A theory of human needs

Culyer A.J. , Lavers, R.J. and Williams A. 'Health indicators', in Shonfield A. and Shaw S. (eds.), Social Indicators and Social Policy, London, 1972, p.114

Armstrong, P. 'The myth of meeting needs in adult education and community development', Critical Social Policy, Vol.2, No.2, 1982 , p.29

Fitzgerald, R. 'The ambiguity and rhetoric of "need"', in Fitzgerald R. (ed), Human Needs and Politics, Sydney, 1977 p.209

Smith, G. Social Need: Policy, Practice and Research. London, 1980

Nevitt, D. 'Demand and need', in Heisler, H. (ed), Foundations of Social Administration, London , 1977

Armstrong, op. cit. p.26

Flew, A.G.N. 'Wants or needs, choices or commands', in Fitzgerald, R. (ed), op. cit.

Taylor-Gooby, P. and Dale, J. Social Theory and Social Welfare London, 1981, p.23; however see Chapter 8 for another interpretation closer to our own, for example p.223

Bradshaw, J. 'The concept of social need', New Society, 30 March, 1972

For an elaboration and critical discussion of Bradshaw's work which ultimately suffers from the same fault see: Clayton, S. 'Social need revisited', Journal of social Policy, 12, 2, 1983.

For example, see his: 'The needs of the elderly and the planning of hospitals' in Canvin, R. and Pearson, N. (eds), Needs of theElderly forHealth and Welfare Services, Exeter, 1972, p.48; 'Everyone his own home' in Townsend, P. Sociology and Social Policy Harmondsworth, 1976 , p.89

Townsend, P. Poverty in the United Kingdom, Harmondsworth, 1979, Chapter 6

For example, see Piachaud, D. 'Peter Townsend and the Holy Grail', New Society, 10 September, 1981

Townsend, P. An Alternative Concept of Poverty, Paper prepared for the Division for the Study of Development, UNESCO, Paris , 1981, p.21

Townsend, P. in Canvin and Pearson (eds), op cit. p.48

Soper, K. On Human Needs, Sussex, 1981, Chapters 2-7

Geras, N. Marx and Human Nature, London, 1983. Geras does not explicitly refer to Soper's book but his analysis is directly relevant to it. Note particularly his list of those writers who in one way or another question the applicability of the concept of need in Marx: pp.49-54

Marcuse, H. One Dimensional Man, London, 1964, p.6; see also Chapters 9 and 10. For a contemporary Marxist who supports Marcuse's distinction, see C. Bay , Strategies of Political Emancipation, London, 1981, p.94. Cf. P. Springborg , The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique of Civilisation, London, 1981, Chapter 9

For detailed discussion of related issues see: Rowbotham, S. , Segal, L. , Wainwright, H. Beyond the Fragments, London, 1979; Barrett, M. WomensOppression Today, London, 1980 , Chapter 1; Hartmann, H. 'The unhappy marriage of Marxism and feminism: towards a more progressive union', in Sargent, L. The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism, London, 1981

For example, this is the thrust of much of Leiss, W. The Limits of Satisfaction , London, 1978. Cf. Springborg , op. cit, Chapter 12. For an excellent summary of related issues, see: Soper, K. op. cit, chapter 9

First put forward in Maslow, A. 'A theory of human motivation', Psychological Review, London, 1943, pp.370-396

There is a close relationship between the concept of 'need' and that of 'interest' and similar debates have occurred about the latter - particularly in economic and political theory. Thus, for example, in On Liberty, Mill classically argues that each person is the best judge of her/his own interests. Yet if choice perse is taken to be the key criterion of interest, then as in the case of need, the idea becomes essentially subjectivist. For attempts to escape from the web of subjectivism which do not quite succeed, see Barry, B. 'The public interest' in Connolly, W. (ed) The Bias of Pluralism, New York, 1969;

Balbus, D. 'The concept of interest in Marxian and pluralist analysis', Politics and Society, Vol.1. 1971 , pp. 151-77; and Connolly, W. 'On "interests" in politics', Politics and Society , Vol.II, 1972, pp.459-77. For an excellent analysis of why their attempts fail, see: Wall, G. 'The concept of interest in politics', Politics and Society, Vol.5, 1975, pp.487-510. Wall also makes the point that there must be a sense in which interests are objectively determinable if the concept is to be employed for the purposes of criticising social, economic and political arrangements.

