Implications of Ethnic Conflict in Manipur for India’s National Security

Abstract

This article analyses the 2023 ethnic violence in the Indian border state of Manipur, examining the factors which contributed to the conflict. Looking at the proliferation of arms, the emergence of radicalised youth organisations, and the exploitation of the situation by armed and secessionist groups, the article highlights the implications of the Manipur conflict for India’s national security. The article argues that delayed and inadequate government response exacerbated the conflict, forcing the two warring communities—the Meiteis and Kuki—to bolster their security measures through a parallel security system. These developments pose a challenge to Indian national security in the sensitive border region and therefore require urgent government intervention. While recovering stolen arms and bolstering border security along the India–Myanmar border remains crucial for long-term peace, the article suggests consociationalism for Manipur, a governance model that has shown—albeit with certain limitations—efficacy in addressing ethnic violence in deeply divided societies.

Introduction

On 27 March 2023, the High Court of India’s north-eastern state of Manipur passed an order directing the state government to consider including the non-tribal Meitei community in the Scheduled Tribe (ST) list. This decision triggered one of the most severe ethnic conflicts in the region’s recent history. The Christian Kuki and Naga tribal communities, who live in the surrounding hills of Manipur, opposed and launched an agitation against the order. Meitei, the largest community in Manipur, accounts for about 53% of the state’s total population of 2.85 million (Census India, 2021). Socio-economically more advanced than other communities in the state, they dominate the urban and valley areas of the state. With two-thirds of seats in the state legislative assembly, they also enjoy significant political power (Kipgen, 2017). Therefore, from the Kuki and Naga perspective, granting ST status to the Meitei could potentially dilute the benefits and protections meant for vulnerable tribal communities of the state like theirs.

On 3 May 2023, tensions escalated when the All Tribal Students’ Union Manipur (ATSUM) organised a Tribal Solidarity March in the ten hill districts of Manipur. At the culmination of this rally, clashes broke out between Kuki and Meitei groups near the border of Churachandpur and Bishnupur districts. The violence quickly spread to other areas and led to the deaths of over 200 people and the displacement of more than 60,000 (Human Rights Watch, 2024). The state government’s inadequate response to the initial outbreak of violence allowed the situation to deteriorate rapidly. Suspending internet services, the government deployed around 17,000 troops and paramilitary forces. While the state managed to bring violence down, intermittent ethnic clashes have continued. According to Baruah (2024), the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) state government ‘bears the lion’s share of the responsibility for this violence’, which he describes as resembling a civil war.

While Manipur has a history of ethnic tensions and violence (Kipgen, 2013; Oinam, 2003), the current conflict’s intensity and scope have raised concerns about India’s national security. The latest conflict in Manipur has extended beyond the period of a typical riot and divided the state into exclusive ethnic zones where the ‘other’ is barred (Baruah, 2024: 9). Inadequate response from both central and state governments led the Meitei and Kuki communities to fortify their defensive measures and create parallel security systems, which exacerbated the conflict and pose a challenge to India’s national security. Located along the India–Myanmar border, the ethnic conflict in Manipur has created opportunities for Myanmar-based Meitei secessionist armed groups to recalibrate their strategies and make regular incursions into Indian territory. The Kuki insurgent groups that had previously entered into agreements with the Government of India—for example, the 2008 Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement—have also been involved in the recent conflict. This factor has further complicated the security landscape in the region.

It has also been reported that the current conflict has led to widespread militarisation of communities in Manipur (Pandey, 2025). Young men from ethnic groups have armed themselves with weapons looted from police stations and training colleges, and have begun using improvised weapons. From their strongholds, they have been regularly launching attacks against each other using improvised weapons (Lama, 2024). In recent months, they have also added drones and missiles to their arsenal (Sood, 2024), adding a new dimension to the conflict that complicates the security scenario in the region (Bhattacharyya, 2024). Such proliferation of arms and, in turn, institutionalisation of violence is fraught with danger as it challenges the government’s writ and ability to maintain order and security.

As Biswas (2023) says, the North-East has often been a ‘cauldron of ethnic violence’: the ongoing Manipur conflict could further destabilise the strategically important region by setting off dormant tensions among various ethnic communities. Since independence, the Government of India has struggled to address the varied ethnic conflicts in the North-East and often resorted to militarisation and controversial measures like imposing the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which has been widely criticised by human rights organisations (Arora, 2020; Bhattacharyya, 2018). Such militaristic approaches have often led to widespread human rights abuses, alienated local populations and created conditions for insurgencies to persist in the region (Haokip, 2013). Unlike previous episodes of ethnic conflict, Manipur this time has witnessed the emergence of three interconnected phenomena during the current crisis: proliferation of gun culture among the communities, radicalisation of youth, and exploitation of the situation by armed/secessionist groups.

