Abstract
With
Introduction
This keyword article delves into how disciplinary power is enacted upon non-citizen populations within welfare states, with a focus on the multiplication of precarity resulting from ‘insecure legal status, disadvantaged labour market position, and deeply inscribed social prejudice’ (Ye and Yeoh, 2018: 478). We take up how migration status intersects specifically with class, but also with race, ethnicity, and gender, examining the consequences non-citizens targeted by welfare policies may face. By scrutinising micro-interactions and the often-overlooked micro-violence and micro-aggressions that underpin disciplinary regimes, this keyword seeks to illuminate the nuances of disciplinary power – at the corporeal, behavioural, and attitudinal levels (O'Neill, 1986) – with the aim of deepening an understanding of how state practices impact migrant communities at the level of welfare policy.
Our focus on discipline as a keyword offers a framework for understanding sanctions and criminalisation (Jessop, 2002; Kiely and Swirak, 2022); it also supports an analysis of how disciplinary power operates at the intersection of migration control and welfare governance or, rather, how intersectional discrimination and racism shape the ways in which different populations are disciplined. The provision of welfare support is increasingly conditional for all inhabitants of a given state; lower rates of support and increasingly harsh sanctions have been implemented by various welfare regimes with the aim of coercing welfare recipients into returning to the labour market (Fletcher and Wright, 2017). In the context of a segregated and racialised neoliberal welfare state (Borrelli et al., 2021), those without citizenship however face different or additional consequences and are exposed to different sanctions if they avail themselves of welfare support. Exploring the intersection of welfare and migration policy may thus help shed light on everyday situations in which marginalised groups in receipt of welfare assistance experience jarring treatment (Liegghio and Caragata, 2015). This might include demeaning interactions and threatening paperwork, both of which contribute to the non-take up of social assistance.
With this keyword, we seek to inform the (re)production of social differentiation, hierarchisation and marginalisation in contemporary migration- and welfare governance. To do so, we first theorise at a higher level of generality some of the different forms of discipline that operate within contemporary society and provide examples of these. Disciplinary power permeates many if not all aspects of life and is therefore frequently normalised. We then move on to specific questions relating to the governance and regulation of non-citizens to illustrate our understanding of the term ‘discipline’; after this we focus on the figure of the ‘poor migrant’ in relation to the reception of social assistance. In this section we introduce our understanding of micro-violence (Canning, 2014), and micro-aggressions (Natalier, 2016), and their deployment in disciplinary welfare regimes.These are embedded in social structure intending to cause harm, ‘but designed not to appear so’ (Broom et al., 2023: 51), perniciously shaping encounters between welfare offices and non-citizens. In doing so, we hope to illuminate some of the complexities of such disciplinary practices and show how they contribute to the marginalisation of non-citizens within welfare states.
Theorising discipline in the context of welfare governance and migration control
Disciplinary power is deeply embedded in contemporary processes of social differentiation and exclusion as well as in the micro-violence that stems from these processes: ‘Legal order, bureaucracy, compulsory jurisdiction over a territory and monopolization of the legitimate use of force are the essential characteristics of the modern state’ (O'Neill, 1986: 44). Classic works by Karl Marx, Max Weber and Michel Foucault trace the ‘history of various social techniques for the administration of corporeal, attitudinal and behavioural discipline’ (O'Neill, 1986: 42). Moving beyond Weber's theorisation of the legal-rational dimensions of discipline, Foucault elaborates a discursively-driven conception of the physiology of power, exploring the existing hierarchies in administration and its features. As Foucault argues (1995: 136), discipline operates by controlling and correcting the body, rendering it docile and submissive while simultaneously strengthening it. This form of power is not simply a matter of one-sided domination but rather involves multiple subjugations enacted in and through the social body; power is ramified through ‘multiple separations, individualizing distributions, an organization in depth of surveillance and control’ (Foucault, 1995: 198). Crucially, such subjugations help shape the ‘multiple aspects of individual identity’ that condition social interactions and contribute to ‘multiple forms of oppression and social hierarchy’ (Josephson, 2002: 1); there is therefore a significant affinity between Foucault's conception of discipline and theories of intersectionality.