This is much the way Bay, C. defines 'needs' in his classic paper: 'Needs, wants, and political legitimacy', Canadian Journal of Political Science, September, 1968, pp.242-246. For an extension ofthis analysis, see his, op. cit., Chapter 4. Here, among other things, he explains what he thinks is wrong with Marcuse's distinction between true and false needs

For examples of different academic approaches to linking needs with human nature, see: Renshon, S. 'Human needs and political analysis: an examination of a framework', and Smith M.B. 'Metapsychology, politics, and human needs' in Fitzgerald, R. (ed) op. cit., Chapters 4 and 7. Clearly what 'human nature' might mean in this context is a complex issue. It can encompass anything from physiological pre-requisites for survival, to 'drives' thought to be totally instinctive to 'motives' considered to be more open-ended. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between humans and animals in these respects, see: Midgley, M. Beast and Man , Hassocks, 1978, Chapters 1-3

Galtung, J. 'The basic needs approach', in Lederer, K. (ed), Human Needs, Cambridge, Mass. 1980, pp.59-60

For a similar analysis in more detail, see: Plant, R. Lesser, H. and Taylor-Gooby, P. Political Philosophy and Social Welfare, London, 1980, pp.25-33

Ibid. pp.28-29

This subjectivist conclusion is extensively discussed in: Fitzgerald, R. (ed) op. cit. Cf. Plant, Lesser and Taylor-Gooby, op. cit. pp.33-36

Plant et al argue that Gallie's concept of 'essential contestability' is useful here and discuss the issue in these terms. Cf. Gallie, W. 'Essentially contested concepts', Aristotelian Society, 1955-6

Runciman, W. Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London, 1966, Chapters 8-11

See the suggestive findings of a recent MORI poll: Lansley, S. and Weir, S. 'Towards a popular view of poverty', New Society, 25 August, 1983

Galtung , op. cit. pp.58-62; Plant, Lesser and Taylor-Gooby, op. cit. pp.37-38

Debates about the relationship between the conceptual and experiential dimensions of understanding have a history as old as philosophy itself. For our purposes, what is important is the recognition that the two cannot be completely separated - the one concerning questions of definition and the other concerning questions of fact - in the way that until recently was accepted as legitimate by most Anglo-Saxon thought. Neither should both be isolated from the practical dimensions of understanding. For a rigorous discussion of why this is the case and an accompanying analysis of 'constitutive activities' which reinforces the arguments in this paper for a non-subjectivist theory of human need, see: Doyal, L. and Harris, R. 'The practical foundation of human understanding ', New Left Review, No.139, 1983, pp.59-78. Further, note that the emphasis here is on the person. In abstraction, there are many other necessary conditions for successful action which are impersonal. We shall discuss these as the paper progresses.

Kant, I. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Abbott, T. London , 1963, pp.188-9; Kant, E. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Abbott, T. London, 1963 , pp.52-59.

The literature on the distinction between action and behaviour is immense. For the early neo-Kantians, see: Bauman, Z. Hermeneutics and Social Science, London, 1978, Chapter 1. For Weber, see: Giddens, A. Studies in Social and Political Theory, London, 1977, Chapter 4. For a review of the more recent philosophical literature, see: Bernstein, R. The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, London , 1979, Part II. Cf. Doyal, L. and Harris, R. Empiricism Explanation and Rationality, forthcoming. Some of the examples employed to illustrate related points have been developed through this collaboration

Plant, Lesser and Taylor-Gooby, op. cit. chapter 3

For related discussions of freedom, see: MacCullum, G. 'Negative and positive freedom', in Laslett, P. Runciman W. and Skinner, Q. (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society, Series 4, Oxford, 1972, pp.174-93; Radcliffe Richards J. The Sceptical Feminist, London, 1980 , Chapter 3; Doyal and Harris, op. cit.

