The nexus between the Baltic governments and think tanks as instruments of foreign and security policy

Abstract

This study aims to unveil the nexus between the governments of the Baltic states and think tanks (TTs), which work on foreign and security policy. The article argues that the Baltic governments wish to use TTs as instruments of foreign policies, as they are highly interested in influencing well-known TTs abroad to further their national interests. The Baltic states undertake a good deal of effort to contribute to debates in the capitals of the powerful nations through the TT channel, hoping that some form of support can be gained for their positions in the international arena. Meanwhile, the governments expect domestic TTs to be visible internationally and influence policy debates by sending Baltic-favourable messages to foreign policy communities. On the other side of the nexus, TTs adapt to government expectations while also trying to maintain some level of independence. The process of using TTs as instruments to further the aims of governments is based mainly on the perceptions of government officials themselves, who are convinced that TTs should serve policy goals. Governments dominate the nexus because TTs depend on governmental support and/or wish to be helpful in furthering governmental goals.

Introduction

Despite a widening range of studies being carried out in terms of think tanks (TTs) and their influence on state policies, it is apparent that TT research lacks insight into how small countries and TTs develop and maintain their relationship. Besides this, while analysing TTs beyond the US and major Western European countries, scholars rarely take an angle that focuses on foreign and security policy. Current studies into TTs rely mainly on the well-established Anglophone literature. However, research on TTs has widened its geographical scope in recent decades. The Western-European TTs in Denmark, France, Germany (Campbell and Pedersen, 2014; Pautz, 2011; Thunert, 2004), and the European Union are being studied much more often and at far greater depth. Central and Eastern European TTs (those of Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Czech Republic) have also been analysed (Jezierska and Giusti, 2020). TT research now provides specific attention to emerging powers such as China (McGann, 2019), and other regions such as Latin America (Merke and Pauselli, 2015) and Africa (Mbadlanyana et al., 2011). However, only a few scholars have dedicated more attention to the Baltic states (Boucher, 2004; Boyd, 2017). The aforementioned literature on specific cases confirms the argument that TTs as producers of policy ideas are operating under unique national conditions.

One of those unique conditions in which the Baltic states operate is the small size of the countries and, as a consequence, policy communities. The Baltic states are defined as small by various parameters, including the size of territory, population, and economy (Lamoreaux and Galbreath, 2008). Nevertheless, when it comes to foreign and security policy, the essential feature of their smallness is that the Baltic states are weak in defending their national interests (Edstrom et al., 2019; Vaicekauskaitė, 2017). In countries like those of the Baltic states, the national specifics of each country and the survival strategies of small states in the international system require to use every possible channel with which to communicate their interests to the powerful international players who define the conditions in which those states must operate. TTs are one such channel or instrument that small countries could use to further their national interests. Small states do not usually have too many TTs, and it is quite often the case that they are more dependent on government support, which builds up a basis for a closer relationship between TTs and governments. Due to such a closer relationship between TTs and governments, the policy role of TTs depends not only on their operational environment but also on the perceptions of government officials regarding those TTs. Therefore, this study traces perceptions of how the governments of the Baltic states see the role of TTs, and how TTs perceive their relationship with those governments. However, it should be emphasised that this article focuses on the Baltic states; even though it can provide some insights about small states, it would require more extensive research to have overarching theoretical insights.

This article builds on theoretical assumptions on TT independence presented in various studies across the TT research community as well as on a total of 14 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with TT management and government officials in the Baltic states, which have been conducted in English and Lithuanian between March 2020 and October 2020 (Appendix 1). The interviewees come from ministries of defence and foreign affairs in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Moreover, officials from government offices were also interviewed, along with representatives of TTs. Five of 14 interviews were conducted with TTs. Unfortunately, not every TT responded to the interview request. Besides, the number of Baltic TTs that focus on foreign policy is small, as explained later.

Meanwhile, nine interviews were conducted with officials from governments. Every institution and TT would provide one representative for the interview, except for the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, from which three representatives agreed to participate in the research. Hence, the limitation exists since different officials, and think-tankers from the same institution could have provided more diverse opinions regarding the nexus. However, they have decided to participate in the research not as individual officials or think-tankers but as institutions. Despite that, the semi-structured interview format allowed for more open conversations and not only institutional positions. As a result, interviews revealed a nuanced picture of the relationship between TTs and governments.

