Abstract
This article highlights India’s evolving nationalist foreign policy through its views on Finland. Using Indian English-language newspapers, writings from Freedom Movement leaders and British Indian civil service reports, it explores the relationship between India and Finland from 1939 to 1945. Despite geographical and political distance, both nations shared aspirations for freedom from foreign rule during a transformative period in global politics. Indian independence efforts ranged from constitutional methods to armed and revolutionary struggles. Foreign political ideas of the Indian independence movement were generally evolving during the 1930s and 1940s. Nationalist leaders—Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhash Chandra Bose—held different positions on Finland. Indian nationalists' engagement in the anti-imperialist movement shaped their perspectives on the Soviet Union and Finland. In addition, Indian positioning towards rising military blocks in Europe had an impact on its positions on Finland. This article sheds light on an under-researched aspect of India’s independence movement—the relationship between India and Finland. Their interactions during World War II reflected broader ideological influences, including nationalism, socialism and anti-imperialism. Moreover, India’s position on Finland anticipated its future foreign policy, emphasizing non-alignment, which later became a cornerstone of the future foreign policy of independent India.
Keywords
Introduction
Before the Second World War, India and Finland had little contact with each other. India had already joined the League of Nations in 1919, and the nationalist movement gained power during the inter-war time. India’s nationalist political leaders started paying more attention to foreign policy in the 1930s, but Finland did not play any role here.
The situation changed with the outbreak of the Winter War in 1939. The Indian nationalist leaders were divided into three main groups in the conflict based on their positions towards Finland: the first group, who were anti-war and/or anti-imperialist condemned the Soviet aggression against Finland in a similar manner as they had condemned aggressions against Abyssinia, Spain, China, Czechoslovakia or Poland. The second group, ideologically close to socialist internationalism and the Soviet Union, did not condemn the Soviet aggression at all. The representatives of the third group, finding themselves between the two first groups, gradually changed their position and hesitantly adopted a more critical position towards Soviet aggression.
In 1941, Finland joined Germany in its fight against the Soviet Union. Great Britain, Dominions and British India declared war against Finland. Although this had few practical consequences in India, all contacts were broken and news was censored. However, the Indian press did report on Finland’s efforts to withdraw from the war. In 1947, India became one of the countries signing and ratifying the peace treaties with Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
After India gained its independence in 1947, the new state did not have to develop its foreign policy from zero. Under the British Raj, India already had a number of capable diplomats, institutions and political parties. 1 The most influential of them was the Indian National Congress (INC), founded in 1885.
The foreign policy of the Indian independence movement was intrinsically tied to its primary objective: resisting British colonial rule and asserting Indian sovereignty. Anti-imperialism was a cornerstone of this policy, driven by a desire to escape foreign domination and establish an independent nation. Consequently, the primary focus of researchers on the Indian pre-independence nationalist foreign policy has been the independence struggle from Great Britain. 2 Ireland gained its independence from Britain on 6 December 1921 and inspired Indian nationalists influencing the development of their future foreign policy. 3
The Soviet Union, established after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, positioned itself as a staunch opponent of imperialism, resonating with Indian nationalists, particularly leftists who viewed British rule as imperial exploitation. The Soviet Union’s support for global anti-imperialist struggles made it a natural ally for many Indian freedom fighters. The Communist International (Comintern) facilitated this support, promoting international communist solidarity and backing anti-colonial movements, including India’s. However, practical cooperation was limited by geopolitical dynamics and British suppression. Research has been conducted on the Indian pre-independence nationalist and revolutionary parties’ relations with the Soviet Union and organizations dominated by it. 4
Some research has also been conducted on the Freedom Movement’s foreign political views on fascism. Under Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership in 1936, the INC, the key representative of the independence movement, condemned fascism as an extreme form of imperialism and racism. Throughout the late 1930s, the Congress supported Abyssinia, Spain, China and Czechoslovakia against fascist aggression while criticizing the imperialist policies of England and France. 5
The relationship between the Indian independence movement and smaller European states struggling for their independence during the Second World War has been researched only superficially. The Soviet Union was emerging as a significant factor in global politics during the 1930s and was often considered an important ally for the Indian Freedom Movement in the anti-imperialist struggle. However, this view was challenged by the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and later the same year with Soviet invasions against its small peaceful neighbouring states. Indian leaders, with incomplete and propaganda-influenced knowledge of Soviet motivations, faced a dilemma. The situation became again more favourable for the Soviets in India when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. Indian perspectives on these events are not widely known.