Plant et al. op. cit. make this point (pp.49-50) but do not really develop it. Presumably because of their concern for the essential contestability argument, they continue throughout their book to focus on minimal standards. For this reason the potential force of their argumentative approach is never quite achieved. Indeed, as regards such minima, at one point they even suggest: 'the level of health required in order to be able to operate may vary from individual to individual, and from society to society: it may well be the case that people in poorer societies, as a result of custom, actually need somewhat less food than people in wealthier ones, and also can keep going when in a less healthy state' (pp.49-50). Even though they then deny that this makes 'the actual concept of physical health variable' (p.50), it is never made clear why and what the consequences are for the range of debates within social policy concerning the subjectivity of specific needs.

The problem of operationalising mental health even in minimal terms might seem more problematic than that of physical health. Certainly this has been argued by, among others, Hirst, P. and Woolley, P. Social Relations and Human Attributes, London, 1982, chapters 4-5. However, there are many who disagree. For example, a 1973 WHO study, World Health Organisation, The International Pilot Study of Schizophenia, Vol.1, Geneva, 1973, suggests that there is much cross-cultural agreement about indicators of mental illness and by implication mental health. For a relevant discussion of Maslow's attempt to identify minimal psychological needs, see: Fitzgerald, R. 'Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs-an exposition and evaluation', in Fitzgerald, R. (ed), op. cit., chapter 3

Rist, G. 'Basic questions about basic human needs', in Lederer, K. Human Needs, Cambridge, Mass. 1980, pp.235-38

Plant, R. Lesser, H. and Taylor-Gooby, P. op. cit. pp.46-51. Also see Weale, A. Political Theory and Social Policy, London, 1983, Chapter 3

For examples, see: Hirst, P. and Woolley, P. op. cit. chapter 2

A speculative account of some of these educational universals can be found in: White, J. Towards a Compulsory Curriculum, London, 1973, chapters 3-4. Also see: T. McCarthy's discussion of J. Habermas' account of 'universal pragmatics', in The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, London, 1978, pp.272-82. It should now be clear that when we refer to 'teachers' or 'education' we are using the terms in their broadest sense, and not just referring to the agents or processes of formal schooling

Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigation, Oxford, 1972, p.91. For a useful summary, see: Rubinstein, D. Marx and Wittgenstein, London, 1981, chapter 9

For lots of examples, see W. Ryan's classic: Blaming the Victim , New York, 1971

On the importance of the concept of rules in bridging the gap between the individual and society, and of the dangers of taking the analogy between games and social rules too far, see: Giddens , A. Central Problems in Social Theory, London, 1979, Chapter 2. Cf. for example, Macdonald G. and Pettit, P. Semantics and Social Science, London, 1981, who state (pp.138-9): 'The patriot, the freedom fighter and the socialist are not possible in any social world deprived of appropriate conceptual resources. There is no patriot who lacks the concept of nation, tradition and independence, no freedom fighter who is without the ideas of liberty, oppression and respect, no socialist who is unfamiliar with the notions of class, exploitation and equality. And yet the concepts required for the fashioning of the corresponding beliefs and desires come to individuals only by grace of the community to which they belong.' These arguments are further explained in: Doyal, L. and Harris, R. op. cit.

We are heavily indebted in this section to Williams, R. particularly his The Long Revolution, Harmondsworth, 1965, Chapters 2-3, and Politics and Letters, London, 1979, Chapter II. 3. While we differ on some details, we feel that we are all making similar points about the social context of successful individual activity. Much the same can be said of Barrington Moore, J. Injustice, London, 1979, Chapter 1

For a demonstration that this must be so, see: Doyal, L. and Harris, R. 'The practical foundation of human understanding', op. cit.

Marx, K. Grundrisse, trans. Nicolaus, M. Harmondsworth, 1973, introduction, especially pp.88-100

O'Brien, M. The Politics of Reproduction, London, 1981, p.16

Firestone, S. The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution, London, 1971. Cf. Rose, H. and Hamner, J. 'Women's liberation, reproduction and the technological fix', in Leonard Barker, D. and Allen, S. Sexual Divisions and Society: Process and Change, London, 1976, pp.199-223

Barrett, M. op. cit. chapter 6

Willaims, R. in his book Communications, Harmondsworth, 1973, p.18, stresses their importance: 'The emphasis on communications asserts, as a matter of experience, that men and societies are not confined to relationships of power, property and production. Their relationships, in describing, learning, persuading and exchanging experiences are seen as equally fundamental.' Also see: Williams, R. The Long Revolution, Harmondsworth, 1965, chapters 2-3

Williams, R. Problems in Materialism and Culture, London, 1980,pp.31-49. For a more general discussion of Marxist theories of ideology see: Larrain, J. Marxism and Ideology, London, 1983, especially Chapter 5. For an analysis of the extent to which communicational and cultural patterns are dependent upon the practical foundations of social life, including production and reproduction, see Doyal, L. and Harris, R. op. cit. 1983.