Classically, discipline was concerned with the policing of the impoverished, unhealthy, or rebellious populations created by the new industrial economy with the aim of rendering labour docile and safeguarding the means of production, especially in areas of production where a meticulous structure was necessary to maintain tight profit margins (O'Neill, 1986). The shaping of individuals into ‘productive’ citizens allowed for the creation of such a disciplinary regime; institutions such as the army, university, or schools then provided a secondary socialisation that encouraged individuals to internalise discipline in order to become more productive workers.
This disciplinary governance of mainly poor populations remains an integral part of how societies are organised today. It contributes to the (re)production of inequalities (see ‘Introduction’) through the selective inclusion and exclusion of poor people. The governance of poverty goes hand in hand with the stigmatisation of poor people as exemplifying a deviation from what is imposed as a ‘collective norm’ (Dubois, 2021: 30). Such conceptions of normativity are ‘formed discursively’, establishing certain modes of behaviour as ‘regular’ or ‘natural’ (Krzyżanowski, 2020); the imaginary distinctions and difference-building processes that such conceptions rely on play a key role in shaping societal values.
In a welfare context, the individualisation of responsibility for conduct legitimates both the imposition of (self-)disciplinary processes and the increasing conditionality of welfare assistance; this is exemplified by the workfare logic that predominates in many welfare regimes (Schmidtz and Goodin, 1998).
Another logic that dominates contemporary welfare governance is the logic of ‘activation’ (see keyword ‘Welfare Governance’), which is grounded in notions of self-discipline (Kiely and Swirak, 2022; Schram, 2006). Here, welfare assistance is exchanged for discipline (Schram, 2006: 175) or, at least, the performance of discipline (for example, individuals adjust their behaviour to become more punctual or otherwise comply with societal norms).
Beyond welfare discipline (e.g., the reduction of support if behavioural conditions are not met, see Soss et al., 2011), we can also observe disciplinary governance in action at the level of migration policy, as when detention is used to punish those who refuse to depart ‘voluntarily’. Within asylum regimes the lives of asylum seekers are tightly structured and their mobility constrained; the system is organised to ensure that they find themselves at the disposal of authorities for potential deportation as well as reliant on the same authorities to secure their basic needs (e.g., housing and food). But it is not only asylum seekers who live under disciplinary governance; all non-citizens face such constraints in one way or another. Self-governance ‘is simultaneously one of the objectives of and instruments for the management of behavior within the disciplinary regime of neoliberalism’ (Swyngedouw, 2019: 83); it is a condition of being a ‘worthy citizen’. Non-citizens must ‘bring themselves into alignment with the political objectives of a neoliberalizing social and economic order’ (Ibid.), as interventionist states seek to modify ‘the behaviour of the poor and of migrants’ (Ibid.). Fear of deportation or other repercussions helps ensure the docility of migrant bodies and maintain an exploitable labour force (De Genova, 2002).
Recent scholarship has explored how e.g., Flemish, Swiss and Danish reception agencies seek to shape newly arrived migrants into obedient and productive citizens (Kohl, 2020; Swyngedouw, 2019). Citizenship classes and employment courses train new arrivals to be punctual and compliant jobseekers and social-welfare clients; later applications for national citizenship may hinge on the ‘integration certificates’ migrants receive upon completion of such courses (Swyngedouw, 2019). Such documents help support the system of coercion that props up ‘protective’ and neoliberal welfare regimes (Ibid.). Like the sword of Damocles, the prospect of punishment looms large over individuals who fail to fulfil certain societal expectations (e.g., labour-market participation in the context of welfare governance; see Kiely and Swirak, 2022).
Disciplinary governance of both the mobility and inactivity of non-citizens is increasingly accepted by national publics; examples include the criminalisation of migration and border crossing, which can result in detention, confinement and other kinds of sanction. According to Foucault (1995: 183), ‘the perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it
Practising discipline through the figure of the ‘poor migrant’ – micro-violence, micro-aggressions and punishment
The suspicion faced by asylum seekers (see ‘Suspicion and Surveillance’), welfare recipients (van Oorschot, 2000), and people of colour who find themselves in the ‘wrong’ (or ‘unusual’) places (Beliso-De Jesús and Pierre, 2020; Watkins-Hayes, 2009), has normalised the use of disciplinary governance as a means of upholding the social order and depoliticising the grounds on which differentiation happens; such processes serve to perpetuate social exclusion and marginalisation.