Formation of Indian Foreign Policy
Both British–Indian official diplomacy focusing on multilateral institutions—often reinforcing British foreign policy—and the unofficial foreign policy of the Indian independence movement were developing during the inter-war period. 6 The League of Nations saw India join its ranks in 1919, but the independence movement grew critical, viewing the League as an extension of imperialistic policies. 7 As the Second World War approached, disillusionment increased and the failure of the League contributed to conflict in Europe. 8
Historians emphasize the importance the independence movement placed on organizations through which the voice of nationalist India could be heard. Indian leaders maintained close links with ‘the progressive, anti-colonial and anti-capitalist forces of the world’. 9 Mahatma Gandhi’s vision focused on non-violence and moral principles, gaining international support for India’s independence from Britain. Younger leaders, like Jawaharlal Nehru, adopted a nuanced approach, building international linkages with organizations like the League Against Imperialism. Nehru’s role became central in combining the national struggle with internationalism. Despite initial resistance within the INC, Nehru’s foreign policy gained acceptance, especially as the INC itself aligned against fascism and imperialism. 10
The foundation of India’s self-governance and constitutional reforms happened in the 1920s and revolved around Gandhi. The Simon Commission visit in 1928 excluding any Indian participants, was the point of rupture and departure. The Round Table Conferences, held between 1930 and 1932, further shaped the discourse around self-governance and constitutional reforms, such as the signing of the Gandhi–Irwin Pact and the implementation of the Government of India Act 1935. These developments were crucial in India’s journey towards self-rule. 11
From 1936 onwards, under Nehru’s leadership, the INC passionately responded to global events. Throughout the late 1930s, the organization fervently supported Abyssinia, Spain, China and Czechoslovakia against fascist aggression, while condemning the imperialist policies of England and France. In 1939, at Tripura, the INC distanced itself entirely from British foreign policy, which was seen as consistently supporting fascist powers and contributing to the destruction of democracies. 12
The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, signed on 23 August 1939 between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, shocked the nationalist leaders. It placed imperialist countries in both blocks—England and France, on the one hand, and Nazi Germany, on the other hand—on the same side as the Soviet Union, which was considered an ally in the struggle against imperialism.
At a Congress Working Committee meeting in September 1939, different opinions emerged on the issue of supporting British war efforts. The INC denounced the Axis powers. The Socialists and Bose saw the war as an imperialist one. They adopted policies denying cooperation to the British rule and found an opportunity to try to overthrow it. The Left within the INC, under the leadership of Nehru adopted a neutral policy: India neither wanted to join the war till she was free did she oppose the British war effort in India. Nehru’s stand prevailed with Gandhi’s and the Congress Right’s support, 13 though Gandhi was cautious about a full-scale confrontation with Britain in 1939–40. 14 The line of division can also partly be seen in the positions of these political fractions towards Finland.
In 1941, as Germany attacked the Soviet Union and Japan joined the war, most Indian sympathizers of the Soviet Union found it easier to support Britain when it allied with the former. Simultaneously tensions between Indian nationalists grew. Bose founded the Indian National Army, which aligned itself with Germany and Japan. Gandhi modified his stance on passive resistance when the Japanese troops approached India. The INC, under Gandhi’s leadership, initiated the Quit India Movement in 1942, which led to the imprisonment of most INC leaders. 15 Nehru, although supporting the Quit India Movement, could see opportunities in cooperation with the British Left. With the initial success of imperialist Japan in Asia, Nehru said that he would support Britain in its hour of distress by increasing necessary production and controlling strikes. He even threatened a violent response in case Japan or Bose’s army invaded India.
Finnish Views on India
In the 1930s and 1940s, direct interactions between Finland and India were sparse, but India’s ancient culture and independence struggle captivated Finnish intellectuals and artists. 16 Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore had a following in Finland even before his Nobel Prize win in 1913. 17 Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violent resistance also resonated within Finnish educated circles, influencing some political thinkers and artists.
Finnish philosopher Arvid Järnefelt notably drew parallels between Finland’s passive resistance against Russian rule (1899–1905) and India’s liberation movement. He suggested that Gandhi admired Finland’s efforts, although this remains unproven. Nonetheless, Järnefelt’s writings bolstered Finnish support for India’s non-violent resistance. 18
Diplomatically, India fell under the purview of the Finnish Legation in London. In the 1920s and 1930s, there were a few reports on India, but the Indian independence movement was rarely mentioned. Finnish newspapers frequently reported on India, often drawing from international news agencies. Publications across the political spectrum covered India’s independence struggle: some centrist and right-wing outlets highlighted the fight for freedom from foreign rule, for example, ‘India is waiting for the dawn of its freedom!’ Leftist papers emphasized social justice and anti-colonialism. 19
Finnish literature enthusiasts were aware of British imperialist narratives, yet the general sentiment towards India’s independence movement remained positive. After 1941, some Finnish newspapers covered the Indian National Army’s efforts against Britain. 20 Although there were some contacts between India and Finland already before the Second World War, these are hardly noticeable in the comments of the Indian nationalists on Finland during the Second World War. The Finnish government had no official position on India during the research period.