Therefore, this article deploys an integrated analytical framework in order to examine the Manipur crisis with respect to these three phenomena so as to foreground the intersections of ethnic conflict with national security. Combining primary and secondary data, this research employs a mixed-methods approach. Primary data were collected through field visits to the affected hill areas in Manipur between November 2023 and February 2024, employing convenience sampling based on accessibility and security considerations during active conflict. The research involved visiting five relief camps in Kangpokpi and Churachandpur districts and interactions with approximately 60 respondents from diverse stakeholder groups, generating data based on insights from the local population, government functionaries, civil society members and youth. Respondents were selected based on three key criteria: current residence in Manipur. direct experience of the 2023 conflict and first-hand witnessing of conflict-related events. Access to respondents was facilitated through local networks, with interactions conducted primarily face-to-face in Kuki-dominated hill areas where security conditions permitted. Additional interactions were conducted through encrypted communication channels when physical access was constrained by security concerns. Given the sensitive nature of the ongoing conflict, all interactions prioritised respondent safety and confidentiality. No interactions were recorded, and identifying information was anonymised to protect participants. Secondary data were sourced from a wide range of documents, including government reports available online, press releases circulated by various civil society organisations within Manipur through social media and encrypted channels, and open-accessed newspaper reportage by Indian and international media organisations.

While the article incorporates a diverse range of sources, there are some limitations which must be acknowledged at the outset. Since access to the valley areas in Manipur was barred due to security concerns, it was not possible to get insights from the Meitei community who live in these areas. However, throughout the article, the Meitei perspective, gleaned from accessible online and other sources, has been accorded due space to provide a more balanced perspective on the crisis in Manipur. Thus, the article emphasises the need for immediate government interventions and proposes a tripartite approach, which includes implementing a robust arms recovery programme, reinforcing security measures along the porous India–Myanmar border and initiating inclusive political dialogue. Sustainable conflict resolution mechanisms must be predicated on an informed understanding of the historical context, recognition of the grievances and legitimate aspirations of all Manipuri communities and a critical and objective assessment of the state’s role in perpetuating ethnic divisions. To address these complex security challenges, the article proposes pragmatic policy recommendations for the Manipur issue.

Contextualising Manipur in the North-East

The North-East region of India, due to its strategic location bordering China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, has remained a crucial national security issue for India. Datta (2000) has examined how ‘ethno-political groupings’ from the region have confronted the state with external support, impacting India’s national security. Since independence, the Government of India has faced ‘rebellions’ from this region, which it has generally managed to ‘contain if not wholly suppress’ through a combination of force and limited concessions (Ganguly et al., 2018: 4). According to McDuie-Ra (2008), even ‘the regional development agenda [in North-East] is underpinned by national security imperatives’. Ganguly et al. (2018: 3) view this ‘internal threat’ not as a single perpetual insurgency, but as a dynamic issue that has ‘metamorphosed over the decades through multiple manifestations’. For Lacina (2013: 146–54), sustainable peace in the North-East India requires New Delhi to focus on the ‘proper workings of the rule of law’ in the region, since institutional weakness ‘enables violent actors to manipulate the Northeast’s government, economy, and citizenry’. She suggests that strengthening state institutions in the North-East remains a prerequisite for any sustainable conflict resolution in the region. Bajpai and Pant (2013: 1–21) also note persistent tension between security imperatives and democratic governance in India’s approach to its internal conflicts.

Furthermore, the perceived threat from China has always made India insecure about its North-East, while at the same time the 1950 Chinese annexation of Tibet ‘offered a template of how postcolonial states could deal with ethnic nationalism’ (Paliwal, 2024: 57). India’s geopolitical setting, therefore, has shaped how it manages ethnic conflicts and national security, with its approach evolving over time to range from coercive measures to occasional constitutional overreach, as exemplified by the use of emergency provisions like the AFSPA in response to locally driven separatism. India has also undertaken geopolitical intervention, such as the 1971 war with Pakistan, which led to the creation of Bangladesh, to counter the North-East insurgencies supported by external actors like Pakistan and China. In 1991, a pragmatic ‘Look East’ policy sought regional stability through partnerships with the neighbouring states, which were willing to curb the cross-border militancy and limit Chinese influence within the region.

According to Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 447), ethnic conflicts have multiple causes: the ‘heterogenous components’ of ethnic violence include structural, institutional and agential factors. Instrumentalist theorists like Brass (2003) demonstrate that ethnic conflicts are produced through deliberate actions of political elites who manipulate ethnic symbols to mobilise group support. Therefore, Brass centres agency, manipulation and political entrepreneurship in the production of ethnic conflict. In border regions, political entrepreneurs operate within constraints shaped by central government security priorities, creating a distinctive political economy where elite actors understand that ethnic mobilisation attracts central government attention in ways that conventional political participation cannot. This creates a problematic feedback loop where ethnic mobilisation triggers security responses from the state as well as ethnic groups that reinforce ethnic identities, making future mobilisation more likely while exhausting state resources by diverting military, intelligence and other resources from external threats.