The disciplinary technologies and practices characteristic of contemporary migration and welfare regimes can severely impact the lives of migrants. Spatial confinement and exclusion (De Coulon, 2013 – e.g., detention or ankle monitors (Bhatia, 2021) – are used to keep track of migrants and deter others from attempting to migrate (Martin, 2012). Excessive paperwork is used to regulate and frustrate claims for housing, financial and integration support; this can discourage those in need from seeking assistance. Moreover, in both asylum and social-welfare contexts support levels are increasingly being reduced to a bare minimum, leaving individuals in destitution (see De Coulon, 2013 on Switzerland; and the entry on ‘Banishment’ in this volume). Similarly, in a welfare governance context, even minor infractions can result in the suspension or cancellation of support; individuals may be disciplined for their very presence, as well as for alleged misdeeds (such as migrating or claiming state support).
Victoria Canning (2014, 2020), has added to this analysis by highlighting the role of micro-violence in the disciplinary governance of marginalised groups. Micro-violence refers to everyday acts of violence experienced by individuals and communities—acts which those in power may consider minor or fail to recognise. Examples include being constantly monitored and scrutinised, being ignored and dismissed, or experiencing ‘micro-aggressions’ such as racist or sexist remarks. Such micro-violence contributes to the normalisation of disciplinary regimes by reinforcing dominant power relations as well as victims’ sense of powerlessness. Micro-aggressions, which aggravate this climate of violence, have been defined as ‘verbal and nonverbal, relational exchanges that send denigrating messages to persons of marginalized and discriminated against social groups’ (Liegghio and Caragata, 2015: 7). The next section aims to illuminate a continuum that runs from direct to more subtle disciplinary mechanisms; by scrutinising the construction of the figure of the ‘poor migrant’, we seek to foster an understanding of welfare and migration regimes as tightly imbricated fields.
A Swiss example: deportability and employability along the spectrum of disciplinary power
At a Swiss cantonal migration authority (where Luca Pfirter conducted fieldwork) Lukas, a caseworker, explains how his agency responds to non-citizen who claim social assistance. Social services are obliged to report any such claims to the appropriate migration authority; Lukas will therefore be told how much an individual is receiving in welfare benefits; he may also be sent a more detailed assessment of their readiness for labour-market participation. Lukas will then consider whether the individual should be subject to the withdrawal of their residence permit and possible deportation. When asked to what extent social services reports influence his decision, he answers at length: ‘Social services are only a support agency. Individuals are responsible for their own integration. We encourage them to cooperate with social services [and] point them in the right direction: [towards] integration… Social assistance should never be something someone receives for a long period of time. If people need long-term support, disability insurance should take over. There is no reason why someone should receive social assistance indefinitely. […] We simply clarify our expectations and outline the sanctions that can be applied. And then we incentivise individual [by] issu[ing] threats and warnings until they do the right thing.’ (fieldnote, Cantonal Migration Office, 2021)
According to the Swiss Foreign Nationals and Integration Act (FNIA, 2019), non-citizens accessing social assistance are carefully monitored, both through the partly automated reporting mechanisms implemented by social services (and other entities, see Borrelli et al., 2021) and through the migration authority's own internal assessments. Welfare recipients are informed about the potential withdrawal or non-prolongation of their residence permit (both temporary and permanent) either by social services or via the warning notices mentioned by Lukas. In consequence they might refrain from asking for social assistance. In an example of self-discipline at work, some ongoing welfare recipients try to pay back small amounts of money as a sign of ‘good will’ (Borrelli et al., 2021).
As reflected in the FNIA (2019), which considers labour-market participation a relevant indicator to measure successful integration, welfare dependency is equated with failing these demands. Prior to 2019 changes to the FNIA, ‘willingness’ to participate was deemed an indicator of integration; we are therefore witnessing a narrowing of the criteria for what constitutes integration. Language skills and compliant behaviour (e.g., regular and punctual attendance at integration programmes or efforts to reduce household costs) are also increasingly perceived as markers of belonging (see also Gschwind et al., 2021 on the case of Germany). As a number of scholars have argued, such logic individualises the blame for ‘failed’ integration, and helps produce the racialised, gendered and – importantly – classed non-belonging of non-citizens, not least by blinding out post-colonial and neoliberal social relations (Korteweg, 2017; Rytter, 2018).