The article argues that the Baltic states use or wish to use TTs as instruments in their foreign and security policies based on the research. These governments expect TTs to carry out the dissemination of Baltic positions rather than provide policy suggestions. Government interests also include efforts to influence TTs abroad, such as in the United States, due to an expectation that influential American TTs may help the Baltic states achieve their foreign and security policy goals. Analysis of the governmental perceptions of foreign TTs illustrates the prioritisation of governments. In some instances, when asked about their cooperation with TTs, governmental institutions would start the conversation by introducing their activities with TTs abroad. Therefore, it was decided to include in the analysis not only domestic but foreign TTs as well. The differences in how Baltic governments perceive local and foreign TTs demonstrate what kinds of relationships with TTs governments expect.

Theorising the independence of foreign policy TTs in small states

The literature on TTs dealing with foreign policy and security issues avoids overarching theoretical insights regarding the government-TT nexus. Instead, the studies mainly focus on the definition of a TT and its influence on decision-makers in specific cases. There are plenty of theoretical approaches that explain what kind of influence TTs can exert on governments. Nevertheless, the authors usually agree that TT influence is a vague idea that is hard to prove (Abelson, 2006). Moreover, such approaches are drawn mainly from the American example, and they do not focus on foreign policy TTs in small states with less vibrant TT communities.

The expectations regarding the nexus of TTs and governments of the small states are almost unspecified in the scholarly literature, which opens a gap for future research. The critical factor of the missing literature is that small states usually do not have globally defining foreign or security policy ambitions (Elman, 1995: 175), which are a cornerstone of having a significant number of TTs deal with foreign policy matters. Moreover, as the strategy of small states is based on adaptation (Wivel et al., 2016), it leads to a false presumption that small states do not tend to be proactive in foreign policy. Besides, small states have an inclination towards a closed policy system in which the executive government relies mainly on professional civil servants to provide advice (Köllner et al., 2018). Therefore, TTs in small states are less interested in foreign policy, or their analysis does not significantly impact policymakers that do not need much advice while conducting a predictable foreign policy of a small state.

In small states, where the government often financially supports or even establishes TTs, the space for independent research is more likely to depend on how governments perceive the role of TTs. This article argues that governmental perceptions regarding the role of TTs are more important than what TTs may think about their mission, especially if a government has established a TT and provides financial support to that TT, or government is a TT client while purchasing a TT service or product. It means that a TT, which the government funds, might set the agenda according to the government’s needs (Ahmad, 2008), leading to the lack of independence.

Katarzyna Jezierska and Adrienne Sörbom (2020) discussed economic/financial, political, and academic TT (in)dependence while separating them analytically. In practice, however, financial, academic, and political independence are highly intertwined because financial dependence often creates conditions for lack of other types of independence, while political dependence means that academic integrity can be easily imperilled. Financial independence is the most discussed in academic literature, and sometimes, it is presented as the essential feature of a TT definition (Abelson, 2018; Jezierska and Sörbom, 2020; Weaver and McGann, 2017). However, financial independence is ‘more an aspiration or a means for achieving, for instance, legitimacy, than a given organisational feature of a think tank’ (Jezierska and Sörbom, 2020). In other words, every TT pursues to be independent, at least rhetorically (Higgott and Stone, 1994: 30), which happens due to a need to be seen as an objective knowledge provider rather than a subjective advocate. Nevertheless, it does not mean that every TT should meet independence criteria to call itself a TT.

Academic independence is ‘the freedom to produce analysis and results in line with the rules of academic integrity’ (Jezierska and Sörbom, 2020: 4). It may be jeopardised if a donor tasks a TT to write a report with specific conclusions or intervenes in the research process. TTs wish to show their capabilities as independent research centres with cognitive autonomy, but they are often framed by the perceived or clearly expressed wishes of their clients. As Thomas Medvetz (2012: 16) put it, ‘the “true” think tanks are marked out by formal independence from bureaucratic, party, market, academic, and media institutions . . . think tanks are also highly dependent on these same institutions for their existence’. Thus, policymakers may be using TTs as knowledge producers to justify their policies (Bajenova, 2018). Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the government’s perceptions of TTs’ role in foreign policy because the government might encourage new policy ideas or expect loyalty to the official policy line. The space for a TT to operate independently is one of the pre-conditions of academic independence, even when a TT is financially dependent on the government.