When the central authority is perceived as unreliable, ethnic groups provide for their own security. This leads to situations where ‘what one group does to enhance its own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make that group less secure’ (Posen, 1993: 28). In Manipur, this operates with particular intensity because communities have bounded geographical ethnic enclaves, access to modern weapons, robust organisational capacity and long experience with political mobilisations (Haokip, 2022). These factors enable escalation from defensive posturing to actual violence. Manipur’s location along the Myanmar border, with ethnic groups like Kuki and Naga straddling international boundaries, means that localised conflicts can rapidly develop cross-border dimensions. As shown by Paliwal (2024), the North-East region remains vulnerable to cross-border insurgent networks, arms flow and external support for political and armed movements. Therefore, the North-East’s unique and chequered history, location and ethnic composition and distribution make ethnic conflicts in this strategically sensitive border region a national security concern.

Manipur’s current crisis is inseparable from the historic hill–valley divide that structured governance, land and identity (Biswas & Bhattacharyya, 2025). Prior to British rule, hill tribes maintained distinct village governance (Wahengbam, 2021). Under colonial ‘indirect rule’, a British Political Agent administered the Naga and Kuki hills while the Meitei Maharaja governed the valley, an institutional bifurcation that endures in law and political practice (Baruah, 2020). This same separation underwrites today’s calls for Separation in Administration among Kuki groups and Meitei anxieties over territorial fragmentation. After India’s independence, a representative constitutional monarchy system was followed in Manipur before the state merged with India on 15 October 1949 and got full statehood in 1972, which included all the hill areas. The Kuki National Assembly opposed it because this upgradation of status from a Union Territory to a State subsumed the tribal-populated hill regions within the new state (Kipgen & Roy Chowdhury, 2016). Remaining relatively peaceful until the early 1990s, the state of Manipur witnessed inter-tribal Kuki–Naga conflict from 1992 to 1997, resulting in more than a thousand deaths and mass internal displacement (Haokip, 2013). The conflict was driven by competing claims over ancestral territories in the hills and identity issues. Rising ethnic nationalism and armed militancy resulted in widespread violence and displacement during this period (Kipgen, 2013: 22).

The Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960, which was passed when Manipur was still a Union Territory, bars outsiders from buying tribal land. Section 158 specifically prohibits non-tribals like Meiteis from purchasing tribal land. These safeguards, though in existence since the British Raj, fuel Meitei grievances over land access and their demand for Scheduled Tribe status, the latter becoming the proximate trigger for the 2023 ethnic conflict. While tribal-to-tribal transfers or those cleared by the Deputy Commissioner occur, Meiteis remain barred from land ownership in tribal regions. Hussain (2025: 4) notes Meitei calls to revise the 1960 law, which is seen as a British legacy. Reforms via a proposed New Land Use Policy (2014) and three bills (2015) sparked controversy over Section 2(b) defining ‘Manipur People’ (SATP, 2015; Shyamkishor, 2017). Kuki and Naga groups opposed the same, citing the 1972 merger with the valley and existing safeguards (Haokip, 2015). Protests in August 2015 left nine dead, in the wake of which Pranab Mukherjee, then President of India, withheld assent to these bills, questioning constitutionality (Haokip, 2022). Kipgen (2017) observes that land law attempts repeatedly to reopen ethnic hostilities. The fear of demographic change heightens tensions. Meitei groups allege that unexplained population surges in the hills are tied to immigration (Das, 2023b; NDTV, 2025). Delimitation is also contested. Tribes challenge the 40:20 split of assembly seats between the Hill and the Valley (Kamei, 2020), while Meitei parties seek a freeze pending implementation of the NRC (Baruah, 2025; Ukhrul Times, 2025). Kuki groups now demand separation rather than merely fair representation, while Meitei actors resist any change that could dilute their political preponderance, leaving the process mired in stalemate (ANI, 2025).

As the above discussion makes clear, several underlying factors drive ethnic conflicts in Manipur. Therefore, the High Court order of 27 March 2023 can be seen as a trigger rather than the cause of the recent outbreak of ethnic violence. The Meitei community’s grievances stem from land pressures in densely populated valley areas, legal prohibition from purchasing land in hill areas, and their concerns about ‘illegal migration’ from Myanmar (Arnan, 2024). On the other hand, the major grievances of the Kuki community relate to perceived partial treatment by the Meitei-dominated state government and fear of losing their land rights and cultural identity. The ruling BJP state government has further exacerbated their apprehensions, as it has undertaken forced eviction drives against the hill populations by declaring their ancestral lands as reserved forests and wildlife sanctuaries, as well as labelled the Kuki community in some instances as ‘drug lords’ under the guise of a ‘war on drugs’ (Sadokpam, 2023). The government has also engaged in polarising anti-Kuki rhetoric by accusing the Kuki of illegally encroaching on state forest lands and by displaying aggressive behaviour towards Chin refugees who are ethnically related to the Kuki. All these factors have led to hostility and violence against the Kuki community in recent times and created a volatile situation in Manipur that has led to the current ethnic conflict.