Both social services and migration authorities describe the Swiss welfare system in terms of a ‘safety net’, but this claim is undermined by the exclusionary logic of a migration policy that differentiates access along lines of nationality. When people without Swiss nationality assert their right to social assistance on the basis that they would otherwise be forced to live in poverty, they become liable for deportation (Pfirter, 2019).
Whether a non-citizen is in receipt of social assistance has therefore become a decisive factor in evaluating the success of that individual's ‘integration’ and determining whether or not they deserve to remain in Switzerland (Borrelli et al., 2021; Kneer and Schindler, 2019; Rudin, 2021). This is only one example of the many ways in which disciplinary regimes link different fields of bureaucratic knowledge and practice, also underlining changing conceptions of the welfare state (Dubois, 2019; Walters, 2000). In Switzerland, the introduction of the FNIA (2019) allowed for the erosion of certain existing rights of permanent residents. For example, it nullified the prior law that protected permanent residents who had resided in Switzerland for more than fifteen years from losing their residence permit if they accessed social assistance. The FNIA also empowers migration authorities to downgrade permanent residence permits to temporary ones, to set clearer and more restrictive integration criteria (e.g., around language-proficiency levels) and to hold individuals responsible for their family members’ perceived failure to ‘integrate’. Right after its introduction and upon the request of the Swiss parliament, the federal council commissioned several studies (BASS, 2018; Ecoplan, 2018; Federal Council, 2019) to explore how cantonal authorities coud further curb the receipt of social assistance by ‘third-country nationals’.
Hence, social assistance as a welfare instrument remains subject to constant pressure and renegotiation. ‘Integration’ has become the catchword for efforts to order social life and impose normative values by counteracting ‘deviant behaviour’ (see Espahangizi, 2019; Piñeiro, 2015). The norms to which non-citizens are expected to conform are legitimized by a range of actors who are implicated in ‘forming’ and ‘shaping’ the individual. Integration centres, employment programmes and ‘social agencies [initiated by civil society]’ are designed to help people to become self-disciplined selves who can fit into the social order as needed in an era of globalization’ (Schram, 2006: xvii). They might reproduce negative discourses, and thus contribute to the micro-violences (e.g., during meetings with their clients) experienced by non-citizens.
The ethnographic fieldnote cited above illuminates how states employ disciplinary practices to regulate and control the behaviour of migrants in a welfare-governance context. Lukas emphasises how the information he receives from social services about individuals’ access to social assistance serves as the basis for his decision-making. This demonstrates that information gathering is a key tool through which states exercise disciplinary power over migrants. Furthermore, Lukas's statement that ‘there is no reason why someone should receive social assistance indefinitely’ highlights the expectation of self-sufficiency and integration that is increasingly imposed on migrants (see also Ratzmann, 2022 on Germany); social assistance is framed as a temporary intervention rather than as a long-term support system. Lukas's use of terms such as ‘encouraging’ and ‘incentivising’ reflects the extent to which such discipline has become normalised within states, with individuals ‘encourag[ed]’ to cooperate with social services and even ‘threatened[ed] and warn[ed]’ until they do the ‘right thing’. This could be said to reinforce power dynamics that further marginalise migrants. Within migration governance, such discourses are also grounded in the inscription within state practices of racist and white supremacist ideologies (Beliso-De Jesús and Pierre, 2020; Watkins-Hayes, 2009), that help perpetuate ideas about ‘lazy’ migrants and ‘welfare spongers’. What is more, both the idea that nobody should receive social assistance indefinitely and the emphasis on individuals’ personal responsibility for integration could be seen as perpetuating classist ideas about poverty, overlooking the systemic factors that contribute to social inequality. Often, single-parent households headed by women that face poverty. Women are also at higher risk of having to submit to sexual exploitation and domestic servitude in order to avoid homelessness (Lewis et al., 2014). By a similar token, non-citizens are more likely to do work that is exploitative (Stingl, 2021) and badly paid; precarious work contracts mean that they are also likely to be the first to lose their jobs, as was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic (Islas, 2020). Single-non-citizen mothers thus face a double stigma or burden: they are expected to find a job as soon as possible, yet they have little access to childcare support; they may therefore find themselves having to undertake low-paid, precarious work in order to demonstrate their ‘willingness’ to be ‘good’ citizens (fieldnotes in social services and migration offices, see also Borrelli et al., 2021). A number of distinct characteristics therefore intersect to shape a reality that increases individuals’ vulnerability (Crenshaw, 2012; Yuval-Davis, 2015).