The political independence of TTs from political interests remains a highly debated topic. The declaration of a TT that is non-partisan does not mean that it is independent of political interests. Even when a government or a party is not involved with a TT financially or organisationally, there might be some hidden interests due to a TT’s ‘proximity to the political field’ (Jezierska and Sörbom, 2020: 4). The proximity could also be caused by the personal networks of TT experts or a revolving door principle (Jezierska and Sörbom, 2020). This principle may prove the assumption that TTs belong to the same foreign policy elite (Walt, 2018). However, TTs might have limited influence on a government because ‘political connections do not necessarily allow them to exercise policy influence’ (Abelson, 2006: 100). In addition, Diane Stone (1996: 31) claims that TTs have diverse positions and ideologies that ‘do not always confirm elite policy preferences’. Therefore, the proximity to the political field does not necessarily lead to dependence on a government or a party.

Meanwhile, in the small states, the number of people who work in foreign and security policy is small, and people tend to know each other without the revolving door phenomenon. In addition, TTs are more likely to have stronger connections to the policymakers because, in many cases, they are more dependent upon governmental financial support. For example, it has previously been reported that TTs in the Baltics, which ‘receive public funding, often need to resist government attempts to use them for their own purposes’ (Boucher, 2004: 49). Thus, governments sometimes look down on TTs as instruments, which resonate with the statist approach that denies the role of non-state players such as TTs because decision-makers dictate ‘how foreign policy is managed’ (Abelson, 2006: 137) and decide whether to listen to TT advice or employ TTs for specific policy goals.

Successful enforcement of TTs as instruments of government policy is ‘a manifestation of the knowledge/power nexus’ (Stone, 2007: 276) when the knowledge and policies blend, meaning there is no significant difference between TTs and government positions. Also, TTs themselves fall more into line with government perspectives to be seen as valuable members of the policy community. TTs can become ‘an extension of the government’s public diplomacy . . . by inserting national perspectives and priorities into international debates’ (Niblett, 2018: 1416). In other words, even though TTs work ‘as producers of discourses’ (Hernando et al., 2018; Desai, 2006), they can also support government policies and shape discourse for the benefit of the already-defined path of foreign policy. Despite the active aspiration of independence, dependence can also have its advantages. For instance, the financial dependence on the government might help ensure that TT production is relevant (Jezierska and Sörbom, 2020). It can also support building a network, which would help to access information that is not available otherwise. However, critics claim that ‘many think-tanks do not contribute much in terms of original research, because they are mainly involved in editing and formatting tasks which have been arranged by government institutions’ (Plehwe, 2015: 358). Thus, unsurprisingly, political and academic independence is related to financial dependence.

The current TT independence analysis mostly focuses on how TTs perceive their independence, what mechanisms they introduce to protect it and how they try to legitimise their knowledge through projecting themselves as independent entities. This article suggests that it is crucial to analyse how governments perceive the role of TTs together with TT perceptions on the nexus with the government because it provides an additional layer to the TT independence analysis. When the perception is that TTs should serve policies and help a government, government institutions take active steps to use TTs for policies. Accordingly, to unveil how the nexus between the Baltic governments and foreign policy TTs as specific policy advice institutions works, the analysis of the interviews will be focussed on independence. As a result, the interviews should help identify how government expectations for the Baltic TTs affect TT independence. Meanwhile, how TTs perceive their relationship with the government should show their resilience towards the government’s pressure if such exists.

An overview of Baltic TTs in regard to foreign and security issues

The history of the Baltic states contributes to the fact that their TTs are not particularly strong. From the restoration of their independence in the early 1990s, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, wanted to be part of the ‘West’–primarily meaning the United States–with TTs in the United States representing the ‘standard’ of what the label ‘TT’ should contain. The broadly discussed obscurity of the term ‘think tank’ becomes even more distinct in the Baltic languages because ‘in Eastern European dictionaries there is no word or phrase for “think tank”’ (Krastev, 2001). Unsurprisingly, the English term is commonly used in spoken language. Even though Baltic TTs were established ‘on the American model [it] does not mean that they must inevitably play a similar role in the policymaking process’ (Krastev, 1999: 39). In fact, quite the opposite of the American TTs, Baltic states do not have philanthropic traditions. Besides, they have different political systems, which ensure distinct features of the policy communities and, as a result, TTs.