Crisis and Response: A Timeline

One of the reasons for the spread of recent ethnic violence in 2023 was the state government’s failure to heed early warning signs of impending violence. The government did not take sufficient preventive measures despite clear indications of rising tensions. For example, on 2 May 2023, Meitei Leepun, an organisation representing the majority community, imposed a counter-blockade against the planned ATSUM rally, leading to intimidation and violence against Kuki community members (Imphal Free Press, 2023). Despite this early incident, the state government failed to deploy proper security arrangements to contain the violence. According to Baruah (2024), the delayed response from the central and state governments reflects a deeper agenda beyond mere administrative failure. He argues that the BJP’s ‘civilizational nationalism’—which, as defined by Van der Veer (2021: 17), ‘selectively includes and excludes groups in society’—has created a political environment in Manipur where ‘religiously infused sentiments’ among the Meitei have made ‘the defence of Manipur’s territorial integrity more emotionally charged than ever’, making territorial claims by Naga and Kuki communities even harder to achieve.

On 3 May 2023, when ethnic violence erupted in adjoining areas of Churachandpur and Bishnupur districts, it quickly expanded throughout the state. As the state police failed to bring the situation under control, the conflict left thousands stranded in hostile territories. This compelled the Indian Army to intervene and facilitate a mass exchange of stranded persons, with the Indian Air Force airlifting 64 dead bodies of Kukis and four of Meiteis to their respective regions (The Hindu, 2023b). Meanwhile, political actors and civil society organisations further exacerbated the conflict through provocative statements. The Meitei-led Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI) declared war against the Kuki, while the pro-Kuki Indigenous Tribal Leadership Forum (ITLF) raised the demand for ‘Separation in Administration’ (ITLF Media Cell, 2023a). Pramot Singh, the chief of the ethno-nationalist group Meitei Leepun, made inflammatory remarks about a potential civil war (The Wire, 2023), making Kuki legislators accuse Chief Minister Biren Singh of supporting anti-Kuki rioters (Karmakar, 2023).

Although curfew was imposed, it proved ineffective in controlling the violence, partly due to the politicised state machinery. The law enforcement agencies showed partiality in their conduct towards the rioters. Both communities suffered casualties and injuries, 98 Kuki deaths from 3 May to 7 October 2023, and 67 Meitei fatalities in the same period (Singh & Lakshman, 2023). Hundreds of houses and religious places were destroyed and vandalised across both communities, including 253 churches (2023 International Religious Freedom Report) and 132 Hindu temples (The Hindu, 2023a). This widespread death and destruction show the systematic nature of the violence, which severely impacted the communities and their social fabric. The state government’s initial failures compelled the Government of India to intervene. However, its delayed and poorly calibrated response ultimately proved inadequate and, in some respects, counterproductive.

After nearly a month of deadly clashes, Amit Shah, the Union Home Minister, visited Manipur on 29 May 2023. He visited conflict-affected areas, met leaders from both communities and promised a solution within 15 days to bring peace (Singh & Karmakar, 2023). However, his later statement accusing ‘illegal immigrants’ from Myanmar of the conflict was not well received by the Kuki community (ITLF Media Cell, 2023b). According to Zaman (2024), the central government’s Hindutva agenda has long viewed the large concentration of Christian populations in the North-East as problematic for insurgency and separatism, and Hindu nationalist organisations have consistently clamoured about the foreign hand behind secessionist movements in the North-East. This ideological approach constrained policy options for the government, as effective intervention would require acknowledging the legitimate grievances of the Christian tribal communities: consequently, ‘driven by electoral concerns and Hindu nationalism, the BJP’s majoritarianism feeds division in an ethnically stratified region’ (Paliwal, 2024: 2).

Failure of the Union Government to fulfil its promises made during Amit Shah’s visit led Ginza Vualzong, the ITLF spokesperson, to announce the establishment of a self-governing body for the Kuki community (Singh, 2023a). In the meantime, sporadic violence continued to persist across Manipur in the absence of concrete measures from the central government. Bipartisan appeals for central rule were continuously disregarded, and no changes were made to the state administration, which further widened the trust deficit between the warring communities. When the Peace Committee was finally established by the Union Government, it struggled due to the inclusion of the Chief Minister, whom the Kuki deeply distrusted and disliked. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s conspicuous silence on the crisis suggested that the central government might be overlooking the ethnic unrest in Manipur for political– ideological reasons (Ghosh, 2025; Singh, 2023b), a pattern consistent with the BJP’s broader strategy of ‘aggressive Hindu nationalism’ that has hit ‘its limits in states with significant Christian populations’ (Zaman, 2024).