The Second World War and Finland: The Winter War
The Soviet Union invaded Finland on 30 November 1939 following the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The Pact included a secret protocol that defined the spheres of influence of the Soviet Union and Germany across Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. Finland fought a 105-day war with the Soviet Union known as the Winter War. 21
The Finnish Winter War was a defining moment in Indo-Finnish history. The Finnish resistance against the larger Soviet force garnered international sympathy and support. Indians, too reacted to the Winter War, predominantly with support; however, the Finnish question divided the INC, particularly the Leftist wing. The Indian Left was influenced by Soviet propaganda, claiming that ‘Firstly fascist Finland was being made the base of attack on Soviet Russia by all imperialist powers… Secondly that some Finnish territories were necessary for the effective military protection of the Soviet.’ 22
When the war began, the Finnish government turned to the League of Nations, asking for its intervention amidst the Soviet attack. According to the Finnish statesman J. K. Paasikivi, ‘the (Finnish) government did not have exaggerated hopes for the outcome of this measure… However, it may be of some help to us.’ Finland received sympathy from many member states. Paasikivi noted the representative of British India saying, ‘Not only Finland has turned to us, but the justice itself has done it’. On 14 December, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution on the ‘expulsion’ of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations and condemned of the ‘action of the USSR against the state of Finland’. 23
Some assistance came to Finland from India. The Jute Industry Congress in Calcutta, with the support of British–Indian authorities, decided to donate one million sacks to Finland for use as sandbag barricades. 24 Mrs Gripenberg, the wife of the Finnish minister in London who organized the Red Cross Collection for Finland in London, also received monetary donations from some Indian maharajas. 25
Many Indian nationalists, too, supported Finland in 1939–40. In January 1940, the great Bengali poet, Rabindranath Tagore, who was a close friend of Gandhi, wrote an article in a monthly periodical, Prabashi, defending Finland and criticizing Stalin. Tagore had previously criticized fascism, Nazism and the inactivity of the Anglo-French block when Abyssinia, Czechoslovakia and Poland had been attacked. To him, the Winter War ‘was an instance of a general situation: a power-loving giant attacking a weakling’. Tagore returned to Finland in his poem ‘Apagath’, which compared metaphorically the Indian struggle to the Finnish resistance against the Soviets. 26
Positions of Leaders of the Indian Independence Movement on Finland
Gandhi and his circle defended Finland against the Soviet Union’s actions from the point of view of non-violence. Paasikivi wrote in his diary on 12 September 1939 that ‘the signing of the [Molotov–Ribbentrop] Pact between Russia and Germany come as a final disillusionment… In India too, Gandhi supported it [the struggle against Nazism]’. 27 In June 1940, Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy criticizing Britain’s stance: ‘Britain with all her intentions could not protect Abyssinia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France’. He offered his own method of non-violence as a solution, putting all the ‘armaments out of use’. 28
Gandhi was more generally critical of the Soviet Union than the Leftist section of the INC. Gandhi did not believe that Western communism (or capitalism) was an answer to Indian problems and outrightly condemned it in several of his writings and speeches. He did not approve communist revolutionary violence and forceful expropriation: ‘But from what I know of Bolshevism, it not only does not preclude the use of force, but freely sanctions it for the expropriation of private property and maintaining the Collective State ownership of the same’. 29 He also stated: ‘Communism of the Russian type, that is communism which is imposed on a people, would be repugnant to India’. 30
It was reported in the Åbo Underrättelser in Finland that the editor
31
of the Gandhian newspaper Hindustan Times wrote an editorial titled ‘Russian banditry’ strongly defending Finland:
The world, now accustomed to acts of unprovoked aggression, finds it difficult to see the Russian attack on Finland as anything other than an act of banditry, worse than anything committed by Germany. Finland’s only crime has been its willingness to preserve its freedom and not to follow the example of other Baltic states in accepting Russian hegemony in the Baltic Sea. For this love of freedom, Finland has to pay dearly to the tyrants who seized power in Moscow in the name of the world proletariat.
32
Almost identical to this editorial in the Hindustan Times were the comments in the Calcutta-based nationalist newspaper Amrita Bazar Patrika. A journalist and a Muslim INC leader close to Gandhi, S. A. Brelvi, wrote of the Winter War in his editorial in the Chronicle of Bombay: ‘In the name of the People Finland has to go to the way of Poland! Socialism is admirable. But Socialist Imperialism—and in this instance it is of the Nazi brand—is a monstrosity no less repugnant than any other Imperialism’. 33 This statement was also quoted in part in the conservative Finnish newspaper Uusi Suomi. 34
Another nationalist journalist, Murli Manohar Prasad, wrote about Finland and the Soviet Union in his editorial of 16 December 1939 in the Searchlight. It condemned the British offer of assistance as making a business out of the supply of defence materials. It considered effective assistance to Finland a geographical impossibility and feared that the offer might serve the military offensive of Germany and the Soviet Union. It expressed that the ‘Russian attack on Finland has served the purpose of taking the mask of Russia and leaving no room for doubt that Imperialism is an essential part of much-boosted Communism’. 35
There were varying nationalist voices on Finland in India. Nehru mentioned Finland many times in his writings during the Winter War; his first comment on the Soviet invasion of Finland is documented in a 2 December 1939 letter to V. K. Krishna Menon, where he stated that ‘Russia’s invasion of Finland has come as yet another shock. It is difficult to form any opinion of the happenings in Europe on the meagre data available’.
