The current study has attempted to assess whether the Indian independent directors are, in a true sense, independent. Extant Corporate Governance literature has postulated that independent directors protect non-controlling minority shareholders, and defend their interests by lending their expertise to strategy. In practice, they seldom reject any strategy proposed by the executive directors who represent the dominant shareholders’ viewpoints. Thus, the independent directors perform advisory roles rather than supervisory roles. The study has assayed that independent directors must cease being subservient to the executive directors and has concluded that mere regulatory changes are insufficient; motivational changes must also accrue to the cause.
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