The ethnic conflict in Manipur escalated and expanded from small crowd assaults to community-wide mobilisation. Weapons of attack graduated from sticks and knives to firearms, rockets and thermal drones. Gunfights were reported in several areas of the adjoining hill and valley districts. In Khamenlok, nine people were killed in a gunfight between the Meitei and Kuki armed volunteers (Sharma, 2023). A Meitei armed group suffered 13 casualties at the hands of Kuki fighters in the Leithu forest area near the India–Myanmar border (Leivon, 2023). Two Kuki men were ambushed and killed by Meitei fighters in the Kangchup area in north-western Manipur (Ali, 2023). These are some of the examples of deadly gunfights that have broken out between the two communities in the recent conflict. These incidents occurred despite the presence of Indian security forces along the buffer zone created by the Union Home Ministry to keep the two communities in their respective territories. Due to weakening state control, the warring communities have now taken their security into their own hands, raising armed youth volunteers. Possessing looted and homemade weapons, they have established a parallel system. They have both defensive and offensive capabilities. Over the course of the conflict, they launched attacks against each other using sophisticated weapons, such as AK-47, M16, LMG and M14 (Pandey, 2025). There are three ways through which the Manipur crisis challenges the national security of India: first, the proliferation of arms among the communities; second, the radicalisation of youth; and third, the involvement of the armed and secessionist groups in the current crisis.

Proliferation of Arms Among the Communities

According to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), a central crime investigation agency, ‘a mob stormed into MPTC Pangei complex on 04 May, 2023 and looted a huge number of arms and ammunition from the MPTC armoury during the ethnic conflict’ (Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024a). In another press release, the CBI informed that during an incident at the second Indian Reserve Battalion headquarters in Naranseina, Bishnupur District, a large number of armed individuals looted 300 firearms, 19,800 rounds of ammunition and approximately 800 various types of munitions and related accessories (Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024b). Although the exact total number of looted arms is not specified in government reports, some newspapers estimate that a total of 5,600 firearms and 650,000 rounds of ammunition have been stolen (The Wire, 2024). However, according to the state chief minister, only 1,757 arms and 22,707 rounds of ammunition have been recovered (The Wire, 2024). Despite the CBI taking up the case, the investigation process hit a roadblock when thousands of women from Imphal blocked the entrance to the Police Training College, the site of the 4 May 2023 armoury loot (Chetry, 2023). This blockade created challenges for the CBI to effectively investigate the case.

While a large cache of arms was looted by Meitei mobs in the valley areas, the Kuki also stormed a few state armouries in the hill districts and took away weapons. For example, Kuki mobs forced their way into police stations in Churachandpur, Kangpokpi and Tengnoupal and looted arms and ammunition (Tiwary, 2023). The specific number of weapons looted by Kuki mobs in the hilly areas is not publicly available, but it is generally known that Kuki have not only retained the looted weapons, but they also enlarged their arsenal through illegal arms trade through the porous Indo-Myanmar border and by making country-made weapons (Pandey, 2025).

The presence of weapons among the Kuki groups has implications for law and order as well as national security. It has led to the prevalence of gun culture within the society and created challenges for the security forces. For example, in Moreh town, a village volunteer group from the Kuki community, armed with sophisticated foreign-made weapons and locally made cannons—known as pumpi—blocked and forced the Indian Army convoy to retreat when the latter attempted to enter the area for patrolling (Hussain, 2024). In the same town, in January 2024, a conflict broke out between a Kuki civil society organisation and the state police. The Kuki were demanding the removal of state forces from their area. The confrontation led to a heavy gunfight between the state police and the Kuki village volunteers, leading to the death of Chingtham Anand, a Sub-Divisional Police Officer (Hasnat & Ningombam, 2024).

In our fieldwork, we observed that the gun culture in the hills poses a challenge to human security. We observed criminal elements taking advantage of the crisis situation and extorting money from businesses and healthcare institutions. For example, eight healthcare centres, including Zion Clinic, Samaritan Nursing Home, Ideal Nursing Home, Immanuel Clinic, PC Nursing Home, Apple Dental Clinic, J.N. Care Clinic and Chansel Clinic, sent a joint letter of grievance to the Kuki Inpi Churachandpur (KIC), a leading civil society organisation in the Churachandpur District in southern Manipur. They urged the KIC to address the issue of forceful monetary demands from unknown armed groups, warning that they might otherwise be compelled to shut down their institutions (Private Hospital and Clinic Owners, 2024).

