This is an article on the methodology of economic thought. The critical assessment of the neoclassical research programme contained here basically comes from the contributions of J.M. Buchanan, Nobel prize winner in Economics 1986. These comments are aimed at pointing out the role that the static maximization approach plays in neoclassical analyses since L. Robbins and P. Samuelson’s influential contributions came about after World War II. Just to complement this basic purpose, I present in section 4 the alternative methodological foundations J.M. Buchanan proposes and uses to replace the static maximization approach when building public choice analyses and I sketch in section 5 several personal comments about some explanatory and prescriptive limitations both neoclassical and public choice analyses share. Except in rare and anomalous cases, neither neoclassical nor public choice analyses contain concepts making reference to the non-voluntary or power influences some individuals might exercise over others in their economic interactions.
“In a brief treatment it is helpful to make bold charges against ideas or positions taken by leading figures. In this respect I propose to take on Lord Robbins as an adversary and to state, categorically, that his all too persuasive delineation of our subject field has served to retard, rather than to advance, scientific progress.” [Buchanan, J.M. (1964), p. 20.]
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