See, for example, Giddens, A. Central Problems in Social Theory, London, 1979, p.108 and generally chapter 3. Cf. Barrington Moore , op. cit. pp.15-31

We believe that the best introduction to Hegel in this respect is: Avineri, S. Hegel 's Theory of theModern State, Cambridge, 1972, chapters 7-9. Cf. Taylor, C. Hegel , Cambridge, 1975 , chapters 14-16

This view is incompatible with Marx's and some Marxist writing. According to both, a truly communist society would have no need for concepts of 'rights', or 'justice', much less an associated legal system or method of policing to back it up. With no scarcity, private property and associated individual greed, what would be the point? For an expansion of this position and a critique which in many respects reinforces our position, see: Buchanan, A. Marx and Justice , London, 1982. Cf. Campbell, T. The Left and Rights, London, 1983

This indeed is the grain of truth in traditional functionalist analysis — whatever its other problems

For a powerful attack on this entire tradition, see: Lukes, S. Individualism, Oxford, 1973

For related arguments which focus on Parsons' classic formulation, see: Gouldner, A. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, London, 1971, pp.218-25. For a similar critique of 'structuralist' formulations, see: Giddens, A. op. cit. chapter 1

For example: Roy, R. 'Human needs and freedom: liberal, Marxist, and Gandhian perspectives', in Lederer, K. (ed), op. cit. p.202. This difficulty continues to emerge in Plant et al's. analysis although they are clearly aware of it in the way in which they formulate their overall approach. Galtung (eg pp.62-71) goes into more detail in this respect but without convincing philosophical justification. It was this, among other things, which prompted us to expand and modify their approaches

Hegel , Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox, T. Oxford, 1967, pp.86-104

Many writers would make this obvious point. For a balanced view, see: Watt, E. 'Human needs, human wants, and political consequences', Political Studies, Vol.XXX, No.4. For a devastating attack on those who would argue that Marx thought anything to the contrary, see Geras, N. op. cit. Part III

For an example of the type of argument we are attacking, see: Rist, G. 'Basic questions about basic human needs', in Lederer, K. op. cit. pp.233-53. At best, there is a tension in much of the literature on underdevelopment between the obvious applicability of some Western technology and what is believed to be the danger of cultural imperialism and/or its use for exploitative purposes. For the potential elitism that this can give rise to, see: Horton, R. 'Lévy-Bruhl, Durkheim and the scientific revolution' , in Horton, R. and Finnegan, R. (eds), Modes of Thought, London, 1973, pp.249-305. To illustrate the opposite side of the coin- how multi-national corporations can use subjectivists' arguments to their advantage—consider the following from Melrose, D. Bitter Pills , Oxford, 1982, p.80, in a discussion of drug misinformation in the Third World: 'But Glaxo did respond to an earlier query we raised about their promotion of Calci-Ostelin syrup as a general tonic in another developing country, when not only does Glaxo not do this in Britain, but the British National Formulary describes this use as having no justification. Glaxo's Senior Medical Adviser responded then by stressing that 'different countries' have very 'different concepts of medical practice'.