A white single mother with citizenship may face financial hardship and moral judgement, but her humanity is likely to be recognised, as will that of the ‘immigrant’ who assimilates into the dominant White population (Grosfoguel et al., 2015). By contrast, non-citizens who are constructed as ‘Others’ on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or legal status are likely to remain below the line that divides superiority and inferiority, facilitating further punishment (Ibid). The entanglements of intersectional oppression manifest themselves in different ways depending on when and how they come together (Ibid). By examining the nexus of migration and welfare governance, we can better understand how such intersectional discrimination entrenches the dividing line that separates citizens and non-citizens (see Kiely and Swirak, 2022; Perocco, 2022).
The disciplinary measures taken against irregularised migrants (e.g., detention and ankle monitors) often exert a clear physical effect (Bhatia, 2021). By contrast, the discipline exerted through welfare governance is rather more subtle. Poverty and dependency on social assistance can lead to the revocation, withdrawal or downgrading of (permanent) residence permits in Switzerland. The fieldnote cited above offers a clear example of how ‘the poor migrant’ is constructed and administered. As Lukas highlights, discipline intervenes along a continuum of coercion that runs from indirect pressure to become financially independent all the way to direct threats. As a result ‘[f]ear of detection and deportation shapes daily life for those with temporary, precarious or non-existent rights to residence, further disciplining individuals’ susceptibility to exploitation’ (Lewis et al., 2014: 9).
Discourse on disciplining poor non-citizens
The use of disciplinary mechanisms to coerce non-citizens into becoming financially independent is not unique to Switzerland (see keyword on ‘Welfare Governance’). Similar exclusionary tendencies have been observed in Belgium (Andreetta, 2019) and in Germany, where non-citizens face the expectation that they should behave like German-born welfare recipients (Gschwind et al., 2021). According to Gschwind et al. (2021), recently arrived migrants with international protection status are less likely to be disciplined by having their welfare benefits cut, with this group perceived being less responsible for their labour market position. This creates a hierarchy based on migration status and perceived deservingness (see keywords ‘Solidarity and Deservingess’).
During the pandemic poor households and deprived city districts were exposed to higher infection rates due to residents’ inability to socially distance. In the United States, Black and Latinx communities faced the prospect of being violently arrested for breaking Covid-19 regulations, in stark contrast to the ‘free mask distribution [available] to mostly white [communities]’ (Rouse, 2021). Here again layers of oppression intersect to undermine the perceived belonging of racialised, classed and gendered non-citizens (see Grosfoguel et al., 2015). A close look at the figure of the ‘poor migrant’ thus underscores the analytic utility of concepts such as discipline, illuminating how punishment, sanctions, micro-aggressions and violence are normalised at the nexus of welfare governance and migration control. Disciplinary power is upheld through the interaction of micro-violence and systemic socio-political and legal inequalities. The terms deployed across these interlinked contexts reveal the link between citizenship (or the lack thereof) and poverty, confirming the intersectional dimensions of disciplinary power: ‘classed dimensions and hierarchies are deeply rooted in the construction of citizenship, and it is clear that the economic elite is constructed as more desirable’ (Kristol and Dahinden, 2019: 49). Rules and norms are hence enacted with the specific aim of disciplining the bodies and behaviour of individuals who fail to contribute economically or do not conform to stereotypes of ‘good’ behaviour. Such migrants are viewed as having failed to integrate in accordance with dominant neoliberal conceptions and norms of labour exploitability (Wacquant, 2009).