TTs that cover foreign and security policies in the Baltic states are only a few and relatively small in size. Starting from Estonia, the only prominent foreign and security TT is International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), which, according to its website, has a staff of 32 employees. The Former Foreign Policy Institute is now part of ICDS, in the form of a sub-institution. It has a separate budget and its researchers, as ICDS was established and is mainly financed by the Estonian Ministry of Defence, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finances the Foreign Policy Institute. The ICDS is financially dependent on the government, but it will be explained later how this dependency affects political and academic independence. The Latvian Institute for International Affairs (LIIA) has 34 employees and is only partially financed by governmental support. Thus, they constantly apply to various funds through other means. Meanwhile, the Center for Security and Strategic Research (CSSR) is affiliated with the National Defence Academy of Latvia and has five members on the team, and is fully supported by the Ministry of Defence. The Baltic Security Foundation (BSF) presents itself as a regional TT but is based in Latvia. The BSF was established in cooperation with the Jamestown Foundation, has five people on its team, and is funded by projects. Finally, the Centre for East European Policy Studies (CEEPS, Riga) has eight employees. However, they have not responded to the interview requests, while the government officials have not mentioned this TT during the interviews. Therefore, CEEPS is not a part of this research.

The Lithuanian Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC) currently has 13 employees, most of whom are recent graduates or still studying at graduate school. The Office of the Government took over cooperation with the EESC from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 2020 the Lithuanian government has supported a TT through direct financial contributions as, prior to this, the TT was surviving mainly by applying for various funding opportunities on a project basis. Meanwhile, the Open Society Foundations is the principal donor to the Vilnius Institute of Policy Analysis (VIPA), which is not affiliated with the government. However, the EESC is more specifically focused on foreign and security policy in comparison to VIPA, which has a broader scope of interest, including democratic processes.

Although not all Baltic TTs are directly supported by the government because some are mainly project-driven or supported by foundations (such as VIPA or LIIA), many TTs have to find a way to protect their independence while enjoying close relations with the government. The analysis of the financial independence of Baltic TTs is a challenge because TTs do not specify details of their income sources. After the analysis of the TT websites, none of the TTs provided information about the size of their budgets and, in many cases, did not even list their donors. As a result, this article cannot fully analyse how TTs are affected by the origins of their income. Therefore, the analysis of their financial independence is mainly based on the conducted interviews.

Despite information being absent regarding TT budgets and origins of income, the interviews revealed that TTs worry about their financial stability because the size of salaries for experts is essential for attracting personnel (I11). In addition, a lack of finances means that ‘researchers often perform many administrative tasks, making it harder for them to conduct research and organise projects’ (Boucher, 2004: 48). Due to the difficulties in terms of raising funds, TTs wish to have some level of governmental support (I11 and I12). Political agreement on supporting TTs is based on perceptions by government officials, as not all government officials may see a need to finance TTs. Furthermore, the financial support does not mean that the specific government will give enough space for research independence. Therefore, the next section of this article tackles the question of what role Baltic governments assign to TTs.