By 3 December 1939, Nehru had formed an opinion on Finland, expressing this in an editorial in the National Herald. He simultaneously not only blamed the imperialist, colonial powers of England and France for the war but also expressed understanding regarding the Soviet decision to sign a pact with Germany. Nehru defended the Soviet aggression against Finland:
In judging Russia let us remember that she is paying back the imperialist powers in their own coin….. The fundamental policy of England, and for some time past of France, has been an anti-Soviet policy. They surrendered to Nazi Germany in the hope that Herr Hitler would turn east and break the Soviets… it is still considered a possibility that a sudden turn of events might line up the Western powers with Germany and Italy in a joint campaign against Russia…. It is not Finland that she is afraid of, but the possibility of Finland being used as a jumping-off platform for other powers to attack her… Soviet policy has been one of protecting Russia from any possible attack and of consolidating her position. That policy has been both anti-Nazi [in spite of the Pact] and anti-Britain.
36
Nehru’s editorial was referred to by Soviet and German media and came, thus, to be known in Finland. However, its authenticity was doubted, and the original text was not known in Finland.
37
Already on 22 November 1939, the conservative Finnish newspaper Uusi Suomi had warned of the possibility that Nehru could be instrumentalized by the Comintern: ‘Nehru, the recently admired leader of the Congress, even if he is from such a prominent family, he was at least in the past years more or less a full communist’. Furthermore, the newspaper wrote in the same article that
the moment might seem to be ripe for attacks against the British Empire. It is perhaps because of this that Moscow is now so eagerly piling up accusations against England, claiming that it is everywhere plotting the destruction of the Soviet Union?
38
Nehru as well as some Left-wing leaders voiced their support to Otto Wille Kuusinen and the Finnish Democratic Republic, 39 a short-lived communist puppet state in occupied Finnish territory during the Winter War. Kuusinen was nominated as its leader. 40 Nehru knew Kuusinen at least by reputation and possibly met him in Moscow in 1927. A Finnish émigré communist and the Comintern secretary, Kuusinen provided the League Against Imperialism with direction and ideological impetus. 41 In addition, Kuusinen was in charge of the Comintern’s relations with the Communist Party of India (CPI) and had an interest in Nehru too.
Nehruvian political-ethical tension with the Soviet state was evident when he wrote his editorial ‘What of Russia Now?’ in the National Herald on 19 January 1940. He stated that the Soviet Union had been a symbol of hope and peace for progressive people everywhere. Nehru saw the Russo-German Pact as ‘a too facile opportunism even at the cost of what she [the Soviet state] stood for in the eyes of the world’. Nehru argued that ‘the Soviet demands on Finland had some justification from the point of the view Russia’s future security’, but that through ‘the armed invasion of Finland… Russia lined herself with aggressor nations, and thereby was false to the tradition she had herself nourished’. Nehru extended
friendly sympathy to the socialism of Russia…. But we do not give our sympathy to the… aggressions of Russia’s Government. In the war against Finland our sympathies are for the people of Finland who have struggled to gallantly to preserve their freedom.
42
Furthermore, Nehru saw a linkage between the Finnish struggle against the Soviet Union and the Indian struggle for freedom. He reconfirmed his support of Gandhian methods and warned against the use of Soviet methods in the Indian struggle:
We must retain our integrity of mind and purpose and hold fast to means and methods, which are right and which are in conformity with our ideals and objectives. Those objectives will not be achieved through violence or the opportunism of the moment. We must adhere to non-violence and right action and evolve through this free India which we labour.
43
It is worth noting here that the initial introduction to socialism of Nehru and many other Indian nationalist leaders was through their education at Cambridge or Oxford, not through direct influence by the Soviet Union. Indian leaders had many other sources of inspiration as well; for instance, Nehru mentioned that Garibaldi inspired him in his youth. While aspects of the Soviet state provided inspiration for Indian leaders, the nationalist, anti-colonial movement in India was aligned with the Gandhian non-violent method of which Nehru was a part. Nehru was not a communist, and he was critical of state violence in the Soviet Union. 44
Nehru had a great understanding of the Soviet position, and he awaited Soviet support for the Indian anti-imperialist struggle. He wrote to Gandhi on 24 January 1940:
Much has happened and the position has grown very difficult. I have no doubt in my own mind that Russia has acted very wrongly in regards to Finland and she will suffer because of this. But… what is really happening is a consolidation of the imperialist and Fascist power to fight Russia.
45
In addition, Nehru wrote to another Gandhian nationalist, Abul Kalam Azad, on 22 February 1940 that the Russian:
invasion of Finland was a very serious error, both from the point of view of principle and expediency…. While we must criticize and disapprove of much that Russia has done… I think it would be a tragedy if Soviet Russia was crippled and weakened by a war against her, for then the only powerful opponent of imperialism would be removed.
46
Nehru’s then 22-year-old daughter Indira had strong views and reacted to her father’s editorial in the National Herald. Although Indira Nehru did not yet have any direct political power, she had a strong pro-Soviet view and tried to influence Nehru in private letters:
47
I have just been reading—in the National Herald—your article on Russia & the Finnish war… You seemed to be shocked equally by the Russo-German Pact and the war on Finland. And yet, doesn’t the responsibility of both rest heavily on these eight years of British foreign policy… the pact has not made any difference to the Soviet Union’s condemnation of Nazism and Imperialism… As to Finland, you agree that the Soviet Union’s demands were justified. Why, then, did the war come as such a shock to you?