Soper, K. op. cit; Leiss, W. op. cit. pp.107-14

For a discussion of these two dimensions of freedom and their political background, see: Gutmann, A. Liberal Equality, Cambridge , 1980, Chapter 1. Cf. Plant, R. Lesser, H. and Taylor-Gooby, P. op. cit . pp. 175-79

Norman, R. Hegel's Phenomenology, London, 1976, chapters 5-6; Cf. Taylor, C. op. cit. chapter 15

Bernstein, R. Praxis and Action, London , 1972, Part I. Cf. Walton, P. and Gamble, A. From A lienation to Surplus Value, London, 1972, chapter 1

This is the germ of political truth in his contention that: 'The Owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk.' Hegel, op. cit. p.13

For detailed argument, see: Doyal , L. and Harris, R. op. cit. Cf. also Doyal, L. and Doyal, L. 'Western scientific medicine: a philosophical and political prognosis', in Byrke, L. and Silvertown, J. Radical Biology, London , 1984

For a useful review of related issues, see: Griffiths, D. Irvine, J. and Miles, I. 'Social statistics: towards a radical science' in Irvine, J. Miles, I. and Evans, J. Demystifying Social Statistics, London, 1979, pp.339-381.

The literature just on underdevelopment in this respect is immense. Two books which give useful summaries of the complex physical and social factors involved are: MacPherson, S. Social Policy in the Third World, Hassocks, 1982; Eckholm, E. Down to Earth , London, 1982. For questions specifically related to health, see: Doyal , L. The Political Economy of Health, London, 1979, chapters 3, 7. For those specifically related to education, see: Entwistle, H. Antonio Gramsci , London, 1979, chapter 1. Cf. Freire, P. Pedagogy of the Oppressed, London, 1972 .

Habermas' analysis of this issue is extremely complex and all that we can do here is offer a rational reconstruction which attempts to capture the spirit of what he is getting at. The best and most detailed guide through his relevant writings is: McCarthy, T. op. cit. chapter 4. For an excellent introduction to Habermas' general theories, see: Bernstein , R. The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, London, 1976, Part IV. For Habermas himself, see for example: Legitimation Crisis, trans. McCarthy, T. London, 1976, pp.102-117

Habermas, J. op. cit. pp.111-117. Cf. McCarthy, T. op. cit. pp.314-15; Geuss, R. The Idea of a Critical Theory, Cambridge, 1981, Chapter 2

Habermas summarises his position about democracy as follows: 'If under these conditions a consensus about the recommendation to accept a norm arises argumentatively, that is, on the basis of hypothetically proposed alternative justifications, then this consensus expresses the "rational will". Since all those affected have, in principle, at least the chance to participate in the practical deliberation, the "rationality" of the discursively formed will consists in the fact that the reciprocal behavioural expectations raised to formal status afford validity to a common interest ascertained without deception. The interest is common because the constraint-free consensus permits only what all can want, it is free of deception because even the interpretation of needs in which each individual must be able to recognize what he wants becomes the object of discursive will-formation. The discursively formed will may be called "rational" because the formal properties of discourse and of the deliberative situation sufficiently guarantee that a consensus can arise only through appropriately interpreted generalizable interests, by which I mean, needs that can be communicatively shared.' Habermas, J. op. cit. p.108

For example, see: Lukes, S. 'Of gods and demons: Habermas and practical reason', in Thompson, J. and Held, D. (eds), Habermas, London, 1982, chapter 7. Cf. Keat, R. The Politics of Social Theory, Oxford, 1981, pp.180-90

Habermas , op. cit. pp.111-117. Also see: McCarthy , T. op. cit. pp.310-317

For example, see: Bernstein, R. op. cit., pp.223-5. Cf. Lukes, S. ibid

After the publication of Rawls' Theory of Justice in 1972, a wide range of critical reviews of his work was published. Indeed, there was a veritable industry of them - some focusing on philosophy, others on politics and still others on specific aspects of the one or the other. For an example of the first, see: Barry, B. The Liberal Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1973. For the second, see: MacPherson, C.B. Democratic Theory, Oxford, 1973, pp.87-94; Miller, R. 'Rawls and Marxism', in Daniels, N. (ed), Reading Rawls, Oxford , 1975, pp.206-30. For the third, see the other papers in the Daniels collection. A useful summary of key points from these different perspectives is in: Plant, R. Lesser, H. and Taylor-Gooby, P. op. cit. pp.124-31. Recently, however, the importance of Rawls' views for socialist theory has been re-evaluated. This is partly due to the publication of Gutmann, A. op. cit; Tucker, D. Marxism and Individualism , Oxford, 1980; and Buchanan, A. op. cit. Our views have been particularly influenced by Gutmann

