The Falsifiability of the Neoclassical Maximization Hypothesis: Some Methodological Considerations

Abstract

In recent years the methodological status of the neoclassical maximisation hypothesis has been subjected to criticism from a number of different sources. These have included criticisms from the Austrian subjectivist school based on the work of Hayek and Shackle along with empirical criticisms emanating from the work of Simon and Leibenstein. These criticisms have evoked a response, and one of the most significant contributors has been the work of Lawrence Boland, particularly his 1981 contribution ‘On the Futility of Criticising the Neoclassical Maximization Hypothesis’. We will, in this paper, criticize Boland’s methodological defence of the neoclassical maximization hypothesis. Firstly, we will argue that his treatment of this hypothesis as an ‘All-and-some’ statement does not withstand critical scrutiny. Secondly, we will reject Mongin’s (1986) argument that the neo-classical maximization hypothesis as an ‘All-and-some’ statement is in fact falsifiable. Thirdly, we will argue that Boland’s defence of a metaphysical core is unconvincing view from the wider perspective of the philosophy of science.