Both Meitei and Kuki communities have procured commercial drones, including thermal drones, and are using them in the ongoing conflict against each other (BBC News India, 2024). Our fieldwork and media reports have documented how these devices evolved from surveillance tools to improvised weapons, with volunteers learning to drop small explosives on enemy territory (Achom & Choudhury, 2024b). As one young male Kuki volunteer from Kangpokpi revealed to us, they consulted YouTube tutorials to learn to repurpose drones for military use. The use of drones adds to security challenges for the state, as thermal drones can track individuals during the night: this poses a challenge to security forces to conduct secret operations in the cover of darkness. Considering Manipur’s topography and its porous international border, drones are highly likely to be used for various illegal activities. Notably, in the ongoing ethnic violence, social activists, social media influencers and ordinary citizens are the main fundraisers for procuring these technologies and weapons for village volunteers (Khumukcham, 2024a). For example, Liciprya Kangujam, a renowned 12-year-old Meitei climate activist, organised a crowdfunding campaign on her Facebook page to raise funds for purchasing a thermal drone for use in the conflict (Ukhrul Times, 2024). Such examples indicate that ethnic polarisation and concomitant political violence have psychologically impacted children and radicalised some of them.

Radicalisation of Youth

The Arambai Tenggol (AT), a youth-led Meitei organisation, has emerged as a significant political actor in the recent crisis, training and radicalising thousands of Meitei youths. AT has reportedly expanded its membership and mobilisation capacity since the conflict began. Security sources cited by The Print estimate its growth from 1,000 to 60,000 members (Hasnat, 2024). While these figures cannot be independently verified due to the informal nature of the organisation, visual documentation from the media and AT’s own social media platforms provides evidence of substantial expansion (Al Jazeera, 2025: 8:40). Their Facebook posts and video recordings consistently show rallies attended by hundreds of young men, with individual events drawing 200 to 500 participants across valley districts. The AT is dedicated to reviving and promoting the native Meitei religion, Sanamahism. AT uses the house of their titular king, Leishemba Sanajaoba, as the site for new recruits to take the oath of loyalty (Choudhury, 2024). They proudly fly the Salai Taret flag, symbolising the seven clans of the Meitei community. The Chief Minister of Manipur is one of their high-profile supporters (Choudhury, 2024). Prior to the outbreak of ethnic violence, the AT organised rallies in various locations, chanting slogans to restore the glory of the old Manipur kingdom. The current ethnic violence has radicalised them, leading them to take up arms and portray themselves as the guardians of the Meitei community. They openly carry weapons, travelling freely across the valley districts and Imphal, the capital city of Manipur—though it must be noted that the Meitei community is internally diverse and not all Meitei support AT.

In our conversations with truck drivers from the Naga and Pangal Muslim community of Manipur, we were informed that AT imposes taxes disguised as public donations at various places, using force against those unwilling to contribute. This has made life increasingly difficult for ordinary people. In January 2024, the AT summoned 37 local MLAs and two MPs to Kangla Fort, demanding that these Meitei legislators take an oath to implement the National Register of Citizens (NRC), abrogate the SoO agreements with the Kuki armed groups, and protect the integrity of Manipur (Bhardwaj, 2024). They assaulted three MLAs, including two BJP and one Congress legislator (Singh, 2024a). Emboldened by a weak state, they also attacked senior police officer Moirangthem Amit Singh when the police filed a report against the AT for looting weapons from state armouries (Achom, 2024). There have been serious concerns that the AT has deep connections with some elected representatives. For example, in one of his interviews, the Chief Minister of Manipur dismissed the thought that it was illegal for youth to carry arms. He, in fact, expressed his support for the youth who picked up arms for ‘self-defence’ and refused to call them ‘anti-nationals’ (Khumukcham, 2024b).

Another serious security concern relates to Valley-Based Insurgent Groups (VBIGs). More than 500 VBIGs had earlier surrendered to the government, paving the way for a peaceful reintegration. However, since the outbreak of the ethnic violence in May 2023, they joined forces with the AT (Hussain, 2023). Armed with weapons reportedly provided to them by a special state police unit comprising Meiteis, they engaged in a gunfight with Assam Rifles in southern Manipur on 28 May 2023 (Hussain, 2023). During a high-level meeting on 17 June 2024, the Union Home Minister Amit Shah emphasised the importance of strategically deploying central forces to re-establish peace and order in Manipur and indicated that the number of forces would be augmented if necessary (PIB, 2024). The following day, as visuals circulating on social media show, the AT took a blood oath to never surrender their arms and to continue their struggle until their demands are met (Lamka Official, 2024). This commitment underscores their determination and the intensity of their cause, which can potentially lead to a future standoff with security forces.

Similar to the Meitei community, there has been radicalisation of youth in the Kuki community as well. Many of these young people have left their education due to violence and displacement. Heightened communal rhetoric and narratives of victimhood have created a condition in which several Kuki youth have become radicalised. These young men have formed armed village volunteer groups in various areas of Manipur’s hill districts. Community interactions during our research revealed that the volunteer groups have become stronger than the insurgent groups due to the prevailing circumstances in which the Kuki community is highly suspicious of the Meitei-dominated state government. The Kuki community, in general, sees these village volunteers as their self-reliant security mechanism, thereby lending legitimacy to the existence and actions of these groups. Youth radicalisation across communities has produced parallel security structures that challenge state authority, while the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry has transformed these radicalised groups into formidable forces. This dangerous combination has provided an opportunity for armed pro-autonomy and secessionist movements to reactivate and exploit the crisis to advance their agendas.

