This paper compares the philosopher Sir Karl Raimund Popper with the Nobel prize winner of economics, James M. Buchanan. Popper is known for his ‘demarcation criterion’ an attempt to separate science from metaphysics. Buchanan is one of the founding fathers of modern political economy, called ‘Public Choice’. The central thesis of this essay is that both owe their fame to a similar trick: to turn prevailing questions upside down. Furthermore, Popper’s views on social and political decisions and on institutions are similar to the arguments of the Public Choice school.
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