Disciplinary power is endemic across state bureaucracies (see Shachar and Mahmood, 2021). However, punitive policies towards migrants can have broader (un)intended consequences, beyond groups such as ‘poor migrants’ and thus not actively targeted by a given measure (Bloch et al., 2014 on the UK). Linking receipt of social assistance to deportability (see keyword on ‘Banishment’) causes people to refrain from accessing their social rights (see Butz and Gaynor, 2022 on transgender women of color) and exemplifies the everyday micro-violence that upholds systemic inequalities (see keyword ‘Suspicion and Surveillance’). As we argue, it may also have negative consequences for citizens. Migration policy is often an experimental field in which cost-reduction measures are piloted before being expanded—as has been the case in the context of welfare assistance.
Conclusion
Disciplinary power is exercised in order to reinforce a perceived natural order, to ‘fix’ individuals perceived as deficient and to exclude others who are deemed unwanted (see keyword on ‘Suspicion and Surveillance’). Above we have highlighted several ways of disciplining poor migrants that have been normalised at the intersection of welfare and migration policy. We have argued that such policy intertwinement can be understood as an enacted practice of suspicion and the outcome of surveillance. Also, we have stated that intersectional discrimination and racism are embedded in disciplinary mechanisms, serving as they do as forms of differentiation.
The disciplinary mechanisms discussed briefly here have two goals. First, to deter poor non-citizens from accessing welfare assistance and to ‘fix’ the character and behaviour of individuals arriving from the ‘outside’ by aligning them with what is assumed to be the ‘correct’ behaviour of citizens. Second, this focus on the ‘Other’ is particularly concerted in a welfare-assistance context; it is part of a concerted strategy to undermine the eligibility of potential welfare recipients (Kiely and Swirak, 2022: 21), and particularly the eligibility of the ‘poor migrant’ (Ibid.: 56–89).
This brief entry has highlighted how disciplinary power acts upon the poor along a continuum that runs from the invisible to the visible, from indirect and direct. As the Swiss case shows, migrants seeking access to welfare assistance can be directly disciplined through the threat of deportation. Non-citizens receive warnings and threats in the form of letters and questionnaires from migration authorities; this can be characterised as a form of micro-violence, exerting pressure and evoking stress. Such communications serve to demean poor migrants by framing their behaviour in terms of an individual failure to integrate in the ‘normal’ manner. Non-citizens understand the potential consequences of failing to comply and amend their behaviour accordingly; some may even opt not to take up social assistance despite being entitled to do so. Here social services function as intermediate disciplinary actor, indirectly and more subtly confronting non-citizens with the consequences of social assistance dependency. Discipline and normalisation thus exist in a circular relationship. The dominant norms and values that structure society (such as the link between economic productivity, a stable and sufficient income and ‘good behaviour’) facilitate the implementation of certain disciplinary mechanisms; in turn, the exercise of disciplinary power serves to legitimise and normalise practices that negatively impact ‘poor migrants’.
We have shed light on the role of discipline in (re)drawing social boundaries along racialised, gendered and
Finally, disciplinary regimes are predicated on the threat of punishment; individuals are compelled to maintain self-discipline because they can never be sure when they themselves will become the object of disciplinary power. Such self-disciplinary regimes are designed to ensure that migrants do not access welfare benefits unless they are absolutely destitute (Nordling and Persdotter, 2021). Disciplinary measures are therefore efficient, productive, and subtle, and form part of an increasingly automated regime of homogenisation and normalisation (in our case, individualisation through bureaucratic assessments and homogenisation through the subjection to routinised procedures).
The disciplinary regimes we have described have been buttressed by the advance of new technologies, which enable increased surveillance and information exchange (see ‘Suspicion and Surveillance’); contemporary reporting systems allow an otherwise multi-faceted and often incoherent state not only to ascertain the legal status of any registered individual at any time but also to establish whether they are entitled to receive any form of welfare assistance (Borrelli et al., 2021). The automatisation of information technologies has facilitated normative disciplinary processes by placing more control in the hands of states; it has also rationalised such processes as technologised practices in a manner that may obscure the violence of such decision-making.
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by the nccr – on the move funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation grant 51NF40-182897.
Author biographies