Involvement of Armed and Secessionist Groups

Ideologically, the AT is an ethno-nationalist organisation which seeks to restore the historical Manipur kingdom. Their ideology closely aligns with the objectives of the secessionist groups advocating for Manipur’s independence from India. The alliance between the AT and the VBIGs creates an opportunity for the VBIGs to reinforce their cause (Hussain, 2023). This could intensify calls for Manipuri independence among the general Meitei youth and potentially pose a threat to the territorial integrity of India in this sensitive north-eastern border state.

What further undermines national security is the involvement of various Kuki armed organisations in the ongoing ethnic conflict (Das, 2023a). In 2008, these armed groups had signed the SoO agreement with the state and the central governments, respectively. Many had hoped this would pave the way for a peaceful solution to the longstanding political demand of the Kuki community for an autonomous status within the Indian Union. However, amidst heightened ethnic tensions and communal polarisation, there are concerns that the SoO might be rendered ineffective.

In November 2023, six months into the recent ethnic conflict, the Kuki National Organisation (KNO), which comprises sixteen armed factions, signed a landmark agreement to form a unified body known as the ‘Kuki Army’ (TC Network English News, 2024). This agreement was later ratified at KNO’s sixth annual convention held on 28–29 June 2024 at an undisclosed location (TC Network English News, 2024). This unexpected unification of different Kuki armed factions is seen by experts as a response to the ongoing ethnic violence, which was unprecedented in its scale and brutality and caused mass displacement among the Kuki community. The leaders of the armed factions disclosed to us that due to the unprecedented escalation of ethnic violence, they had no option but to unify at the time of what the larger Kuki community perceived as an existential crisis.

The peace agreement signed by the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) with the state and central governments, respectively, on 29 November 2023, may also have played a role in this. The UNLF is one of the largest and oldest Meitei secessionist groups in Manipur, fighting for independence. The November 2023 agreement was perceived by Kukis as an attempt by the government to establish peace camps in their hill areas. These peace camps have an operational framework similar to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process, with slightly different terms and conditions (Sinha, 2017). The establishment of the Kuki Army suggests a preparation for a prolonged conflict in Manipur that can involve actors from both within and outside India.

Before the outbreak of the 2021 civil war in Myanmar, some Manipuri secessionist groups operated along the Myanmar–India border with tacit approval of the Myanmar Junta. However, soon after the civil war, the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EOA), comprising the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Chin National Army (CNA) and the People’s Defence Force, drove out the Junta forces along the border area and established their control. Due to Manipuri secessionist groups’ close relationship with the Junta, the EAOs have periodically engaged in skirmishes with them. As a result, these secessionist groups have been forced to relocate away from their safe haven within Myanmar.

Taking advantage of the highly volatile situation in Manipur, which has rendered the Myanmar–India border more porous due to security lapses, these groups have been clandestinely entering Indian territory (Achom & Choudhury, 2024a). During the interrogation of Moirangthem Anand Singh, a member of banned secessionist group, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) found that the China–Myanmar module of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM) assisted cadres from proscribed Meitei secessionist groups Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in infiltrating India to exploit the current ethnic violence in Manipur (Singh, 2024b). In a special court in New Delhi, the NIA also reported that Oken Singh and Yaiphapa, both members of the PLA, established a weapons training camp at an ecological park in Imphal (Pisharoty, 2024). They had infiltrated from Myanmar during the recent ethnic violence. These infiltration attempts and regrouping of proscribed Meitei secessionist groups within Manipur create a new security challenge for India, which has been trying to stabilise the North-East for the last two decades through sustained diplomatic efforts and comprehensive counter-insurgency measures. If these secessionist groups are able to re-establish themselves within the North-East, this would likely pave the way for a more troubled future in the region.

Conclusion

The 2023 Manipur crisis reflects broader issues of ethnic identity, autonomy and governance across India’s North-East, where historical administrative divisions, contested land policies and demographic anxieties create competing territorial claims and claims to indigeneity (Baruah, 2020; Haokip, 2022; Kipgen, 2013). The failure of both state and central authorities to contain the crisis has transformed a localised ethnic conflict into a multidimensional threat to India’s national security. Our analysis shows how the manipulation of the March 2023 High Court order created mobilisation opportunities on the one hand, while governance failures transformed this civic mobilisation into systematic militarisation on the other hand. This led to armed factions seizing the opportunity to strengthen their ranks by recruiting disgruntled youth. The proliferation of weapons in Manipur shows how defensive security-seeking behaviour creates offensive capabilities that threaten others. With the Naga community looting arms lately (The Hindu, 2024c), further militarisation has happened. This shows how localised conflicts trigger broader ethnic mobilisations across the region’s fragmented and fluid landscape.