48
Indira condemned the British decision to send fighter planes to Finland after the prior British refusal to send war material to Spanish republicans. She compared ironically Marshal Mannerheim with General Franco: ‘Franco is such a gentleman? And so, of course, is Baron Mannerheim’. She reminded Nehru that Mannerheim with the help of German forces had suppressed the uprising of Finnish Reds during the Finnish Civil War in 1918:
There was a time when the Finnish Social Democrats & Communists held a majority in the Finnish Diet. A hastily organised army by Mannerheim proved inadequate so Germany sent an army of 12,000. And with its aid the counter-revolution emerged the victor and promptly proceeded to slaughter … 15,000 Communists of whom over 4500 were women & children, ‘to maintain order’. Who says that Finland has forgotten that appalling White Terror?… all this talk of poor Finland makes me sick. Just because a country is small in size, do the crimes of its Government lessen also and does its repression & totalitarianism likewise become softer & more bearable?
49
In March 1940, Nehru’s position seems to have become more critical of the Finnish government and armed forces although he still expressed his sympathy towards the Finnish people. Nehru used some elements of Indira’s letter in his editorial in the National Herald published on 14 March 1940, a few days before the Ramgarh Session of the INC on 19–20 March where the Winter War was expected to be discussed but was finally left out of the discussions:
We have expressed our sympathy for Finland and condemned the Russian action there… Finland is just a battleground for England and France to attack Russia. Field-Marshal Mannerheim is a chip of the old Tsarist block whose consuming passion since the Soviets came into power is to destroy them… When the freedom came to the Finns in 1918 and a socialist national government was established, Baron Mannerheim destroyed it with the help of German troops… During the last twenty years, Finland has presented a spectacle for white guards and the fascist Lappo movement
50
dominating the parliament, occasionally raiding it, arresting its members, outlawing Left parties.
51
,
52
In his book Glimpses of World History, Nehru presented, in addition to his anti-imperialistic worldview, a narrative of the ‘progressive’ Soviet Union as a ‘land full of hope and energy and enthusiasm, feverishly building away and establishing the socialist order’.
53
Nehru saw that the First World War resulted in colonial powers gaining more territories in western Asia and Africa:
Russia is completely cut off from western Europe by a string of States—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Rumania … they were welcomed by the Allies, as they … would help in keeping off the Bolshevik infection! All the Baltic States are non-Bolshevik; otherwise they would of course join the Soviet Federation.
54
In his autobiography, Nehru explained the development of his position:
As the War progressed, new problems arose, or the old problems took new shape, and the old alignments seemed to change, the old standards to fade away. There were many shocks and adjustment was difficult. The Russo-German Pact, the Soviet’s invasion of Finland, the friendly approach of Russia towards Japan. Were there any principles, and standards of conduct in this world, or was it all sheer opportunism?
55
Nehru’s hesitancy or calculated position regarding Finland affected the INC. The Congress Working Committee in its Wardha meeting on 1 March 1940 omitted the paragraph in Nehru’s draft condemning Soviet action in Finland to avoid the blurring of any issues. Nehru seemed to have repeated his ambiguous view that Russia’s error in attacking Finland should not divert attention from Britain and France, who were exploiting Finland in its struggle against the Soviets. 56
V. K. Krishna Menon was the leader of the India League (a nationalist Indian association in Great Britain) and became a foreign policy adviser of Nehru for decades. He was a member of the British Labour Party but had communist sympathies. He refused to condemn the Soviet invasion of Finland, which cost him the Labour candidacy in the parliamentary constituency of Dundee. Moreover, he was also thrown out of the party. Given his links to the Communist Party of Great Britain, Menon was a conduit between British communist leaders and the INC leadership, particularly Nehru. 57 A strong position on the Soviet invasion against Finland could thus, at least narrowly, influence Indian nationalist leadership.
