingly, individualism and collectivism need to be carefully balanced for more harmony between European Laws and Islamic rulings as well as for the betterment of Muslim younger generations in Europe. Besides freedom of choice, and autonomy, gender equality is a key standard practised in Europe. Muslim women may struggle more in their claims for personal autonomy. Personal autonomy given to females to travel alone or to work with males remains challenging when compared with European laws. My research informants reported challenges stemming from living in Europe where laws were not in total conformity with Islamic family laws. They reported challenges in issues such as caring for the aged members of the family by professionals, inheritance, gender equality and autonomy for individuals. They also reported issues relating to interfaith marriage and child-rearing. Second and third generations expect jurists to settle the issues of maintaining the higher principles of gender equality and justice that are emphasized in Islam, and the advantages given to men.

Marriage Factor

Marriage is a religious requirement and consequently, a moral safeguard as well as a social necessity as Surah 24: 32 informs. Islam prohibited adultery and marriage is the only lawful means for sexual relations as the text limits it: ‘those who guard their private parts except from their wives or those right hands possess, for indeed, they are not to be blamed (Surah 70: 29–30). Nonetheless, marriage is a mutual contract between a man and a woman, a contract that leads to legal responsibilities. It extends to the social level working as a bridge between two extended families. The texts set some rulings to direct the choice of believers. Some categories of women are permanently prohibited while others are temporally prohibited as divorced or widowed women during the waiting period of four months. The category of permanent prohibitions is based on some marital and blood relations. They are derived from Surah 4: 23. The restrictions that refer to forbidding marriage to relatives are identical to the European laws that discourage consanguineous marriages.

Another restriction concerned the choice of a non-Muslim partner. Thus, a Muslim man should not marry an unbeliever woman until she accepts Islam, likewise, a Muslim woman should not marry a man until he accepts Islam Surah 2: 221. In addition, Muslim women are forbidden from marrying men from amongst the people who believe in the earlier scriptures. Surah 60: 10 and 5: 5 permit Muslim men to marry a Christian or a Jewish woman if they wish and forbid Muslim women to do the same. A male first-generation was married to a European wife pointed out the ruling was ambiguous: ‘Most of the European females do not believe anymore. The ruling to forbid Muslim men to marry unbelievers simply means that Muslim men should be selective when marrying Europeans’. Most importantly, the ruling forbidding Muslim females from marrying men from amongst ‘the People of the Book’ limits their freedom of choice. Females are looking for solutions for this issue. For example, a Muslim female asked, ‘I am a girl and I am twenty years old’. A Christian man, who is ready to respect Islamic obligations and does not mind our children being Muslims proposed to me, so is it permissible to marry him? The answer was: ‘It is not permissible for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man, even though he is from ‘the People of the Book’ and promises to respect your religion after marriage’. ²⁰ As such, a Muslim woman is supposed to only marry a Muslim man. In contrast, there was a conditional exception for a Muslim convert woman to maintain her marriage to a non-Muslim if her conversion to Islam happened after marriage:

The Council affirms and repeats that it is forbidden for a Muslim female to establish marriage to a non-Muslim male. This has been an issue of consensus throughout history … However, in the case of marriage being established prior to the female entering Islam, the Council has decided on this conditional resolution. ²¹

The rulings do not only limit the choices of Muslim women but also, they are not in line with the unconditional right to choose partners. Significantly, the testimonies of the younger generations in my research reflect the dynamics of these rulings in the field. For example, an informant challenged the traditions about forbidding a Muslim female to marry a non-Muslim. She was aware of the ruling but decided to go against it. She told me:

My father, while in Morocco, had two wives; one a Moroccan Muslim and the second a Moroccan Jew. The challenge I had as a Muslim was concerning my choice of a partner. When a co-worker asked for marriage, I agreed. He was a Belgian citizen like me, but he was a Jew and I was a Muslim … My father had some understanding and asked me to have ‘a talk’. The main issue that dominated the discussion was that my friend would never force me to become a Jew and that we should allow our children to choose their religion.

