Comparative Corporate Governance: Beyond ‘Shareholder Value’

Abstract

This paper serves as an introduction to the special issue on comparative corporate governance as well as providing a critical review of the literature on globalisation, comparative economic organisation and corporate governance systems. Despite the widespread rhetoric of global convergence and market-led institutional reform, we argue that national specificity and societal variance of institutional arrangements are still conspicuously resilient in reality and pertinent to issues of regulation, policy and business strategy. Our discussion focuses on the limitations of agency theory and its primary objective, shareholder value maximisation, on the one hand, and the determinants and consequences of institutional diversity across societies on the other. In particular, we suggest that the integration of the literature on employee participation and innovation systems into comparative institutional analysis will serve as a promising alternative to shareholder-centred theories and policy prescriptions while complementing the arguments based on legal and political origins of national systems. While the contributions to the special issue broadly share the basic tenets of our argument, they also address, in commendable rigour and depth, other issues, such as: trust and social relationships; societal and moral foundations of economic behaviour; institutional transferablity; and corporate control and power relations in society.