Subhas Chandra Bose, a radical nationalist leader, who founded the leftist Forward Block and split from the INC in 1939, had the most pro-Soviet view. Bose did not accept temporary cooperation with the British even during the war. He initially sought help from the Soviet Union but in 1941 escaped to Germany. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact inspired Bose. He considered both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as the common enemies of Britain. He hoped that they could have formed an Asian front and supported India’s armed struggle for independence. 58 Soviet diplomats in Kabul commended Bose’s position on Finland in February 1941 when Bose was in Afghanistan: ‘From the very beginning of the war between USSR and Finland, Bose criticised the anti-Soviet campaign. It should be noted that Bose was the only leader from INC who unconditionally supported the Soviet Union’. 59 Bose believed in Soviet propaganda and considered the Winter War as a fight between the Finnish government and the people of Finland. ‘The former was supported by the British and French governments and the latter by the Soviet Russia. Such being the case, why should Russia oppress the people of Finland?’ 60
J. P. Narayan, the leader of the Congress Socialist Party (CSP), a socialist faction within the INC, could not accept the Soviet invasion of Finland. Narayan became disillusioned by Stalin’s excesses in the 1930s but remained a Marxist. His CSP and the CPI were in close cooperation during this time. On 30 April 1939, the newspaper Congress Socialist published a joint May Day statement by Narayan and communist P. C. Joshi, describing the Soviet Union as ‘The Socialist Fatherland of the workers’. It continued: ‘The working class of India and whole people this day pledge their honour to defeat any imperialist-fascist war plans against the USSR’. However, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was difficult for Narayan to accept. The CSP’s differences with the CPI became bitter in 1939, when the CPI justified the Soviet invasion of Finland and recruited CSP supporters to its cause. 61
The Moscow-dominated CPI followed the Comintern in calling the war in Europe an ‘Imperialist War’. The CPI organized a general strike on 2 October 1939. During the Ramgarh session of the INC, the CPI published ‘Proletarian Path’, demanding India ‘make revolutionary use of the war crisis’. 62 In practice, the communists organized strikes, solidarity campaigns and agitations. The central government of India warned against communist agitation and sabotage of war efforts. 63 Agitations were also directed against Finland. For example, at the press workers’ conference in Bangalore, a communist made a speech ‘condemning British imperialism for its interference in the Russo-Finnish war’. 64 Nine leading communists also issued a printed leaflet titled ‘Facts about Finland’ where they attempted to explain the Soviet charges levelled against Finland. 65 The imperialist war became a people’s war when Germany attacked its former ally.
The communists in India were not a large group and split into different factions. This split is evident in their positions on Finland. The slogan ‘Every contingent, every volunteer, every inch of aid to Russia would be in the interest of the Indian nationalism’ was developed by Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar, the leader of the (Marxist-Leninist) Workers Party of India, when he inaugurated the Lucknow students’ conference in October 1941. Mazumdar encouraged the students to fraternize with the forces of national revolution and fight against the failed leadership of Gandhi who had compromised national goals by conspiring with the imperialist exploiters. At the same conference Saumyendranath Tagore, the leader of the Revolutionary Communist Party and grand-nephew of Rabindranath Tagore, stated:
the success of Russia is very much essential for the Indian independence but Russian leadership, in the recent past had blundered very much by compromising the people … with the treacherous attack on Poland and Finland, and by entering into a Pact with Germany … active help was out of question.
66
Indian radical leftist nationalist students, too, were divided regarding Finland. Some argued that ‘Soviet statesmen in doing this [the Winter War]…are pursuing a foreign policy that is firmly and unwaveringly directed towards establishment of real peace and directed against…the imperialist England, France and Germany’. The others argued that ‘Stalin did everything possible to estrange the enlightened public opinion from Russia’…invading ‘a small and helpless country like Finland has shocked even some of the most hardened Stalinists, who had hitherto hid from themselves all the previous atrocities of the Russian dictator’. 67
The Moscow Peace Treaty of 1940 and the Short-lived Peace
Finland signed the Moscow Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union on 12 March 1940, which was ratified on 21 March. The Soviet peace terms were harsh for Finland: It had to cede 9% of its territory, and consequently, 12% of the population had to leave their homes. Finland had to rent out a naval base to the Soviet navy for thirty years. The economic consequences, too, were heavy. Militarily, Finland’s position was weakened. The reactions from Indian nationalists to the peace negotiations and treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union left the INC divided.
The National Herald wrote on 18 February 1940:
Unfortunate as the Russian attack on Finland is, it must not be forgotten that Russia today is a great Socialist Republic and an attack directed against her can only be construed generally speaking as an attack against the ideology on which she stands. The war should be cease…. Being the stronger party it would be an act both statesmanship and generosity if Stalin took the initiative himself and proposed reasonable terms to the Finns—a people that have more than vindicated the justice of their claim for independence.
Indira Nehru, on the other hand, defended on 12 March 1940 the Soviet terms for peace, using the Baltic States as a positive example for Finland. The Baltic States had been forced in 1939, before the Soviet occupation in 1940, to conclude treaties with the USSR establishing military bases in the Baltic countries. 68
On 18 March 1940, Nehru was of the opinion that ‘The Finnish war may end soon, as it appears likely, or may not. Left to the Finns, it would undoubtedly end soon… Finland is just a battleground for England and France’. 69
The London correspondent of the National Herald wondered in an article published on 30 March 1940 about the ‘Russo-Finnish Peace’ and whether or not a world war could be averted. The newspaper was of the opinion that if the British had joined the war against the Soviet Union with the Finnish, that would certainly have caused a world war. It regarded the peace negotiations in Moscow in a positive light, as they seemed to postpone the possibility of a world war and revealed the shortcomings of the diplomacy of the imperialist Allied countries:
At the end of it Finland may be independent or she may not be, but the world would be a different place… For whatever will be the situation tomorrow, there is little doubt that the Allied diplomacy has been a failure… I think masses of people in every country share the relief of the Russian and Finn people. Politically, Finland, if the present position is not worsened, will more easily be developed into a country and be less of a road, a road for western imperialisms and a real or imagined menace to the Russians.
