As anti-establishment parties, right-wing populists (RWPs) have been successful in attracting the politically discontent. This article shows how this appeal of RWPs asymmetrically affects citizens on the economical left and right. Building on previous work, the analysis examines how anti-establishment status conditions not only the effect of political disaffection, but also the effect of redistribution preferences on RWP support. A multilevel analysis using nine waves of the European Social Survey and a composite anti-establishment measure reveals that where RWPs are more established, strong pro-redistribution preferences drive voters away from these parties even more than voters are attracted to them based on political distrust. Political distrust more than outweighs the countervailing effect of pro-redistribution preferences only where RWPs are less established. There, pro-redistribution voters are a particularly suitable target as they are also more politically dissatisfied. These findings help to understand when and why RWPs can attract different segments of society.
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