Using domestic TTs as instruments of foreign policy

The Baltic TTs and governments are in the process of defining what role(s) the TTs should play in the foreign policy debate, but they are doing this differently. For instance, the interviewees from Estonia agree on what the national TT should do (this being ICDS). The ICDS, the Estonian Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) meet up once a year for planning purposes (I7). However, not all TT activities are planned because they need time to react to unexpected circumstances (I10). Furthermore, the MoD finances ICDS to a much larger extent than the MFA. Hence, the MoD has more weight when it comes to future ICDS plans. Another specific feature of the nexus between the Estonian government and ICDS is that ‘experts who research specific topics get the clearance for access to classified information’ (I10). Because ICDS experts have access to classified information, government officials sometimes send their internal papers to ICDS experts for external review (I7). Such a close relationship between the government and ICDS helps the TT produce relevant reports. While serving as the provider of such an external review, Estonian ICDS claims that their ‘duty is to raise provocative questions’, and the supervisory board is the one to ensure its independence (I2). The supervisory board, which consists of officials from various government institutions and is chaired by the permanent secretary of the MoD, is ultimately responsible for protecting the independence of TTs. The ICDS representative explained that the supervisory board understands that it has to carry out independent research (I2). Nonetheless, the supervisory board may agree with the complainer, and ICDS may have to remove an unfavourable report. Furthermore, stakeholders themselves can review the interim results of more significant projects. However, the interviewee said that such a review is not politicised but is an open debate on improvements that can be made to the TT’s product(s) (I2). Still, this process shows that stakeholders can have some influence on TT reports, even though the supervisory board mechanism should help ensure political and academic independence.

In addition to policy reports, ICDS helps educate society on security issues in collaboration with the government. For example, ICDS organises national defence courses twice a year, in which Estonian citizens from various sectors come to learn about the defence from the highest-ranking decision-makers (I2). ICDS is also involved in the Ukrainian resilience programme. Therefore, the government and ICDS exist under conditions of mutual interdependence: ICDS receives financial support, while the government gets assistance in various projects. Nonetheless, think-tankers may still choose to avoid specific topics or harsh criticism towards the government due to the possible financial loss. Therefore, economic dependence might translate to limited political and academic independence.

While only ICDS covers foreign and security policy in Estonia, there are more options available in Latvia. The Latvian Ministry of Defence primarily cooperates with the CSSR of the National Defence Academy of Latvia. They organise all of their research activities in cooperation with the Latvian MoD, organising events, seminars, and conferences (I5). There is a perpetual negotiation between the TT and the MoD regarding the production and dissemination of ideas. However, the CSSR is not seen as a provider of policy recommendations but rather as a partner who can work out a public opinion or carry out other tasks which would best support the current policies of the MoD. The LIIA is a key partner of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even though LIIA is negotiating its budget with parliament and the MFA, only about 16%–20% of the total budget comes from the government, while the rest comes from projects such as Horizon 2020, Norwegian European Economic Area funding, and others. The LIIA is volatile from a financial perspective because the majority of its budget depends upon projects, but its diversity of finances is the basis for more intellectual independence (I1). However, the LIIA interviewee expressed his disappointment that some ministries in Latvia expect specific questions from the experts when they are invited to moderate ministerial events, making the experts avoid such assignments (I1). These kinds of situations illustrate that Latvian officials do not protect TT’s academic independence as their partners would expect.

While the Latvian LIIA confirmed its independence, the Baltic Security Foundation (BSF) representative expressed an opinion that government institutions in Latvia primarily dominate the debate in terms of security and defence (I8). The person gave one example of a possible return of conscription in Latvia: ‘whenever this issue comes up, the MoD shuts up everybody’ (I8). Therefore the BSF representative was sure that ‘for government-financed think tanks, the priorities are being set by ministries’ (I8), and consequently, they cannot call themselves politically or academically independent.

In contrast, one Estonian expert claimed that, despite financial dependence, Estonian TTs could openly criticise politicians (I2). This particular expert gave an example in which, during an open event, he criticised the Estonian president for lack of knowledge regarding minority issues in Estonia, and his criticism was noticed as a positive action. However, the interviewee was sure that an expert in Lithuania could not do that because the officials there are more used to intruding into the independent work of experts (I2). Thus, the opinions varied among the researchers on how politically and academically independent a TT can be when it is financially dependent on the government.

Meanwhile, Lithuania is still searching for a way to work with the Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC). As the EESC only recently began receiving government financial support, think-tankers and government officials emphasised the need for financial stability (I4, I11, and I13). The withdrawal of the government’s financial support would be consequential to a relatively small TT, which relies upon two stakeholders: the Government and Vilnius University (I13). However, the government takes the lead in making the EESC research relevant. One of the interviewees explained that the EESC receives a list of needs from the government (I11). According to those needs, the EESC writes up a project, shares it with the Office of the Government, which sends it out to relevant ministries and, after their contributions have been received, the final project is formed. The TT itself refused to comment on the content of the agreement with the government (I13), claiming that it is confidential. The Lithuanian Office of the Government admits that the system of EESC financing has not yet been fully developed and that the focus should be on creating conditions in which the TT could ensure its political independence and transparency (I11). Eventually, the interviews suggest that the TT does not have much room to take the initiative. The government is expressing its priorities and the TT has to follow them to receive its funding for the projects.

