Transcending all barriers between economics and politics, this interdisciplinary approach has successfully carved out a niche for itself. In the present study we take the reader on a guided tour into the territory of the Public Choice School. One crucial distinction of this survey article is that the emphasis is on establishing links with the past for each of the major strands along which Public Choice theory has developed. However, it is by no means our endeavour to show that the New Political Economy is simply ‘old wine’ in ‘new bottles’. Much to the contrary, it is our contention that tracing the origins of the various strands of New Political Economy would help us trace the development and progress of the subject as it has evolved. Going back to the historical origins is sure to provide us with insights which, we believe, would contribute significantly in its future development. Although there is no denying that as regards certain specific arguments, differences of opinion are sure to arise but if we move away from the specifics to the general, there can be absolutely no two opinions about the fact that Public Choice theory has much that is commendable and in our opinion does provide an ideal framework for analysing government operations.
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