When I asked whether they had a religious wedding she said the imam refused and they had a civil marriage and not a religious one. In addition, another female told me that she married a non-Muslim who refused to convert to Islam. She decided to go against her conviction, but she refused to share details. The assumption that a Muslim woman will never accept marrying a non-Muslim is, therefore, not borne out by facts on the ground as my research. When I investigated the issue, the majority of informants, 88%, were against allowing Muslim women to marry non-Muslims even if the woman desired to do so. However, a significant minority, about 12%, agreed that women's choices should be respected. Furthermore, some females favoured the application of European family laws rather than Islamic ones. A female second generation argued: ‘I prefer the European laws because they give more rights to women than the Islamic rulings’. The problem, therefore, is multi-faceted and it is yet unsettled for the younger generations who are raised with freedom of choice. The ruling does not give unconditional permission, especially to women, to choose their partners.

Another related subject was arranged marriage. Arranged marriages are the norm for many. Arranged marriages are allowed and promoted in Islam as long as both the bride and the groom accept them. Those who were ready to get married are very likely to meet their future partner through family or friends. A second generation gave me a practical reason for agreeing to an arranged marriage: ‘We look to arranged marriages as a means to keep the choice of partners and the wealth within the community’. The European culture challenges this norm when against the wishes of partners. The following testimony of a second-generation Muslim underlines the point:

I was born in Belgium and so were my four sisters and a brother. I am the oldest. My father is self-employed. We have our own house and we live together. Before I finished my studies and when in the last year, my parents asked me to marry a relative from our country of origin … however, I refused, and European laws allowed me to marry the partner of my choice.

The European laws enabled the informant to say no to the choice of her family. In line with this, another female second-generation tells her story:

My parents and some extended family members tried to arrange a husband for me. They looked to this arranged marriage as a means to keep the family traditions and the wealth within the family. They proposed to me a husband that I thought was not the best for me. It was the local imam who convinced my family not to force me and to let me choose whom to marry. However, the imam had set some conditions to guide my choice.

The testimonies above present not only challenges to the norm of arranged marriage culture but to the assumed authority given to parents. Life in Europe helped those who wished to go against this tradition. Besides, conditional polygamy is permitted in Islam. Interestingly, an informant told me, ‘I have seven children with two wives’. In the course of the discussion, I found that he has been legally married to one and lives with the second without being legally married. He had children with both wives. He told me, ‘The law forbids polygamy but permits living with partners without the necessity for legal marriage’.

Handling marriage conflicts is another more important subject. European laws give equal rights regardless of gender. The religious regulations grant more rights to male partners. To balance the notion, the creation of religious courts was a proposed framework to settle marriage conflicts. In the context of the UK there are significant numbers of religious courts or councils as reported by The Guardian 01/03/2017: ‘Surprisingly little is known about the councils – even down to how many there are in the UK (estimates range from 30 to 80). Some, like Birmingham's, are large and long-established; others are informal, backroom affairs. Individual imams also carry out the same functions’.

In conclusion, traditions and religious rulings play an important role in directing Muslims’ social life referring to family. However, the measures of acceptance and implementation of these rulings by the younger generations are varied.

Conclusion

I started with two hypotheses – the first was that the transmitted package of parents was meant to have an impact on their children; the second was in assuming that the younger generations should not be considered as passive recipients. This article provides evidence that the first assumption concerning ‘the package of inheritance’, was not totally adopted by the younger generations, simply, because those in the first generation were more attached to the origins, while the younger generations needed to negotiate traditional and modern values to construct a coherent self-narrative about their bicultural existence as ‘European-Muslim’. The assumption that they are not expected to be passive recipients is true. They aim to be acceptable to both host society and Muslim practices. They provide rationalizations for their measures of attachments and also deal with possible liability for how and where they claim to belong.

Consequently, they faced three alternatives: (i) acculturation – this refers to the complete adoption of the European culture and way of life, even involving activities forbidden in Islam; (ii) de-enculturation – this means there is to be the complete adherence to the origins as transmitted by parents and rejection of European norms; (iii) partial acculturation – means adapting to both cultures to be acceptable to both host societies. A better understanding of the complexities (as outlined in this article) in which the second and third-generation respondents live, points towards the partial acculturation in which Muslims try to adapt to both cultures in their efforts in making sense of themselves in a host society. Their contacts with non-Muslims in education work etc. lead them to a better understanding and deeper commitment to integrating even when their choices go against their received cultural convictions.