Lithuania has no institutional consensus regarding what the state should do in terms of its TTs at home (I11). For instance, the Ministry of National Defence (MoND) is keen on increasingly using TTs as instruments of its objectives, with less space for its members to carry out ‘meaningless academic studies’ (I3). The representatives of the MoND believe that one of the most critical functions of a national TT could become cooperation with foreign TTs, which is currently conducted by the Ministry (I4 and I3). One of the interviewees believes that the Lithuanian EESC could become an idea generator that would find a common denominator between different interests in Lithuanian institutions (I4). Meanwhile, the Office of the Government would like to have a national TT that would compete in the international arena with its ideas and policy proposals, but these ideas should reflect Lithuanian positions (I11). In contrast, the MFA representative was more interested in TTs as academic institutions which could put out quality research (I12). Nonetheless, there is one common denominator between the institutions; they all wish that TTs would add value to current government policies.

However, as to the added value of the current TT research, the scepticism of providing new solutions endures even in TTs. The Baltic government officials agree that TTs cannot provide much policy-applicable research and are not influential in policies (I3, I5, I9, I11, and I12). However, the expert from the Latvian LIIA said that the MFA and parliament itself is active in inviting them for consultations, which illustrates some sort of influence (I1). The ICDS expert believes that their influence is latent when they influence how people think, but it would be hard to trace whether the TT directly impacted policy enactments (I2). Meanwhile, the Estonian MoD’s official claimed that the ICDS has some sort of influence through its research. He gave an example of the air defence report, ¹ which caused some changes in MoD’s understanding of the matter (I7). Nevertheless, the interviewee believes that it will be possible to measure this report’s real influence only after some time has passed, by which time it will have become apparent whether or not this report has led to an increase in budget or other politically important decisions.

Overall, it seems that the governments of the Baltic states see TTs as an extension of their existing knowledge. Several government officials explained that TTs provide an external perspective that confirms their ideas or provides assumptions that encourage them to look at subjects from another point of view (I5 and I12). Accordingly, TT independence in the Baltic states is as ambiguous as the TT’s role in policies. While TTs are relatively important and useful for the government, state financing makes the process easier in turning them into instruments of government policies. In conclusion, governments define how much independence TTs have because they are the primary clients who set the rules to operate for TTs. In other words, when the government avoids losing the comfort of not being criticised, it is a challenge for a TT to protect its independence.

Using TTs as instruments of government policy abroad

The attempts to use foreign TTs as a platform with which to influence policy are not a novelty. The New York Times article (Lipton et al., 2014) revealed that countries such as Norway, for instance, provide financial support for the American TTs. Norwegian officials openly admit that their funding of American TTs helps get some attention from the most powerful nation’s politicians and decision-makers. It is due to the vibrant US TT community and the special status of the most powerful country in the world which makes American TTs ‘targets for a foreign state and non-state actors seeking to obtain insights about, or exert influence on, US policymaking’ (Tromblay, 2018: 3). The Baltic states seek similar results in the United States and other countries while using local and foreign TTs.