Rawls, J. Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1972, p.62 and pp.90-95. Rawls defines primary goods as follows: 'As a first step, suppose that the basic structure of society distributes certain primary goods, that is, things that every rational man is presumed to want. These goods normally have a use whatever a person's rational plan of life (p.62). He goes on to divide primary goods into two categories: 'social primary goods' such as 'rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth'; and 'natural' primary goods such as 'health and vigor' (and) 'intelligence and imagination'. Where we differ from Rawls concerns the priority which he places on social primary goods. Rights and liberties will be of little use until, in our terms, the basic needs for health and vigour have been at least marginally met. Cf. Gutmann, A. op. cit. pp.125-6. Also, see his discussion of the 'thin theory of the good', pp.395-99.

Rawls, J. op. cit. pp.17-22 and pp. 137-42. Cf. Dworkin , R. 'The original position' , in Daniels, N. op. cit. pp.16-53. For an interesting and detailed criticism of Rawls' formulation which attacks the abstract character of his conception of personhood, see: Sandel, M. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, 1982. For reasons which we have hinted at but which we cannot explore here in depth, we believe that it is possible successfully to combine a sympathetic interpretation of Rawls' approach with a richer conception of personhood which recognises its social parameters.

Rawls, J. op. cit. pp.60-65

Gutmann, A. op. cit. pp.122-40

For example, see: MacPherson, C.B. op. cit. pp.89-90; Miller, R. op. cit. pp.175-80

The most notable recent contribution to this debate is surely, Nove, A. The Economics of Feasible Socialism, London, 1983. Cf. Shalom, S. (ed), Socialist Visions, London, 1983 Section VI. See also the discussion of Nove in Anderson, P. In the Tracks of Historical Materialism, London, 1983 , Chapter 4

For a powerful argument to this effect, along with responses to Rawls' libertarian critics from the right, see: Gutmann, A. op. cit. chapter 6. Cf. Tucker, D. op. cit. pp.189-97. For a related attempt to translate Rawls' principles into a more naturalistically conceived theory of individual rights, see: Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously, London, 1981, chapter 6. Cf. Buchanan, A. op. cit. chapters 6-7. For a fascinating description of what can happen when individual rights are not taken seriously, see: Fedor, F. Heller, A. and Markus, G. Dictatorship Over Needs, Oxford, 1983. All three are political exiles from Hungary and the book is about Russia and Eastern Europe.

Gutmann, A. op. cit. pp.178-181, 197-203

Gutmann, A. op. cit. pp.191-97. Cf. Gutmann, A. 'What's the use of going to school', in Sen, A. and Williams, B. Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge, 1982, Chapter 14

For a recent careful argument of this case see Radcliffe Richards, J. The Sceptical Feminist: A Philosophical Enquiry, Harmondsworth , 1980, Chapters 4 and 8

These issues are discussed in Barrett, M. and McIntosh, M. The Anti-Social Family, London, 1982, chapter 4, especially pp.140-142, 156-158. On children's rights see Freeman, M.F.A. The Rights and Wongs of Children, London, 1983, chapters 1 and 2

Leiss, W. op. cit. Part Two

Cf. Castleman, B.I. 'The export of hazardous factories to developing nations', in Navarro, V. and Berman, D.M. (eds), Health and Work Under Capitalism: An International Perspective, Farmingdale, 1983

Cf. Ilo , conclusions of the 1976 World Employment Conference, Meeting Basic Needs: Strategies for Eradicating Mass Poverty and Unemployment, Geneva, 1977; Independent Commission on International Development Issues (the Brandt Report), North-South: a Programme for Survival , London, 1980.

Enzensberger, H. 'A critique of political ecology', in Raids and Reconstruction, London, 1976, pp.253-95. He concludes by saying: 'If ecology's hypotheses are valid, then capitalist societies have probably thrown away the chance of realising Marx's project for the reconciliation of man and nature. The productive forces which bourgeois society has unleashed have been caught up with and over-taken by the destructive powers released at the same time. The highly industralised countries of the west will not be alone in paying the price for the revolution that never happened. The fight against want is an inheritance they leave to all mankind, even in those areas where mankind survives the catastrophe. Socialism, which was once a promise of liberation, has become a question of survival. If the ecological equilibrium is broken, then the rule of freedom will be further off than ever.