Abstract
This research focused on reactions to and evaluations of lies in public and interpersonal contexts. It was shown that people in general are not radical social constructionists; they endorsed the existence of false statements and claimed that lies were told more by some authorities and people than others. Some lies by authorities evoked reactions of amusement, and acceptability or indifference by up to half of the respondents, but most were judged as wrong, and seriously so, especially when the consequences for victims were dire. For lies in interpersonal contexts, where the respondent could be judging others or self in the role of liar, it was found that perceived wrongness was both weaker and more differentiated across situations forjudgments of self. For neither public nor interpersonal lies was there a single general factor underlying the interitem correlations. Across the domains, judged wrongness of lies by the media and politicians was unrelated to corresponding judgments in interpersonal contexts, but those associated with legal contexts correlated significantly with each of the four interpersonal factors, especially those concerned with lies about illegal acts. Questions were posed about the ways in which such judgments are embedded in daily life, and possible similarities and differences between public and interpersonal contexts were identified.
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