Even before conducting the interviews with TTs in the Baltic states, the attentive news follower could spot that American TTs get more attention in the Baltic states. For instance, in 2017, the Lithuanian MoND announced that, in collaboration with the influential US TT, the Atlantic Council, it had held the first strategic-level tabletop exercise in Lithuania (Ministry of National Defense Republic of Lithuania, 2020). Furthermore, the retired General Ben Hodges as a member of CEPA, participates in various events in the Baltic states to talk about such issues as the Suwalki Gap, which is of strategic importance for the defence of the Baltic states. The governments want to cooperate with those TTs which are capable of constructing discursive space (Zimmerman, 2016) in crucial partner countries because TTs are perceived as recyclers of conventional wisdom (Rüland, 2002) rather than producers of policy advice. The most critical factor in the selection for cooperation with TTs is based on foreign policy priorities. The United States is seen as the main partner in all three Baltic states, followed by Germany, a leading nation of Enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania; Canada, which performs the same role in Latvia, and the United Kingdom in Estonia. Besides this, as a Latvian official explained: ‘the UK and Germany are two major powers in Europe’ (I5). The Baltic governments try not to duplicate cooperation with TTs (I4). For instance, Latvians cooperate more with the German Council on Foreign Relations (GDAP), and Estonians with the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). The Lithuanian MoND cooperates with the Atlantic Council and joins Latvian cooperation with the German Marshall Fund and Estonian programmes with the CSBA (I3). The MoND representative said that they invite Estonian and Latvian government representatives to their events and vice versa, both in Vilnius and Washington, DC (I3). Therefore, the Baltic states have national policies that allow them to employ TTs for their national interests and coordinate regional actions.

Cooperation with TTs is seen as a part of Lithuanian security policy (I4). According to the Lithuanian MoND, systemic cooperation with foreign TTs began 4 or 5 years ago, with contracts, programmes, and assigned finances (I3). Specifically, the MoND cooperates with the Atlantic Council based on a contract, while cooperation with the Center of European Policy Analysis (CEPA) is less formal, with occasional events organised together (I3). One of the MoND representatives said that ‘we are not buying lobbyism services’ (I4), while the other claimed that they are selecting TTs based upon the criteria of a ‘price-to-value ratio’ (I3). The interviewee explained: ‘we focus on the dissemination of our interests and lobbying’ (I3). The value of TTs is measured by their capabilities to influence policies, their focus and knowledge of the Baltic region, and the experience of think-tankers in high-ranking government positions (I4). This illustrates that the Lithuanian government perceives foreign TTs as instruments for policies and does not believe that TTs might be independent.

The Lithuanian MoND tries to use TTs to influence both the executive and legislative branches of the US government and, overall, the community of security and defence policy (I3). The representative said that they set out specific goals and discuss them with TTs to decide upon ‘which specific institutions should be invited to participate and get acquainted with our products, participate in events, seminars, workshops, exercises’ (I3). An interviewee mentioned that Lithuania once ‘purchased a very expensive study’ from an American TT but did not provide details (I3). The representative was convinced that, during the years of active engagement with TTs, Lithuania ‘obtained real, tangible, and comparable results’ (I3). Nevertheless, the official refused to provide details about the results.

Concerning Latvian cooperation with foreign TTs, the Latvian Defence attachés are looking for TTs that suit Latvian interests and match their financial capabilities (I5). The Latvian MoD names several TTs they cooperate: the German/Marshall Fund, the RUSI, the MacDonald-Laurier Institute, the NATO Association of Canada, and DGAP. Meanwhile, the MFA also cooperates with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the Foundation for Social Democracy, the Konrad Adaneur Fund, and the Atlantic Council. The cooperation has various levels of interaction: from formal contracts to occasional events, with TTs helping embassies identify speakers.

In contrast, the Estonian MFA pointed out that they do not have any contracts with foreign TTs as such cooperation is conducted on a project-by-project basis (I10). Despite this, the interviewee expressed a wish to have a more systemic form of cooperation with TTs in the United States, such as placing ‘a researcher or somebody from the ministry within a TT to do research there. However, that would need financing. It is needed, but it is not a priority right now’ (I10). According to the representative from the Estonian MoD, there are three pillars of cooperation with TTs: working on topics that are important to Estonia with the identification of specific foreign experts who are knowledgeable about the Baltic region; policy papers that raise the awareness of Estonia in terms of its engagement in global matters with domestic and international audiences; and requests for some level of technical knowledge (I7). When it comes to the last pillar, the CSBA helps to conduct war games when the ICDS does not possess the technical capabilities to perform such a task (I7). The representative from the Estonian MoD explained that they are monitoring to what extent TTs are helping to influence the country’s policymakers and what areas of access they may have to local academia and media (I7). Foreign TTs are also useful for the governments of the Baltics because they can provide recommendations that would provide fresh perspectives on their internal political perspectives, and they could also help with arranging contact with policymakers (I5). Overall, the Estonian officials see opportunities while cooperating with foreign TTs, especially when building a network and receiving knowledge that is available in the local TT, ICDS.

