Abstract
Francis Fukuyama, Liberalism and its Discontents (London: Profile Books, 2022), xiv + 178 pp.
Over the years, the term ‘liberalism’ has undergone drastic changes in terms of its interpretation by both conservatives and progressives; some even consider it obsolete. Fukuyama’s latest book is a timely take on what actually constitutes classical liberalism, especially with populism being the trend and democracies being vitiated by authoritarianism. Fukuyama ardently traces the meaning of liberalism back to its classical definition and the political principles that it entails, identifying ideas that are extremely significant for today’s divisive and divided societies.
Following a Preface, the book is divided into ten chapters, each examining crucial aspects of liberalism. The Preface makes the disclaimer that the book intends to defend classical liberalism, as it ‘is under severe threat around the world’ (p. vii). Fukuyama also stresses that he is referring to the term not as what it means today, but in its original meaning, as used in the seventeenth century, a doctrine that emphasised the importance of the Constitution, rule of law and individual liberties. The Preface also highlights the various challenges that both leftists and rightists see in the present forms that liberalism has taken, leading to the search for an alternative system.
At the core of liberalism lies the sanctity of individual rights. Democracy and liberalism are distinct terms, and nations that practise both are often referred to as ‘liberal democracies’ (p. 3). Such societies regress, however, when liberal institutions are used to subvert democratic principles in authoritarian ways and when national identity gets confined to a specific religion, ethnicity or race. Fukuyama cites the USA and Modi’s India as prominent examples of such struggles. Classical liberalism helps in navigating ‘diversities prevalent in pluralistic societies’, as tolerance is embedded within as a core value (p. 7). Defending this kind of liberalism on three grounds – pragmatic, moralistic and economic, Fukuyama traces its roots to the French Revolution, which later was challenged with the emergence of nationalism and communism. The latter part of the twentieth century saw peaceful coexistence between liberalism and democracy, due to economic growth and social equality (p. 15). However, liberalism then suffered a backlash, especially with the emergence of neoliberalism, leading to drastic inequalities.
Neoliberalism as an economic policy, ardently followed by Thatcher and Reagan and continued by Clinton and Blair, combined with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, had severe global impacts. While supporting free trade, neoliberals oppose state interventions in the market economy and democratising liberal social policies. Fukuyama strongly argues that a proper understanding of liberalism can make it compatible with social security measures provided by the state (p. 27). This argument is also found in an important recent critique of the potentially negative impacts of globalisation and abuses of trade liberalisation (Stiglitz, 2002: 59–67), notably an important book that also highlights discontents in its title. The widening of economic disparities as another consequence of neoliberalism, Britain’s exit from Brexit and Trump’s election in 2016 proved that populism superseded earlier liberal policies.
Fukuyama analyses in detail how neoliberalism makes people more selfish, as property rights and consumer welfare become prime focus areas, pushing inclusive social welfare measures and state interventions to the background. He discusses Rousseau, Kant, Locke, Hobbes and John Rawls to revisit their notions of individual liberty and social welfare, identifying inherent flaws in the ideas of these philosophers. He then turns his attention to identity politics, seeking to understand how this makes practising liberalism difficult. In South Asian countries, loyalty to smaller identities tends to supersede large national identities, making it problematic by tending to spark communal tensions (p. 65). In the USA, identity-based fights, like the rights of Afro-Americans and the third gender, have strongly politicised the initially good intentions of fulfilling the core ideas of liberalism.
Freedom of speech, at the core of classical liberalism, is now also blatantly being abused. With progress in technology, freedom of speech and media houses are policed by states and powerful leaders, exercising control over the media. The internet, too, ‘rather than dispersing power, has concentrated it’ (p. 104). Fukuyama beautifully explains how this concentration of power can erode freedom of speech and privacy, identifying the need to restore liberalism’s core ideas of cognition and rationality. What are the alternatives then? According to right-wing views, liberalism creates a spiritual vacuum, devoid of a community feeling. When nationalism gets replaced with cosmopolitanism, they see individual autonomy as a threat to traditional religious and cultural beliefs. Left wingers, too, have their grouse against liberalism on substantive and procedural grounds (p. 124). They consider liberalism as being no different from neoliberalism, as it has resulted in gross inequalities and financial crises.
Another vehement criticism of liberalism is its rootedness in scientific temperament. Foucault famously argued that scientific language was actually used to hide various power structures. This argument is now employed by postmodern critiques of liberalism. Fukuyama does not claim that identity politics is wrong, but contends that it needs to be grounded in universal human equality. However, leftists and rightists alike have failed to develop a feasible model to handle such contested issues, while they have succeeded in discrediting those who wish to take liberalism forward, blocking minds rather than opening new vistas.
As liberal theory subscribes to the idea of universalism, it does not take into consideration how national boundaries ought to be drawn (p. 129). Historically, liberal societies have initiated economic growth and have also vibrantly produced arts and culture. However, a matter of concern for future societies is whether liberal societies can overcome the internal divisions that they have nurtured by being liberal. Fukuyama seeks a course correction, which is necessary as liberal societies have to react to emerging authoritarian powers.
Fukuyama also advocates that if liberalism has to be preserved, the sources of discontent need to be understood. His suggestions revolve around the USA, though he admits that American institutions have decayed over time. A modern state needs to be impersonal as it has to deal with various issues, social security measures have to be implemented at a sustainable level, the idea of federalism needs to be taken more seriously, and freedom of speech has to be strongly practised with proper understanding of its limits. On the individual front, Fukuyama emphasises the need to respect individual privacy and the importance of individual rights over cultural groups and individual autonomy as basic rights (p. 150). Finally, Fukuyama urges moderation and the practice of self-restraint, both at individual and communal levels.
The ideas propounded by Fukuyama are not easy to practise, as more and more democracies are going down the authoritarian way. The solutions that he offers in the closing chapter are impractical from a South Asian perspective, and also in a world that is becoming ever-more divisive, with shrinking state interventions leading to more intolerable scenarios. The book is a sophisticated commentary on the ideas of classical liberalism and the discontents it faces from critics on the right and the left. But it fails to suggest practical ways especially regarding how the laissez faire economic model can be reversed.