The editor of the Bombay Chronicle, S. A. Brelvi, on the other hand, defended Finland and small states in general. In an anti-imperialist spirit, he saw similarities in Finland’s and Abyssinia’s situations and condemned imperial aggressors. According to Brelvi, harsh peace conditions could be the end of Finnish independence. The Amrita Bazar Patrika could not characterize the peace pact as ‘honourable’ and remarked that ‘Finland retains only the shell and not the substance of independence’. The Yugantar believed that ‘the influence of Germany over the Baltic State has decreased quite as much as the influence of Russia has increased’. The Forward Block saw the treaty as ‘not only protecting the independence of Finland but also guaranteeing the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries’. 70
After the peace treaty was ratified, Soviet views, too, were presented in India. Indians could read Molotov’s views in the Indian Express on 30 March 1940. Molotov stressed the continued friendship between the Soviet Union and Germany. He claimed that Finland received imperialist aid from England and France and was critical of any defence alliance between the Nordic countries. India was encouraged to maintain neutrality. 71
Interestingly, Finland was also used as an argument in the internal debate of the Indian independence movement after the Winter War. The second-in-command of the All India Forward Block, Sardar Sardur Singh Kavishar wrote that the Soviet war against Finland and the occupation of many European countries demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the INC’s policy of non-cooperation with the British government. He encouraged the formation of an Indian national army. 72
The Continuation War
Finland rejoined the war against the Soviet Union on 25 June 1941, this time fighting on the side of Germany. This war is called in Finland the Continuation War as it is seen as an extension of the Winter War. Finnish leaders justified the alliance with Germany as self-defence. Regaining territory lost during the Winter War is considered the most common reason for Finland to rejoin the war. Despite cooperation with Germany, Finland never signed the Tripartite Pact; instead, it signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was noticed in India. 73
In September 1941, the views of the Finnish government were published in the Indian press. The Finnish Minister of Trade and Industry, Väinö Tanner, stated that Finland was led into war by force and that the Finns were comrades in arms with Nazis only by accident. ‘We shall not continue the war longer than our interests demand. It is for us an entirely defensive war’. 74
In December 1941, Great Britain and its dominions declared war against Finland. These were political declarations without any intention of fighting. As India was a British colony, the Governor-General of India published a declaration on 7 December 1941 stating that India was now at war with Finland. This was taken note of by some Finnish newspapers. 75 The Bombay Chronicle, without mentioning India, commented that Great Britain was technically at war with Finland. 76 For Indians, there were very few direct consequences of the British war declaration against Finland. However, shipping and trade between India and Finland ceased, news from Finland was censured, and already in August 1941, telegrams to and from Finland were suspended. 77
Finland became less topical in international politics after the Winter War. At the same time, the launch of the Quit India Movement in 1942, encouraging strikes and boycotts to end the British rule, led to the imprisonment of many INC leaders. Consequently, Indian nationalist politicians did not have an avenue or means to express their views on Finland. Indian newspaper readers could read articles from British, American and sometimes from Soviet news agencies; Finland was seen to fall under the influence and control of Germany—a puppet state like Romania and Hungary—and news from the region was highly censored. 78
An article in the Indian Express of 22 September 1941 exemplifies the new critical tone regarding Finland. It claimed that ‘the very first German air attacks against the Soviet Union were made from Finnish territory’ as stated by the Vice-Chief of the Soviet Information Bureau, Lozovsky. He also stated that ‘Now Britain and USA must realise how right the Soviet Union was, when in good time (1939), it raised the question of safeguarding its frontiers with Finland’. Lozovsky insisted that ‘the Soviet Union had no wish to destroy Finnish independence but Hitler and the Finnish government had already done so’. 79
The Finnish–Soviet front was not followed actively in the Indian media but in January 1943:
The favourable turn on the tide of the war for the Allies [was] the theme of articles in all newspapers… the consequence raising of the siege of Leningrad… the series of successes of the Red Army in Stalingrad and the other theatres of war especially in the Caucasus have been welcomed by enthusiasm. The future war against Finland and the prospects of the Allies’ invasion perhaps somewhere in the North-west of Europe [were] particularly emphasized.
80
In 1943, Indian newspapers followed the process of Finland trying to leave the war. Some sympathies from the Winter War remained for Finland. The special correspondent of the Indian Express in London analysed on 21 July 1943 that ‘Russia’s official statements and propaganda makes plain Soviet plans for post-war Europe’. Indian nationalist media could not avoid repeating some elements of Russian propaganda. The Indian Express stated the same sentiment expressed by Stalin to Churchill and Roosevelt in November 1943 in Tehran and later in 1945 in Yalta—that the Soviet Union does not insist on communist governments in neighbourly countries but on friendly relations.
In the case of Finland:
the Russians are standing firmly by territorial concessions won from Finland in the winter war. They are equally insistent upon a friendly and neighbourly Finn Government, meaning the removal of the present Government which is regarded by Moscow autocratic and pro-Nazi. There has been no recent signs of activity by the so-called Finnish People’s Government… for the same reason of defence and security which applies for Finland and Poland, both Hungary and Romania must be friendly and neighbourly. Czechoslovakia exemplifies what the Russians mean. The Russians are on very cordial terms with the Czech refugee government, which is liberal and democratic.