Next to the attempts to influence policies abroad through TTs, the interviewed Baltic government representatives find it helpful when local TTs spread their messages to foreign audiences for the sake of reaching their own goals as small states, which are usually not so visible in the international arena. However, this does not happen in every Baltic state. The Estonian ICDS is more capable of amplifying Baltic messages abroad than the other TTs (I5). Meanwhile, the Lithuanian MoND would like to enable the local TT (EESC) to cooperate with foreign TTs and promote Lithuanian interests abroad (I3). Furthermore, it was said that ‘we do not need academic analysis. We need academic support’ (I3), which shows that some Lithuanian government officials do not believe academic independence is necessary for a TT because they do not believe that TTs can suggest any novel ideas for policymakers. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian MoND’s representatives had differing opinions on the independence of TTs. Even though one of the representatives believed that there are no differences between the lobby organisations and TTs (I3), the other believed that it is crucial to have an open discussion with think-tankers (I4). Despite the existing differences of opinion, the idea that TTs in foreign countries may be useful in implementing foreign and security policy goals was something that all government officials confirmed in all three Baltic countries.

The increasing tendency to utilise TTs to achieve foreign and security goals is a practice that could be seen as the opposite of TT independence. The Baltic governments perceive TTs as dependent on their financial donors. Thus, they see an opportunity to use domestic or/and foreign TTs for foreign policy agendas. The local TTs are mainly seen as useful when they have contacts outside the country or when foreign entities notice their products. Based on the conducted interviews, one may conclude that governments expect less of policy solutions and suggestions from TTs in comparison to the task they are expected to undertake in terms of ‘educating’ other countries on Baltic security issues so that the Baltic states can receive international support for the Baltic security agenda.

Conclusion

The attempts to use TTs as instruments characterise the nexus between the governments and TTs in the Baltic states. The Baltic states seek to employ TTs for their foreign and security policies in two ways. First, the expectation is that local TTs may increase the visibility of the Baltic perspective by producing reports in English, connecting, and cooperating with foreign TTs. Second, the governments occasionally and consistently try to reach out to foreign TTs in countries of strategic interest to influence decision-makers of these countries. Basically, in connection with the previous point, the governments expect to contribute to security policy discourses through TTs, hoping to increase the general awareness of Baltic security problems with the probability of favourable decisions being made in connection with the region. The government interviewees often emphasised the limited capabilities of small states while seeing the employment of TTs as a usual practice to achieve foreign and security goals. Yet, it would be misleading to argue that big states do not use TTs as instruments or do it less often. Further research is necessary to compare to what extent larger and small states see TTs as foreign policy instruments. Nonetheless, in the case of the Baltic states, the TTs are seen as an investment targeted towards specific outcomes in the pursuit of defending national interests.

Even though the innovative policy ideas TTs produce are more of a pleasant surprise than an expectation for Baltic governments, Estonia is more open to the suggestions of TTs than the other two. Despite the most significant financial contributions to ICDS, Estonia is more interested in hearing what it has to say. Meanwhile, Lithuania invests less in local TTs but expects TTs to present state interests. While the leading Latvian TT, LIIA, still has the highest level of financial independence due to its more diversified income sources, government officials are also attracted to the idea that LIIA should promote Latvian interests abroad.

When comparing perceptions of independence of local and foreign TTs, it is evident that local TTs are seen as more dependent on governments due to direct financial dependence and regulations. On the one hand, Lithuanian and Latvian officials perceive foreign TTs as lobby organisations dependent on donors with potential influence on their governments. Moreover, some Lithuanian officials believe that financial support automatically leads to dependence, including political and academic. On the other hand, Estonian officials perceive foreign TTs as being separate from lobbyist organisations. Estonia generally considers foreign TTs as less dependent on their donors, similarly to local TTs being less dependent on the governments compared to Latvia and Lithuania. Nonetheless, all three Baltic governments argue that TTs need to present themselves as independent institutions. Otherwise, TTs would not be as beneficial for foreign and security policy as the governments wish them to be. In conclusion, the Baltic states perceive both local and foreign TTs as having limited capabilities to be independent. Therefore, they can potentially be used to achieve foreign policy aims.