Ethnic conflicts in sensitive border regions like Manipur produce implications that go beyond localised ethnic violence to challenge India’s security and strategic interests. Delaying conflict resolution will only allow warring parties to prepare for worst-case scenarios, enabling armed groups to expand. The systematic radicalisation of youth organisations—Arambai Tenggol’s expansion from 1,000 to 60,000 members and formation of Kuki village volunteer groups—reflects the unprecedented transformation of civilian communities into armed entities challenging state authority. From a national security perspective, leaving the conflict to fester threatens India’s strategic connectivity projects with Myanmar and Thailand, particularly the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, which India has cultivated over the last decade. Manipur’s crisis also threatens India’s strategic interests in Southeast Asia, especially given Myanmar’s civil war and China’s expanding influence in the region. The emergence of ethnic-based parallel security systems, proliferation of weapons among the warring communities and deepening ethnic polarisation could turn the North-East into a proxy battleground for external actors and lead to regional instability.

Despite the temporary abatement of violence, communities in Manipur have become increasingly polarised due to the perceived lack of seriousness in addressing core issues. This has led to the establishment of parallel systems in respective areas and provided new impetus for secessionist groups. As warned by Lt Gen. Rana Pratap Kalita, GOC-in-C of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command, violence could return at any moment (Ramachandran, 2024). As reported by Al Jazeera, ‘with hamlet after hamlet armed and the state’s credibility at an all-time low, military experts and local communities say Manipur is a tinderbox that could explode at any time, again’ (Pandey, 2025). Therefore, to pre-empt further escalation in Manipur, the Government of India must take immediate action and consider a long-term strategy.

As a temporary measure, on 13 February 2025 Presidential rule was imposed in Manipur. Under Presidential rule, the central armed forces and the Indian Army have a better scope to restore order and bring security to affected areas, thereby gaining the confidence of the communities. The government should implement an arms-surrender policy with incentives and immunity from prosecution, enforce stringent regulations on drone usage, and provide compensation to affected families through Direct Benefit Transfer. At the same time, the central government should beef up security along the India–Myanmar border by deploying unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance. Strengthening diplomatic efforts with Myanmar’s Military Junta and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) such as the KIA and CNA will be crucial, along with implementing stricter measures to control illegal immigration and arms trade. These actions will help monitor and control secessionist groups infiltrating the border and also contribute to regional stability.

The above-mentioned measures will address the immediate human security concerns and, at the same time, also help in establishing a conducive atmosphere for carrying out much-needed governance reforms to address the longstanding political issues that are at the core of the problem. As Haokip (2022) argues, ‘the future of the state depends on how ethnic aspirations are negotiated and accommodated’. Hence, we propose a consociational system for Manipur, drawing lessons from successful implementations of such a model in deeply divided societies like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Northern Ireland and Lebanon. In a consociational system, power-sharing among different ethnic groups could promote stability and cooperation through inclusive political arrangements, ensuring that all major communities—Meitei, Kuki and Naga—have a stake in governance.

A consociational framework for Manipur should focus, first and foremost, on the creation of a power-sharing executive with representatives from all major communities, with a two-deputy chief minister model as used in some Indian states. It should have a mutual veto provision on issues that are critical for community identity and land rights. Implementation of Section 9(1) of the Delimitation Act, 2002, should be made a priority, considering not only population size but also geographical features, communication infrastructure, public convenience and contiguity of areas for delimitation. This approach would ensure fair and effective representation for communities, while maintaining the integrity of Manipur. Granting a degree of autonomy to different regions in the state should also be prioritised, allowing local governance structures under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India to manage their own affairs in areas such as education, revenue, culture and local development. This could be similar to other autonomous district councils in the North-East, such as Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. This will ensure equitable distribution of resources and opportunities to prevent economic grievances from fuelling ethnic tensions. Initiation of security reforms to implement impartial security policies sensitive to all communities’ needs should be undertaken, including training security forces in smart policing and cultural sensitivity. Pradeep Chandran Nair, former Director General of Assam Rifles, has highlighted that Manipur police tend to be partisan and divided on ethnic lines (News9, 2024). Security reforms will address this critical issue. Finally, the establishment of an independent commission to investigate the human rights abuses and establish accountability should also be undertaken. Manipur presents challenges for implementing such a model due to Meitei demographic and political dominance, as well as Naga cross-border affiliations that can complicate power-sharing models. However, the proposed consociational framework could be tailored to Manipur’s unique context to achieve a more inclusive and stable political environment. Successful implementation of such a model would require strong political will at the central level as well as commitment from local stakeholders.