81
The Armistice Agreement between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and Finland, on the other hand, was signed in Moscow on 19 September 1944. The terms of the armistice were even harder for Finland than in 1940. The Indian press followed the peace negotiations, in an attempt to understand how fighting ceased with the Soviet Union, and how Finland started to fight against German troops in Finland in 1944. 82
After the end of the Second World War, the peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland were signed in Paris on 10 February 1947 by Sir Samuel Runganadhan, High Commissioner for India in London, on behalf of India. Runganadhan led the Indian delegation at the peace conference in Paris. The progress at the conference was reported to be slow. India sought an ‘independent line of fair compromise’. The Indian delegation stressed ‘the humanitarian aspect of each problem confronting the conference’. 83 The treaties in regard to Germany and Japan had not been shaped yet. In 1919, India had been a signatory of the peace treaty in Versailles. The signing of the peace treaties after the First World War and the Second World War strengthened the international status of India.
The interim government of India, headed by Nehru, was formed on 2 September 1946 from the newly elected Constituent Assembly and had the task of assisting the transition of British India to independent India. Nehru moved a resolution in the Central Assembly on 11 April 1947 recommending the ratification of the peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The House agreed to the resolution. Nehru pointed out that India was not directly concerned with many provisions of the peace treaties. However, Nehru, following his anti-imperialist conviction, mentioned that Italy renounced all rights to its former colonies. He stated that India was concerned about the treaties because they ‘might lay the foundation of peace or war in Europe. The future of Germany might control the future of Europe’. Nehru stated that ‘by our signing these treaties we did not align any particular block. In fact, the treaties themselves are a compromise of those respective blocks’. 84
Conclusion
The main outcome of this article is that it shows how the Finnish Winter War was a defining moment in Indo-Finnish history. The invasion of Finland by the Soviet Union in 1939–40 did, although briefly, integrate the sympathies of Indian nationalist leaders with Finland. Many Indian nationalist leaders had strong views about Finland’s struggle against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Indian independence movement or its most important representative, the INC, could not reach a consensual position on Finland.
The primary concern of the leaders of the Indian independence movement during the Second World War was centred on India’s struggle for independence and the broader implications of the war for India’s future. Finland was topical but often overshadowed in India by the larger powers and larger developments during the Second World War. Indian nationalist leaders saw Finland not only through its relations to Great Britain and the Soviet Union but also through the fight against fascism and colonialism. The Indian independence movement at large denounced the Axis with the exception of Bose. Imperial Great Britain was mistrusted and initially even seen by the Indian Left as a catalyst to the rise of fascism and Nazism. On the contrary, many Indian nationalist leaders on the political spectrum admired the ‘progressive’ and ‘anti-colonial’ Soviet Union. Their positions on the emerging military blocks give us an opportunity to understand their positions on Finland.
It is clear that the Indian nationalist leaders were divided into three main groups based on their positions towards Finland in 1939–40: the first group, who were anti-war and/or anti-imperialist, condemned the Soviet aggression against Finland in a similar manner as they had condemned aggressions against Abyssinia, Spain, China, Czechoslovakia or Poland. The second group, ideologically close to the Soviet Union and largely outside the INC, did not condemn the Soviet aggression at all. The representatives of the third group, finding themselves between the two first groups, gradually changed their position and hesitantly adopted a more critical position towards Soviet aggression.
It was easier for the centre-Right and non-Left within the INC than for the Left, to condemn the Soviet invasion of Finland during the Winter War. Finland became a dilemma for some Leftist nationalist leaders. The Left-leaning leadership remained committed to the cause of freeing India from British imperialism through constitutional or revolutionary methods. Nehru and some other leaders considered the Soviets to be ‘the only powerful opponent of imperialism’ and Finland as a ‘battleground for England and France’. The idea that the Soviet Union could itself be an imperialistic power invading its neighbouring countries was difficult for Nehru to accept. Thus, a justification for this was needed and found in history, geography and particularly in the politics of imperialist England and France. The Soviet aggression was condemned with some reluctance and understanding of the Soviet position. This anticipated the future development of Indian foreign policy on the Soviet Union. The issue of Finland also played a role in the inner cohesion of the INC, which Nehru as an emerging leader must have taken into consideration. Finland also seems to have resonated in diverse correspondences of the nationalist Indian leadership in India which helped fine-tune India’s foreign policy in the years following 1947.
In December 1941, Great Britain, its dominions and British India declared war against Finland. Some sympathies remained towards Finland. Generally, Indian nationalist politicians did not express their views on Finland in 1941–44 due to other more urgent priorities, censorship and imprisonment.
The signing and ratification of the peace treaty after the Second World War with Finland and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria demonstrates how Indian leaders viewed smaller states in relation to the main actors in the Second World War. In addition, it anticipated the future development of Indian foreign policy. This was an opportunity to express India’s non-alignment, the backbone of the future Cold War foreign policy of independent India.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.